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METAPHYSIC

IN THREE BOOKS

ONTOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY

BY

HERMANN LOTZE

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE Translation of the *Metaphysic* has been executed, like that of the *Logic*, by several hands. The whole of Book I (*Ontology*) and the chapter 'Of Time' (Book II, ch. iii) were translated by the late Mr. T. H. Green, Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford; chapters i, ii, and iv, of Book II by Mr. B. Bosanquet, Fellow of University College, Oxford; chapters v-viii (inclusive) of Book II by the Rev. C. A. Whittuck, Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford; and the whole of Book III by Mr. A. C. Bradley, Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. The Index and Table of Contents were added by the Editor.

The entire translation has been revised by the Editor, who is responsible in every case for the rendering finally adopted. The Editor has to thank Mr. J. C. Wilson, of Oriel College, Oxford, for ample and ready assistance when consulted on passages involving the technical language of Mathematics or Physics; if the Author's meaning in such places has been intelligibly conveyed, this result is wholly due to Mr. Wilson's help.

In conveying his assent to the proposal of an English translation, the Author expressed a wish to work out Book III of the *Metaphysic* (the *Psychology*) more fully, but had not time to carry out his intention. For the third volume of the Author's '*System of Philosophy*,' alluded to in the Preface, no materials were found after his death sufficiently

advanced for publication, excepting a paper subsequently published in 'Nord und Süd' (June 1882), under the title 'Die Principien der Ethik.' The Author's views on the subjects reserved for the volume in question may be gathered in part from his earlier work 'Mikrokosmos,' which will soon, it may be hoped, be made accessible to English readers¹, and more fully from his lectures recently published under the titles 'Grundzüge der Aesthetik,' 'der Praktischen Philosophie,' and 'der Religionsphilosophie.'

In preparing the translation of the *Metaphysic* for the present (second) edition, no changes appeared to be necessary beyond some verbal corrections in the translation, and a few additions to the footnotes and to the Index. The second German edition shows no alterations, excepting that it does not contain the Author's Preface, which was probably thought to be of no permanent interest. This Preface is however retained in the present edition, as throwing light on the Author's unfulfilled plan of his work.

¹ The English translation of the *Microcosmus*, by Miss Hamilton and Miss Jones, was published in 1885. (Clark, Edinburgh.)

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE publication of this second volume has been delayed by a variety of hindrances, which caused a lengthened interruption of its passage through the press. In the meantime several works have appeared which I should have been glad to notice ; but it was impossible, for the above reason, to comment upon them in the appropriate parts of my book ; and I therefore reserve what I have to say about them.

I can promise nothing in respect of the third volume but that, should I have strength to finish it, it will be confined to a discussion of the main problems of Practical Philosophy, Aesthetic, and the Philosophy of Religion. I shall treat each of these separately, and without the lengthiness which was unavoidable in the present volume owing to a divergence from prevalent views.

THE AUTHOR.

GOTTINGEN : *December 23, 1878.*

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BOOK I.

ON THE CONNEXION OF THINGS.



INTRODUCTION.

I. REAL¹ is a term which we apply to things that are in opposition to those that are not; to events that happen in distinction from those that do not happen; to actually existing relations in contrast with those that do not exist. To this usage of speech I have already had occasion to appeal. I recall it now in order to give a summary indication of the object of the following enquiries. It is not the world of the thinkable, with the inexhaustible multiplicity of its inner relations—relations which are eternally valid—that here occupies us. Our considerations are expressly directed to this other region, of which the less palpable connexion with that realm of ideas, ever since the attention of Plato was first fastened upon it, has remained the constantly recurring question of Philosophy. It is a region that has been described in opposite terms. It has been called a world of appearance, of mere phenomena—and that in a depreciatory sense—by men who contrasted the

¹ ['Wirklich.' For the distinction between 'Wirklichkeit' and 'Objectivitat' see note, p. 23 below. 'Wirklichkeit' and 'Realitat' are less sharply distinguished, but the latter is perhaps applied exclusively to *things*, whereas 'Verhältnisse' (relations) are here called 'wirklich.' 'Ein reales Gesetz' ch. 3 (end) seems to be felt by the author as a contradiction in terms. See ch. 3 below and notes, and Logic, sect. 347.]

variable multiplicity of its contents with the imperturbable repose and clearness of the world of ideas. To others it presented itself as the true reality. In its unfailing movement, and in the innumerable activities pervading it, they deemed themselves to have a more valuable possession than could be found in the solemn shadow-land of unchangeable ideas. This diversity of appellation rests on a deep antithesis of conception, which will attract our notice throughout all philosophy. My only reason for mentioning it here is that the two views, while wholly different in their estimates of value, serve equally to bring to light the centre round which metaphysical enquiries, so far as their essence is concerned, will always move ; i. e. the fact of change. While predicable only by metaphor of anything that is merely object of thought, change completely dominates the whole range of reality. Its various forms—becoming and decay, action and suffering, motion and development—are, as a matter of fact and history, the constant occasions of those enquiries which, as forming a doctrine of the flux of things in opposition to the permanent being of ideas, have from antiquity been united under the name of Metaphysic.

II. It is not that which explains itself but that which perplexes us that moves to enquiry. Metaphysic would never have come into being if the course of events, in that form in which it was presented by immediate perception, had not conflicted with expectations, the fulfilment of which men deemed themselves entitled to demand from whatever was to be reckoned as truly existing or truly taking place. These expectations might be accounted for in various ways. They might be held to be innate to the intelligent spirit. If that were true of them, it would follow that, in the form of necessary assumptions as to the mode of existence and connexion of anything that can possibly be or happen, they determine our judgment upon every occurrence with which observation presents us. Or they might be taken to consist in requirements arising in the heart out of its needs,

hopes, and wishes; in which case their fulfilment by the external world, as soon as attention was recalled to it, would be no less strongly demanded. Or finally it might be held that, without carrying any intellectual necessity in their own right, they had arisen out of the *de facto* constitution of experience as confirmed habits of apprehension, suggesting that in every later perception the same features were to be met with as had been found in the earlier. The history of philosophy may convince us of the equally strong vivacity and assurance, with which these different views have asserted themselves. The tendency of the present day, however, is to deny the possession of innate cognition, to refuse to the demands of the heart every title to a share in the determination of truth, to seek in experience alone the source of that certain knowledge which we would fain acquire in regard to the connexion of things.

III. Philosophy has been too painfully taught by the course of its history how the neglect of experience avenges itself, for any fresh reminder of its indispensableness to be required. Taken by itself, however, and apart from every presupposition not furnished by itself, experience is not competent to yield the knowledge which we seek. For our wish is not merely to enumerate and describe what has happened or is happening. We also want to be able to predict what under definite circumstances will happen. But experience cannot show us the future; and cannot even help us to conjecture what it will be unless we are certain beforehand that the course of the world is bound to follow consistently, beyond the limits of previous observation, the plan of which the beginning is presented to us within those limits.

An assurance, however, of the validity of this supposition is what experience cannot afford us. Grant as much as you please that observation in its ceaseless progress had up to a certain moment only lighted on cases of conformity to the rules which we had inferred from a careful use of

earlier perceptions : still the proposition that this accumulation of confirmatory instances, which has so far gone on without any exception being met with, has increased the probability of a like confirmation in the future, is one that can only be maintained on the strength of a previous tacit admission of the assumption, that the same order which governed the past course of the world will also determine the shape to be taken by its future. This one supposition, accordingly, of there being a universal inner connexion of all reality as such which alone enables us to argue from the structure of any one section of reality to that of the rest, is the foundation of every attempt to arrive at knowledge by means of experience, and is not derivable from experience itself. Whoever casts doubt on the supposition, not only loses the prospect of being able to calculate anything future with certainty, but robs himself at the same time of the only basis on which to found the more modest hope of being able under definite circumstances to consider the occurrence of one event as more probable than that of another.

IV. There have been philosophers of sceptical tendency who have shown themselves well aware of this. Having once given up the claim to be possessors of any such innate truth as would also be the truth of things, they have also consistently disclaimed any pretension from a given reality to infer a continuation of that reality which was not given with it. Nothing in fact was left, according to them, in the way of knowledge but the processes of pure Mathematics, in which ideas are connected without any claim being made that they hold good of reality, or history and the description of what is or has been. A science of nature, which should undertake from the facts of the present to predict the necessity of a future result, they held to be impossible. It was only in practical life that those who so thought relied with as much confidence as their opponents on the trustworthiness of those physical principles, which within the

school they maintained to be quite without justification. The present professors of natural science, who by their noisy glorification of experience compel every metaphysical enquiry at the outset to this preliminary self-defence, appear to be only saved by a happy inconsistency from the necessity of a like disclaimer. With laudable modesty they question in many individual cases whether they have yet discovered the true law which governs some group of processes under investigation: but they have no doubt in the abstract as to the presence of laws which connect all parts of the world's course in such a way that, if once complete knowledge had been attained, infallible inferences might be made from one to the other. Now experience, even if it be granted that in its nature it is capable of ever proving the correctness of this assumption, certainly cannot be held to have yet done so. There still lie before us vast regions of nature, as to which, since we know nothing of any connexion of their events according to law, the assertion that they are throughout pervaded by a continuous system of law cannot rest on the evidence of experience, but must be ventured on the ground of a conviction which makes the systematic connexion of all reality a primary certainty.

V. There are various ways of trying to compromise the difficulty. Sometimes the admission is made that the science of nature is only an experiment in which we try how far we can go with the arbitrary assumption of a law regulating the course of things; that only the favourable result which experience yields to the experiment convinces us of the correctness of the assumption made. Upon this we can in fact only repeat the remark already made, and perhaps it will not be useless actually to repeat it. If a question is raised as to the nature of the connexion between two processes, of which the mutual dependence is not deducible from any previously known truth, it is usual no doubt to arrive at the required law by help of an hypothesis,

of which the proof lies in the fact that no exception can be found to its application. But in truth an hypothesis thus accredited is intrinsically after all nothing more than a formula of thought in which we have found a short expression for the common procedure which *has been* observable in all instances, hitherto noticed, of the connexion in question. The character of a law is only imparted to this expression by the further thought, which experience cannot add, but which *we* add—the thought that in the future members of this endless series of instances the same relation *will* hold good which, as a matter of experience, we have only found to hold good between the past members of the series.

It is again only by a repetition of what I have already said that I can reply to the further expansion of the view referred to. It may readily be allowed that the observation of the same connexion between two occurrences, when constantly repeated without an instance to the contrary, gives an ever increasing probability to the assumption of a law connecting them and renders their coincidence explicable only on this assumption. But on what after all does the growing power of this surmise rest? If to begin with we left it an open question whether there is any such thing as law at all in the course of things, we should no longer be entitled to wish to find an explanation for a succession of events, and in consequence to favour the assumption which makes it explicable. For every explanation is in the last resort nothing but the reduction of a mere coincidence between two facts to an inner relation of mutual dependence according to a universal law. Every need of explanation, therefore, and the right to demand it, rests on the primary certainty of conviction that nothing can in truth be or happen which has not the ground of its possibility in a connected universe of things, and the ground of its necessary realisation at a definite place and time in particular facts of this universe. If we once drop this primary conviction,

nothing any longer requires explanation and nothing admits of it; for that mutual dependence would no longer exist which the explanation consists in pointing out. Or, to employ a different expression: if we did not start from the assumption that the course of things was bound by a chain of law, then and for that reason it would not be a whit more improbable that the same processes should always occur in a uniform, and yet perfectly accidental, connexion; than that there should be the wildest variety of the most manifold combinations. And just because of this the mere fact of a constantly repeated coincidence would be no proof of the presence of a universal law, by the help of which a further forecast might become possible as to the yet unobserved cases that lie in the future. It is not till the connexion of manifold facts according to law is established as a universal principle that any standard can exist for distinguishing a possible from an impossible, a probability from an improbability. Not till then can the one case which has been observed to occur, to the exclusion of the multitude of equally possible cases, warrant us in assuming the persistency of a special relation, which in accordance with the universal reign of law yields this one result and excludes other results that are in themselves equally possible.

All experience accordingly, so far as it believes itself to discover a relation of mutual dependence between things according to law, is in this only confirming the supposition, previously admitted as correct, of there being such a relation. If the supposition is still left in doubt, experience can never prove it. And the actual procedure of physical enquiry is in complete harmony with this state of the case. Even where the processes observed seem to contradict every thought of a uniting law, the investigator never takes himself to have found in these experiences a disproof of the supposition stated, such as would render further effort useless. He merely laments that a confirmation of it is

not forthcoming, but never despairs of arriving at such a confirmation by further research.

VI. If then we enquire not so much into ostensible principles, which are generally drawn up for contentious purposes, as into those which without being put into words are continually affirmed by practice, we may take the prevalent spirit of the natural sciences to be represented by the confession that the certainty of there being a relation of mutual dependence between things according to law is independent of experience. Nay, it is common in these sciences to take that relation for granted in the particular form of a relation according to universal law with an exclusiveness which philosophy cannot accept off-hand. But in this admission that there are laws the investigator of nature still believes that all he has done has been to admit a general point of view. The question what the laws of reality are, which in fact includes every object of further enquiry, he reserves as one that is to be dealt with exclusively by the elaboration of experience. He denies the necessity or possibility of any metaphysical enquiry which in this region might aspire to add anything to the results that experience may give. Against such claims the only adequate defence of Metaphysic would consist in the complete execution of its aims; for it would only be in detail that it could be made intelligible how the manipulation, which experience must undergo in order to yield any result, is impossible, unless by the aid of various definite intermediary ideas, which contain much that does not arise out of the mere general idea of conformity to law, as such, and of which, on the other hand, the certainty cannot in turn be founded on empirical evidence.

For the present this brief hint on the subject may be taken to suffice—the more so as it is to be immediately followed by a comprehensive concession to our opponents. In our view Metaphysic ought not to repeat the attempt, which by its inevitable failure has brought the science into

disrepute. It is not its business to undertake a demonstration of the special laws which the course of things in its various directions actually follows. On the contrary, while confining itself to an enquiry into the universal conditions, which everything that is to be counted as existing or happening at all must, according to it, be expected to fulfil, it must allow that what does in reality exist or happen is a thing which it cannot know of itself but can only come to know by experience. But it is only from this final knowledge of fact that those determinate laws of procedure could be derived, by which this particular reality satisfies those most general requirements which hold good for every conceivable reality. Metaphysic accordingly will only be able to unfold certain ideal forms (if that expression may be allowed), to which the relations between the elements of everything real must conform. It can supply none of those definite proportions, constant or variable, by the assignment of which it might give to those forms the special mathematical construction necessary to their applicability to a real world that is throughout determined in respect of quality, magnitude, number, and sequence. All this Metaphysic leaves to experience. It will still, however, continue to demand that the results at which experience arrives should admit of being so interpreted as to fit these ideal forms and to be intelligible as cases of their application; and to treat as fictions or as unexplained facts those which remain in contradiction with them.

VII. There would be nothing then to forbid us from identifying Metaphysic with the final elaboration of the facts with which the sciences of experiment and observation make it acquainted—but an elaboration distinguished from such sciences by the pursuit of other aims than those towards which they are directed with such laudable and unremitting energy. Natural science, while employing the conceptions of certain elements and forces most effectually for the acquisition of knowledge, foregoes the attempt to

penetrate to the proper nature of those elements and forces. In a few cases important discoveries, leading to rapid progress in further insight, have been made by application of the calculus to certain assumed processes, at any possible construction of which science itself has been unable to arrive. We therefore do no injustice to science in taking its object to consist in a practical command over phenomena; in other words, the capability, however acquired, of inferring from given conditions of the present to that which either will follow them, or must have preceded them, or must take place contemporaneously with them in parts of the universe inaccessible to observation. That for the acquisition of such command, merely supposing a mutual dependence of phenomena according to some law or other, the careful comparison of phenomena should to a great extent suffice, without any acquaintance with the true nature of what underlies them, is a state of things intelligible in itself and of which the history of science gives ample evidence. That the same process should always suffice for the purpose is not so easy to believe. On the contrary, it seems likely that after reaching a certain limit in the extent and depth of its enquiries, natural science will feel the need, in order to the possibility of further progress, of reverting to the task of defining exhaustively those centres of relation, to which it had previously been able to attach its calculations while leaving their nature undetermined. In that case it will either originate a new Metaphysic of its own or it will adopt some existing system. So far as I can judge, it is now very actively engaged in doing the former. Its efforts in that direction we observe with great interest but with mixed feelings. The enviable advantage of having acquired by many-sided investigation an original knowledge of facts, for which no appropriation of other men's knowledge can form a perfect substitute, secures a favourable judgment in advance for these experiments of naturalists: and there is the more reason that this should be so, since

the philosophical instinct, which is able to ensure their success, is not the special property of a caste, but an impulse of the human spirit which finds expression for itself with equal intensity and inventiveness among those of every scientific and practical calling. But there is a drawback even here. It arises from the involuntary limitation of the range of thought to the horizon of the accustomed occupation, to external nature, and from the unhesitating transference of methods which served the primary ends of natural science correctly enough, to the treatment of questions bearing on the ulterior relations of the facts of which mastery has been obtained, and on their less palpable dependence upon principles to which reference has been studiously avoided in the ascertainment of the facts themselves.

Of course it is not my intention to indicate here the several points at which, as it seems to me, these dangers have not been avoided. I content myself with referring on the one hand to the inconsiderate habit of not merely regarding the whole spiritual life from the same ultimate points of view as the processes of external nature, but of applying to it the same special analogies as have determined our conception of those processes; and secondly to the inclination to count any chance hypothesis of which the object is one that admits of being presented to the mind, or, failing of this, of being merely indicated in words, good enough to serve as a foundation for a wholly new and paradoxical theory of the world. I do not ignore the many valuable results that are due to this mobility of imagination. I know that man must make trial of many thoughts in order to reach the truth, and that a happy conjecture is apt to carry us further and more quickly on our way than the slow step of methodical consideration. Still there can be no advantage in making attempts of which the intrinsic impossibility and absurdity would be apparent if, instead of looking solely at the single problem of which the solution

is being undertaken, we carried our view to the entire complex of questions to which the required solution must be equally applicable. I do not therefore deny that the metaphysical enterprises of recent physical investigators, along with the great interest which they are undoubtedly calculated to excite, make pretty much the same impression on me, though with a somewhat different colouring, as was made on the votaries of exact science by the philosophy of nature current in a not very remote past.

Our business, however, is not with such individual impressions. I only gave a passing expression to them in order to throw light on the purpose of the following dissertation. The qualification of being conducted according to the method of natural science, by which it is now the fashion for every enquiry to recommend itself, is one which I purposely disclaim for my treatise. Its object is indeed among other things to contribute what it can to the solution of the difficult problem of providing a philosophical foundation for natural science; but this is not its only object. It is rather meant to respond to the interest which the thinking spirit takes, not merely in the calculations by which the sequence of phenomena on phenomena may be foretold, but in ascertaining the impalpable real basis of the possibility of all phenomena, and of the necessity of their concatenation. This interest, reaching beyond the region on which natural science spends its labour, must necessarily take its departure from other points of view than those with which natural science is familiar, nor would I disguise the fact that the ultimate points of view to which in the sequel it will lead us will not be in direct harmony with the accustomed views of natural science.

VIII There is a reproach, however, to which we lay ourselves open in thus stating the problem of Metaphysic. It is not merely that experience is vaunted as the single actual source of our ascertained knowledge. Everything which cannot be learnt from it is held to be completely

unknowable: everything which in opposition to the observable succession of phenomena we are apt to cover by that comprehensive designation, the essence of things. The efforts, therefore, to which we propose to devote ourselves will be followed with the pitying repudiation bestowed on all attempts at desirable but impracticable undertakings. Beyond the general confidence that there is such a thing as a connexion of things according to law, the human spirit, it is held, has no source of knowledge, which might serve the purpose of completing or correcting experience. It would be a mere eccentricity to refuse to admit that a confession of the inscrutability of the essence of things, *in a certain sense*, must at last be elicited from every philosophy; but what if the more exact determination of this sense, and the justification of the whole assertion of such inscrutability, should be just the problem of Metaphysic, which only promises to enquire, but does not fix beforehand the limits within which its enquiry may be successful? And it is clear that the assertion in question, if prefixed to all enquiry, is one that to a certain extent contradicts itself. So long as it speaks of an essence of things, it speaks of something and presupposes the reality of something as to the existence of which according to its own showing experience can teach nothing. As soon as it maintains the unknowability of this essence, it implies a conviction as to the position in which the thinking spirit stands to the essence, which, since it cannot be the result of experience, must be derived from a previously recognized certainty in regard to that which the nature of our thought compels us to oppose, as the essence of things, to the series of phenomena. But it is just these tacit presuppositions, which retain their power over us all the time that we are disputing our capacity for knowledge, that stand in need of that explanation, criticism, and limitation, which Metaphysic deems its proper business. Nor have we any right to take for granted that the business is a very easy one, and that it may be properly discharged by

some remarks well-accredited in general opinion, to be prefixed by way of introduction to those interpretations of experience from which alone a profitable result is looked for. When we assume nothing but conformity to law in the course of things, this expression, simple itself, seems simple in its signification : but the notions attached to it turn out to be various and far-reaching enough, as soon as it has to be employed in precisely that interpretation of experience which is opposed to Metaphysic.

I will not enlarge on the point that every physical enquiry employs the logical principles of Identity and Excluded Middle for the attainment of its results : both are reckoned as a matter of course among the methods which every investigation follows. But meanwhile it is forgotten that these principles could not be valid for the connected series of phenomena without holding good also of the completely unknown basis from which the phenomena issue. Yet many facts give sufficient occasion for the surmise that they apply to things themselves and their states in some different sense from that in which they apply to the judgments which are suggested to us in thinking about these states. We show as little scruple in availing ourselves of mathematical truths, in order to advance from deduction to deduction. It is tacitly assumed that the unknown essence of things, for one manifestation of which we borrow from experience a definite numerical value, will never out of its residuary and still unknown nature supply to the consequence which is to be looked for under some condition an incalculable coefficient, which would prevent the correspondence of our mathematical prediction with the actual course of events.

Nor is this all. Besides these presumptions which are at any rate general in their character and which are all that can be noticed at the outset, in the actual interpretation of experience there are implied many unproven judgments of a more special sort, which can only be noticed in the

sequel. For logical laws hold good primarily of nothing but the thinkable content of conceptions, mathematical laws of nothing but pure quantities. If both are to be applied to that which moves and changes, works and suffers, in space and time, they stand in constant need of fresh ideas as to the nature of the real, which as connecting links make it possible to subordinate to the terms of those laws this new region of their application. It is vain for us therefore to speak of a science founded on experience that shall be perfectly free from presuppositions. While this science thinks scorn of seeking support from Metaphysic and disclaims all knowledge of the essence of things, it is everywhere penetrated by unmethodised assumptions in regard to this very essence, and is in the habit of improvising developments, as each separate question suggests them, of those principles which it does not deem it worth while to subject to any systematic consideration.

IX. In making these remarks I have no object in view but such as may properly be served by an introduction. I wish to prepossess that natural feeling of probability, which in the last instance is the judge of all our philosophical undertakings, in favour of the project of putting together in a systematic way the propositions in regard to the nature and connexion of what is real, which, independently of experience and in answer to the questions with which experience challenges us, we believe ourselves to have no option but to maintain. I expressly disclaim, however, the desire to justify this belief, from which as a matter of fact we are none of us exempt, by an antecedent theory of cognition. I am convinced that too much labour is at present spent in this direction, with results proportionate to the groundlessness of the claims which such theories make. There is something convenient and seductive in the plan of withdrawing attention from the solution of definite questions and applying oneself to general questions in regard to cognitive capacities, of which any one *could*

avail himself who set seriously about it. In fact, however, the history of science shows that those who resolutely set themselves to mastering certain problems generally found that their cognisance of the available appliances and of the use of them grew keener in the process ; while on the other hand the pretentious occupation with theories of cognition has seldom led to any solid result. It has not itself created those methods which it entertains itself with exhibiting but not employing. On the contrary, it is the actual problems that have compelled the discovery of the methods by which they may be solved. The constant whetting of the knife is tedious, if it is not proposed to cut anything with it.

I know that such an expression of opinion is in unheard-of opposition to the tendency of our time. I could not, however, repress the conviction that there is an intrinsic unsoundness in the efforts made to found a Metaphysic on a psychological analysis of our cognition. The numerous dissertations directed to this end may be compared to the tuning of instruments before a concert, only that they are not so necessary or useful. In the one case it is known what the harmony is which it is sought to produce : in the other case the mental activities which are believed to have been discovered are compared with a canon which the discoverers profess that they have still to find out. In the last resort, however, every one allows that as to the truth of our cognition and its capability of truth no verdict can be compassed which is independent of that cognition itself. It must itself determine the limits of its competence. In order to be able to do this—in order to decide how far it may trust itself to judge of the nature of the real, it must first arrive at a clear notion of the propositions which it is properly obliged—obliged in thorough agreement with itself—to assert of this real. It is by these assumptions, which are simply necessary to Reason, that the conception of the real which is supposed to be in question is determined ; and it is only their content that can justify Reason,

when the question is raised, in forming any judgment with regard to its further relation to this its object—either that is in maintaining the unknowability of its concrete nature, or in coming to the conclusion as the only one compatible with the reconciliation of all its thoughts, that the conception of things which it generates has no independent object, or in persistently retaining a belief in such an object in some sense which reason itself determines—a belief which, because of such a nature, neither requires nor admits further proof. On the other hand it strikes me as quite unjustifiable to treat the most obscure of all questions, that of the psychological origin of knowledge and the play of conditions which co-operate in producing it, as a preliminary question to be easily dealt with, of which the issue might settle decisively the validity or invalidity collectively or severally of the utterances of reason. On the contrary the psychological history of the origin of an error only conveys a proof that it is an error on supposition that we are previously acquainted with the truth and can thus be sure that the originating condition of the error involved a necessary aberration from that truth.

Thus the doctrine which I would allege rests not on any conviction which has previously to be admitted as to the psychological roots of our knowledge, but simply on an easily recognisable fact, of which the admission is implied by the very act of disputing it. Every one, evade it as he will, must in the last instance judge of every proposition submitted to him and of every fact with which experience presents him upon grounds of which the constraining force presses itself upon him with an immediate assurance. I say, 'in the last instance,' for even when he undertakes to examine this self-evidence, his final affirmation or denial of it must always rest on the like self-evidence as belonging to his collected reasons for deciding on the matter. In regard to that which this self-supported reason must affirm, now that by the space of centuries it has, in sequence on

experience, reflected on itself, a comprehensive consciousness may be obtained or at least sought. But how all this takes place in us, and how it comes about that those fundamental truths which are necessities of our thought acquire their self-evidence—these are points on which enlightenment, if possible at all, can only be looked for in a remote future. But whenever it may come, it can only come after the first question has been answered. The process of our cognition and its relations to objects must, whether we like it or no, be subject to those judgments which our reason passes as necessities of thought upon *every* real process and on the effect of *every* element of reality upon every other. These declarations are not in the least at war with the high interest which we take in psychology as a proper region of enquiry. They only amount to a repetition of the assertion which every speculative philosophy must uphold, that while Psychology cannot be the foundation of Metaphysic, Metaphysic must be the foundation of Psychology.

X. It is time, however, for some more precise statements as to the line which it is proposed to take in the following enquiry. In referring to the supposition of a universal relation of mutual dependence between all things real as the common foundation of all scientific investigation, I at the same time indicated a doubt with reference to the exclusive form to which in the present stage of scientific culture it is the fashion to reduce this relation—the form of conformity to universal law. This form is neither the only one nor the oldest under which the human spirit has presented to itself the connexion of things. It was emphatically not as instances of a universal rule but as parts of a whole that men first conceived things: as related to each other not primarily by permanent laws but by the unchangeable purport of a plan, of which the realisation required from the several elements not always and everywhere an identical procedure, but a changeable one. In this con-

viction originated the dazzling forms of the idealistic constructions of the universe. Starting from a supreme idea, into the depths of which they claimed to have penetrated by immediate intuition, the authors of these schemes thought to deduce the manifold variety of phenomena in that order in which the phenomena were to contribute to the realisation of the supposed plan. It was not the discovery of laws that was their object, but the establishment of the several ends which the development of things had gradually to attain and of which each determined all habits of existence and behaviour within the limits of that section of the universe which it governed. The barrenness of these schemes is easily accounted for. They failed in that in which men always will fail, in the exact and exhaustive definition of that supreme thought, which they held in honour. Now any shortcoming in this outset of the theory must be a source of constantly increasing defect in its development, as it descends to particulars. If ever a happy instinct led it to results that could be accepted, it was only an aesthetic satisfaction that such guesses yielded, not any certainty that could meet doubt by proof. Yet the general conviction from which the speculations in question set out does not yield in any way, either as less certain or as less admissible, to the supposition of universal conformity to law, which in our time is deemed alone worthy of acceptance. For my part therefore—and I wish there to be no uncertainty on the point—I should reckon this theory of the universe, if it could be carried out in detail, as the completion of philosophy; and though I cannot but deem it incapable of being thus carried out, I yet do not scruple to allow to the conviction, that its fundamental thought is virtually correct, all the influence which it is still possible for it to retain on the formation of my views.

But from among the objects of the enquiry before us, this theory, at least as carrying any immediate certainty, remains excluded. For we are not to employ ourselves

upon the world of ideas itself, with its constituents arranged in an order that holds good eternally and is eternally complete, but upon the given world, in which the process of realisation of the ideas is supposed to be visible. Now it is not once for all nor in a systematic order that this real world unfolds ectypes of the ideas. In that case it would scarcely be possible to say in what respect the series of the ectypes is distinguishable from that of the archetypes. But the world of reality presents innumerable things and occurrences distributed in space and time. It is by shifting relations of these that the content of the ideas is realised in manifold instances and with degrees of completeness or incompleteness—is so realised only again to disappear. However then we may think on the obscure question of the position in which the ideas stand to the world of phenomena and of the regulation of this world by them, it is certain that as soon as their realisation becomes dependent on the changing connexion between a number of points brought into relation, there must arise a system of universal laws, in accordance with which in all like cases of recurrence a like result necessarily follows, in unlike cases an unlike result, and a certain end is attained in one case, missed in another. Accordingly, even the idealistic theory of the world, which believes reality to be governed by ends that belong to a plan, if it would render the process of realisation of these ends intelligible, necessarily generates the conception of a universal connexion of things according to law as a derived principle, though it may refuse it the dignity of an ultimate principle. It will find no difficulty in admitting further that the human spirit does not possess any immediate revelation as to an end and direction of the collective movement of the universe, in which according to its own supposition that spirit is a vanishing point. Having for its vocation, however, to work at its limited place in the service of the whole according to the same universal laws which hold good for all the several elements of the whole,

the human spirit will more easily possess an immediate consciousness of this necessity by which it like everything else is determined.

Considerations of this sort settle nothing objectively: but they suffice to justify the abstract limitation of our present problem. Metaphysic has merely to show what the universal conditions are which must be satisfied by anything of which we can say without contradicting ourselves that it is or that it happens. The question remains open whether these laws, which we hope to master, form the ultimate object which our knowledge can reach, or whether we may succeed in deducing them from a highest thought, as conditions of its realisation which this thought imposes on itself.

XI. In order to the discovery of the truths we are in search of it would be desirable to be in possession of a clue that could be relied on. The remarks we have just made at once prevent us from availing ourselves of a resource in which confidence was placed by the philosophers of a still recent period. The followers of the idealistic systems to which I last referred imagined that in their dialectic method they had security for the completeness and certainty of the formulae in which they unfolded the true content of the universe. They directed their attention but slightly to the riddles of experience. To a much greater degree they had allowed themselves to be affected by the concentrated impression of all the imperfections by which the world outrages at once our knowledge, our moral judgment, and the wishes of our hearts. In opposition to that impression there arose in their minds with great vivacity but, as was not denied, in complete obscurity the forecast of a true being, which was to be free from these shortcomings and at the same time to solve the difficult problem of rendering the presence of the shortcomings intelligible. This forecast, into which they had gathered all the needs and aspirations of the human spirit, they sought by the application of their method to

unfold into its complete content. In their own language they sought to raise that into conception¹ which at the outset had been apprehended only in the incomplete form of imagination².

I do not propose to revert to the criticism of this method, on the logical peculiarity of which I have enlarged elsewhere. It is enough here to remark that in accordance with the spirit of the theories in which it was turned to account, it has led only to the assignment of certain universal forms of appearance which cannot be absent in a world that is to be a complete ectype of the supreme idea. It has not led to the discovery of any principles available for the solution of questions relating to the mutual qualification of the several elements, by which in any case the realisation of those forms is completely or incompletely attained. The method might conceivably be transformed so as to serve this other end, for its essential tendency, which is to clear up obscure ideas, will give occasion everywhere for its use. But in this transformation it would lose the most potent part of that which formerly gave it its peculiar charm. Its attraction consisted in this, that it sought in a series of intuitions, which it unfolded one out of the other, to convey an immediate insight into the very inner movement which forms the life of the universe, excluding that labour of discursive thought which seeks to arrive at certainty in round-about ways and by use of the most various subsidiary methods of proof. As making such claims, the method can at bottom only be a form of that process of exhibiting already discovered truths which unfolds them in the order which after much labour of thought in other directions comes to be recognised as the proper and natural system of those truths. If however the method is to be employed at the same time as a form of *discovering* truth, the process, questionable at best, only admits of being in some measure carried out in relation to those universal and stable forms of

¹ [Begriff.]

² [Vorstellung]

events and phenomena, which we have reason for regarding as an objective development of the world's content or of its idea. In regard to the universal laws, by which the realisation of all these forms is uniformly governed, we certainly cannot assume that they constitute a system in which an indisputable principle opens out into a continuous series of developments. We cannot in this case ascribe the development to the reality¹ as objective, but only to our thoughts about the reality¹ as subjective. The Dialectic method would therefore have to submit to conversion into that simpler dialectic, or, to speak more plainly, into that mere process of consideration in which the elementary thoughts that we entertain as to the nature and interconnection of the real are compared with each other and with all the conditions which warrant a judgment as to their correctness, and in which it is sought to replace the contradictions and shortcomings that thereupon appear by better definitions. Nothing is more natural and familiar than this mode of procedure, but it is also obvious that it does not of itself determine beforehand either the point of departure for the considerations of which it consists or in detail the kind of progress which shall be made in it.

XII. Other attempts at the discovery of a clue have started from a conception of classification. There lies a natural charm in the assumption that not only will the content of the universe be found to form an ordered and rounded whole according to some symmetrical method, but also that the reason, of which it is the vocation to know it, possesses for this purpose innate modes of conception in organised and completed array. The latter part of this

¹ [*'Sache'* in this work means whatever a name can stand for, is coextensive with *'Vorstellbarer Inhalt'* (a content which can be presented in an idea), *Logic*, sect. 342, and therefore has *'objectivity'* (*Objectivität*), *Logic*, sect. 3; on the other hand it is much wider than *'Ding'* (a thing), which has not only *'Objectivität'* but also *'Wirklichkeit'* or rather *'Realität'*, (concrete external reality); cp. ch. 3 below, and notes; and *Logic*, sect. 3 and 347. There is no exact English equivalent for *'Sache'* in this sense.]

notion, at any rate, was the source of Kant's attempt by a completion of Aristotle's doctrine of Categories to find the sum of truths that are necessities of our thought. In the sense which Aristotle himself attached to his Categories, as a collection of the most universal predicates, under which every term that we can employ of intelligible import may be subsumed, they have never admitted of serious philosophical application. At most they have served to recall the points of view from which questions may be put in regard to the objects of enquiry that present themselves. The answers to those questions always lay elsewhere—not in conceptions at all, but in fundamental judgments directing the application of the conception in this way or that. Kant's reformed table of Categories suffers primarily from the same defect; but he sought to get rid of it by passing in fact from it to the 'principles of Understanding' which, as he held, were merely contracted in the Categories into the shape of conceptions and could therefore be again elicited from them. The attempt is a work of genius, but against the reasoning on which it is founded and the consequences drawn from it many scruples suggest themselves. Kant found fault with Aristotle for having set up his Categories without a principle to warrant their completeness. On the other hand, plenty of people have been forthcoming to point out the excellence of the principles of division which Aristotle is supposed to have followed. I do not look for any result from the controversy on this point. Given a plurality of unknown extent, if it is proposed to resolve it not merely by way of dichotomy into M and non- M but ultimately into members of a purely positive sort, M , N , O , P , Q , there can be no security in the way of method for the completeness of this disjunctive process. From the nature of the case we must always go on to think of a residuary member R , of which nothing is known but that it is different from all the preceding members. Any one who boasts of the completeness of the division is merely saying that for

his part he cannot add a fresh member *R*. Whoever denies the completeness affirms that a further member *R* has occurred to him which with equal right belongs to the series. Aristotle may have had the most admirable principles of division; but they do not prove that he has noticed all the members which properly fall under them. But the same remark holds equally good against Kant. It may be conceded to him that it is only in the form of the judgment that the acts of thought are performed by means of which we affirm anything of the real. If it is admitted further as a consequence of this that there will be as many different primary propositions of this kind as there are essentially different logical forms of judgment, still the admission that these different forms of judgment have been exhaustively discovered cannot be insisted on as a matter, properly speaking, of methodological necessity. The admission will be made as soon as we feel ourselves satisfied and have nothing to add to the classification; and if this agreement were universal, the matter would be practically settled, for every inventory must be taken as complete, if those who are interested in its completeness can find nothing more to add to it. But that kind of theoretical security for an unconditional completeness, which Kant was in quest of, is something intrinsically impossible.

These however are logical considerations, which are not very decisive here. It is more important to point out that the very admission from which we started is one that cannot be made. The logical forms of judgment are applied to every possible subject-matter, to the merely thinkable as well as to the real, to the doubtful and the impossible as well as to the certain and the possible. We cannot therefore be the least sure that all the different forms, which are indispensable to thought for this its wide-reaching employment, are also of equal importance for its more limited application to the real. So far however as their significance in fact extends also to this latter region, it is a significance

which could not be gathered in its full determination from that general form in which it was equally applicable to the non-real. The categorical form of judgment leaves it quite an open question, whether the subject of the judgment to which it adds a predicate is a simple 'nominal essence'¹ remaining identical with itself, or a whole which possesses each of its parts, or a substance capable of experiencing a succession of states. The hypothetical form of judgment does not distinguish whether the condition contained in its antecedent clause is the reason of a consequence, or the cause of an effect, or the determining end from which the fact stated in the consequent proceeds as a necessary condition of its fulfilment. But these different conceptions, which are here presented in a like form, are of different importance for the treatment of the real. The metaphysical significance of the Categories is, therefore, even according to Kant's view, only a matter of happy conjecture, and rests upon material considerations, which are unconnected with the forms of judgment, and to which the systematisation of those logical forms has merely given external occasion. It is only these incidentally suggested thoughts that have given to the Categories in Kant's hands a semblance of importance and productiveness, which these playthings of philosophy, the object of so much curiosity, cannot properly claim. This roundabout road of first establishing a formal method affords us no better security than we should have if we set straight to work at the thing—at the matter of our enquiry.

XIII. We are encouraged to this direct course by the recollection that it is not a case of taking possession for the first time of an unknown land. Thanks to the zealous efforts of centuries the objects we have to deal with have long been set forth in distinct order, and the questions about them collected which need an answer. Nor had the philosophy which has prepared the way for us itself to break

¹ ['Einfacher Denkinhalt.']

wholly new ground. In regard to the main divisions of our subject it had little to do but to repeat what everyone learns anew from his own experience of the world. Nature and spirit are two regions so different as at first sight to admit of no comparison, and demanding two separate modes of treatment, each devoted to the essential character by which the two regions are alike self-involved and separate from each other. But on the other hand they are destined to such constant action upon each other as parts of one universe, that they constrain us at the same time to the quest for those universal forms of an order of things which they both have to satisfy alike in themselves and in the connexion with each other. It might seem as if this last-mentioned branch of its enquiry must be the one to which early science would be last brought. As a matter of history, however, it has taken it in hand as soon as the other two branches, and has long devoted itself to it with greater particularity than, considering the small progress made in the other branches, it could find conducive to success. But whatever may be the case historically, now at least when we try to weigh the amount of tenable result which has been won from such protracted labour, we are justified in beginning with that which is first in the order of things though not in the order of our knowledge ; I mean with Ontology, which, as a doctrine of the being and relations of all reality, had precedence given to it over Cosmology and Psychology—the two branches of enquiry which follow the reality into its opposite distinctive forms. It is to this division of the subject that with slight additions or omissions, Metaphysic under every form of treatment has to all intents and purposes returned. The variety in the choice of terms occasioned by peculiar points of view adopted antecedently to the consideration of the natural division of the subject, has indeed been very great. But to take any further account of these variations of terminology, before entering on the real matter in hand, seems to me as useless

as the attempt to determine more exactly that limitation of the problems before us which metaphysicians have had before them in promising to treat only of rational cosmology and psychology, as opposed in a very intelligible manner to the further knowledge which only experience can convey.

XIV. No period of human life is conceivable in which man did not yet feel himself in opposition to an external world around him. Long in doubt about himself, he found around him a multitude of perceptibly divided objects, and he could not live long without having many impressions forced upon him as to their nature and connexion. For none of the every-day business that is undertaken for the satisfaction of wants could go on without the unspoken conviction that our wishes and thoughts have not by themselves the power to make any alteration in the state of the outer world, but that this world consists in a system of mutually determinable things, in which any alteration of one part that we may succeed in effecting is sure of a definite propagation of effects on other parts. Moreover no such undertaking could be carried out without coming on some resistance, and thus giving rise to the recognition of an unaccountable independence exercised by things in withstanding a change of state. All these thoughts as well as those which might readily be added on a continuation of these reflections, were primarily present only in the form of unconsciously determining principles which regulated actions and expectations in real life. It is in the same form that with almost identical repetition they still arise in each individual, constituting the natural Ontology with which we all in real life meet the demand for judgments on events. The reflective attempt to form these assumptions into conscious principles only ensued when attention was called to the need of escaping contradictions with which they became embarrassed when they came to be applied without care for the consequences to a wider range of knowledge.

It was thus that Philosophy, with its ontological enquiries, arose. In the order of their development these enquiries have not indeed been independent of the natural order in which one question suggests another. Still owing to accidental circumstances they have often drifted into devious tracks; have assumed and again given up very various tendencies. There is no need, however, in a treatise which aims at gathering the product of these labours, to repeat this chequered history. It may fasten directly on the natural conception of the universe which we noticed just now—that conception which finds the course of the world only intelligible of a multiplicity of persistent things, of variable relations between them, and of events arising out of these changes of mutual relation. For it is just this view of the universe, of which the essential purport may be thus summarised, which renews itself with constant identity in every age. Outside the schools we all accommodate ourselves to it. Not to us merely, but to all past labourers in the field of philosophy, it has presented itself as the point of departure, as that which had either to be confirmed or controverted. Unlike the divergent theories of speculative men, therefore, it deserves to be reckoned as itself one of the natural phenomena which, in the character of regular elements of the universe, enchain the attention of philosophy. For the present however all that we need to borrow from history is the general conviction that of the simple thoughts which make up this view there is none that is exempt from the need of having its actual and possible import scientifically ascertained in order to its being harmonised with all the rest in a tenable whole. No lengthy prolegomena are needed to determine the course which must be entered on for this purpose. We cannot speak of occurrences in relations without previously thinking of the things between which they are supposed to take place or to subsist. Of these things, however—manifold and unlike as we take them to be—we at the same

time affirm, along with a distinction in the individual being of each, a likeness in respect of that form of reality which makes them things. It is with the simple idea of this being that we have to begin. The line to be followed in the sequel may be left for the present unfixed. Everything cannot be said at once. That natural view of the world from which we take our departure, simple as it seems at first sight, yet contains various interwoven threads; and no one of these can be pursued without at the same time touching others which there is not time at the outset to follow out on their own account and which must be reserved to a more convenient season. For our earlier considerations, therefore, we must ask the indulgence of not being disturbed by objections of which due account shall be taken in the sequel.

CHAPTER I.

On the Being of Things.

1. ONE of the oldest thoughts in Philosophy is that of the opposition between true being and untrue being. Illusions of the senses, causing what is unreal to be taken for what is real, led to a perception of the distinction between that which only appears to us and that which is independent of us. The observation of things taught men to recognise a conditional existence or a result of combination in that which to begin with seemed simple and self-dependent. Continuous becoming was found where only unmoving persistent identity had been thought visible. Thus there was occasioned a clear consciousness of that which had been understood by 'true being,' and which was found wanting in the objects of these observations. Independence not only of us but of everything other than itself, simplicity and unchanging persistence in its own nature, had always been reckoned its signs. Its signs, we say, but still only its signs; for these characteristics, though they suffice to exclude that of which they are not predicable from the region of true being, do not define that being itself. Independence of our own impressions in regard to it is what we ascribe to every truth. It holds good in itself, though no one thinks it. Independence of everything beside itself we affirm not indeed of every truth, but of many truths which neither need nor admit of proof. Simplicity exclusive of all combination belongs to every single sensation of

sweetness or redness; and motionless self-subsistence, inaccessible to any change, is the proper character of that world of ideas which we oppose to reality on the ground that while we can say of the ideas that they eternally *hold good* we cannot say that they *are*. It follows that in the characteristics stated of Being not only is something wanting which has been thought though not expressed but the missing something is the most essential element of that which we are in quest of. We still want to know what exactly that Being itself is to which those terms may be applied by way of distinguishing the true Being from the apparent, or what that reality consists in by which an independent simple and persistent Being distinguishes itself from the unreal image in thought of the same independent simple and persistent content.

2. To this question a very simple answer may be attempted. It seems quite a matter of course that the thinking faculty should not be able by any of its own resources, by any thought, to penetrate and exhaust the essential property of real Being, in which thought of itself recognises an opposition to all merely intelligible existence. The most that we can claim, it will be said, is that real Being yields us a living experience of itself in a manner quite different from thinking, and such experiences being once given, a ground of cognition with reference to them thereupon admits of being stated, which is necessary not indeed for the purpose of inferring that presence of real Being which is matter of immediate experience but for maintaining the truth of this experience against every doubt. Upon this view no pretence is made of explaining by means of conceptions the difference of real Being from the conception of the same, but immediate sensation¹ has always been looked upon as the ground of cognition which is our warrant for the presence of real Being. Even after the habit has been formed of putting trust in proofs and credible communi-

¹ ['Sinnlichen Empfindung.']

cations, we shall still seek to set aside any doubt that may have arisen by rousing ourselves to see and hear whether the things exist and the occurrences take place of which information has been given us, nor does any proof prove the reality of its conclusion unless, apart from the correctness of its logical concatenation, not merely the truth of its original premisses, as matter of thought, but the reality of its content is established—a reality which in the last resort is given only by sensuous perception. It may be that even sensation sometimes deceives and presents us with what is unreal instead of with what is real. Still in those cases where it does not deceive, it is the only possible evidence of reality. It may in like manner be questioned whether sensation gives us insight into the real *as it is*. Still of the fact that something which really is underlies it, sensation does not seem to allow a doubt.

3. The two objections just noticed to the value of sensation cannot here be discussed in full, but with the second there is a difficulty connected which we have to consider at once. The content of simple sensations cannot be so separated from the sensitive act as that detached images of the two, complete in themselves, should remain after the separation. We can neither present redness, sweetness, and warmth to ourselves as they would be if they were not felt, nor the feeling of them as it would be if it were not a feeling of any of these particular qualities. The variety, however, of the sensible qualities, and the definiteness of each single quality as presented to the mind's eye, facilitate the attempt which we all make to separate in thought what is really indivisible. The particular matter which we feel, at any rate, appears to us independent of our feeling, as if it were something of which the self-existent nature was only recognised and discovered by the act of feeling.

But we do not succeed so easily in detaching the other element—that real being, of which, as the being of this sensible content, it was the business of actual sensation in

opposition to the mere recollection or idea of it to give us assurance. It cannot be already given in this simplest affirmation or position which we ascribed to the sensible contents, and by which each of them is what it is and distinguishes itself from other contents. Through this affirmation that which is affirmed only comes to hold good as an element in the world of the thinkable. It is not real merely because it is in this sense something, as opposed to nothing void of all determination. In virtue of such affirmation Red is eternally Red and allied to Yellow, not allied to what is warm or sweet. But this identity with itself and difference from something else holds good of the Red of which there is no actual sensation as of that of which there is actual sensation. Yet it is only in the case of the latter that sensation is supposed to testify to real existence. Apart from that simplest affirmation, however, the various sensible qualities in abstraction from the sensitive act which apprehends them have nothing in common. If therefore we assert of them, so far as they are felt, a real Being different from this affirmation, this Being is not anything which as attaching to the nature of the felt quality would merely be recognised and discovered by the sensitive act. On the contrary, it lies wholly in the simple fact of being felt, which forms the sole distinction between the actual sensation of the quality that is present to sense and the mere idea of quality which is not so present. Thus it would appear that the notion with which we started must be given up; for sensation is not a mere ground of cognition of a real Being which is still something different from it and of which the proper nature has still to be stated; and the being which on the evidence of sensation we ascribe to things consists in absolutely nothing else than the fact of their being felt.

4. This assertion, however, can only be hazarded when certain points of advanced speculation have been reached, which we shall arrive at later. The primary conception of

the world is quite remote from any such inference. According to it sensation is certainly the only 'causa cognoscendi' which convinces us of Being, and just because it is the only one, there easily arises the mistake of supposing that what it alone can show consists only of it, whereas in fact Being is, notwithstanding, independent of our recognition of it, and all things, of which we learn the reality, it is true, only from sensation, will continue to be, though our attention is diverted from them and they vanish from our consciousness. Nothing indeed appears more self-evident than this doctrine. We all do homage to it. Yet the question must recur, what remains to be understood by the Being of things, when we have got rid of the sole condition under which it is cognisable by us. It was as objects of our feeling that things were presented to us. In this alone consisted as far as we could see what we called their Being. What can be left of Being when we abstract from our feeling? What exactly is it that we suppose ourselves to have predicated of things, in saying that they *are* without being felt? Or what is it that for the things themselves, by way of proof, confirmation, and significance of their being, takes the place of that sensation which for us formed the proof, confirmation, and significance of their being.

The proper meaning of these questions will become clearer, if I pass to the answers which the natural theory of the world gives to them; for it must not be supposed that this theory makes no effort to remedy the shortcoming which we have noticed. Its simplest way of doing so consists in the reflection that on the disappearance of our own sensation that of others takes its place. The men whom we leave behind will remain in intercourse with others. Places and objects, from which we are removed, will be seen by others as hitherto by us. This constitutes their persistency in Being, while they have vanished from our senses. Everyone, I think, will find traces in himself of this primary way of presenting the case. Yet it helps us

rather to put off the question than to answer it. It is sure to repeat itself at once in another form. Being was said to be independent of any consciousness on the part of a sentient subject. What then if consciousness is extinguished out of the entire universe and there is no longer any one who could have cognisance of the things that are supposed to exist? In that case, we answer, they will continue to stand in those relations to each other in which they stood when they were objects of perception. Each will have its place in space or will change it. Each will continue to exercise influences on others or to be affected by their influence. These reciprocal agencies will constitute that in which the things possess their being independently of all observation. Beyond this view of the matter the natural theory of things scarcely ever goes. In what respect it is unsatisfactory and in what it is right we have now to attempt to consider.

5. There is one point on which it is held to be defective, but unfairly, because its defect consists merely in its inability to answer an improper question, which we have simply to get out of the habit of putting. The question arises in this way. All those relations, in which we just now supposed the reality of things to consist, may be thought of equally as real and as unreal. But they must be actually real and not merely thought of as real, if they are to form the Being of things and not merely the idea of this Being. In what then, we ask, consists this reality of that which is in itself merely thinkable, and how does it arise? That this question is unanswerable and self-contradictory needs no elaborate proof. In what properly consists the fact—how it comes about or is made—that there is something and not nothing, that something and not nothing takes place; this it is eternally impossible to say. For in fact, whatever the form of the question in which this curiosity might find expression, it is clear that we should always presuppose in it as antecedent to that reality of

which we seek an explanation, a prior connected reality, in which from definite principles definite consequences necessarily flow, and among them the reality that has to be explained. And the origin of this latter reality would not be like that of a truth which arises as a consequence out of other truths but which yet always subsisted along with them in eternal validity. The origin in question would be expressly one in which a reality, *that was previously itself unreal*, arises out of another reality. Everything accordingly which we find in the given reality—the occurrence of events, the change in the action of things upon each other, the existence of centres of relation between which such action may take place—all this we must assume to begin with in order to render the origin of reality intelligible.

This obvious circle has been avoided by the common view. Nor can it be charged with having itself fallen into another circle in reducing the real Being of things to the reality of those relations the maintenance of which it supposed to constitute what was meant by this Being. For it could not be intended to analyse this most general conception of reality, of which the significance can only be conveyed in the living experience of feeling. All that could be meant by definitions of Being in the common theory was an indication of that which within this given miracle of reality is to be understood as the Being of the Things in distinction from other instances of the same reality, from the existence of the relations themselves and from the occurrence of events. Whether the common theory has succeeded in this latter object is what remains to be asked.

6. Philosophy has been very unanimous in denying that it has. How, it is asked, are we to understand those relations, in the subsistence of which we would fain find the Being of the Things? If they are merely a result of arbitrary combinations in which we present things to our minds, we should equally fail in our object whether the things ordered themselves according to this caprice of ours

or whether they did not. In the former case we should not find the Being independent of ourselves which we were in search of. If the latter were the true state of the case, it would make it still more plain that there must be something involved in the Being of things which our definition of this Being failed to include—the something in virtue of which they are qualified to exist on their own account, not changing with and because of our changeable conception of their Being. We cannot be satisfied therefore without supposing that the relations, of which we assume the existence, exist between the things themselves, so as to be discoverable by our thought but not created by or dependent on it. The more, however, we insist on this objective reality of relations, the more unmistakeable we make the dependence of the Being of everything on the Being of everything else. No thing can have its place among the other things, if these are not there to receive it among them. None can work or suffer, before the others are there to exchange impressions with it. To put the matter generally; in order to there being such a thing as an action of one thing upon another, it would seem that the centres of relation between which it is to take place must be established in independent reality. A Being in things, resting wholly on itself and in virtue of this independence rendering the relations possible by which things are to be connected, must precede in thought every relation that is to be taken for real. This is the *pure* Being, of which Philosophy has so often gone in quest. It is opposed by Philosophy, as being of the same significance for all things, to the empirical Being which, originating in the various relations that have come into play between things, is different for every second thing from what it is for the third, and which Philosophy hopes somehow to deduce as a supervening result from the pure Being.

7. I propose to show that expectation directed to this metaphysical use of the conception of pure Being is a delusion, and that the natural theory of the world, in

which nothing is heard of it, is on this point nearer the truth than this first notion of Speculation. Every conception, which is to admit of any profitable application, must allow of a clear distinction between that which is meant by it and that which is not meant by it. So long as we looked for the Being of things in the reality of relations in which the things stand to each other, we possessed in these relations something by the affirmation of which the Being of that which is, distinguishes itself from the non-Being of that which is not. The more we remove from the conception of Being every thought of a relation, in the affirmation of which it might consist, the more completely the possibility of this distinction disappears. For not to be at any place, not to have any position in the complex of other things, not to undergo any operation from anything nor to display itself by the exercise of any activity upon anything ; to be thus void of relation is just that in which we should find the nonentity of a thing if it was our purpose to define it. It is not to the purpose to object that it was not this nonentity but Being that was meant by the definition. It is not doubted that the latter was the object of our definition, but the object is not attained, so long as the same definition includes the opposite of that which we intended to include in it.

No doubt an effort will be made to rebut this objection in its turn. It will be urged that if, starting from the comparison of the multiform Being of experience, we omit all the relations on which its distinction rests, that which remains as pure Being is not the mere privation of relations but that of which this very unrelatedness serves only as a predicate, and which, resting on itself and independent, is distinguished by this hardly to be indicated but still positive trait from that which is not. Now it is true that our usage is not to employ these and like expressions of that which is not or of the nothing, but the usage is not strictly justifiable so long as we apply the expressions to

this pure Being. They only have an intelligible sense because we already live in the thought of manifold relations, and within the sphere of these the true Being has opportunity of showing by a definite order of procedure what is the meaning of its independence and self-subsistence. Once drop this implication, and all the above expressions, in the complete emptiness of meaning to which they thereupon sink, are unquestionably as applicable to Nothing as they are to Being, for in fact independence of everything else, self-subsistence and complete absence of relation are not less predicable of the one than of the other.

8. We may expect here the impatient rejoinder—‘There still remains the eternal difference that the unrelated Being is while the unrelated non-Being is not: all that comes of your super-subtle investigation is a contradiction of your own previous admission. For the meaning of Being, in the sense of reality and in opposition to not-being, is as you say undefinable and only to be learnt by actual living. The cognition thus gained necessarily and rightfully presupposes the conception of pure Being, as the positive element in the experienced Being. We have not therefore the problem of distinguishing Being from not-Being any longer before us. That is settled for us in the experience of life. Our problem merely is within real Being by negation of all relations to isolate the *pure* Being, which must be there to begin with in order to the possibility of entrance into any relations whatever. In forming this conception of pure Being therefore, Thought is quite within its right, although for that which it looks upon as the positive import of the conception it can only offer a name, of which the intelligibility may be fairly reckoned on, not a description.’

Now by way of reply to these objections I must remind the reader that what I disputed was not at all the legitimacy of the formation of the idea in question but only the

allowability of the metaphysical use which it is sought to make of it. The point of this distinction I will endeavour first to illustrate by examples. Bodies move in space with various velocities and in various directions. No doubt we are justified as a matter of thought in fixing arbitrarily and one-sidedly now on one common element, now on another, in these various instances, and thus in forming the conception of direction without reference to velocity, that of velocity apart from direction, that of motion as the conception of a change of place, which leaves direction and velocity unnoticed. There is nothing whatever illegitimate in the formation of any of these abstractions. Nor is it incompatible with the nature of the abstractions that instances of each of them should be so connected in thought as to yield further knowledge. None of them, however, immediately and by itself allows of an application to reality without being first restored to combination with the rest from which our Thought, in arbitrary exercise of its right of abstraction, had detached them. There will never be a velocity without direction; never a direction *ab* in the proper sense of the term without a velocity leading from *a* to *b*, not from *b* to *a*. There will never be a motion that is a mere change of place, as yet without direction and velocity and waiting to assume these two qualifications later on. That which we are here seeking to convey is essentially, if not altogether, the familiar truth that general ideas are not applicable to the real world in their generality, but only become so applicable when each of their marks, that has been left undetermined, has been limited to a completely individual determinateness, or, to use an expression more suited to the case before us, when to each partial conception necessary to the complete definition there has been again supplied in case it expresses a relation, the element to which the relation attaches.

9. We take the case to be just the same with the conception of pure Being. It is an abstraction formed in

a perfectly legitimate way, which aims at embracing the common element that is to be found in many cases of Being and that distinguishes them from not-Being. We do not value this abstraction the less because the simplicity of what it contains is such that a verbal indication of this common element, as distinct from any systematic construction of it, is all that is possible. Still, like those to which we compared it, it does not admit, as it stands, of application to anything real. Just as an abstract motion cannot take place, just as it never occurs but in the form of velocity in a definite direction, so pure Being cannot in reality be an antecedent or substance of such a kind as that empirical existence with its manifold determinations should be in any sort a secondary emanation from it, either as its consequence or as its modification. It has no reality except as latent in these particular cases of it, in each of these definite forms of existence. It is merely in the system of our conceptions that these supervene upon it as subsequent and subordinate kinds. There was a correct feeling of this in what I call the natural theory of the world. It was quite aware of the intellectual possibility of detaching the affirmation that is the same in all cases from the differences of the manifold relations which are affirmed by it in the different cases of Being, just as the uniform idea of quantity can be detached from the different numbers and spaces which are subordinate to it. But it rightly held to the view that the pure Being thus constituted has not reality as pure but only in the various instances in which it is a latent element; just as is the case with quantity, which never occurs as pure Quantity but only as this or that definite Quantum of something.

10. The length of this enquiry, which leads to a result seemingly so simple, must be justified by the sequel. It may be useful, I think, to repeat the same thought once again in another form. There are other terms which have been applied to pure Being, in the desire to make that

which admits of no explanatory analysis at least more intelligible by a variety of signs. Thus it is usual to speak of it as an unconditional and irrevocable Position¹ or Putting. It will be readily noticed that as so applied, each of these terms is used with an extension of meaning in which it ceases to represent any complete thought. They alike tend to give a sensuous expression to the idea in question by recalling the import in which they are properly used, and when that on which their proper meaning rests has again to be expressly denied the result is obscurity and confusion. We cannot speak of a putting or Position in the proper sense of the term without stating what it is that is put. And not only so, this must be put somewhere, in some place, in some situation which is the result of the putting and distinguishes the putting that has taken place from one that has not taken place. Any one who applied this term to pure Being would therefore very soon find himself pushed back again to a statement of relations, in order to give to this 'Position' or pure Being the meaning necessary to its distinction from the not-putting, the pure non-Being. The notion which it is commonly attempted to substitute for this—that of an act of placing pure and simple, which leaves out of sight every relation constituted by the act—remains an abstraction which expresses only the purpose of the person thinking to think of Being and not of not-Being, while on the other hand it carefully obliterates the conditions under which this purpose can attain its end and not the precise opposite of this end. Nor would it be of any avail to be always reverting to the proposition that after all it is by this act of putting that there is constituted the very intelligible though not further analysable idea of an objectivity which can be ascribed only to that which is, not to nothing. For, apart from every other consideration, if

¹ ['Position oder Setzung.' It seems unavoidable that the English word 'Position' should be used, though it has of course no active meaning such as belongs to 'Position' and 'Setzung.']

we in fact not merely performed the act of mere putting, as such, but by it put a definite content, without however adding what sort of procedure or what relations were to result to the object from this act of putting, the consequence would merely be that the thing put would be presented to our consciousness as an essence which signifies something and distinguishes itself from something else, but not as one that is in opposition to that which is not. Real Being, as distinct from the mere truth of the thinkable, can never be arrived at by this bare act of putting, but only by the addition in thought of those relations, to be placed in which forms just the prerogative which reality has over cogitability.

The other general signification, which the expressions 'Position' and 'putting' have assumed, illustrates the same state of the case. We cannot affirm simply something, we can only affirm a proposition—not a subject, but only a predicate as belonging to a subject. Now it is psychologically very intelligible that from every act of affirmation we should look for a result, which stands objectively and permanently before thought, while all negation implies the opposite expectation, that something will vanish which previously thus stood before it. It is quite natural therefore that we should fall into the delusion of imagining that in the purpose and good will to affirm there lies a creative force, which if it is directed to no definite predicate but exercised in abstraction would create that universal and pure Being which underlies all determinate Being. In fact however the affirmation does not bring into Being the predicate which forms its object, and it could just as well, though for psychological reasons not so naturally, assert the not-Being of things as their Being. The Being of things, therefore, which is in question, cannot be found in the affirmation of them merely as such but only in the affirmation of their Being. We are thus brought back to the necessity of first determining the sense of this Being in order

to the presence of a possible object of the affirmation, and this determination we have, so far at least, found no means of carrying out except by presupposition of relations, in the reality of which the Being of that which is consists in anti-thesis to the not-Being of that which is not

11. There is a further reason for avoiding the expression which I have just been examining. 'Position' and 'putting forth' are alike according to their verbal form terms for actions¹. Now it may seem trifling, but I count it important all the same, to exercise a precaution in the choice of philosophical expressions and not to employ words which almost unavoidably carry with them an association which has a disturbing influence on the treatment of the matter expressed. In the case before us the prejudicial effects apprehended have not remained in abeyance. It has not indeed been believed possible to achieve a putting forth which should create Being. but there was always associated with the application of the word the notion that it has been by a corresponding act, from whomsoever proceeding, that this Being so unaccountably presented to us has originated and that we then penetrate to its true idea when we repeat in thought this history of its origin. We shall find the importance of this error, if we revert to the reproach brought against the natural theory of the world. It is objected that in looking for the Being of every thing in its relations to other things, it leaves no unconditioned element of reality—none that would not have others for its presupposition. If a can only exist in relation to b , then, it is said, b must be there beforehand; if b exists only in relation to c , then c must be its antecedent. And if perchance there were a last element x dependent not on any further elements but on the first a , this, it will be urged, would only make still more apparent the untenability of a construction of reality which after all has to make the being of a itself the presupposition of this Being. But this whole embarrassment

¹ [v. note on p. 43.]

could only be incurred by one, whose problem it was to *make* a world, nor would he incur it, unless a limitation on his mode of operation interfered with the making of many things at the same time and compelled him to let an interval of time elapse in passing from the establishment of the one element to that of the other. for undoubtedly, if Being consists only in the reality of relations, *a* could not stand by itself and therefore could not exist till the creating hand had completed the condition of its Being by the after-creation of *b*. But what could justify us in importing into the notion of this productive activity this habit of our own thinking faculty, which does, it is true, in presenting relations to itself pass from one point of relation to another? Why should we not rather assume that the things as well as the relations between them were made in a single act, so that none of them needed to wait, as it were hung in the air during a certain interval, for the supplementary fulfilment of the conditions of its reality? We will not attempt however further to depict a process, which cannot be held to be among the objects of possible investigation. It is not our business to discover in what way the reality of things has been brought about, but only to show what it is that it must be thought of and recognised as being when once in some way that we cannot conceive it has come to be. We have not to make a world but so to order our conceptions as that they may correspond without contradiction to the state of the given world as it stands. Such a contradiction we may be inclined to think is involved in the thought of a creative 'Position,' which could only put forth things that really are under the condition of their being mutually related, yet on the other hand could only put them forth one after the other. But there is no contradiction in the recognition of a present world of reality, of which the collective elements are as a matter of fact so conditioned by the tension of mutual relatedness that only in this can the meaning of their Being and its distinction from not-Being be recognised.

12. The foregoing remarks contain an objection to the metaphysical doctrine of Herbart, which requires some further explanation. It need not be said that Herbart never entertained the unphilosophical notion that the irrevocable 'position,' in which he found the true Being of things, was an activity still to be exercised. He too looked on it as a fact to be recognised. As to how the fact came to be so it was in his eyes the more certain that nothing could be said as, being unconditioned and unchangeable according to his understanding of those terms, it excluded every question in regard to origin and source. But a certain ambiguity seems to me to lie in the usage of this expression of an irrevocable 'position.'

There are two *demands* which may no doubt be insisted on. In the first place, assuming that we are in undoubted possession of the true conception of Being, we should be bound to be on our guard in its application against attaching it to qualities which on more exact consideration would be found to contradict it. Nothing can then compel us on this assumption to revoke the affirmation or 'position,' as an act performed by ourselves, by which we recognised the presence in some particular case of that 'position,' not to be performed by us, in which true Being consists. If on the other hand instead of being in possession of the correct conception of Being, we are only just endeavouring to form it, intending at a later stage to look about for cases of its application, in that case we have so to construct it as to express completely what we meant, and necessarily meant, to convey by it. Nothing therefore ought to be able to compel us again to revoke the recognition that in the characteristics found by us there is apprehended the true nature of that position which we have not to make but to accept as the Being presented to us. Here are two sorts of requirement or necessity, but in neither case have we to do with anything except an obligation incumbent on our procedure in thinking. The proposition—Being consists in so

and so, and the proposition—this is a case of Being, ought alike to be so formed as that we shall not have to revoke either as premature or incorrect. But as to the nature of Being itself nothing whatever is settled by either requirement and it is not self-evident that the ‘position’ which constitutes Being and which is not one that waits to be performed by us, is in itself as irrevocable as our thoughts about it should be. The common view of the world does not as a matter of fact, at least at the beginning, make this claim for Being. The fixedness of Being, which it ascribes to things, only amounts to this, that they serve as relatively persistent points on which phenomena fasten and from which occurrences issue. But according to this view if once reason had been found to say of a thing, ‘It has been,’ it would in spite of this revocation of its further persistence still be held that, so long as it has been, it has had full enjoyment of the genuine and true Being, beside which there is no other specifically different Being.

The question whether such a view is right or wrong I reserve for the present. Herbart decided completely against it. True Being according to him is only conceived with irrevocable correctness, if it is apprehended as itself a wholly irrevocable ‘position.’ This necessary requirement, however, with him involved the other—the requirement that every relation of the one thing to another, which could be held necessary to the Being of the Thing, should be excluded, and that what we call the true Being should be found only in the pure ‘position,’ void of relation, which we have not to exercise but to recognise. No doubt it is our duty to seek such a cognition of the real as will not have again to be given up. But I cannot draw the deduction that the object of that cognition must itself be permanent, and therefore I cannot ascribe self-evident truth to this conviction of Herbart’s. It is a Metaphysical doctrine in regard to which I shall have more frequent opportunity later on of expressing agreement and hesitation, and

which I would now only subject to consideration with reference to the one point, with which we are specially occupied. In order to preserve the connexion of our thoughts, I once again recall the point that the conception of a pure, completely unrelated Being turned out to be correctly formed indeed, but perfectly inapplicable. We were able to accept it only as an expression or indication of that most general affirmation, which is certainly present in every Being, and distinguishes it from not-Being. But we maintained that it is never merely by itself, but only as having definite relations for its object, that this affirmation constitutes the Being of the real; that thus pure Being neither itself is, nor as naked 'Position' of an unrelated content forms the reality of that content, nor is rightly entitled to the name of Being at all.

13. On the question how determinate or empirical Being issues from pure Being, the earlier theories, which started from the independence of pure Being, pronounced in a merely figurative and incomplete manner. The wished-for clearness we find in Herbart. According to his doctrine pure Being does not lie behind in a mythical past. Each individual thing enjoys it continuously, for each thing is in virtue of a 'position' which is alien to all relations and needs them not. It is just the complete indifference of things to all relations, and it alone, that makes it possible for them to enter into various relations towards each other, of which in consequence of this indifference none can in any way add to or detract from the Being of the things. From this commerce between them, which does not touch their essence, arises the chequered variety of the course of the given world.

I cannot persuade myself that this is an admissible way of presenting the case. Granting that there really is such a thing as an element α in the enjoyment of this unrelated 'Position' of being unaffected by others and not reacting upon them, it does not indeed contradict the conception of

this Being that ideas of relation should afterwards be connected with it. But in reality it is impossible for that to enter into relations which was previously unrelated. For a could not enter into relations *in general*. At each moment it could only enter into the definite relation m towards the definite element b , to the exclusion of every other relation μ towards the same element. There must therefore be some reason in operation which in each individual case allows and brings about the realisation only of m , not that of a chance μ . But since a is indifferent towards every relation, there cannot be contained in its own nature either the reason for this definite m , nor even the reason why it should enter into a relation, that did not previously obtain, with b and not rather with c . That which decided the point can therefore only be looked for in some earlier relation l , which however indifferent it might be to a and b , in fact subsisted between them. If a and b had been persistently confined each to its own pure Being, without as yet belonging at all to this empirical reality and its thousandfold order of relations, they would never have issued from their ontological seclusion and been wrought into the web of this universe. For this entry could only have taken place into some region in space, at some point of time, and in a direction somewhither; and all this would imply a determinate place outside the world, which the things must have left in a determinate direction. Therefore, while thus seemingly put outside the world into the void of pure Being, the Things would have already stood, not outside all relations to the world, but only in other and looser relations instead of in the closer ones, which are supposed to be established later. And just as it would be impossible for them to enter into relations if previously unrelated, so it would be impossible for them wholly to escape again from the web of relations in which they had once become involved.

It may indeed be urged with some plausibility that, since

we take the relations of things to be manifold and variable, Being can attach to no single one of them, and therefore to none at all: that therefore 'it cannot be Being which the Thing loses, if we suppose all its relations successively to disappear. But this argument would only be a repetition of the confusion between the constancy of a general idea and the reality of its individual instances. Colour, for instance, is not necessarily green or red, but it is no colour at all if it is none of these different kinds. Were it conceivably possible that all relations of a thing should disappear without in their disappearance giving rise to new ones—a point of which I reserve the consideration—we could not look upon this as the return of the thing into its pure Being, but only as its lapse into nonentity. A transition, therefore, from a state of unrelatedness into relation, or *vice versa*, is unintelligible to us. All that is intelligible is a transition from one form of relation to another. And an assumption which would find the true Being of Things in their being put forth without relations, seems at the same time to make the conception of these things unavailable for the Metaphysical explanation of the universe, while it was only to render such explanation possible that the supposition that there are Things was made at all.

14. There is yet one way out of the difficulty to be considered. 'In itself,' it may be said, 'pure Being is foreign to all relations, and no Thing, in order to be, has any need whatever of relations. But just because everything is indifferent to them, there is nothing to prevent the assumption that the entry of all things into relations has long ago taken effect. No thing has been left actually to enjoy its pure Being without these relations that are indifferent to it, and it is in this shape of relatedness that the sum of things forms the basis of the world's changeable course.' Or, to adopt what is surely a more correct statement—'It has not been at any particular time in the past that this entry into relations has taken place, which, as we pointed out, is unthink

able. Every thing has stood in relations from eternity. None has ever enjoyed the pure Being which would have been possible for its nature.' In this latter transformation, however, the thought would essentially coincide with that which we alleged in opposition to it. It would amount simply to this, that there *might be* a pure Being, in which Things, isolated and each resting on itself, without any mutual relation, would yet *be*; that there is no such Being, however, but in its stead only that manifoldly determined empirical Being, in each several form of which pure Being is latently present. Between the view thus put and our own there would no longer be any difference, except the first part of the statement, supposing it to be adhered to. A Being, which might be but is not, would for us be no Being at all. The conception of it would only purport to be that of a possibility of thought, not the conception of that reality of which alone Metaphysic professes to treat. We should certainly persist in denying that this pure Being so much as *could be* elsewhere than in our thoughts. We take the notion of such Being to be merely an abstraction which in the process of thinking, and in it only, separates the common affirmation of whatever is real from the particular forms of reality, as applied to which alone the affirmation is itself a reality.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Quality of Things.

15. ACCORDING to the natural theory of the world, as we have so far followed it, the Being of Things is only to be found in the reality of certain relations between one and another. There are two directions therefore in which we are impelled to further enquiry. We may ask in the first place, what is the peculiar nature of these relations, in the affirmation of which Being is supposed to lie? In that case its definition would assign a number of conditions, which whatever is to be a Thing must satisfy. We feel, secondly, with equal strength the need of trying to find first in the conception of the Thing the subject which would be capable of entering into the presupposed relations. The order of these questions does not seem to me other than interchangeable, nor is it indeed possible to keep the answers to them entirely apart. It may be taken as a pardonable liberty of treatment if I give precedence to the second of the mutually implied forms of the problem. It too admits of a double signification. For if we speak of the essence of Things, we mean this expression to convey sometimes that by which Things are distinguished and each is what it is, sometimes that in virtue of which they all are *Things* in opposition to that which is not a Thing. These two questions again are obviously very closely connected, and it might seem that the mention of the first was for us superfluous. For it cannot be the business of ontology to describe the peculiar

qualities by which the manifold Things that exist are really distinguished from each other. It could only have to indicate generally what that is on the possible varieties of which it may be possible for distinctions of Things to rest. But this function it seems to fulfil in investigating the common structure of that which constitutes a Thing as such ; for this necessarily includes the idea and nature of that by particularisation of which every individual Thing is able to be what it is and to draw limits between itself and other Things. The sequel of our discussion may however justify our procedure in allowing ourselves to be driven to undertake an answer to this second question by a preliminary attempt at answering the first.

16. What the occasions may be which psychologically give rise in us to the idea of the Thing, is a question by which the objects of our present enquiry are wholly unaffected. The idea having once arisen, and it being impossible for us in our natural view of the world to get rid of it, all that concerns us is to know what we mean by it, and whether we have reason, taking it as it is, for retaining it or for giving it up. As we have seen, sensation is our only warrant for the certainty that something is. It no doubt at the same time warrants the certainty of our own Being as well as that of something other than ourselves. It is necessary, however, in this preliminary consideration to forget the reference to the feeling subject, just as the natural view of the world at first forgets it likewise and loses itself completely in the sensible qualities, of which the revelation before our eyes is at the supposed stage of that view accepted by it as a self-evident fact. It is only in sensation therefore that it can look, whether for the certainty of there being something, or, beyond this, for the qualities of that which is. Yet from its very earliest stage it is far from taking these sensible qualities as identical with that which it regards as the true Being in them. Not till a later stage of reflection is it attempted to maintain

that what we take to be the perception of a thing is never more than a plurality of contemporary sensations, held together by nothing but the identity of the place at which they are presented to us, and the unity of our consciousness which binds them together in its intuition. The natural theory of the world never so judges. Undoubtedly it takes a thing to be sweet, red, and warm, but not to be sweetness, redness, and warmth alone. Although it is in these sensible qualities that we find all that we experience of its essence, still this essence does not admit of being exhaustively analysed into them. In order to convey what is in our minds when we predicate such qualities of a Thing, the terms which connote them must, in grammatical language, be construed into objects of that '*is*,' understood in a transitive sense, which according to the usage of language is only intransitive. 'The other ways of putting the same proposition, such as 'the thing tastes sweet,' or 'it looks red,' help to show how in the midst of these predicates, as their subject or their active point of departure, the Thing is thought of and its unity not identified with their multiplicity. This idea, however far it may be from being wrought out into clear consciousness, in every case lies at the bottom of our practical procedure where we act aggressively upon the external world, seeking to get a hold on things, to fashion them, to overcome their resistance according to our purposes.

I need not dwell on the occasions—readily suggesting themselves to the reader—which confirm us in this conception, while at the same time they urgently demand a transformation of it which will make good its defects. Such are the change in the properties in which the nature of a determinate thing previously seemed to consist, and the observation that none belongs to the thing absolutely, but each only under conditions, with the removal of which it disappears. The more necessary the distinction in consequence becomes between the thing itself and its changeable

modes of appearance, the more pressing becomes the question, what it is that constitutes the thing itself, in abstraction from its properties. But I do not propose to dwell on the more obvious answers to this question any more than on the occasions which suggest it. Such are the statements that the Thing itself is that which is permanent in the change of these properties, that it is the uniting bond of their multiplicity, the fixed point to which changing states attach themselves and from which effects issue. All this is no doubt really involved in our ordinary conception of the Thing, but all this tells us merely how the true Thing behaves, not what it is. All that these propositions do is to formulate the functions obligatory on that which claims to be recognised as a Thing. They do not state what we want to know, viz. what the Thing must be in order to be able to perform these required functions. I reserve here the question whether and how far we may perhaps in the sequel be compelled, by lack of success in our attempts, to content ourselves with this statement of postulates. The object of ontological thinking is in the first instance to make the discovery on which the possibility of fulfilling the ontological problem depends—to discover the nature of that to which the required unity, permanence, and stability belong.

17. It is admitted that sensation is the single source from which we not only derive assurance of the reality of some Being, but which by the multiplicity of its distinguishable phenomena, homogeneous and heterogeneous, first suggests and gives clearness to the idea of a particular essence¹ which distinguishes itself from some other particular essence. It is quite inevitable therefore that we should attempt to think of the required essence² of things after the analogy of this sensible material, so far at any rate as is compatible with the simultaneous problem of avoiding everything which would disqualify sensations for adequately expressing this essence³.

¹ ['Die Vorstellung eines Was, das von einem andern Was sich unterscheidet,'] ² ['Was,'] ³ ['Wesen,']

This attempt has been resolutely made in the ontology of Herbart. To insist on the mere unity, stability, and permanence of Things, was a common-place with every philosophy which spoke of Things at all. It was then left to the imagination to add in thought some content to which these formal characteristics might be applicable. Herbart defines the content. A perfectly simple and positive quality, he holds, is the essence of every single thing, i. e. of every single one among those real essences, to the combinations of which in endless variety we are compelled by a chain of thought, of which the reader can easily supply the missing links, to reduce the seemingly independent 'Things' of ordinary perception. Now if Herbart allows that these simple qualities of Things remain completely unknown to us; that nothing comes to our knowledge but appearances flowing from them as a remote consequence, then any advantage that might otherwise be derived from his view would disappear unless we ventured to look for it in this, that his unknown by being brought under the conception and general character of quality would at least obtain an ontological qualification, by which it would be distinguished from a mere postulate, as being a concrete fulfilment of such postulate.

If however we try to interpret to ourselves what is gained by this subordination, we must certainly confess that Quality in its proper sense is presented to us exclusively in sensations, and in no other instances. Everything else which in a looser way of speaking we so call consists in determinate relations, which we gather up, it is true, in adjectival expressions and treat as properties of their subjects, but of which the proper sense can only be apprehended by a discursive comparison of manifold related elements, not in an intuition. There would be nothing in this, however, to prevent us from generalising the conception of Quality in the manner at which, to meet Herbart's view, we should have to aim. Our own senses offer us

impressions which do not admit of comparison. The colour we see is completely heterogeneous to the sound we hear or the flavour we taste. Just as with us, then, the sensations of the eye form a world of their own, into which those of the ear have no entry, so we are prepared to hold of the whole series of our senses that it is not a finished one, and to ascribe to other spirits sensations which remain eternally unknown to us, but of which, notwithstanding, we imagine that to those who are capable of them they would exhibit themselves with the same character of being vividly and definitely pictured, with which to us the sensations of colour, for instance, appear as revelations of themselves.

It is always difficult in the case of the simplest ideas by the help of words about them to represent the characteristic trait, scarcely expressible but by the ideas themselves, in virtue of which they satisfy certain strongly felt needs of thought. Still I trust to be sufficiently intelligible if I find in the character, just mentioned, of being presentable as a mental picture or image immediately without the help of a discursive process, the reason of our preference for apprehending the essence of a thing under the form of a simple quality. Just as the colour red stands before our consciousness, caring, so to speak, to exhibit nothing but itself, pointing to nothing beyond itself as the condition of its being understood, not constituting a demand that something should exist which has still to be found out, but a complete fulfilment; so it is thought that the super-sensible Quality of the Thing, simple and self-contained, would reveal its essence, not as something still to be sought for further back, but as finally found and present. And even when further reflection might be supposed to have shaken our faith in the possibility of satisfying this craving for an intuitive knowledge and limited us to laying down mere forms of thinking which determine what the essence of things is not; even then we constantly revert to this longing for the immediate presentability of this essence, which after

all can only be satisfied with the likeness of the *quaesitum* to a sensible quality. We may have to forego intuition ; but we feel its absence as an abiding imperfection of our knowledge.

18. That the demand in question must really be abandoned is not in dispute. Whatever eternal simple and super-sensible Quality we may choose to think of as the essence of the Thing, it will be said that, as a Quality, it always remains in need of a subject, to which it may belong. It may form a How, but not the What of the Thing. It will be something which the Thing has, not which it is.

This objection, familiar as it is to us all, with the new relation which it asserts between Subject and Quality, rests meanwhile on two grounds of which the first does not suffice to render impossible the previously assumed identity of the Thing with its simple quality. In our thought and in its verbal expression, the Qualities—red, sweet, warm—appear as generalities, which await many more precise determinations, in the way of shade, of intensity, of extension, and of form, from something which belongs to the nature of the individual case in which they are sensible, and thus not to the qualities themselves. We thus present them to ourselves in an adjectival form, as not themselves amounting to reality but as capable of being employed by the real, which lies outside them, through special adjustment to clothe its essence ; as a store of predicable materials, from which each thing may choose those suitable to the expression of its peculiar nature. Then of course the question is renewed as to the actual essence with which this nature of its own lies behind this surface of Quality.

But we must be on our guard against repeating in this connexion a question which in another form we have already disclaimed. We gave up all pretension of being able to find out how things are made and we confessed that the peculiar affirmation or ‘position,’ by which the real is eternally distinguishable from the thinkable, may indeed

be indicated by us—but that we cannot follow its construction as a process that is taking place. But it is precisely this objection that may now be brought up against us, that we are illegitimately attempting to construe that idea of the Thing, which must comprehend the simple supra-sensible Quality along with its reality, into the history of a process by which the two constituent ideas which make up the idea of the Thing—or rather the objects of these ideas—have come to coincide. For if we maintain the above objection in its full force—[the objection founded on the distinction between the Quality of the Thing and the Thing itself] and refuse to keep reverting to the supposition that some still more subtle quality constitutes the Thing itself, while a quality of the kind just objected to merely serves as a predicate of the Thing, the result will be that we shall have on the one side a Quality still only generally conceived, unlimited, and unformed, as it presents itself merely in thought and therefore still unreal; on the other side a ‘position’ which is still without any content, a reality which is as yet no one’s reality. It would be a hopeless enterprise to try to show how these two—such a quality and such a ‘position’—combine, not in our thought to produce an idea of the Thing, but in reality to produce the Thing itself.

This however was not what was meant by the view, which sought to identify the essence of the Thing with its simple supra-sensible Quality. It was emphatically not in the form of a still undetermined generality—not as the redness or sweetness which we think of, but obviously only in that complete determination, in which red or sweet can be the object of an actually present sensation—it was only in this form that the Quality, united with the ‘position’ spoken of, was thought of as identical with the essential Being (the *τί ἔστι*) of Things. It was not supposed that there had ever been a process by which the realities signified by these two constituent ideas had come to be united, or by which the

complete determinateness of the Quality as forming the essential Being of the Thing, had been elaborated as a secondary modification out of the previous indeterminateness of a general Quality. It is true, that in our usage of terms there unavoidably attaches to the word 'Quality' a notion of dependence, of its requiring the support of a subject beyond it; and it is this notion which occasions 'Quality' to be treated as synonymous with the German 'Eigenschaft¹.' But in truth this impression of its dependence issues only from the general abstraction of Quality, which we form in thought, and is improperly transferred to those completely determined qualities, which form the content of real feelings and constitute the occasions of these abstractions.

19. But, true as this defence of the view referred to may be, we still gain nothing by it. Undoubtedly, if a quality in the complete determinateness which we supposed, simple and unblended with anything else, formed an unchangeable object of our perception, we should have no reason to look for anything else behind it, for a subject to which it attached. But if we just now took this in the sense that this quality might in that case pass directly for the Thing itself, we must now subjoin the counter-remark that in that case, if nothing else were given, we should have no occasion at all to form the conception of a Thing and to identify that quality with it. For the impulse to form the conception and the second of the reasons which forbid the identification of the simple quality with the Thing, lie in the given change. The fact that those qualities which form the immediate objects of our perception, neither persist without change nor change without a principle of change, but always in their transition follow some law of consecutiveness, has led to the attempt to think of the Thing as the persistent subject of this change and of the felt qualities merely as predicates of which one gives place to the other.

¹ [lit. 'Property.']

Whether this attempt is justified at all—whether an entirely different interpretation of the facts of experience ought not to be substituted for it—is a question which we reserve as premature. For the present our business is only to consider in what more definite form this assumption of Things, in case it is to be retained, must be presented to thought, if it is to render that service to our cognition for the sake of which it is made; if, i.e., it is to make the fact of change thinkable without contradiction.

And in regard to this point I can only maintain that speculative philosophy, while trying to find a unity of essence under change, was wrong in believing that this unity was to be found in a simplicity, which in its nature is incapable of being a unity or of forming the persistent essence of the changeable. Change of a thing is only to be found where an essence a , which previously was in the state a^1 , remains identical with itself while passing into the state a^2 . In this connexion I still leave quite on one side the difficulties which lie in the conception, apparently so simple, of a state. For the present it may suffice to remark that we are obliged by the notion we attach to the term 'state' to say not that the essence is identically like¹ itself, but only that it is identical with itself, in its various states. For no one will deny that a , if it finds itself in the state a^1 , cannot be taken to be exactly like a^2 , without again cancelling the difference of the states, which has been assumed. All that we gain by the distinction, however, is, to begin with, two words. For the question still remains: In what sense can that at different moments remain identical with itself, which yet in one of these moments is not iden-

¹ ['*Gleichheit*,' used here, and in §§ 59 and 268, with a strict insistence on all that is involved in its meaning of equality; viz on the qualitative likeness, without which comparison by measurement is impossible. Thus in the places referred to the terms which are '*gleich*' are a and a , and neither 'equal' nor 'like' translates '*gleich*' adequately, it includes both. 'Identity' was used in *Logic*, § 335 ff., but will not do here, because of the contrast with the continued identity, '*Identität*,' imputed to a *thing*.]

tically like itself as it was in the other? It is scarcely necessary to remark how entirely unprofitable the answers are which in the ordinary course of thought are commonly given to this question ; such as, The essence always remains the same with itself, only the phenomenon changes ; the matter remains the same, the form alters ; essential properties persist, but many unessential ones come and go ; the Thing itself abides, only its states are variable. All these expressions presuppose what we want to know. We have here pairs of related points, of which one term corresponds in each case to the Thing a , the other is one of its states a^1 , a^2 . How can the first member a of these pairs be identical with itself, if the several second members are not identical with each other, and if, notwithstanding, the relation between the two members of each pair is to be maintained, in the sense that the second member, which is the Form, the Phenomenon, the State, is to be Form, Phenomenon, or State of the first member ?

So long as we are dealing with the compounded visible things of common perception, the pressure of this difficulty is but slight. In such cases we look upon a connected plurality of Predicates pqr , as the essence of a thing. This coherent stock may not only assume and again cast off variable additions, s and t , but it may in itself by the internal transposition of its components in qrp , $r pq$, $p r q$, experience something which we might call its own alteration in opposition to the mere variation of those external relations. Or finally it may be the form of combination that remains the same, while the elements themselves, p q and r , vary within certain limits. In these cases the imagination still finds the two sides of its object before it, and can ascribe to one of them the identity¹, to the other the difference². What justifies it in understanding the fluctuations of that which does not remain exactly like itself as a series of states of the Identical, is a question which is left to take

¹ ['Identität.']² ['Ungleichheit.']

care of itself. The difficulty involved in it comes plainly into view if we pass from the apparent things of perception to those which we might in truth regard as independent elements in the order of the Universe, and we think of each of these as determined by a simple quality, *a*. The simple, if it alters at all, alters altogether, and in the transition from *a* to *b*, there remains nothing over to which the essence would withdraw, as to the kernel that remains the same in the process of change. Only a succession, *abc*, of different essences—one passing away, the other coming into being—would be left, and with this disappearance of all continuity between the different appearances there would disappear the only reason which led us to regard them as resting on subject Things.

20. This inference cannot be invalidated by an objection which readily suggests itself and which I have here other reasons for noticing. It is to the instance of sensations that we must constantly revert, if we would explain to ourselves what supra-sensible Qualities really mean to us when we combine them with sensations under the common idea of Quality. Let us then take a simple Red colour, *a*, in which we find no mixture with other colours, still less a combination of other colours, as representing the manner in which the simple quality, *a*, of an essence would appear to us, if it were perceivable by the senses. It will then be argued as follow: If this Red passes into an equally simple Yellow, there still undoubtedly remains a common element, which we feel in both colours, though it is inseparable from *a* and *b*, the universal *C* of colour. Neither the redness in the red, nor that which makes the yellow what it is, has any existence either in fact or in thought apart from the luminous appearance in which the nature of colour consists, nor has this appearance any existence of its own other than in the redness or yellowness. On the contrary its whole nature shows itself now in one colour, now in the other. In the same way the essence of the thing will now be the per-

fectly simple *a*, now the equally simple *b*, without this implying a disappearance of the common *C*, the presence of which entitles us to regard *a* and *b* merely as its varying states or predicates. It would be idle to meet this argument by saying that the common element *C* of colour is only a product of our intellectual process of comparison; nay, not even such a product, but merely the name for the demand, simply unrealisable, which we make upon our intellect to possess itself of this common element presumed to be present in red and yellow, in detachment from both colours. For the fact, it may be replied, would still remain that we should not make this impracticable demand, if it were not felt in the perception of red and yellow, 'There is something there, which we look for though we do not find it as anything perceivable or separate, this common *C*, for which we have made the name colour.'

Now since we readily forego the pretension of apprehending the essence of things in the way of actual intuition, and confine ourselves to enquiring for the form of thought under which we have to conceive its unknown nature, we might certainly continue to look upon the comparison just stated as conveying the true image of the matter in hand, i.e. the image of that relation, in which the simple essence stands to its changeable states. We might at the same time regard this analogy of our sensations as a proof of the fact that the demand which we make upon the nature of things for an identity within the difference does not, as such, transgress the limits of the actually possible. In more detail the case might be put thus: What may be the look of that persistent *C*, which maintains itself in the change of the simple qualities of the Thing, of this it is true we have no knowledge, and we as little expect to know it as we insist on seeing the general colour *C*, which maintains itself in the transition from Red to Yellow. The mere fact, however, that in order to render this transition possible the continuous existence of this universal is not merely de-

manded without evidence by our thought, but is immediately testified to by sensation as plainly present though not separable from particular sensible objects—this proves to us that the continuance of a common element in a series of different and absolutely simple members is at any rate something possible, and not a combination of words to which no real instance could correspond.

21. The above will, I hope, have made plain the meaning of this rejoinder. I should wish ultimately to show that it is inapplicable, but before I attempt this, I may be allowed to avail myself of it for the purpose of more exactly defining certain points so as to save the necessity of enlarged explanations further on. When in our comparison we chose to pass from the simple quality red to another equally simple, to point to yellow as this second quality seemed a selection which might be made without hesitation. But sour or sweet might equally have presented themselves. It was only the former transition, however, (from red to yellow) which left something actually in common between the different members; while the second on the contrary (from red to sweet) would have left no other community than that which belongs to our subjective feeling as directed to those members. Our selection therefore was natural, for we knew what the point was at which we wished to arrive and allowed ourselves to be directed by this reference. The fact however that the other order of procedure is one which we can equally present to ourselves reminds us that the transition from one simple quality to another is not in every case possible without loss of the common element *C*. But this is no valid objection. It will be at once replied that in speaking of change it has always been understood that its course was thus limited to certain definite directions. No one who takes the essence of a thing to admit of change can think of it as changeable without measure and without principle. To do so would be again to abolish the very reason that compelled us to

assign the succession of varying phenomena to a real subject in the Thing; for that reason lay merely in the consecutiveness with which definite transitions take place while others remain excluded. The only sense therefore that has ever attached to the conception of change, the only sense in which it will be the object of our further consideration, is that in which it indicates transformations or movements of a thing within a limited sphere of qualities. Beyond this will be another equally limited sphere of qualities, forming the range within which another essence undergoes change, but it is understood that in change the thing never passes over from one sphere into the other. As regards the more precise definition of these spheres, our comparison with colours can only serve as a figure or illustration. As colour shifts to and fro from one of its hues to another, without ever approximating to sounds or passing into them, it serves well as a sensible image of that limitation of range which we have in view. But this does not settle the question whether the various forms $a^1 a^2 a^3 \dots$, into which the essence a might change now and again, are kinds of a common C only in the same sense in which the colours are so, or whether they are really connected with each other in some different form, which logical subordination under the same generic idea does not adequately symbolise.

22. It is time, however, to show the unsatisfactoriness of this attempt to justify a belief in the capacity for change on the part of a Thing, of which the essence was confined to a perfectly simple Quality. If our imagination ranges through the multiplicity of sensible qualities, it finds certain groups of these within which it succeeds in arresting a common element C , while beyond them it fails to do so. This was the point of departure of our previous argument. Passing from this consideration of an intellectual process to consideration of the Thing, we said; 'if the essence of a thing changes, the limitation within itself of such a sphere

of states affords it the possibility of completing its change within the sphere without loss of its abiding nature *C*. Only if it passed beyond these limits would all continuity disappear and a new essence take its place.' Very well; but what correspondence is there between these two 'if's' which we allowed to follow each other as if completely homogeneous? The former refers to a movement of our intellect. Meanwhile the object presented to the intellect stands before it completely unmoved. The general colour, of which we think, is not sometimes Red, sometimes Yellow, but is always simultaneously present in each of these colours and in each of the other hues, which we class together as equally external primary species of colour. In the Thing, however, the supposed *C* cannot be made so simply to stand towards the manifold $a^1 a^2 a^3$ in the relation of a universal kind to its species. Even were it the case that in respect of their nature $a^1 a^2 a^3$ admit of being regarded as species of *C*, still, *if* the thing changes, they are not contained in it, as in a universal *C*, with the eternal simultaneity of species that exist one along with the other. They succeed each other, and the essence *a*, if it is a^1 , for that reason excludes from itself a^2 and a^3 . Thus it is just this that remains to be asked, how that second *if* can be understood; how we are to conceive the state of the case by which it comes about that the thing moves—moves, if you like, within a circumscribed sphere of qualities $a^1 a^2 a^3 \dots$, but still within it does move, and so passes from one to the other of the qualities as that, being in the one, it excludes the others; how it is that it so moves while yet these qualities are the species of a universal *C*, eternally simultaneous and only differing as parts of a system. And, be it observed, we are at present not enquiring for a cause which produces this motion, but only how the essence *a* is to be thought of, in case the motion takes place. This question we cannot answer without coming to the conclusion that the change is not reconcilable with the assumption of a simple quality,

constituting this essence. At the moment when a has the form a^1 and in consequence excludes the forms a^2 and a^3 , it cannot without reservation be identified with a C , which includes $a^1 a^2 a^3$ equally in itself. It would have to be C^1 in order to be a^1 , C^2 in order to be a^2 , and the same course of changes which we wished to combine with a persistent simple quality would find its way backwards into this quality itself.

23. I could not avoid the appearance of idle subtlety if I pursued this course of thought without having shown that it is forced upon us. Why, it will be asked, do we trouble ourselves, out of obstinate partiality for the common view, to give a shape to the idea of the Thing in which it may include the capacity of change? Why do we not follow the enlightened view of men of science which finds no difficulty in explaining the multiplicity of phenomena by the help of changeable relations between unchangeable elements? There is the more reason for the question since this supposition not only forms the basis of the actual procedure of natural science but is precisely that for which Herbart has enforced respect on the part of every metaphysical enquirer.

Let us pursue it then in the definite form which this philosopher has given to it. According to him, not only as a matter of fact do elements, which undergo no change in the course of nature, underlie phenomena, but according to their idea the real essences, the true things which we have to substitute for the apparent things of perception, are unchangeably identical with themselves, each resting on itself, standing in need of no relation to each other in order to their Being, but for that reason the more capable of entering into every kind of relation to each other. Of their simple qualities we have no knowledge, but undoubtedly we are entitled to think of them as different from each other and even as opposed in various degrees without being obliged in consequence to transfer

any such predicates, supposing them to be found by our comparison, to the qualities themselves as belonging to their essence; as if, that is, some of the qualities were actively negated by others, and some were presupposed by and because of others. This admission made, let us suppose that two essences, *A* and *B*, come into that relation *M* to each other which Herbart describes as their being *together*. I postpone my remarks about the proper sense of this 'together.' All that we now know of it is that it is the condition under which what Herbart considers to be the indifference of essences towards each other ceases. Supposing them then to be '*together*,' it might happen that *A* and *B* without detriment to their simplicity might yet be representable by the compound equivalent expressions $\alpha + \gamma$ and $\beta - \gamma$. In that case the continuance of this state of being '*together*' would require the simultaneous subsistence of $+\gamma$ and $-\gamma$; i. e. the continuance of two opposites, which if we put them together in thought, seem necessarily to cancel each other. But they cannot really do so. Neither are the simple essences *A* and *B* according to their nature accessible to a change, nor are the opposite elements which our Thought, in its comparing process, might distinguish in them, actually separable from the rest, in combination with which they belong to two absolutely simple and indivisible Qualities.

'But, if this be so, nothing happens at all and everything remains as it is!' This is the explanation which Herbart expects to hear, but he adds that we only use such language because we are in full sail for the abyss which should have been avoided. I must however repeat it. What has taken place has been this. We, the thinkers, have imagined that from the contact of opposites there arose some danger for the continuance of the real essences. We have then reminded ourselves that their nature is inaccessible to this danger. Thus it has been we who have maintained the *conception* of the real essence in its integrity against the

falsification which would have invaded it in every attempt to account its object capable of being affected by any disturbance from without. This has taken place in our thought, but in the essence itself nothing has in fact happened. The name of self-maintenance, which Herbart gives to this behaviour on the part of the Things, can at this stage of his theory as yet mean nothing but the completely undisturbed continuance of that which in its nature is inaccessible to every disturbance that might threaten it. An activity issuing from the essences, a function exercised by them, it indicates as little as a real event which might occur to them. And just for this reason the multiplicity of kinds and modes, in which Herbart would have it that this self-maintenance takes effect, cannot really exist for it. The undisturbed continuance is always the same, and except the variation of the external relations, through which the so-called 'being together' of the essences is brought about and again annulled, nothing new whatever in consequence of this being 'together' happens in the universe.

24. Quite different from this sense of self-maintenance, which Herbart himself expressly allows in the *Metaphysic*, is that other sense in which he applies the same conception in the *Psychology*. Only the investigator of Nature could have satisfied himself with the conclusion just referred to. For him the only concern is to ascertain the external processes, on which for us the change in the qualitatively different properties of things as a matter of fact depends. It is no part of his task to enquire in what way these processes, supposing them to take place, bring it about that there is such a thing as an appearance to us. If it is the belief of the students of Natural Science that the theory, which regards all those processes as mere changes in the relations of elements themselves unchangeable, is adequate for its purpose—though in the sequel I shall have to deny that according to this way of presenting the case any but an incomplete view even of the course of external nature is

possible—yet for the present I am ready to allow that there may be apparent success upon this method in the attempt to eliminate all changes on the part of the real itself from the course of the outer world.

But this only renders the admission of change a yet more inevitable necessity, if we bear in mind that the *entire* order of the universe which forms the object of Metaphysical enquiry includes the origin of the phenomenon in us no less than the external processes which are its *de facto* conditions. Thus, if the physical investigator explains the qualitative change of things as mere appearance, the metaphysician has to consider how an appearance is possible. Herbart is quite right—and I do not for the present trouble myself with the reproaches which might be brought against this point of his doctrine—in assuming the simple real essence of the soul as the indispensable subject, for which alone an appearance can arise. Whereas in regard to no other real essence do we know in what its self-maintenance consists, this, according to him, is clear in regard to the soul. Each of its primary acts of self-maintenance, he holds, has the form of an idea, i. e. of a simple sensation. Between these aboriginal processes there take place a multitude of actions and reactions, from which is supposed to result, in a manner which we need not here pursue in detail, the varied whole of the inner life. These acts of self-maintenance on the part of the soul, however—consisting at one time in a sensation, at another in the hearing of a sound; now in the perception of a flavour, now in that of warmth—are manifestly no longer simple continuations of the imperturbable essence of the soul. Taking a direction in kind and form according to the kind and form of the threatening disturbance, they are functions, activities, or reactions of the soul, which are not possible to an unchangeable but only to a changeable Being. For it is not in a merely threatened disturbance but only in one which has actually taken effect that the ground can lie of the definite reaction,

which ensues at every moment to the exclusion of many others that, as far as the nature of the soul goes, are equally possible for it. In order to be able to meet the threatened disturbance a by an act of self-maintenance α , the other disturbance b by another act β , the soul must take some note of the fact that at the given moment it is a and not b , or b and not a , that demands the exercise of its activity. It must therefore itself suffer in both cases, and differently in one case from the other. This change on its own part—I say change, for it would be useless to seek to deny that various kinds of suffering are inconceivable without various kinds of change on the part of the subject suffering—cannot be replaced by the mere change in the relations between the soul unchanged in itself, and other elements. Any such relation would only be a fact for a second observer, which might awaken in him the appearance of a change taking place in the observed soul, which in reality does not take place: but even for this observer the appearance could only arise, if he on his own part at least actually possessed that capability of change which in the observed soul he holds to be a mere appearance.

It is therefore quite impossible entirely to banish the inner liability to change on the part of the real from an explanation of the course of the universe. If it were feasible to exclude it from a theory of the outer world, it would belong the more inevitably to the essence of that real Being, for which this outer world is an object of perception. But, once admitted in this position, it cannot be a self-evident impossibility for the real elements, which we regard as the vehicles of natural operations. That, on the contrary, it is a necessity even for these, we shall try to show later on.

Our consideration of the question, however, so far rests on a certain supposition; on the necessity, in order to render the fact of appearance intelligible, of conceiving a simple real subject, the soul. There is no need for me here to justify this assumption against the objections which are

specially directed against it. It is no object of our enquiry, so far, to decide whether the conception of Things is tenable at all; whether it does not require to be superseded by another conception. I repeat; it is only *in case* Things are to be taken to exist and to serve to make the world intelligible, that we then enquire in what way they must be thought of. And to that question we have given the answer that Essence, Thing or Substance, can only be that which admits of Change. Only the predicates of Things are unchangeable. They vary indeed in their applicability to Things, but each of them remains eternally the same with itself. It is only the Things that change, as they admit of and reject now one predicate, now another. This thought indeed is not new. It has already been expressly stated by Aristotle. For us, however, it necessarily raises at once questions that are new.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Real and Reality¹.

25. THE changes which we see going on, and the consecutiveness which we believe to be discoverable in them, compelled us to assume the existence of Things, as the sustainers or causes of this continuity. The next step was, if possible, to ascend from that which needs explanation to the unconditioned, in regard to which only recognition is possible. For this purpose we tried to think of the Thing as unchangeably the same with itself, and, impressed with the need of assimilating the idea of it as much as possible to what is contained in sensation, since sensation alone actually gives us an independent something instead of merely requiring it, we took its nature to consist in a simple quality. We convinced ourselves, however, that an unchangeable and simple quality is not thinkable as a subject of changeable states or appearances, and thus we are compelled to give up the claim to any such immediate cognition as might reveal the essence of Things to us in a simple perception. I do not mean to imply by this that we should have hoped really to attain this perception. But we indulged the thought that, for such a spirit as might be capable of it, there would be nothing in the essence of Things incompatible with their being thus apprehended. This conviction in its turn we have now to abandon. In its very nature that which is to be a Thing in the sense of

¹ ['Von dem Realen und der Realität.']

being a subject of change would repel the possibility of being presented as an unmoving object of any intuition. A new form has therefore to be sought for that which is to be accounted the essence of any Thing; and in order to find it we again take our departure from that natural theory of the world which without doubt has tried answers of its own to all these questions that are constantly re-asserting themselves with fresh insistence.

26. In regard to the common objects of perception we answer the question, What are they? in two ways, of which one soon reduces itself to the other. Products of art, which exhibit a purpose on the part of a maker, we denote by reference to the end for which they are intended, setting aside the variety of forms in which they fulfil that end. The changeable products of nature, in the structure of which a governing purpose is more or less obscure to us, we characterise according to the kind and order of phenomena into which they develop of themselves or which could be elicited from them by external conditions. In both cases by the essence of the thing that we are in quest of we understand the properties and modes of procedure, by which the Thing is distinguished from other things. The other series of answers, on the contrary, exhibits as this essence the material out of which the things are made, overlooking the various kinds of behaviour and existence to which in the case of each thing the particular formation of this material gives rise. Yet after all this second mode of answering the question ultimately passes over into the former. It satisfies only so long as it consists in a reduction of a compound to more simple components. Supposing us to have discovered this simple matter, how then do we answer the question, What after all is the simple matter itself? What for instance is the Quicksilver, of which we will suppose ourselves to have discovered that something else consists of it? So long as our concern was to reduce this other thing to it, it was taken for some-

thing simple. But itself in its simplicity, what is it? We find it fluid at our ordinary temperatures, fixed at lower temperatures, vaporous at higher ones; but we could not say what it is in itself, supposing it not to be acted on by any of these external conditions or by any of the other conditions, under which its phenomenal properties change in yet other ways.

We can in fact only answer, that it is in itself the unassignable something, which under one condition appears as α^1 , under another as α^2 , under a third as α^3 , and of which we assume that, if these conditions succeed each other in reverse order, it will pass again from α^3 into α^2 and α^1 , without ever being converted into β^1 , β^2 or β^3 —forms which in a like mutual connexion exhibit the various phenomena of another thing, say Silver. Thus, it may be stated as a general truth, that our idea of that which makes a Thing what it is consists only in the thought of a certain regularity with which it changes to and fro within a limited circle of states whether spontaneously or under visible external conditions, without passing out of this circle, and without ever having an existence on its own account and apart from any one of the forms which within this circle it can assume. This way of presenting the case, while fully sufficient for the needs of ordinary judgment, has given occasion to various further metaphysical experiments.

27. If attention is directed to the qualities by which one Thing distinguishes itself from another, its essence in this sense cannot any longer be thought of as object of a simple perception, but only in the logical form of a conception, which expresses the permanently uniform observance of law in the succession of various states or in the combination of manifold predicates. From this point a very natural course of thought leads us to two ways of apprehending the Thing. We may define it first by the collective marks, which at a given moment it exhibits, in their *de facto* condition. This gives us a statement of what the essence

is, τὸ τί ἐστὶ according to Aristotle's expression. But it would be conceivable that, like two curves which have an infinitely small part of their course in common, so two different things, *A* and *B*, should coincide in the momentary condition of their marks, but should afterwards diverge into paths of development as different as were the paths that brought them to the state of coincidence. In that case the essence of each will be held only to be correctly apprehended, if the given condition of each is interpreted as the result of that which it previously was, and at the same time as the germ of that which it will be. This seems the natural point of departure from which Aristotle arrived at the formula τί ἦν εἶναι. He did not complete it by the other equally valuable τί ἔσται εἶναι, though the notion that might have been so expressed was not alien to his way of thinking. In practice, it must be admitted, these determinations of the idea of the Thing, which theoretically are of interest, cannot be carried through. Even the actual present condition of a Thing would not admit of exhaustive analysis, without our thinking of the mutual connexion between the manifold phenomena which it exhibits, as already specifically ordered according to the same law which would appear still more plainly upon a consideration of the various states, past and to be expected, of the Thing. The second formula therefore only gives general expression to the intention of constantly gaining a deeper view of the essence of the Things, in a progression which admits of indefinite continuance, while a fuller regard is for ever being paid to the multiplicity of the different ways in which the Thing behaves under different conditions, to its connexion with the rest of the world, and lastly—according to a direction of enquiry very natural, though still out of place in this part of *Metaphysics*—to the final purpose of which the fulfilment is the Thing's vocation in the universe. As a means of setting aside the difficulties, which beset us at this point, the expressions

referred to have not in fact been used, nor do they seem at all available for the purpose.

28. We proceed to particularise some of these. Had we succeeded in making the essential idea of a thing so completely our own, that all modes of procedure of the thing under all conditions would flow from the idea self-evidently as its necessary consequences, we should after all in so doing have only attained an intellectual image of that by which as by its *essentia* the Thing is distinguished from everything else. The old question would repeat itself, what it is which makes the thing itself more than this its image in thought, or what makes the object of our idea of the thing more than thinkable, and gives it a place as a real thing in the world. Just as the Quality demanded a Subject to which it might attach, so still more does the idea, less independent than the quality, seem to require a fixed kernel to give its matter that reality which, as the material contained in an idea, it does not possess. If we have once forbidden ourselves to look for the essence of the Thing in a simple uniform quality that may be grasped in perception; if we resolved rather to find an expression for it in the law which governs the succession of its phenomena; then that which we are in quest of has to fulfil for all things the same indistinguishable function. Itself without constituent qualities it has to give reality to the varying qualities constituent of things. We are thus brought to the notion of a material of reality, a Real pure and simple¹, which in itself is neither this nor that, but the principle of reality for everything.

The history of Philosophy might recount numerous forms under which this notion has been renewed; but it is needless to treat them here in detail. The natural requirements of the case have always led, when once this path has been entered on, to the same general determinations as Plato assigned to this *ὄλῃ*. The consideration that observation

¹ ['Eines Wirklichkeitstoffes, eines Realen schlechthin.']

presents us with an indefinite number of mutually independent Things, permanent or transitory, caused this primary matter of all things to be regarded by the imagination as divisible, in order that there might be a piece of it in each single thing, sufficient to stiffen the thing's ideal content into reality¹. But this conception of divisibility in its turn had to be to a certain extent withdrawn. For it would imply that before its division the matter has possessed a continuity, and this would be unthinkable without the assumption of its having properties of some kind, by which it would have been possible for this material of reality to be distinguished from other thinkable materials. But thus understood, as already definitely qualified, it would not have disposed of the metaphysical question which it was meant to solve. For the question was not, what quality of primary matter as a matter-of-fact formed the basis of the individual things that fashion themselves out of it, but what it is that is needed to help any and every thinkable quality to be more than thinkable, to be real. If therefore the imagination did notwithstanding, as we do not doubt that it did, present this ultimate Real to itself mainly as a continuous and divisible substance, this delineation of it, occasioned by reference to the observation of natural objects, strictly speaking went beyond that which in this connexion it was intended to postulate. All that had to be supposed was the presence in every single thing, however many things there might be, of such a kernel of reality, wholly void of properties. There were therefore according to this notion an indefinite number of instances of this conception of the real, but they did not stand in any connexion with each other any more than in any other case many instances of a general idea, merely because they are all subordinate to that idea, stand in any actual connexion with each other. But I will not continue this line of remark; for the obscurity of this whole conception

¹ ['Realer Wirklichkeit.' Cp. Logic, sect. 347.]

is not to be got rid of by criticism, but by pointing out its entire uselessness.

29. It is manifest that a representation which has its value in the treatment of ordinary objects of experience, has been applied to a metaphysical question, which it is wholly insufficient to answer. In sensuous perception we are presented with materials, which assume under our hands such forms as we will, or are transformed by operations of nature into things of the most various appearance. But a little attention informs us that they are but relatively formless and undetermined. The possibility of assuming new forms and of manifold transmutation they all owe to the perfectly determinate properties which they possess, and by which they offer definite points of contact to the conditions operating on them. The wax, which to the ancients represented the primary matter on which the ideas were supposed to be impressed in order to their realisation, would not take this impression, and would not retain the form impressed on it but for the peculiar unelastic ductility and the cohesion of its minute parts, and any finer material which we might be inclined to substitute for it, though it might possess a still more many-sided plasticity, would at the same time be still less capable of preserving the form communicated to it.

It is therefore a complete delusion to hope by this way of ascent to arrive at something which, without any qualification on its own part, should still bear this character of pure receptivity, necessary to the Real we are in quest of. After all we should only arrive at a barren matter *R*, which would be equally incapable of receiving a definite shape, and of duly retaining it when received. For that which was without any nature of its own different from anything else, could not be acted on by any condition *p* at all, nor by any condition *q* otherwise than by another *q*. No position of circumstances therefore would ever occur under which that indeterminate subject *R* could be any more compelled or entitled to assume a certain form *π* rather than any other

we like, κ . If we supposed however this unthinkable event to come about and R to be brought into the form π , there would be nothing to move it to the retention of this form to the exclusion of any other, κ , since every other would be equally possible and equally indifferent to it. In this absence of any resistance, which could only rest on some nature of R 's own, every possibility of an ordered course of the world would disappear. In every moment of time everything that was thinkable at all would have an equal claim to reality, and there would be none of that predominance of one condition over another which is indispensable to account for any one state of things or to bring about a determinate change of any state of things. But not only would any origin or preservation of individual forms be reduced to nothing by the complete absence of qualities on the part of the Real. The relation itself, which at each moment must be supposed to obtain between it and the content to which it gives reality, would from a metaphysical point of view be unmeaning. Words no doubt may be found by which to indicate it metaphorically. We speak of the properties which constitute the whole essence of a Thing, as inhering in the unqualified substance of the Real, or as attaching to it, or as sustained by it. But all these figurative expressions with the use of which language cannot dispense, are in contradiction with the presupposed emptiness and formlessness of the matter. Nothing can sustain anything, or allow it to attach to or depend upon itself, which does not by its own form and powers afford this other points of contact and support. Or, to speak without a figure, it is impossible to see what inner relation could be meant, if we ascribed to a certain Real a property π or a group of properties π as its own. R would be as void of relation to the property or group of properties, as alien to it, as any other R^1 .

30. These shortcomings on the part of the conception of the Real would make themselves acutely felt as soon as an

attempt was made, not merely to set it up in isolated abstraction, but to turn it to account for the actual explanation of the course of things. It would then become evident that nothing could be built on it which had any likeness to a Static or Mechanic of change. But it will be objected that we are fighting here against ghosts raised by ourselves, so long as we speak of processes by which the connexion of the real with the qualities it contains is supposed for the first time to have come about. This, however, it will be said, is what has never been meant. Even the ancients, who originated the conception of matter in question, we find were aware that at no place or time did the naked and unformed matter exist by itself. It had existed from eternity in union with the Forms, by means of which the different Things, now this, now that, had been fashioned out of it. In the plainest way it was stated that, taken by itself, it was rather without being, a $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon$, and that Being first arose out of its indefeasible union with the qualitative content supplied by the Ideas. This may be fairly urged, and in this explanation we might perfectly acquiesce, if it were one that really admitted of being taken at its word. If it were so taken, it would amount simply to a confession that what the theory understood and looked for under the designation of the Real is nothing more than the 'Position,' throughout inseparable from the constituent qualities of Being, by which these qualities not merely are thought of but *are*; and that consequently it would be improper for this 'Position,' which only in thought can be detached as the uniform mode of putting forth from that which is put forth by it, to be regarded in a substantive character as itself a something, a Real, the truly existing Thing; improper that, compared with it, everything which on other grounds we took to form the essence of the Thing, should be forced into the secondary position of an unessential appendage.

The doctrines, however, which speak of the real material of Being, are far from conveying this unreserved admission

even in the explanation adduced. On the contrary, they continue to interpret the distinction between the principle that gives reality and the real itself as if it represented something actual. When they ascribe to the matter, which has no independent existence, successive changes of form, they do not merely mean by this that the inexplicable 'Position' passes from the content π to the other content κ . In that case all that would be attained would be a succession, regulated or unregulated, of states of fact without inner connexion. Their object rather is to be able to treat the matter R as the really permanent connecting member which experiences π and κ , or exchanges the one for the other, as states of itself, and which, in virtue of its own nature, forbids the assumption of other phenomena ϕ and ψ , or the realisation of another order of succession. Without this last addition the conception of the Real R would not, upon this view any more than upon other, have any value. For I repeat, it is only under the obligation of explaining a particular consecutiveness in the course of the world, which does not allow any and every thinkable variation in the state of facts, that we are constrained, instead of resting in the phenomena, to look for something behind them under the name of the Real, however that is to be conceived. A flux of absolute becoming without any principle, once allowed, demands no explanation and needs no assumption to be made which could lead to such an explanation, intrinsically impossible, as the one given. The doctrines in question, therefore, under the guidance of this natural need which they think to satisfy by the supposition of the Real pure and simple, do not in fact make the admission which they seem to make. Although their 'matter' R nowhere exists in its nakedness, this is, so to speak, only a fact in the world's history, which need not follow from the idea of R . Although as a matter of fact everywhere imprisoned in variously qualified forms, still in all those forms R continues to exist as the single self-subsistent independent Being and

imparts its own reality to the content which changes in dependence on it. Thus the matter, considered by itself and in detachment from the forms in which it appears, is still not properly, as it is called, a $\mu\eta\ \delta\nu$, but according to the proper sense even of the doctrines which so designate it, merely an $\sigma\iota\kappa\ \delta\nu$, if weight may be laid on the selection of these expressions. And against this permanent residuum of the doctrine of the $\delta\lambda\eta$ the objections already made retain their force. It is impossible to transfer the responsibility of providing for the reality of the determinate content to a Real without content, understood in a substantive sense, for none of the connecting thoughts are possible which would be needed in order to bring this Real into the desired relation with the qualities assigned to it.

31. I cannot therefore believe that interpreters, as they went deeper into this ancient notion of an empty Real as such, of an existing nothing which yet purports to be the ground of reality to all definite Being, would find in it a proportionately deeper truth. To us it is only an example of an error of thought, which is made too often and too easily not to deserve an often-repeated notice. If we ask whence the colour of a body proceeds, we usually think at first of a pigment which we suppose to communicate the colour to it. And in this we are often right; for in compound things it may easily be that a property, which seems to be spread over the whole of them, attaches only to a single constituent. But we are wrong already in as far as our phrase implies that the pigment communicates its colour to the whole body. Nothing of the sort really happens, but a combination of physical effects brings it about that in our sensation the impression of colour produced by the pigment completely disguises the other impression, which would have been produced by the other constituents of the body, that have throughout remained colourless. But when we repeat our question, it appears that the same answer cannot always be repeated. The pigment cannot owe its colour to a new

pigment. Sooner or later the colouring must be admitted as the immediate result of the properties which a body possesses on its own account as its proper nature, and does not borrow from anything else.

Our procedure has been just the same with reference to the things and their reality. We desired to know whence their common property of reality is derived, and in imagination introduced into each of them a grain of the stuff of reality which we supposed to communicate to the properties gathered about it the fixedness and consistency of a Thing. What actual behaviour, however, or what process this expression of 'communication' so easily used, is to signify, remained more than we could say. In fact, just as little as a pigment would really convey its colouring to anything else, could the mere presence of the Real convey the reality, which is emphatically held to be peculiar to it, to an essence in the way of qualities, which, we are to suppose, have somehow grouped themselves around it. Indeed, the metaphysical representation is in much worse case than that which we made use of in the example just instanced. For of the pigment we did not dream that it was itself not merely colourless, but in its nature completely indifferent to the various colours that may be thought of, and that it proceeded to assume one of them as if the colours, before they were properties of a thing, already possessed a reality which enabled them to enter into a relation to bodies and to let themselves be assumed by bodies. In this case we were aware that the Redness, which we ascribe to the pigment, is the immediate result of its own nature under definite circumstances ; that it could not exist, that nothing could have it, until these circumstances acted on this nature, and that it would change if the body, instead of being what it is, were another equally determinate body. But in our metaphysical language, when we spoke of the properties in opposition to the real essence of things, we in fact spoke as if the thinkable qualities, by which one thing is distin-

guished from another, before they really existed as qualities of a Thing might already possess a reality which should enable them to enter into a definite relation to an empty Real—a relation by which, without having any foundation more than all other qualities in the nature of this Real, it was possible for them to become *its* properties.

I leave this comparison, however, to be pursued on another occasion. Apart from figure, our mistake was this. We demanded to know what it is on which that reality or Being of Things which makes them Things¹ rests. By way of answer we invented the Substantive conception of the Real pure and simple, and believed that by it we had represented a real object, or rather the ultimate Real itself. In fact however *real* is an adjectival or predicative conception, a title belonging to everything that in some manner not yet explained behaves as a Thing—changes, that is to say, in a regular order, remains identical with itself in its various states, acts and suffers; for it is this that we assumed to be the case with Things, *supposing that there are Things*. The question was, on what ground this actual behaviour rests. It is a question that cannot be settled by thinking of our whole requirement as satisfied in general by the assumption of a Real as such, of which after all, as has been shown, we could not point out how in each single case it explains the reality which itself is never presented to us as universal and homogeneous, but only as a sum of innumerable different individual cases.

The conception of the Real therefore is liable to a criticism similar to though somewhat different from that which is called for by the conception of pure Being. This latter we found correctly formed, but inapplicable, so long as the definite relations are not made good again, which had been suppressed in it by the process of abstraction. Of the conception of the Real on the contrary it may be maintained that it is untruly formed. That which is conceived

¹ ['Das dinghafte Sein der Dinge, ihre Realitat.']

in this conception everywhere presupposes the subject to which it may belong, and cannot itself be subject. For this reason it cannot be spoken of in substantive form as the Real, but only applied adjectivally to all that is real. It would be well if the usage of language favoured this way of speaking, more lengthy though it is, in order to keep the thought constantly alive that it is not through the presence of a Real in them that Things become or are real, but that primarily they are only called real if they exhibit that mode of behaviour which we denominate reality. In regard to this we have stated what we mean by it. The mode under which it may be thinkable has still to be ascertained.

32. With a view to answering the above question we are naturally led to the opposite path to that hitherto pursued. Let us see how far it will take us. The two incomplete ideas, by the union of which we form the conception of the Thing—that of the content by which it is distinguished from other things and that of its reality—cannot be any longer taken to represent two actually separable elements of its Being. The Reality must simply be the form in which the content actually exists, and can be nothing apart from it. But the requirement that this should be so meets at once with a serious objection. So long as we could answer the question *What* the Thing is by calling it a simple quality, we had a uniform content, apprehensible in intuition, before us, to which it seemed, to begin with at least, that the 'Position' of reality might be applied without contradiction. We have now decided that this essence is only to be found in a law, according to which the changeable states, properties or phenomena, $\alpha^1 \alpha^2 \alpha^3$ of the thing, are connected with each other. But how could a law be that which, if simply endowed with reality, would constitute a thing? How could it be gifted with those modes of behaviour which we demand of whatever claims to be a Thing?

This question involves real difficulty, but it also expresses doubts which merely arise from a scarcely avoidable imper-

fection in our linguistic usage. The first of these doubts is analogous to that which we raised against the simple Quality as essence of the Thing, and which we found to have no justification. As long as we thought of the Quality in the way presented to us in language by adjectives, as a generality abstracted from many instances, distinct indeed from other qualities but undetermined in respect of intensity, extent and limitation; so long it could not be accepted as the essence of a Thing. After all the determinateness still lacking to it had been made good, it might have been so accepted, if the necessary requirement of capability of change had not prevented this. In like manner the conception of law is at the outset understood in a similar general sense. Abstracted from a comparison between the modes of behaviour of different things, it represents primarily the rule, according to which from a definite general class of conditions a definite class of results is derived. The rule indeed is such that there is a permanent proportion according to which definite changes in the results correspond to definite changes in the conditions; but the cases in which the law will hold good, and the determined values of the conditions which give rise in each of these cases to equally determined values on the part of the effects—these are not contained in the law itself or contained in it only as possibilities which are thought of along with it, but of which it asserts none as a fact. In this shape a law cannot be that of which the immediate reality, even if it were thinkable, would form a Thing. But this is not what is meant by the theories which employ such an expression [which identify thing and law]. What they have in view, to put it shortly, is not a general law but an instance of its application. This latter expression, however, needs further explanation and limitation.

33. If in the ordinary general expression of a law, for all quantities left indefinite, we substitute definite values, it is not our habit, it is true, to call the individual instance thus

obtained any longer a law at all, because unless we revert to the general form of which it is an application it is no longer fitted to serve as a ground of judgment upon other like cases, and this assistance in reasoning is the chief service which in ordinary thinking we expect from a law. Intrinsically, however, there is no such real difference between the individual instance and the universal as would forbid us from subsuming the former under the name of Law. On the contrary, it is itself what it is in respect of its whole nature only in consequence of the law, and conversely the law has no other reality but in the case of its application. It is therefore a legitimate extension of the usage of terms, if we apply the name of a law to the definite state of facts itself, which includes a plurality of relations between elements which are combined according to the dictates of the general law. It may be the general law of a series of quantities that each sequent member is the n^{th} power of the preceding one. It is not, however, in this general form that the law forms a series. We have no series till we introduce in place of n a definite value, and at the same time to give to some one of the members, say the first, a definite quantitative value. Applying this to our present case, the general law would correspond only to the abstract conception of a *Thing as such*; the actual series on the other hand, which this law governs, to the conception of some individual Thing. And it is only in this latter sense as corresponding to the actual series that it can be intended to represent a law as being the essence to which 'Position' as a Thing belongs.

Upon this illustration two remarks have to be added. In our parallel the definite series appears as an example of a general law, of which innumerable other examples are equally possible. It may turn out in the sequel that this thought has an equally necessary place in the metaphysical treatment of things; but at this point it is still foreign to our enquiry. It does not belong to that essence of a thing

of which we are here in quest, that the law which orders its content should apply also to the content of other things. On the contrary, it is completely individual and single of its kind, distinguishing this thing from all other things. On this point we are often in error, misled by the universal tendency to construct reality out of the abstractions, which the reality itself has alone enabled us to form. The course, which investigation cannot avoid taking, thoroughly accustoms us to look on general laws as the *Prius*, to which the manifold facts of the real world must afterwards, as a matter of course, subordinate themselves as instances. We might, however, easily remind ourselves that as a matter of fact all general laws arise in our minds from the comparison of individual cases. These are the real *Prius*, and the general law which we develop from them is primarily only a product of our thought. Its validity in reference to many cases is established by the experiences from the comparison of which it has arisen, and is established just so far as these confirm it. Had our comparison, instead of being between one thing and other things, been a comparison of a thing with itself in various states—and that is the sort of comparison to which alone our present course of enquiry would properly lead—then it would by no means have been self-evident that the consecutiveness and conformity to law, which we had found to obtain between the successive states of the one thing, must be transferable to the relations between any other elements whatever they might be, and thus to the states and nature of another thing. We should have no right therefore to regard the essence of the Thing as an instance of a universal law to which it was subject. At the same time it is obvious that this law of the succession of states in a single thing, wholly individual as it is, if it were apprehended in thought, would continue logically to present itself to us as an idea, of which there might be many precisely similar copies. It is quite possible to attempt to make plurals even of the idea of

the universe and of the supreme Being. It is considerations in a different region, not logical but material, that alone exclude the possibility of there being such plurals; and it is these alone which in our Metaphysic can in the sequel decide for or against the multiplicity of precisely similar things, for or against the validity of universal laws which they have to obey. To make my meaning clearer, I will supplement the previous illustration of a numerical series by another. We may compare the essence of a thing to a melody. It is not disputed that the successive sounds of a melody are governed by a law of æsthetic consecutiveness, but this law is at the same time recognised as one perfectly individual. There is no sense in regarding a particular melody as a kind, or instance of the application, of a general melody. Leaving to the reader's reflection the task, which might be a long one, of making good the shortcomings from which this illustration, like the previous one, suffers, I proceed to the second supplementary remark which I have to make.

If we develop a general law from the comparison of different things under different circumstances, two points are left undetermined—one, the specific nature of the things, the other, the particular character of the conditions under which the things will behave in one way or in another. Let both points be determined, and we arrive at that result, identical with itself and unchangeable, which we represented by comparison with a definite series of quantities, but which cannot answer our purpose—the purpose of apprehending that essence of the Thing which remains uniform in change. We have therefore, as already remarked, only to carry out the comparison of a thing with itself in its various states. The consecutiveness and conformity to law, that would thus appear, would be the individual law or essence of the Thing in opposition to the changeable conditions that have now to be left undetermined. One more misunderstanding I should like to get

rd of in conclusion. It is no part of our present question whether and how this comparison and the discovery of the abiding law is possible for us with reference to any particular thing. Our problem merely is to find the form of thought in which its essence could be adequately apprehended supposing there to be no hindrance in the nature of our cognition and in its position towards Things to the performance of the process. The same reserve is made by every other metaphysical view. Even the man who looks for the essence of the Thing in a simple Quality does not expect to know that Quality and therefore satisfies himself with establishing the general form in which it would appear to him, but denies himself the prospect of ever looking on this appearance.

34. So much for those objections to the notion of a law as constituting the essence of the Thing, which admit of being set aside by an explanation of our meaning. In fact, *if* we thought of the 'Position' which conveys reality as lighting upon this individual law, it would form just that permanent yet changeable essence¹ of a Thing which we are in search of. The reader, however, will find little satisfaction in all this. The question keeps recurring whether after all that 'Position' of reality, applied to this content, can in fact exhaustively constitute the essence of a real Thing; whether we have not constantly to search afresh for the something which, while following this law, would convey to it—convey to what is in itself a merely thinkable mode of procedure—reality? In presence of this constantly recurring doubt I have no course but to repeat the answer which I believe to be certainly true. Let us, in the first place, recall the fact that in what we are now asking for there is something intrinsically unthinkable. We are not satisfied with the doctrine that the Thing *is* an individual law. We believe that we gain something by assuming of it that in its own nature it is something more and other

¹ ['Das beständige und dennoch veränderliche Was.']

than this, and that its conformity to this law, by which it distinguishes itself from everything else, is merely its mode of procedure.

Can we however form any notion of what constitutes the process which we indicate by this familiar name of conformity to law? If this nucleus of reality, which we deem it necessary to seek for, possessed a definite nature, alien to that which the law enjoins, how could it nevertheless come to adjust itself to the law? And if we would assume that there are sundry conditions of which the operation upon it might compel it to such obedience, would this compulsion be itself intelligible, unless its own nature gave it the law that upon these conditions supervening it should obey that other law supposed to be quite alien to its nature? In any case that which we call conformity to law on the part of a Thing would be nothing else than the proper being and behaviour of the Thing itself. On the other side: What exactly are we to take the laws to be before they are conformed to? What sort of reality, other than that of the Things, could belong to them, such as they must certainly have if it is to be possible for a nature of Things, assumed hitherto to lie beyond them, to adjust itself to them? There is only one answer possible to these questions. It is not the case that the things follow a mode of procedure which would in any possible form be actually separable from them. Their procedure is whatever it may be, and by it they yield the result which we afterwards, upon reflective comparison, conceive as their mode of procedure and thereupon endow in our thought with priority to the Things themselves, as if it were the pattern after which they had guided themselves. If we would avoid this conclusion by denying to the required nucleus of the Thing any nature of its own, we should be brought back to that conception of the absolute Real, *R*, which we have already found so useless. Even if this real Nothing were itself thinkable, it would certainly not be capable of distributing the reality,

which it is supposed to have of its own, over the content which forms the essence of a determinate Thing. It could not therefore represent our *quaesitum*, the something of which we require a so-called conformity to a determinate mode of procedure. There is therefore, it is clear, nothing left for us but to attempt to defend the proposition, that the real Thing is nothing but the realised individual law of its procedure.

35. I shall be less wearisome if I connect my further reflections on the subject with an historical antithesis of theories. Idealism and Realism have always been looked upon as two opposite poles of the movement of philosophical thought, each having different though closely connected significations, according as the enquiry into what really is, or the reference to that which is to be valued and striven after in life, was the more prominent. The opposition was in the first instance occasioned by the question which now occupies us. In the inexhaustible multiplicity of perceivable phenomena Plato noticed the recurrence of certain uniform Predicates, forming the permanent store from which, in endless variety of combination, all things derive their particular essence or the nature by which one distinguishes itself from the other and each is what it is. And just as the simple elements, so the real combinations of these which the course of nature exhibited, were no multiplicity without a Principle, but were subject on their own part to permanent types, within which they moved. Further, the series of relations, into which the different things might enter with each other—ultimately even the multiplicity of that world which our own action might and should institute—testified no less to this inner order of all reality. The case was not such as the Sophists, his predecessors in philosophy, had tried to make it out to be. It was not the case that a stream of Becoming, with no check upon its waves, flowed on into ever new forms, unheard of before, without obligation to return again to a

state the same with or like to that from which it set out. On the contrary, everything which it was to be possible for Reality to bring about was confined within fixed limits. Only an immeasurable multiplicity of places, of times, and of combinations remained open to it, in which it repeated with variations this content of the Ideal world.

The full value of this metaphysical conception I shall have to bring out later. For the present I wish to call attention to the misleading path, never actually avoided, into which it has drawn men astray. It was just the multiplicity in space and time of scattered successive and intersecting phenomena—the course of things—that properly constituted the true reality, the primary object given us to be perceived and known. That world of Ideas, on the other hand, which comprehended the permanent element in this changing multiplicity and the recurrent forms in the transmutation of the manifold, was in contrast with it something secondary, having had its origin in the comparisons instituted by our thought, and, so far as of this origin, neither real nor calculated to produce in turn any reality out of itself. However great the value of the observation that Reality is such as to enable us by the connexion of those ideas of ours to arrive at a correspondence with its course; still it was wrong to take this world of ideas for anything else than a system of abstractions or intellectual forms, which only have reality so far as they can be considered the modes of procedure of the things themselves, but which could in no sense be opposed to the course of things as a *Prius* to which this course adjusts itself, completely or incompletely, as something secondary.

In order to make my meaning quite clear, I must emphasize the proposition that the only reality given us, the true reality, includes as an inseparable part of itself this varying flow of phenomena in space and time, this course of Things that happen. This ceaselessly advancing melody of event

—it and nothing else—is the metaphysical place in which the connectedness of the world of Ideas, the multiplicity of its harmonious relations, not only is found by us but alone has its reality. Within this reality single products and single occurrences might be legitimately regarded as transitory instances, upon which the world of ideas impressed itself and from which it again withdrew: for before and after and beside them the living Idea remained active and present in innumerable other instances, and while changing its forms never disappeared from reality. But the whole of reality, the whole of this world, known and unknown together, could not properly be separated from the world of Ideas as though it were possible for the latter to exist and hold good on its own account before realising itself in the given world, and as though there might have been innumerable equivalent instances—innumerable other worlds—besides this, in which the antecedent system of pure Ideas might equally have realised itself. Just as the truth about the individual Thing is not that there is first the conception of the Thing which ordains how it is to be, and that afterwards there comes the mere unintelligible fact, which obeys this conception, but that the conception is nothing more than the life of the real itself; so none of the Ideas is an antecedent pattern, to be imitated by what is. Rather, each Idea is the imitation essayed by Thought of one of the traits in which the eternally real expresses itself. If the individual Ideas appear to us as generalities, to which innumerable instances correspond, we have to ascribe this also to the nature of that supreme Idea, into which we gather the individual Ideas. The very meaning of there being such an Idea is that a stream of phenomena does not whirl on into the immeasurable with no identity in successive moments, without ever returning to what it was before and without relationship between its manifold elements. The generality of the Ideas therefore is implied in the systematic character of what fills the universe, in the inner

design of the pattern, of which the unbroken reality and realisation constitute the world. It is completely misinterpreted as an outline-sketch of what might be in impeachment of what is—of a possibility which, in order to arrive at reality, would require the help of a second Cosmos, of a real and of movements of the real that are no part of itself.

36. I shall have frequent opportunity in the sequel of dwelling again on this system of thought; nor in fact can I hope to make it perfectly clear till I shall have handled in detail the manifold difficulties which oppose a return to it. I say expressly—a return to it; for to me it seems the simplest and most primary truth, while to representatives of the present intricate phase of scientific opinion it usually appears a rash and obscure imagination. Psychologically it is almost an unavoidable necessity that the general laws, which we have obtained from comparison of phenomena, should present themselves to us as an independent and ordaining *Prius*, which precedes the cases of its application. For in relation to the movement of our cognition they are really so. But if by their help we calculate a future result beforehand from the given present conditions, we forget that what comes first in our reflection as a major premiss is yet only the expression of the past and of that nature of its own which Reality in the past revealed to us. So accustomed are we to this misunderstanding, so mastered by the habit of first setting what is in truth the essence of the Real over against the Real, as an external ideal for it to strive after, and of then fruitlessly seeking for means to unite what has been improperly separated, that every assertion of the original unity of that which has been thus sundered appears detrimental to the scientific accuracy to which we aspire. True, the need of blending Ideal and Real, as the phrase is, has at all times been keenly felt; but it seems to me that the attempts to fulfil this problem have sometimes promoted the error which they combated. In

demanding a special act of speculation in order to achieve this great result, they maintain the belief in a gulf, not really there, which it needs a bold leap to pass.

For the present, however, I propose to drop these general considerations, and, if possible, to get rid of the obscurity and apparent inadmissibility of the result just arrived at. One improvement is directly suggested by what has been said. We cannot express our Thesis, as we did just now, in the form: 'The Thing is the realised individual law of its behaviour.' This expression, if we weigh its terms, would contain all the false notions against which we were anxious to guard. Instead of the '*realised* law' it would clearly be better to speak of the law never realised, but that always has been real. But no verbal expression that we could find would serve the purpose of excluding the suggested notion which we wish to be expressly excluded. For in speaking of a law, we did not mean one which, though real as a law, had still to wait to be followed, but one followed eternally; and so followed that the law with the following of it was not a mere fact or an event that takes place, but a self-completing activity. And this activity, once more, we look upon not in the nature of a behaviour separable from the essence which so behaves, but as forming the essence itself—the essence not being a dead point behind the activity, but identical with it. But however fain we might be to speak of a real Law¹, of a living active Idea, in order the better to express our thought, language would always compel us to put two words together, on which the ordinary course of thinking has stamped two incompatible and contradictory meanings. We therefore have to give up the pretension of remaining in complete accord with the usage of speech.

¹ ['Einem realen Gesetze,' see note on p. 1, above.]

CHAPTER IV.

Of Becoming and Change.

37. WHEN I first ventured, many years ago, on a statement of metaphysical convictions, I gathered up the essence of the thoughts, with which we were just then occupied, in the following proposition : ' It is not in virtue of a substance contained in them that Things are ; they are, when they are qualified to produce an appearance of there being a substance in them.' I was found fault with at the time on two grounds. It was said that the proposition was materially untrue, and that in respect of form the two members of the proposition appeared not to correspond as antitheses. The latter objection would have been unimportant, if true : but I have not been able to convince myself of its truth, or of the material incorrectness of my expression. According to a very common usage the name ' Substance ' was employed to indicate a rigid real nucleus, which was taken, as a self-evident truth, to possess the stability of Reality—a stability which could not be admitted as belonging to the things that change and differ from each other without special justification being demanded of its possibility. From such nuclei the Realty was supposed to spread itself over the different properties by which one thing distinguishes itself from another. It was thus by its means, as if it was a coagulative agent, which served to set what was in itself the unstable fluid of the qualitative content, that this content was supposed to acquire the form and steadfastness that belong to

the Thing. It was matter of indifference whether this peculiar crystallisation was thought of as an occurrence that had once taken place and had given an origin in time to Things, or whether the solidifying operation of the substance was regarded as an eternal process, carried on in things equally eternal and without origin in time as an essential characteristic of their nature. In either case the causal relation remained the same. It was by means of a substance empty in itself that Reality, with its fixedness in the course of changes, was supposed to be lent to the determinate content.

I believe myself to have shown that no one of the thoughts involved in this view is possible. In going on, however, to supplement the conclusion that it is not in virtue of a substance that Things are, by the further proposition that, if they are qualified to produce an appearance of the substance being in them, then they are, I did not intend any correspondence between this and the other member of the antithesis in the sense of opposing to the rejected construction of that which makes a Thing a Thing another like construction. What I intended was to substitute for every such *construction* (which is an impossibility) that which alone is possible, the *definition* of what constitutes the Thing. The notion which it was sought to convey could only be this, that when we speak of something that makes a Thing, as such ('die Dingheit'), we mean the form of real existence belonging to a content, of which the behaviour presents to us the appearance of a substance being present in it; the truth being that the holding-ground which under this designation of substance we suppose to be supplied to Things is merely the manner of holding itself exhibited by that which we seek to support in this impossible way.

38. There was no great difficulty in showing the unthinkable-ness of the supposed real-in-itself. The denial is easy, but is the affirmation of a tenable view equally easy? Setting aside

the auxiliary conception just excluded, have we other and better means—are we left with means that still satisfy us—of explaining the functions which we cannot but continue still to expect of Things, if the assumption of their existence is to satisfy the demands for the sake of which it was made? On this question doubts will arise even for a man who resolves to adopt by way of experiment the result of the previous considerations. I repeat: A world of unmoved ideal contents, if it were thinkable without presupposing motion at least on the part of him to whom it was object of observation, would contain nothing to occasion a quest for Things behind this given multiplicity. Nor is it the mere variety of these phenomena, but only the regularity of some kind perceived or surmised in it, that compels us to the assumption of persistent principles by which the manifold is connected.

Common opinion, under a mistake soon refuted, had thought to find these subjects of change in the Things perceivable by the senses. For these we substituted supra-sensible essences of perfectly simple quality. But the very simplicity of these would have made any alternative but Being or not-Being impossible for them, and would thus have excluded change. Yet change must really take place somewhere, if only to render possible the appearance of change somewhere else. Then we gave up seeking the permanent element of Things in a state of facts always identical with itself, and credited ourselves with finding it in the very heart of change, as the uniform import of a Law, which connects a multiplicity of states into one rounded whole. Even thus, however, it seemed that only an expression had been gained for that in virtue of which each Thing is what it is, and distinguishes itself from what it is not. As to the question how an essence so constituted can partake of existence in the form of a Thing, there remained a doubt which, being insufficiently silenced, evoked the attempt to represent the real-in-itself as the unyielding stem

to which all qualities, with their variation, were related as the changeable foliage. The attempt has failed, and leaves us still in presence of the same doubt. The first point to be met is this: *If* we think of change as taking place, then the law which comprehends its various phases as members of the same series will serve to represent the constant character of the Thing which persists throughout the change; but how can we think the change itself, which we thus presuppose? How think its limitation to these connected members of a series? And then we shall have to ask: Would the regularity in the succession of the several states $a^1, a^2, a^3 \dots$ really amount to that which, conceived as persistence of a Thing, we believe it necessary to seek for in order to the explanation of phenomena? These questions will be the object of our next consideration.

39. Under the name 'change,' in the first place, there lurks a difficulty, which we must bring into view. It conveys the notion that the new real, as other than something else, is only the continuation of a previous reality. It tends to avoid the notion of a naked coming into being, which would imply the origin of something real out of a complete absence of reality. Yet after all it is only the distinctive nature of the new that can anyhow be thought of as contained in the previously existing. The reality of the new, on the other hand, is not contained in the reality of the old. It presupposes the removal of that reality as the beginning of its own. It thus beyond a doubt *becomes* (comes into being) in that sense of the term which it is sought to avoid. It is just this that constitutes the distinction between the object of Metaphysic and that world of ideas, in which the content of a truth a is indeed founded on that of another b , but, far from arising out of the annihilation of b , holds good along with it in eternal validity.

If now we enquire, how this becoming, involved in every

change, is to be thought of, what we want to know, as we naturally suppose, is not a process by which it comes about. The necessity would be too obvious of again assuming the unintelligible becoming in this process by which we would make it intelligible. Nor can even the notion of becoming be represented as made up of simpler notions without the same mistake. In each of its forms, origination and decay, it is easy to find a unity of Being and not-Being. But the precise sense in which the wide-reaching term 'Unity' would have in this connexion to be taken, would not be that of coincidence, but only that of transition from the one to the other, and thus would already include the essential character of becoming. There is no alternative but to give up the attempt at definition of the notion as well as at construction of the thing, and to recognise Becoming, like Being, as a given perceivable fact of the cosmos.

Only on one side is it more than object of barren curiosity. It may appear to contain a contradiction of the law of Identity, or at least of the deductions thought to be derivable from this law. No doubt this law in the abstract sense, which I previously stated¹, holds good of every object that can be presented to thought. a will never cease to $= a$ till it ceases to be. That which is, never is anything that is not, so long as it is at all. On the same principle that which becomes, originates, passes away, is only something that becomes so long as it is becoming, only something that originates so long as it originates, only something that passes away so long as it passes away. There does not therefore follow from the law of Identity anything whatever in regard to the reality of any m . Let m be what it will, it will be $= m$, *in case* it is and so long as it is. But whether it is, and whether, once being, it must always be, is a point on which the principle of Identity does not directly decide at all. Yet such an inference from it is

¹ [Logic, § 55.]

attempted. Because the conception of Being, like every other conception, has an unchangeable import, it is thought that the reality, which the conception indicates, must belong as unchangeably to that to which it once belongs. The doctrines of the irremoveability and indiscerptibility of everything that truly is are thus constantly recurrent products of the movement of metaphysical thought.

But this inference is limited without clear justification to the subsistence of the Things on which the course of nature is supposed to rest. That relations and states of Things come into Being and pass away is admitted without scruple as a self-evident truth. It is true that without this admission the content of our experience could not be presented to the mind at all. If, however, it were the principle of Identity that required the indestructibility of Things, the same principle would also require the unchangeableness of all relations and states. For of everything, not merely of the special form of reality which attaches to Things, it demands permanent absence of variation. This consideration might lead us to repeat the old attempts at a denial of all Becoming, or—since it cannot be denied—to undertake the self-contradictory task of explaining at least the becoming of the appearance of an unreal becoming. But if we refuse to draw this inference from the principle of Identity, then that persistency in the Being of Things, which we hitherto tacitly presupposed, needs in its turn to be established on special metaphysical grounds, and the question arises whether the difficult task of reconciling it with the undeniable fact of change cannot be altogether avoided by adopting an entirely opposite point of view.

40. This question has in fact already been often enough answered in the affirmative. Theories have been advanced in the history of Thought, which would allow of no fixed Being and reduced everything to ceaseless Becoming. They issued, however,—as the enthusiasm with which they were generally propounded was enough to suggest—from

more complex motives than we can here examine. We must limit ourselves to following the more restricted range of thoughts within which we have so far moved. Still, we too have seen reason to hold that it is an impossible division of labour to refer the maintenance of the unity which we seek for in succession to the rigid unalterableness of real elements, and the production of succession merely to the fluctuation of external relations between these elements. Change must find its way to the inside of Being. We therefore agree with the last-mentioned theorists in thinking it worth while to attempt the resolution of all Being into Becoming, and in the interpretation of its permanence, wherever it appears, as merely a particular form of Becoming; as a constantly repeated origination and decay of Things exactly alike, not as a continuance of the same Thing unmoved. But it would be useless to speak of Becoming without at the same time adding a more precise definition. Neither do we find in experience an origination without limit of everything from everything, nor, if we did find it, would its nature permit it to be the object of scientific enquiry, or serve as a principle of any explanation. Even those theorists who found enthusiastic delight in the sense of the unrestrained mobility enjoyed by the Becoming which they held in honour as contrasted with the lifeless rigidity of Being—even they, though they have set such value on the inexhaustible variety of Becoming, and on its marvellous complications, have yet never held its eternal flux to be accidental or without direction. Even in Heraclitus we meet with plain reference to inexorable laws which govern it. It is only, then, as involving this representation of a definite tendency that the conception of Becoming merits further metaphysical examination.

41. The thought just stated first had clear expression given it by Aristotle in his antithesis of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*. The undirected stream of event he encloses, so to speak, within banks, and determines what is possible and what

is impossible in it. For what he wishes to convey is not merely the modest truth, that anything which is to be real must be possible. It is of this possibility rather that he maintains that it cannot be understood as a mere possibility of thought, but must itself be understood as a reality. A Thing exists *δυνάμει* when the conditions are really formed beforehand for its admission as an element of reality at some later period, while that alone can exist *ἐνέργεια*, of which a *δύναμις* is contained in something else already existing *ἐνέργεια*. Thus all Becoming is characterised throughout by a fixed law, which only allows the origination of real from real, nay more, of the determinate from the determinate. We have here the first form of a principle of Sufficient Reason, transferred from the connected world of Ideas to the world of events. The first conscious assertion of a truth, which human thought has made unconscious use of from the beginning, is always to be looked on with respect as a philosophical achievement, even if it does not offer the further fruits which one would fain gather from it. Barren in detail, however, these two Aristotelian conceptions certainly are, however valuable the general principle which they indicate. They would only be applicable on two conditions; if they were followed by some specific rule as to what sequent can be contained *δυνάμει* in what antecedent, and if it could be shown what is that *C* which must supervene in order to give reality to the possible transition from *δύναμις* into *ἐνέργεια*.

To find a solution of the first problem has been the effort of centuries, and it is still unfound. On the second point a clearer explanation might have been wished for. The examples of which Aristotle avails himself include two cases which it is worth while to distinguish. If the stones lying about are *δυνάμει* the house, or the block of marble *δυνάμει* the statue, both stones and marble await the exertion of activity from without, to make that out of them *ἐνέργεια* which indeed admits of being made out of them but into

which they do not develop themselves. They are possibilities of something future because they are available for that something if made use of by a form-giving motion. On the other hand, if the soul is the activity of the living body, it is in another sense that the body is *δυνάμει* the soul. It does not wait to have the end to which it is to shape itself determined from without, as the stone waits for external handling to be worked into a house or into a statue. On the contrary it involves in itself the necessary *C*, the active impulse which presses forward to the realisation of that single end, of which the conditions are involved in it to the exclusion of all other ends. Each case is metaphysically important. The first is in point where we have to deal with the connexion between different elements of which one acts on the other and with the conveyance of a motion to something which as yet is without the motion. The second case apart from anything else involves the question, on which we propose to employ ourselves in the immediate sequel: granted that a thing *a*, instead of awaiting from without the determination of that which it is to become, contains in its own nature the principle of *a* and the principle of exclusion of every *β*, how comes it about that this is not the end of the matter but that the *a* of which the principle is present proceeds to come into actual being, and ceases to exist merely in principle?

42. I shall most easily explain at once the meaning of this question and the reason for propounding it, by adducing a simple answer, which we might be tempted to employ by way of setting the question aside as superfluous. It is self-evident, we might say, that *a* proceeds from *a* because *a* conditions this *a* and nothing but this *a*, not any *β*. Now it is obvious that this answer is only a repetition of the questionable supposition which we just made. The very point we wanted to ascertain was, what process it is in the thing that *in reality* compels the conditioned to issue from that which conditions it, as necessarily as in our

thought the consciousness of the truth of the proposition which asserts the condition carries with it the certainty of the truth of that which asserts the conditioned. We do not in this case any more than elsewhere cherish the unreasonable object of finding out the means by which in any case a realised condition succeeds further in realising its consequence. But to point to it as a self-evident truth that one fact should in reality call another into being, if to the eye of thought they are related as reason and consequence, is no settlement of our question. I reserve for the present the enquiry into the manner in which we think in any case of the intelligible nature of a consequence F as contained in the nature of its reason G ¹. Whatever this relation may be, the mere fact that it obtains does not suffice to make the idea of F arise out of G even in our consciousness. Were it so, every truth would be immediately apparent to us. No roundabout road of enquiry would be needed for its discovery, nor should we even have a motive to seek for it. The universe of all truths connected in the way of reason and consequent would stand before our consciousness, so long as we thought at all, in constant clearness. But this is not the case. Even in us the idea of the consequence F arises out of that of its reason G only because the nature of our soul, with the peculiar unity which characterises it, is so conditioned by particular accompanying circumstances, p , that it cannot rest in the idea of G and, supposing no other circumstances, q , to condition it otherwise, cannot but pass on account of its own essence to the idea of F —to that and no other. In the absence of those accompanying conditions, p , which consist in the whole situation of our soul for the moment, the impulse to this movement is absent likewise; and for that reason innumerable ideas pass away in our consciousness without evoking images of the in-

¹ [G and F refer to the German words used here 'Grund' and 'Folge.']

numerable consequences, F , of which the content is in principle involved in what these ideas contain. If instead of the conditions, p , those other circumstances, q , are present—consisting equally in the general situation of the soul for the moment—then the movement may indeed arise but it does not necessarily issue in the idea of F . It may at any moment experience a diversion from this goal. This is the usual reason of the distraction and wandering of our thoughts. It is never directly by the logical affinity and concatenation of their thinkable objects that their course is determined but by the psychological connexion of our ideas, so far as these are the momentary states of our own nature. Of the connexion of reason and consequence in Things we never recognise more than just so much as the like connexion on the part of our own states enables us to see of it.

It is not enough therefore to appeal to the principle, that the content of G in itself, logically or necessarily, conditions that of F , and that therefore in reality also F will ensue upon G . The question rather is why the Things trouble themselves about this connexion between necessities of thought; why they do not allow the principle G which they contain to be for ever a barren principle, but actually procure for it the consequence F which it requires; in other words, what addition of a complementary C must be supposed in order that the Things in their real being may pass from G to F just as our thought—not always or unconditionally—passes from the knowledge of G to the knowledge of F .

43. We are thus brought back to a proposition which I shall often in the sequel have occasion to repeat: namely that the error lies just in this, in first setting up in thought an abstract series of principles and consequences as a law-giving power, to which it is supposed that every world that may possibly be created must be subject, and in then adding that, as a matter of self-evidence, the real process

of becoming can and must *in concreto* strike only into those paths which that abstract system of law has marked out beforehand. It will never be intelligible whence the conformity of Things to rules of intellectual necessity should arise, unless their own nature itself consists in such conformity. Or, to put the matter more correctly, as I stated in detail above (84); it is just this real nature of things that is the First in Being—nay the only Being. Those necessary laws are images in thought of this nature, secondary repetitions of its original procedure. It is only for our cognition that they appear as antecedent patterns which the Things resemble. It is therefore of no avail to appeal to the indefeasible necessity, by which Heraclitus thought the waves of Becoming to be directed. Standing outside the range of Becoming, this *Ἀνάγκη* would have had no control over its course. It became inevitable that Becoming should be recognised as containing the principle of its direction in itself, as soon as we admitted the necessity of substituting its mobility for the stationariness of things. Now if we attempt to find the necessity in the Becoming, one thing is clear. Between the extinction of the reality of *m* and the origin of the new reality of *μ*, no gap, no completely void chasm can be fixed. For the mere removal of *m* would in itself be exactly equivalent to the removal of anything else, *p* or *q*, that we like to imagine. Any other new reality therefore, *π* or *κ*, would have just as much or as little right to follow on the abolished *m*, as that *μ*; and it would be impossible that definite consequents should flow from definite antecedents. It is impossible therefore that the course of nature should consist in successive abolitions of one and originations of another reality. Every effort to conceive the order of events in nature as a mere succession of phenomena according to law, can only be justified on the ground that it may be temporarily desirable for methodological reasons to forego the search for an inner connexion. As a theory of the true constitution of reality it is impossible.

But the theory of Becoming might with perfect justification admit all this and only complain of a misinterpretation of its meaning. Just as motion, it will be said, cannot be generated by stringing together moments of rest in the places a , b , c , so Becoming cannot be apprehended by supposing a succession of realities, a , b , c , of which each is detached from the rest and looked upon as a self-contained and—for however brief an interval—motionless Being. On the contrary, to each single one of these members the same conception of Becoming must be applied as to the series, and just as the definitely directed velocity, with which the moving object without stopping traverses its momentary place a , necessarily carries it over into the place b and again through it into another, so the inner Becoming of the real a , as rightly apprehended, is the principle of its transition into b and into b only. For this is self-evident: that, just as it is not Being that is, but Things that are, so it is not Becoming that becomes, but the particular becoming thing; and that consequently there is no lack of variety in the qualities a , b , c , which at each moment mark out in advance the direction in which the Becoming is to be continued.

I do not doubt that this defence would have expressed the mind of Heraclitus, with whose more living thought that modern invention of the schools which explains Becoming as a mere succession of phenomena stands in unfavourable contrast. And we might go further in the same spirit. 'You,' we might say, 'who treat a motionless content as existing, have certainly no occasion to contemplate its change; but for all that we have nothing but your own assurance for it that the "Position" by which you suppose a to have been once constituted will endure for ever. In reality you can assign no reason why such should be the case with it, unless you look upon the a of one moment as the condition of a in the next moment and thus after all make a become a . But in the nature of reality

there may be contained the springs of movement which are lacking to mere thought. If we think of an a , of which the essence consists only in the motion to b , we are indeed as little able to state how this a and its efflux is made, as you would be to state how your a and its rest is made. But your conception has no advantage over ours. For the motion, which (as extended to Things themselves) you find fault with, you after all have to allow in regard to the external relations of your Things, where you are as little able to construct it as in the inner nature of Things. To us, however, if admitted (within Things) as a characteristic of the real, it affords the possibility of explaining not merely the manifold changes in the course of nature but also as a special case that persistency in it which you are fond of putting in the foreground, without going into particulars, as something intelligible of itself, but which at bottom you present to yourselves merely as an obstruction to your own thoughts. Your law of Identity, moreover, would be equally suited by our assumption. We could not indeed suppose a to become b and c in three successive moments, unless it were precisely b in the second moment and c in the third—thus at each moment exactly what it is. More than this—more than the equality with itself of each of these momentary forms—cannot be required by the law of Identity. That the reality of the one moment should be the same as that of the other, could not be more properly demanded as a consequence of this law than could the exact opposite of its meaning; namely that everything should be simply identical with everything else.'

44. If the view just stated were the true meaning of the theories which maintained the sole reality of Becoming, their fundamental thought would not be exactly expressed either by this conception of Becoming or by that of Change. It would not be expressed by the former, because when in connexion with such speculations we oppose Becoming to Being we do not commonly associate with it in thought any

such continuity as has been described ; a continuity according to which every later phase in the becoming, instead of merely coming into being *after* the earlier, issues *out of* it. It would not be expressed by the conception of change, because in it the later does in fact arise out of the complete extinction of the earlier ; because *b* is consequently another than *a* and, apart from that constancy of connexion, there is no thought of a permanent residuum of *a* which would have undergone a change in adopting *b* as its state.

We may go on to remark that, however much of the interpretation given we may take to be of use, it is at once apparent that the theory is insufficient to explain everything which we believe to be presented to us in experience. It would be convincingly applicable only to the case of a development which, without any disturbance from without, gradually exhibited the phases *b*, *c*, *d*, lying in the direction of the moving *a*. In reality, however, we find no unmistakeable instance of such development. None but an artificial view, which we must notice later, has attempted to explain away what seems to be an obvious fact—the mutual influence of several such developments on each other, or the change that proceeds from the reciprocal action of different things. The next point for our consideration will therefore be, what we have to think in order to apprehend this mutual influence, taking it for the present to be matter of indifference how we judge of the metaphysical nature of the Things between which the influence is exchanged.

45. In the first instance we only find occasion for assuming the exercise of an influence by one element *a* over another *b* in a change to *β* which occurs in *b* when *a* having been constantly present incurs a change into *a*. It is not merely supposed that the contents of *a* and *β*, as they exist for thought, stand to each other once for all in the relation of reason and consequence ; but that *a* sometimes is, sometimes is not, and that in accordance with this changeable

major premiss the change from b into β sometimes will ensue, sometimes will not.

Now we know that it might be ordained by a law external to a and b that b should direct its course according to these different circumstances: but it would only obey this ordinance if it were superfluous and if its own nature moved it to carry out what the ordinance contains. In order to the possibility of this that difference of conditions, consisting in the fact that at one time a is, at another is not, must make a difference for b itself, not merely for an observer reflecting on the two. b must be in a different state, must be otherwise affected, must experience something different in itself, when a is and when a is not: or, to put it in a short and general form; if Things are to take a different course according to different conditions, they must *take note* whether those conditions exist or no. Two thoughts thus unite here. In order that a may be followed by β not by β^1 or β^2 , a and β must stand in the relation of principle or *ratio sufficiens* and consequence. But in order that β may actually come into being and not remain the for ever vainly postulated consequence of a , the *ratio sufficiens* must become *causa efficiens*, the foundation in reason must become a productive agency: for the general descriptive conception of the agency of one thing on another consists in this that the actual states of one essence draw after them actual states of another, which previously did not exist. Now how it can come about that an occurrence happening to the one thing a can be the occasion of a new occurrence in the thing b , is just what constitutes the mystery of this interference or 'transeunt' action, with which we shall shortly be further occupied. We introduce it here, to begin with, only as a demand, which there must in some way be a possibility of satisfying, if an order of events dependent on conditions is to be possible between individual things.

46. Supposing us however to assume that this un-

intelligible act has taken place, from the impression which b has experienced as its own inner state we look for after effects within itself; a continuation of its Being or of its Becoming different from what it would have been without that excitement. To determine in outline the form of this continuation is a task which we leave to the sequel. As regards the question of its origin, we are apt to look on our difficulties as got rid of when this point is reached. This immanent operation, which develops state out of state within one and the same essential Being, we treat as a matter of fact, which calls for no further effort of thought. That this operation in turn remains completely incomprehensible in respect of the manner in which it comes about, we are meanwhile very well aware. For how a state α^1 of a thing a begins to bring about a consequent state, α^2 , in the same thing, we do not understand at all better than how the same α^1 sets about producing the consequence β^1 in another being b . It is only that the unity of the essence, in which the unintelligible process in this case goes on, makes it seem superfluous to us to enquire after conditions of its possibility. We acquiesce therefore in the notion of immanent operation, not as though we had any insight into its genesis, but because we feel no hindrance to recognising it without question as a given fact. Conditions of the same subject, we fancy, must necessarily have influence on each other: and in fact if we refused to be guided by this fundamental thought, there would be no hope left of finding means of explanation for any occurrence whatever.

47. Towards these notions the two theories as to the essence of things, which we have hitherto pursued, stand in different relations. On the preliminary question how it comes about that the inwardly moving a attains an influence over the equally passing b the doctrine of Becoming must like every other admit ignorance for the present. But supposing this to have come about, it will look for the operation of this influence only in an altered form of Becoming, which

a strives to impress on b . The next-following phase of b will consequently not be β , but a resultant compounded of β and the tendency imparted from without. Henceforth this new form would determine the progressive Becoming of that original b , if it continued to be left to itself: but every new influence of a c would alter its direction anew. If each of these succeeding phases is called a Thing, on the ground that it is certainly capable of receiving influences from without and of exerting them on its likes, then Thing will follow Thing and in its turn pass away, but it will be impossible to speak of the unity of a Thing which maintains itself under change. It is possible that the residuary effects of an original b in all members of the series may far outweigh the influence of action from without. In that case they would all, like different members of a single pedigree, bear a common family characteristic in spite of the admixture of foreign blood, but they would be no more one than are such members. It is another possible case that b without disturbance from without should develop itself into its series b, β^1, β^2 . Its members would then be comparable to the successive generations of an unmixed people, but again would form a real unity as little as do these. Even if b reproduced itself without change, each member of the series $b \ b \ b$ would indeed be as like the preceding one as one day is like another, but would as little *be* the preceding one as to-day is yesterday.

This lack of unity will afford matter of censure and complaint to the theory which treats the Thing as persistent; but it is time to notice that this theory has itself no unquestionable claim to the possession of such unity. Those who profess the theory rightly reject the notion which would represent the vanishing reality of one thing as simply followed by the incipient reality of the other without connecting the two by any inward tie; but they think scorn of recognising this continuity in an actual, though unintelligible, becoming of the one *out of* the other

and hope to make it intelligible by the interpolation of the persistent Essence. But this implies that they are in fact reduced simply to the impossibility, on which we have already touched, of attaching the manifold of change by a merely outward tie to the unchangeable stock of the Thing. This is merely disguised from them by the power of a word, the use of which we have found it impossible to avoid but are here called upon to rectify. When we called a^1 , a^2 , a^3 *states* of a , we could reckon only too well on the prospect that this expression would remain unchallenged and would be thought to contain the fulfilment of a demand, for which it merely supplies a name. Quite of itself this expression gives rise incidentally to the representation of an essence which is of a kind to sustain these states, to cherish them as *its own* and thus to maintain itself as against them. But what does this mean, and how can that be, which—under the impression that we are saying something that explains itself—we call the state of an essence? And in what does that relation consist—a relation at once of inseparableness and difference—which we indicate by the innocent-seeming possessive pronoun? So long as we maintain the position that a as in the state a^1 is something other than what it is as in the state a^2 ; so long again as we forego the assumption that there is present an identical residuum of a in a^1 and a^2 , on which both alike might have a merely external dependence; so long as we thus represent a as passing in complete integrity into both states—while this is so, the expressions referred to convey merely the wish or demand, that there should be something which would admit of being adequately expressed by them, or which would satisfy this longing after identity in difference, after permanence in change. They do not convey the conception of anything which would be in condition to satisfy this demand.

In saying this I must not be understood to take it as settled that this Postulate cannot be fulfilled, only as un-

proven that it can be. Reality is richer than Thought, nor can Thought make Reality after it. The fact of Becoming was enough to convince us that there is such a thing as a union of Being and not-Being, which we even when it lies before us are not able to reconstruct in thought, much less could have guessed at if it had not been presented to us. It is possible that we may one day find a form of reality which may teach us by its act how those unreconcilable demands are fulfilled, and prove, in doing so, that in their nature they are capable of fulfilment, and that the relation, seemingly so clear, between Thing and state is other than an empty combination of words, to which nothing in reality corresponds. It will not be till a very late stage in these enquiries that we shall have opportunity of raising this question again. For the present we take the real permanent unity of the Thing under change of states to be a doubtful notion, which is of no value for the immediate objects of our consideration.

48. If a or α is to act on b , b must in all cases be differently affected by the existence of a and by its non-existence. The 'transeunt' action of a on b would thus lead back to an operation 'immanent' in b . The proximate condition which brings about the change of b , must have lain in b itself. We usually distinguish it as an impression from the reaction—a usage of speech on which we may have to dwell below. For the present we satisfy ourselves with the reflection that anything which b is to experience through the action of a must result from the conflux of two principles of motion; from that which a ordains or strives to bring about and from that which b , either in self-maintenance or in self-transformation, would seek to produce, if a were not. Two principles are thus present in b , of which in general the one conditions something else than what the other conditions. Neither of these two commands therefore could realise itself, if each of them were absolute. For neither the one nor the other of them would

have any prerogative, both being, to revert to the old phrase, states of the same essence, *b*. A determinate result is only possible on supposition that not only a third general form of consequence is thinkable, into which both impulses may be blended, but that also the two principles have comparable quantitative values. In the investigations of natural science it is not doubted that the determination of a result from various coincident conditions always presupposes, over and above the assignment of that which each condition demands, the measure of the vivacity with which it demands it. It is not merely in nature, however, but in all reality that something goes on which has no place in the syllogistic system formed by the combination of our thoughts. In the latter, of two opposite judgments only one can be valid. In reality different or opposite premisses confront each other with equal claim to validity and both ask to be satisfied on the ground of a common right. I am therefore only filling a gap which has hitherto been left unfilled in *Metaphysic*, when I seek to bring out the necessity of this mathematical element in all our judgments of reality, leaving its further examination to the sequel.

49. 'Quo plus realitatis aut esse unaquaeque res habet, eo plura attributa ei competunt.' So says Spinoza¹; and nothing seems to forbid the converse proposition, that a greater or less measure of Being or of reality belongs to things according to the degree of their perfection. I cannot share the disapproval which this notion of there being various degrees of strength of Being has often incurred. It is no doubt quite correct to say that the general conception of Being, identical with itself, is applicable in the same sense wherever it is applicable at all, and that a large thing has no more Being in being of large size than a little thing in being of small size. I do not find any reason, however, for emphasizing in *Metaphysic* this logical equality of the conception of Being with itself, since *Metaphysic* is concerned

¹ [Eth. i. Prop. ix.]

with this conception not as it is by itself but in its application to its content—to the things that are. But in this application it should not, as it seems to me, be looked upon as if the 'Position' which it expresses remained completely unaffected by the quantity of that on which the 'Position' falls. In the same way motions, the slowest as well as the quickest, all enjoy the same reality. We cannot say that they *are*, but they all *take place*, one as much as another. Neither in their case does this reality admit of increase or diminution for any single one of them. The motion with the velocity *C* cannot, while retaining this velocity, be taking place either more or less. But for all that the velocity is not matter of indifference in relation to the motion. When it is reduced to nothing the motion ceases; and conversely no motion passes out of reality into unreality otherwise than by the gradual reduction of velocity.

Now that which we admit in the case of the extreme limit—the connexion of Being, or in this case of taking place, with that which is or happens—why should we not allow to hold good within that interval, in which this quantity still has a real value? Why should we look on the velocity as a secondary property, only accidentally attaching to that character of the motion which consists in its being something that occurs, when after all it is just so far as this property vanishes that the motion continuously approximates to the rest in which nothing occurs? The fact is that the velocity is just the degree of intensity with which the motion corresponds to its own Idea, and the occurrence of the quicker motion is the more intensive occurrence. If now we apply the term 'Being,' as is proper in Metaphysic, not to the empty 'Position' which *might* fall upon a certain content, but to the filled and perfectly determinate reality as already including that on which the 'Position' has actually fallen, I should in that case have no scruple about speaking of different quantities or inten-

sities of the Being of Things, according to the measure of the power with which each thing actively exerts itself in the course of change and resists other impulses. Nor in this argument am I by any means merely interested in rescuing a form of expression that has been assailed. I should seriously prefer this expression for the reason that it helps to keep more clearly in mind what I take to be the correct view; viz. that Being is really a continuous energy, an activity or function of things, not a doom thrust upon them of passive 'position'¹. The constant reminder of this would be a more effectual security against shallow attempts to deduce the Real from the coincidence of a still unreal essence with a 'Position' supposed to be foreign to this content and the same for all Things indifferently.

¹ ['Passivischer Gesetzheit.']

CHAPTER V.

Of the Nature of Physical Action.

OUR concern so far has been to give to the conception of Becoming a form in which it admits of being applied to the Real. In seeking to do so we were led to think that the connexion between a cause and its effects must be more than a *conditioning* of the one by the other; that it must consist in an *action* on the part of the cause, or require such an action for its completion. Only thus could it become intelligible that effects, which in a world of ideas are consequences that follow eternally from their premisses—premisses no less eternally thinkable, should in the world of reality sometimes occur, sometimes not. Many and various have been the views, as the history of Philosophy shows, which have been successively called forth by the need of supplying this complement to the idea of cause and by the difficulty of doing so without contradiction. Many of them, however, are for us already excluded, now that it becomes our turn to make the same attempt, by the preceding considerations.

50. In the first place we meet at times with a disposition—no longer indeed admitted among men of science but still prevalent in the untutored thoughts of mankind—to ascribe the nature and reality of a consequent wholly and exclusively to some one being, which is supposed to be the cause, the single cause, of the newly appearing event. The unreasonableness of this view is easily evinced. It condenses all productive activity into a single element of reality, while

at the same time it deems it necessary that the results of the activity should be exhibited in certain other elements, which stand to the exclusively causal element in the relation of empty receptacles for effects with the form and amount of which they have nothing to do. As we have already seen, everything which we can properly call a receptivity consists, not in an absence of any nature of a thing's own, but in the active presence of determinate properties, which alone make it possible for the receptive element to take up into itself the impressions tendered to it and to convert them into states of its own. Deprived of these qualities or condemned to a constant inability of asserting them, the elements in which the ordinance of the active cause is supposed to fulfil itself, would contribute no more to its realisation by their existence than by their non-existence. Instead of something being *wrought* by the cause, it would rather be created by it in that peculiar sense in which, according to a common but singular usage, we talk of a creation out of nothing. I call it a singular usage because we should properly speak simply of creation, to which we might add, merely in the way of negation, that the creation does not take place out of anything in particular. Trained by experience, however, to look upon new states merely as changes of what is already in existence, our imagination in this case gives an affirmative meaning even to the 'nothing' as the given material out of which something previously unreal is fashioned.

The same extraordinary process is repeated in that manner of conceiving the action of a cause of which I have just spoken. The supposition is allowed to stand of things which the active cause requires in order to fulfil its active impulse in them : but as these according to the conception in question contribute nothing to the nature of the new event, they are in fact merely empty images which serve to meet the requirements of our mental vision. They represent imaginary scenes upon which an act, wholly unconditioned by these scenes of its exhibition, originates, out of

nothing and in nothing, some new reality. I reserve the question whether this conception of creation admits any application at all and, if so, in what case. It is certainly inapplicable in studying the course of the already existing universe; inapplicable when the fact that requires explanation is this, that individual things in their changing states determine each other's behaviour. Were it possible for one of these finite elements, *A* or *B*, to realise its will, α or β , in other elements after this creative manner, without furtherance or hindrance from the co-operation of any nature which these other elements have of their own, there would be nothing to decide upon the conflicting claims which any one of these omnipotent beings might make on any other. The ordinances, α or β or γ , would be realised, with equal independence of all conditions, in all beings *C*, *D*, *E*. This notion, if it were possible to carry it out in thought, would at any rate not lead to the image of an ordered course of the universe, in which under definite conditions different elements are liable to different incidents, while other incidents remain impossible to them. Any assumption that *A* or *B* can only give reality to its command upon *C* or *D*, not upon *E* or *F*, would force us back upon the conception that *C* or *D* are not only different from *E* and *F*, but that in virtue of their own nature they are joint conditions of the character and reality of the new occurrence, which we previously regarded as due to a manifestation of power on one side only, to a single active cause.

51. Natural science, so long as it maintains its scientific character, is constrained by experience to recognise this state of the case. It has reduced it to the formula that every natural action is a reciprocal action between a plurality of elements. It was apt to be thought, however, that the proposition in this form expressed a peculiarity of natural processes, and it was a service rendered by Herbart to point out its universal validity as a principle of Metaphysics in his doctrine that every action is due to several causes. Though

these things are ultimately self-evident, the mere establishment of a more exact phraseology calls for some enquiry. In the first place Reasons¹ and Causes² will have to be distinguished more precisely than is done in ordinary speech. By 'causes,' consistently with the etymology of the German term 'Ursache,' we understood all those real things of which the connexion with each other—a connexion that remains to be brought about—leads to the occurrence of facts that were not previously present. The complex of these new facts we call the effect, in German 'Wirkung'—an ambiguous term which we shall employ to indicate not the productive process but only the result produced. Wherever it shall appear necessary and admissible to take notice of this distinction, we shall reserve the infinitive 'Wirken' to express the former meaning. The 'Reason' on the other hand is neither a thing nor a single fact³, but the complex of all relations obtaining between things and their natures; relations from which the character of the supervening effect is deducible as a logically necessary consequence.

Now just because we do not think of the new event as issuing from a creative activity independent of conditions, the explanation of any effect would require us, besides assigning the causes (Ursachen) to show the reason (Grund) which entitles the causes to be causes of just this effect and no other. Further, just because several constituents of this reason (Grund) are not merely given as possible in thought, but are embodied or realised in the form of real properties of real things and of actually subsisting relations between them, the consequence does not merely remain one logically necessary which we should be entitled to postulate, but becomes a postulate *fulfilled*, an actual effect instead of an unreal necessity of thought. Finally, observation convinces us that things, without changing their nature, yet sometimes do, sometimes do not, exercise their influence on each other. It appears therefore that it is not the relations

¹ ['Grunde.'] ² ['Ursache.'] ³ ['Nicht Ding noch Sache.']

of similarity¹ or contrast between the things—relations which upon comparison of their natures would always be found the same—that qualify them to display their productive activity, but that, as a condition of this activity, there must besides supervene a variable relation, *C*. I reserve the question whether we are right in thinking of this relation as other than one of those included in what we meant to be understood by the complete Reason (*Grund*) of the effect. A doubt being possible on this point, which will demand its own special investigation, we will provisionally conform to the ordinary way of looking at the matter and speak of *C* as the condition of the actual production of the effect—a condition which is something over and above the Reason (*Grund*) that determines the form of the ensuing effect.

52. According to this usage of terms the causes (*Ursachen*) of a gunpowder-explosion are two things or facts, viz. the powder *A* and the heated body which forms the spark *B*. The condition, *C*, of their action upon each other is presented to us in this case as their approximation or contact in space. The reason (*Grund*) of the effect lies in this, that the heightened temperature and the expansiveness of the gaseous elements condensed in the powder are the two premisses from which there arises for these elements a necessity of increase in their volume as effect. The final question, how in this case the efficient act takes place, we do not profess to be able to answer. Of whatever conjecture as to the nature of heat we may avail ourselves for the purpose, we find it impossible in the last resort to state how it is that the heightened temperature operates in bringing about in the expansive materials the movement of dilatation which they actually undergo. It is only the effect, the result brought about, which in this case is not a motionless state but itself a movement, that is open to our observation.

In one respect this instance is unsatisfactory. In the case supposed we have no experience as to what becomes

¹ ['*Ähnlichkeit*.']

of the spark which was supposed to form one of the *two* causes of the total event. If on the other hand we throw a red-hot body, *B*, into some water, *A*, we notice, over and above the sudden conversion of water into steam, which in this instance corresponds to the explosion of the powder in the other, the change which *B* has undergone. Lowered in its temperature, perhaps with its structure shattered, or itself dissolved in what is left of the water, there remains what was previously the heated body. Thus even the effect in this case consists of several different changes which are shared by the different concrete causes (*Ursachen*) that have been brought into contact. Finally, since the evaporating water dissipates itself in the air, leaving behind it the cooled motionless body, that contact between the two which previously formed the condition of their effect upon each other, has changed into a new relation in space between the altered bodies. Combining all these circumstances, we may say that, where a definite relation, *C*, gives occasion to an exercise of reciprocal action between the things *A* and *B*, *A* passes into α , *B* into β , and *C* into γ .

53. The particular forms and values which these transitions *A*— α , *B*— β , *C*— γ , take in individual cases, can only be determined by so many special investigations, and these would be beyond the province of Metaphysics. Even the task of merely showing that all kinds of causation adjust themselves in general to the formula just given would be one of inordinate length, and must be left to be completed by the attentive reader. The only point which I would bring into relief is this, that alike the contributions which the several ‘causes’ (*Ursachen*) make to the form of the effect, and the changes which they themselves undergo through the process of producing it, admit of variation in a very high degree. In view of this variety the usage of speech has created many expressions for states of the case, of which the distinction is well-founded and valuable for the collective estimate of the importance of what takes place but

which do not exhibit any distinctions that are fundamental in an ontological sense. If elastic bodies, meeting, exchange their motions with each other wholly or in part, we have no doubt about the necessity of regarding both as metaphysically equivalent causes of this result. They both contribute alike, though in different measure, to determine the form of the result, and the effect produced visibly divides itself between the two.

It is otherwise in the instance of the exploding powder. Here everything that conditions the form of the result appears to lie on one side, viz. in the powder, in the capability of expansion possessed by the elements condensed in it. The spark contributes nothing but an ultimate complementary condition—the high temperature, namely, which is the occasion of an actual outburst on the part of the previously existing impulse to expansion, but which would not be qualified to supply the absence of that impulse. For this reason we look upon these two causes of the effect in different lights. It is not indeed as if, in accordance with the reason given, we assigned the designation ‘cause’ *par excellence* to the powder. On the contrary this designation is assigned by ordinary usage rather to the spark, which alone presents itself to our sensuous apprehension as the actively supervening element in contrast with the expectant attitude of the powder. But this usage at least we are ready to modify when we enter upon a more scientific consideration of the case; we then treat the spark as merely an *occasional cause* which helps an occurrence, for which the preliminaries were otherwise prepared, actually to happen. Though it is undoubtedly important, however, to note that peculiarity of the case which is indicated by the expression ‘occasional cause,’ yet from the ontological point of view the spark, even in its character as occasional cause, falls completely under the same conception of cause under which we subordinate the powder. For whatever

tendency to expansion we may ascribe to the elements united in the powder, taken by itself this merely suffices to maintain the present state of things. It is only the introduction of a heightened temperature that produces the necessity of explosion. The 'occasional cause' therefore brings about this result, not in the sense of giving to an event, for which the reason (*Grund*) was completely constituted, but which still delayed to happen, the impulse which projected it into reality, but in the sense of being the last step in the completion of that 'reason' of the event which was incompletely constituted before. Similar reflections will have to be made in all those cases where one 'cause' seems only to remove a hindrance which impedes the other causes in actually bringing about an effect for which the preliminary conditions are completely provided by them. The setting aside of an obstruction can only be understood as the positive completion of that which the obstruction served to cancel in the complete 'Reason.'

Phenomena such as occur in the processes of life call for still further distinctions of this kind. The same occasional causes, Light, Warmth, and Moisture, excite the seeds of different plants to quite different developments. In whatever amounts we combine these external forces, though we may easily succeed in destroying the power of germination in any given seeds, we never succeed in eliciting different kinds of plants from them. The same remark applies to the behaviour of living things at a later stage, when fully formed. The form of action which they exhibit, upon occasion being given from without, is completely determined by their own organization, and we look upon the occasional causes in this case as mere *stimuli*, necessary and fitted to excite or check reactions of which the prior conditions are present within the organism, but with no further influence on the form which the reactions take. I do not pause to correct any inexactness that may be found in this last expression, nor do I repeat

remarks which I have previously made and which would be applicable here. It is enough to say that, in a natural history of the various forms which the process of causation may assume, all those that have been just referred to, as well as many others, fully deserve to be distinguished by designations of their own and to have their peculiarity exhibited in full relief. It is the office of ontology, on the contrary, to hold fast the general outline of the relation of reciprocal action, in respect of which none of these forms contain any essential difference. In the view of ontology all causes of an effect are just as necessary to its production the one as the other. However great or small the share may be which each of them has in determining the form of the effect, no one of them will be wholly without such a share. Each of them is a contribution without which the complete 'reason' (*Grund*) of the actual effect cannot be constituted. No one of them serves as a mere means of converting into fact a possibility already, without it, completely determined in kind and quantity. It is exclusively with this ontological equivalence of the manifold causes of a fact that we are here concerned. It will only be at a later stage that it will become necessary to refer to those other characteristics of the causal relation of which the existence might even at this stage easily be established by the farther consideration of the instances already given. Such would be the fact that the effect produced does not attach itself exclusively to any one of the co-operative causes but rather distributes itself among them all, and, finally, the change, after the resulting action has been exerted, of the relation which served to initiate it.

54. After all these remarks, however, the proper object of enquiry has still been left untouched. How is this relation *C*, of which the establishment was necessary to elicit the effect, to be understood metaphysically? The need in which this question stands of special consideration is most

readily apprehended if we transfer ourselves to the ontological position of Herbart. His theory started expressly from the supposition of a complete mutual independence on the part of the real Beings, of their being unconcerned with any Relation. If it allows the possibility of their falling into relations with each other, the readiness to make this admission rests simply on the supposition that they remain unaffected by so doing. At the same time this metaphysical theory recognises a relation, under the name of the coexistence¹ of the real Beings, which does away with their complete indifference towards each other, and compels them to acts of mutual disturbance and of self-maintenance.

In what, however, does this 'coexistence,' so pregnant with consequences, consist? So long as we confine ourselves to purely ontological considerations, we can find in this expression merely the indication of a postulate, not the indication of that by which this postulate is fulfilled. The 'coexistence' is so far nothing but that relation, as yet completely unknown, of two real Beings, upon the entry of which their simple qualities can no longer remain unaffected by each other but are compelled to assert an active reciprocal influence. Thus understood, let us call the 'coexistence' Γ . The term 'coexistence,' however, with its spatial associations, having once been chosen for this *Quaesitum*, appears to have been the only source of Herbart's cosmological conviction that, as a self-evident truth, the only form in which the ontological 'coexistence' Γ , the condition of efficient causation, can occur in the world, is that of coincidence in space. At least I do not find any further proof of the title to hold that the abstract metaphysical postulate Γ admits of realisation in this and in no other imaginable² form. I shall have occasion below to express an opinion against the material truth of this assumption; against the importance thus attached to contact

¹ ['Zusammen,' lit. 'together.']

² ['Anschaulich.']

in space as a condition of the exertion of physical action. Here we may very well concede the point to the common opinion, if appeal is made to the many instances in which, as a matter of fact, the approximation of bodies to each other presents itself to us as a necessary preliminary to their action upon each other. Assuming, then, that contact can be shown universally to be an indispensable preliminary condition of physical action, even then we should only have discovered or conjectured the empirical form *C* under which as a matter of fact that metaphysical *T*, the true ground of all physical action, presents itself in the world. The question would remain as to the law which entitles this connexion in space to make that possible and necessary which would not occur without it.

We are all at times liable to the temptation of taking that in the last resort to explain itself, of which continued observation has presented us with frequent instances. It cannot, therefore, be matter of surprise to me if younger and consequently keener intellects undertake to teach me that in this case I do not understand myself. Whatever my error may be, I cannot get rid of it. I must repeat that, so far as I can see, there is no such inner connexion between the conception of contact in space and that of mutual action as to make it self-evident that one involves the other. Granted that two Beings, *A* and *B*, are so independent of each other, so far removed from any mutual relation that each could maintain its complete existence without regard to the other, as it were in a world of its own; then, though it may be easy to picture the two as 'coexisting' in the same point of a space, it seems to me impossible to show that for this reason alone their indifference to each other must disappear. The external union of their situations which we present to our mind's eye must remain for them as unessential as previously every other relation was. Inwardly their several natures continue alien to each other, unless it can be shown that this 'coexistence' in space, *C*,

is more than a 'coexistence' in space, that it includes precisely that metaphysical coexistence, which renders the Beings that would otherwise be self-sufficing, susceptible and receptive towards each other. Not believing myself in the correctness, as a matter of fact, of this theory of contact, I have naturally no reason to attempt such a proof, which, moreover, would carry us prematurely beyond the province of ontology. As a question of ontology, it only remains to ask what the *I* is, i. e. what is the condition which we must suppose fulfilled, if in any relation *C*, whether it be one of contact in space or of some wholly different form, we suppose things previously indifferent to each other to become subject to the necessity of having respect to each other and of each ordering its states according to the states of the other. This question is the starting-point of the various views that have been held on the problem, how one thing comes to act on another. None of them could avoid enquiring for a mode of transition of some sort or other from the state which is not one of coexistence to one that is so. It is according as they claim to have discovered the mode of transition or to be entitled to deny that there is any such transition, that they have resulted in notably divergent conceptions of the course of the universe.

55. The transfer of an *influence*, *E*, is the process by which according to the common view it is sought to explain the excitement of Things, previously unaffected by each other, to the exercise of their active force: and the process is generally conceived in a one-sided way as an emanation proceeding from an active Being only, and directed upon a passive Being. That this representation only serves to indicate the fact of which an explanation is sought, becomes at once apparent if we attempt to define the proper meaning and nature of that to which, under the figurative name of influence, we ascribe that transition from the one Being to the other. Only one supposition would make the matter

perfectly clear; the supposition, namely, that this *E* which makes the transition is a Thing, capable of independent reality, which detaches itself from its former connexion with *A* and enters into a similar or different connexion with something else *B*. But precisely in this case unless something further supervened, there would be no implication of that action of one thing on another, which it is sought to render intelligible. If a moist body *A*, becoming dry itself, makes a dry body *B*, moist, it is the palpable water *E* which here effects this transition. If, however, what we understood by moisture was merely the presence of this water, at the end of the transition neither *A* nor *B* would have undergone a change of its own nature, such a change as it was our object to bring under the conception of an effect attained by an active cause. The transition itself is all that has taken place.

True, the withdrawal of the water alters the drying body, its accession alters the body that becomes moist. The connexion between the minutest particles changes as the liquid forces its way among them. As they are forced asunder, they form a larger volume and the connexion between them becomes tougher, while the drying body becomes more brittle as it shrinks in extent. These are effects of the kind which we wish to understand, but the supposed transition of the water does not suffice for their explanation. After the water has reached its new position in the second body *B*, the question arises completely anew what the influence is which, so placed, it is able to exercise—an influence such that the constituents of *B* are compelled to alter their relative positions. In like manner the question would arise how the removal of the water from *A* could become for this body a reason for the reversal of its properties. This illustration will be found universally applicable. Wherever an element *E*, capable of independent motion, passes from *A* to *B*—thus in all cases where we observe what can properly be called a ‘*causa*

transiens'—there universally this transition is only preliminary to the action¹ of one body on another. This action follows the transition, beginning in a manner wholly unexplained only when the transition is completed. Nor would it be of the slightest help if, following a common tendency of the imagination, we tried to sublimate the transeunt element into something more subtle than a 'thing.' Whatever spiritual entity we might suppose to radiate from *A* to *B*, at the end of its journey it would indeed be in *B*, but the question how, being there, it might begin to exert its action upon constituents different from it, would recur wholly unanswered.

56. This difficulty suggests the next transformation of the common view. Instead of the causative thing (*Ursache*), we suppose a force, an action, or a state, *E*, to pass from *A* to *B*. We may suppose these various expressions, which are to some extent ambiguous, to have so far a clear notion attached to them that they denote something else than a thing. They thus avoid the question how the thing acts on other things after its transition has been effected. But in that case they are liable to the objection, familiar to the old Metaphysic: '*attributa non separantur a substantiis*.' No state, *E*, can so far detach itself from the Thing *A*, of which it was a state, as to subsist even for an infinitesimal moment between *A* and *B*, as a state of neither, and then to unite itself with *B* in order to become its state.

The same remark would apply if that which passed from *A* to *B* were supposed, by a change of expression, to be an action, and thus not a state but an event. No event can detach itself from the *A*, in a change of which it consists, and leave this *A* unchanged behind it in order to make its way independently to *B*. According to this conception of it, so far as it is a possible conception at all, the action thus supposed to transfer itself would simply be the whole process of efficient causation which it is the problem to

¹ ['*Wirkung*.']

explain, not a condition, in itself intelligible, which would account for the result being brought about.

And after all these inadmissible representations would not even bring the advantage they were meant to bring. As in regard to the transition of independent causative things, so in regard to the transition of the state or event *E* from *A* to *B* the old question would recur. Granting that *E* could separate itself from *A*, what gave it its direction at the particular moment to *B*, rather than to *C*? If we assume that *A* has given it this direction, we presuppose the same process of causative action as taking place between *A* and *E* for which we have not yet found an intelligible account as taking place between *A* and *B*. Nor is this all. Since it will not be merely on *B* and *C*, but presumably on many other Beings that *A* will put forth its activity, we shall have to ask the further question what it is that at a given moment determines *A* to impart to *E* the direction towards *B* and not towards *C*, or towards *C* and not towards *B*. An answer to this question could only be found in the assumption that already at this moment *A* is subject to some action of *B*, and not at the same time to any action of *C*, and that there thus arises in it the counter-action, in the exercise of which it now enjoins upon *E* the transition to *B* and not to *C*. Thus for the second time we should have to presuppose an action which we do not understand before we could present to ourselves so much as the possibility of that condition which is no more than the preliminary to a determinate action.

Finally it is important to realise how completely impossible is the innocent assumption that the transferred *E* will all of a sudden become a state of *B*, when once it has completed its journey to *B*. Had this homeless state once arrived at the metaphysical place which *B* occupies, it would indeed be there, but what would follow from that? Not even that it would remain there. It might continue its mysterious journey to infinity and, as it was once a no-man's

state, so remain. For the mere purpose of checking it in its course, we must make the yet further supposition of an arresting action of *B* upon it. And given this singular notion, it would still be a long way to the consequence that *E*, being an independent state, not belonging to anything in particular, should not only somehow attach itself to the equally independent being *B*, but should become a state of this *B* itself, an affection or change of *B*. These accumulated difficulties make it clear that the coming to pass of a causative action can never be explained by the transfer of any influence, but that what we call such a transfer is nothing but a designation of that which has taken place in the still unexplained process of causation or which may be regarded as its result.

57. Apart from its being wholly unfruitful, the view of which we have been speaking has become positively mischievous through prejudices which very naturally attach themselves to it. It treats the transmitted effect *E* as one ready-made, and merely notices the change on the part of the things of which incidentally it becomes a state. No doubt there is a tacit expectation that, upon its being carried over to *B*, many further incidents will there follow in its train of which no more explicit account is taken. But in order that the view may have any sort of clearness, it must in any case assume that *B* will afford to *E* on its arrival the same possibility of reception and of existence in it which was offered it by *A*. There thus arise jointly the notions that the effect must be the precise counterpart of its cause or at least resemble¹ it, and that all beings, between which a reciprocal action is to be possible, must be qualified for it by homogeneity of nature.

Our previous considerations compel us to contradict these views at every point. No thing is passive or receptive in

¹ ['Gleich oder doch ähnlich sein müsse.' Cp note on 'Gleichheit,' § 19 supra. Sect. 59 makes it clear that the term 'gleich' does not merely refer to the alleged *equality* of cause and effect.]

the sense of its being possible for it to take to itself any ready-made state from without as an accession to its nature. For everything which is supposed to arise in it as a state, there is some essential and indispensable co-operating condition in its own nature. It is only jointly with this condition that an external impact can form the sufficient reason which determines the kind and form of the resulting change. So long as there is speaking generally a certain justification, owing to that peculiarity of the cases contemplated which we mentioned above, for treating one thing *A par excellence* as the cause, a second *B* as the sustainer of the effect or as the scene of its manifestation, in such cases we shall even find that the form of the effect produced by *A* depends in quite a preponderating degree on the nature of the *B*, which suffers it. It is only to forms of occurrence which are possible and appropriate to this its nature that *B* allows itself to be constrained by external influences. It is little more than the determination of the degrees in which these occurrences are to present themselves that is dependent on corresponding varieties in the external exciting causes. This is the case not only with living beings, but with inanimate bodies. Upon one and the same blow one changes its form yieldingly, another splits into fragments, a third falls into continuous vibrations, some explode. What each does is the consequence of its completely determinate structure and constitution upon occasion of the outward excitement.

This being so, if it is improper to speak of a transmission of a ready-made effect, it is still more so to speak of a universal identity in kind and degree¹ of cause with effect. It would in itself be an inexactness, to begin with, to try to establish an equation between the 'cause' (*Ursache*), which is a Thing, and the effect which is a state or an occurrence. All that could be attempted would be to maintain that what takes place in the one 'cause' considered as active is

¹ ['*Gleichheit*,' v. note on p. 138.]

identical with that which will take place in the other considered as passive ; or, to put the proposition more correctly, considering the number of objects which are equally entitled to be causes, each will produce in the other the same state in which it was itself. Expressed in this form, we might easily be misled into looking upon it as in fact a universal truth. The science of mechanics, at least, in the distribution of motions from one body to another, puts a number of instances at command which would admit of being reduced to this point of view and which might awaken the conjecture that other occurrences of a different kind would upon investigation be found explicable in the same way. Against this delusion I must recall the previous expression of my conviction ; that even in cases where as a matter of fact a perfectly identical reciprocal action, Z , is exercised between A and B , it yet cannot arise in the way of a transmission of a ready-made state, Z ; that what takes place in A and B is even in these cases always the production anew of a Z , conformably with the necessity with which Z under the action of B arises out of the nature of A , and under the action of A arises out of the nature of B ; that, while it is a possible case, which our theory by no means excludes, that these two actions should be of the same nature, their homogeneousness is not a universal condition which we are to consider in the abstract as essential to the occurrence of any reciprocal action.

58. The fatal error on which we have been dwelling, is not one to be lightly passed over. The conviction must be established that of the alleged identity between cause and effect nothing is left but the more general truth with which we are familiar. This truth is that the natures of the Things which act on each other, the inner states in which for the moment they happen to be and the exact relation which prevails between them—that all this forms the complete ‘reason’ from which the resulting effect as a whole issues. Even that this consequence is *contained* in its

reason is more than we should be entitled to say, unless we at least conceive as immediately involved in the nature of the things and already in living operation those highest grounds of determination, according to which it is decided what consequence shall follow from what reason in the actual world. And this tacit completion of our thought would emphatically not lead back to the view which we are here combating. For of what is contained in those highest conditions which determine what shall emanate from what, in the actual world, as consequent from cause or reason, we have not in fact the knowledge which we might here be inclined to claim. There is nothing to warrant the assurance that it is exclusively by general laws, the same in innumerable instances of their application, that to each state of facts, as it may at any time stand, the new state, which is to be its consequence, is adjusted. It is an assurance in which the wish is father to the thought. It naturally arises out of our craving for knowledge, for it is doubtless only upon this supposition that any consequence can be derived analytically from its 'reason' or be understood as an instance of a general characteristic.

But what is there to exclude '*in limine*' the other possibility; that some one plan, which in the complex of reality only once completes itself and nowhere hovers as a universal law over an indefinite number of instances, should assign to each state of facts that consequence which belongs to it as a further step in the realisation of this one history—so belongs to it, however, but once at this definite point of the whole, never again at any other point? On that supposition indeed our knowledge would no longer confront reality with the proud feeling that it can easily assign its place to everything that occurs in it, as a known instance of general laws, and can predetermine analytically the consequence which must attach to it. The series of events would unfold itself for us synthetically; an object of wondering contemplation and experience, but not an object

of actual understanding till we should have apprehended the meaning of the whole, as distinguished from that which repeats itself within the whole as a general mode of connexion between its several members.

59. We will not, however, pursue these ultimate thoughts. I merely hint at them here in order to dislodge certain widely-spread prejudices from their resting-place, but cannot now work them out. We will take it for granted that every effect in the world admits of being apprehended in accordance with the requirements of knowledge as the conclusion of a syllogism, in which the collective data of a special case serve as minor premiss to a major premiss formed by a general law. Even on this supposition it would still be an unwarrantable undertaking to seek to limit the content of that general law itself and that relation between its constituent members which is supposed to serve as a model for the connexion between the facts given in the minor premiss. Supposing this content of the law to be symbolised by $\alpha + \beta = f$, we are not to go on for ever attempting to deduce the title of $\alpha + \beta$ to be accepted as the reason of f from higher and more general laws. Each of these higher laws which we might have reached would repeat the same form $\alpha_1 + \beta_1 = f_1$ and would compel us at last to the confession that while undoubtedly a conception of the individual admits of being derived analytically from the general, the most general laws are given synthetic relations of reason and consequent, which we have simply to recognise without in turn making their recognition dependent on the fulfilment of any conditions whatever. No doubt, in the plan of the world as a whole these given relations are not isolated, unconnected, data. Any one who was able to apprehend and express this highest idea would find them bound together, not indeed necessarily by a logical connexion; but by an æsthetic necessity and justice. From finite knowledge this actual system of reality is hidden. It has no standard at command for deciding with what combination

$\alpha + \beta$ this system associates a consequence f , to what other combination $\alpha_1 + \beta_1$ it forbids every consequence. In judging of particular phenomena the natural sciences conform to this sound principle. It is to experience alone that they look for enlightenment as to all those simplest and most primary modes of action of bodies upon each other, to which by way of explanation they reduce the individual characteristics of the given cases.

This makes us wonder the more at the general inclination to venture recklessly just at this most decisive point, upon an *a priori* proposition of a kind from which science would shrink if it were a question of the primary laws of matter and motion, and to make the possibility of any reciprocal action depend on identity of kind and degree¹, comparability or likeness on the part of the agents between which it is to take place. Where this identity really exists, it does not help to explain anything—neither the nature of the effect nor the manner in which it is brought about. For our minds, no doubt, α and α upon coming together form the sum 2α , but how they would behave in reality—whether one would add itself to the other, whether they would fuse with each other, would cancel, or in some way alter each other—is what no one can conjecture on the ground of this precise likeness between them. As little can we conjecture why they should act upon each other at all and not remain completely indifferent. In spite of this likeness they were, on the supposition, two mutually independent things before they came together. Why their likeness¹ should compel them to become susceptible to each other's influence is far less immediately intelligible than it would be that difference and opposition should have this effect. These at least imply a demand for an adjustment to be effected by a new event, whereas from an existing likeness the absence of any reciprocal action would seem the thing

¹ ['Gleichheit,' v. note on § 57. 'Equality' would not suit the argument here.]

to be naturally looked for. Such considerations however simply settle nothing. All that we can be certain of is the complete groundlessness of every proposition which connects the possibility of reciprocal action between things, with any other homogeneity on the part of the things than that which is guaranteed by the fact of this reciprocal action. To connect the reciprocal action with *this* homogeneity is an identical proposition. *If* the things act upon, and are affected by, each other, they have just this in common that they fall under the conception of substance, of which the essence is determined merely by these two predicates. But there is no other obligation to any further uniformity on their part in order to their admitting of subsumption under this conception of substance.

60. There have been two directions in which the mischievous influence of the prejudices we have been combating has chiefly asserted itself. One of its natural consequences was the effort to reduce whatever happens to a single common denomination, to discover perhaps in spatial motion, at present, for instance, in the favourite form of vibration, not one kind of event, but that in which all events, as such, consist; the primary process, variations of which—none of them being more than variations in quantity—had not only to afford to all other events, differing in kind and form, the occasions for their occurrence, but to produce them as far as possible entirely out of themselves, as an accession to their own being, though indeed an unintelligible one. This impoverishment of the universe, by reduction of its whole many-coloured course to a mere distribution of a process of occurrence which is always identical, was in fact scarcely avoidable if every effect in respect of all that it contained was to be the analytical consequence of its presuppositions. It is enough here to have raised this preliminary protest against the ontological principles on which this reduction is founded. There will be occasions later for enlarging further upon the objections to it.

The other equally natural consequence of the prejudice in question was the offence taken at the manifold variety in the natures of things. This has been at the bottom of views now prevalent on many questions, and especially on that of the reciprocal action between soul and body. On this point ancient philosophy was already under the influence of the misleading view. That¹ like can only be known by like was an established superstition to which utterance had been given before the relation of causality and reciprocal action became an object of enquiry in its more general aspect. What truth there may be in this ancient view is one of the questions that must be deferred for special investigation; but I can scarcely pass it over at once, for do I not already hear the appeal, 'If the eye were not of the nature of the sun, how could it behold the light²?' But the finest verses do not settle any metaphysical question, and this greatly misapplied utterance of Goethe's is not an exception. To the logical analyst, in search for clearness, it conveys another impression than to the sensibility that demands to be excited. It is not the eye at all that sees the sun: the soul sees it. Nor is it the sun that shines, but the seen image³, present only in the soul, that yields to the soul the beautiful impression of illumination. Light in that sense in which it really issues from the sun—the systematic vibratory motions of the ether—we do not see at all, but there supervenes upon it owing to the nature of our soul the new phenomenon, wholly incomparable with it, of luminous clearness. What confirmation then could there be in Goethe's inspired lines for the assumption that like can only be known by like, kin by kin? To the poet it is no reproach that he should have seized and expressed a

¹ ['Gleich.']

² ['War nicht das Auge sonnenhaft
Wie konnte es das Licht erblicken?']—Zahme Xenien IV.]

³ [I know of no other word than 'image' by which 'Bild' can here be rendered, but it must be understood that no meaning of 'likeness' attaches to the word in this connexion. T. H. G.]

general truth of great interest in a beautiful form, though the persuasive force of that form of expression lies less in its exactness than in the seductive presentation to the mind's eye of a fascinating image. Perhaps this poet's privilege has been somewhat too freely used in these charming verses, of which the matter is false in every single fibre; but we must candidly confess what we all feel, that at all events they express forcibly and convincingly the pregnant thought of a universal mutual relativity which connects all things in the world, and among them the knowing spirit with the object of its knowledge, and which is neither less real nor less important if it is not present in the limited and one-sided form of a homogeneity of essence. The truth on the contrary is that there is no limit to the possible number and variety of the ties constituted by this relativity, by the mutual susceptibility and reciprocal action of things. The metaphysician, who stands up for this wealth of variety against every levelling prejudice which would attenuate it without reason, is certainly in deeper sympathy with the spirit of the great poet than are those who use this utterance, itself open to some objection, as a witness in favour of a wholly objectionable scientific mistake.

61. So much by way of digression. Let us return to the object before us. It was impossible, we found, in the case of two causes operating on each other, to represent anything as passing from each to the other which would explain their reciprocal influence. Yet it appeared to be only under this condition that the conception of causal action was applicable. The only alternative left, therefore, is to render the course of the universe explicable, without presupposing this impossible action.

The first attempt in this direction is the doctrine of Occasionalism—the doctrine which would treat a relation *C* arising between *A* and *B* only as the occasion upon which in *A* and *B*, without any mutual influence of the two upon

each other, those changes take place into α and β , which we commonly ascribe to reciprocal action between them. In this simple form there would be little in the doctrine to excite our attention. It is easy to see that an occasion which cannot be used is no occasion. But in order to be used, it must be observable by those who are to make use of it. If A and B , upon an occasion C , are to behave otherwise than they would have done upon an occasion γ , they must already in case C be otherwise affected than they would have been in case γ . That this should be so is only thinkable on supposition that some action, wherever it may have come from, has already taken effect upon them. The occasion, accordingly, which was to make it possible for the active process to be dispensed with, presupposes it on the contrary as having already taken place. Otherwise the occasion could not serve as an occasion for a further reaction. Occasionalism therefore cannot be accepted as a *metaphysical* theory. The notion that it can is one that has only been ascribed to me by a misinterpretation which I wish expressly to guard against. As I remarked above, I can only regard 'Occasionalism' as a precept of Methodology, which for the purpose of definite enquiries excludes an insoluble question—one at any rate which does not press for a solution—in order to concentrate effort upon the only attainable, or only desirable, end. If it is a question of the reciprocal action between soul and body, it is of importance to investigate the particular spiritual processes that are in fact so associated with particular bodily ones according to general rules that the manifold and complex occurrences, presented to us by our inner experience, become reducible to simple fundamental relations, and thus an approximate forecast of the future becomes possible. On the other hand, it is for this purpose a matter of indifference to know what are the ultimate means by which the connexion between the two series of events is brought about. Thus for this question

as to body and soul—and it was this that, as a matter of history, the doctrine of Occasionalism was framed to meet—it may be as serviceable as for Physics, which itself is content to enquire in the first instance into the different modes of connexion between different things, not into the way in which the connexion is brought about. Metaphysics, however, having this latter problem for its express object, cannot be satisfied with passing it over, but must seek its solution.

62. Meanwhile I may mention a special expression of this view, which is not without some plausibility. ‘Why,’ it will be asked, ‘if it is once allowed that the relation *C* between *A* and *B* is the complete reason of a definite consequent *F*, do we go on to seek for something further by which the sequence of this consequent is to be conditioned? What power in the world could there be which would be able to hinder the fulfilment of a universal law of nature, if all conditions are fulfilled to the realisation of which the law itself attaches the realisation of its consequent?’ Such is the argument that will be used, and it may be supplemented by a previous admission of our own, that whenever there is an appearance as if the occurrence of a consequent, of which all the conditions are present, were yet delayed, pending a final impulse of realisation, it will always be found on closer observation that in fact the sum of conditions was not completed and that it was for its completion, not for the mere realisation of something of which the cause was already completely given, that the missing detail required to be added¹.

This argument, however, is only a new form of an old error, and our rejoinder can do no more than repeat what is familiar. The assertion that there obtains a general law, which not only connects necessary truths with each other but reality with reality, is simply an expression of the recollection, observation, and expectation that in all cases where

¹ [Cp. § 53.]

the condition forming the hypothesis of the law has been, is, or will be realised, the event forming its conclusion has occurred, is occurring, or will occur. We are therefore not entitled to treat the validity of the law as an independently thinkable fact, to which its supervening fulfilment attaches itself as a necessary consequence. Rather it is simply the observed or expected fulfilment itself, and we should have to fall back on the barren proposition that wherever the law fulfils itself it does fulfil itself, while the question how this result comes about would remain wholly unanswered. Or, to express the same error in another way; were we really to conceive the law to be valid merely as a law, it would follow that it was only hypothetically valid, and was not in a state of constant fulfilment: for in the latter case it would be no law, but an eternal fact. Even on this supposition it will only fulfil itself when the conditions involved in its antecedent, which form the sole legitimization of its conclusion, have been actually realised. If then the force compelling the realisation proceeded from the law, this must be incited to the manifestation of its force by the given case of its application, which implies that it must itself be otherwise affected in that case than in the case where it is not applicable. We should thus be clearly presupposing an action exercised upon the law itself in order, by help of the power of the law, to dispense with the action of the things upon each other.

If, then, we decide to give up these peculiar views in which the law is treated as a thing that can act and suffer; if we allow that, whatever be the ordinance of the law, it must always be the things that take upon themselves to execute it, then *A* and *B*, at the moment when they find themselves in the relation *C*, must be in some way aware of this fact and must be affected by it otherwise than they would be by any other relation γ , not at present obtaining. The upshot of these considerations is that neither the validity of a general law nor the mere subsistence of a

relation between two things is enough to explain the new result thereupon arising without the mediation of some action. On the contrary, what we call in this connexion the action supervening in consequence of the relation, is in fact only the reaction upon another action that precedes it and to which the things had already been subject from each other. It was our mistake to look upon this as a relation merely subsisting but not yet operative, a relation merely introducing and conditioning the causative action. The recognition of this truth is of fundamental importance. We shall be often occupied in the sequel with its further exposition. This preliminary statement of it may serve to throw light on the complete untenableness of Occasionalism even in this refined form and to show that it can as little dispense as can any other theory with the problematical process of causative action, by help of which alone it can explain how it is that a law is alternately fulfilled and not fulfilled according as its conditions are fulfilled or no.

63. Another series of kindred attempts may be grouped under the name given by Leibnitz to the most elaborate of them, that of the 'Pre-established Harmony.' In laying down the principle that 'the Monads are without windows,' Leibnitz starts from the supposition of a relation of complete mutual exclusion between the simple essences on which he builds his universe. The expression is one that I cannot admire, because I can find no reason for it, while it summarily excludes a possibility as to which at any rate a question still remained to be asked. That Monads, the powers of which the world consists, are not empty spaces which become penetrated by ready-made states through openings that are left in them, was a truth that did not need explanation, but this proved nothing against the possibility of a less palpable commerce between them, to which the name 'reciprocal action' might have been fitly applied. It would not therefore have caused me any surprise if Leibnitz had employed the same figure in an exactly opposite way

and had taught that the Monads had windows, through which their inner states were communicated to each other. There would not have been less reason, perhaps there would have been more, for this assertion than for that which he preferred. To let that pass, however, when once reciprocal action had been rejected, there was nothing left for explanation of the *de facto* correspondence which takes place between the states of things but an appeal to a higher all-encompassing bond, to the deity which had designed their developments. Before the understanding of God there hover innumerable images of possible worlds : each of them so ordered in the multitude of its details as is required with consistent necessity by certain eternal laws of truth, binding for God himself and not alterable at his pleasure. In this inner arrangement of each world God can alter nothing. If in the various worlds his wisdom finds various degrees of perfection, he yet cannot unite their scattered superiorities into one wholly perfect world. His will can only grant for that one which is relatively most perfect, just as it is, admission to reality.

The further elaboration of the doctrine might be looked for in either of two different directions. It might have been expected either to take the line of confining the original determination to the general laws governing the world that has been called into existence, as distinct from the sum of the cases in which these laws may be applied, or that of supposing these cases of their application also to have been once for all irrevocably determined. The first assumption would only have led back to the embarrassments of Occasionalism just noticed. Leibnitz decided unhesitatingly for the second. Just as in our first parents the whole series of descendants is contained, with all details of their individuality, with their acts and destinies, so is every natural occurrence, down to the direction which the falling rain-drop takes to-day in the storm, completely predetermined. But this is not to be understood as if the manifold con-

stituent agents of the world by their co-operation at each moment brought about what is contained in the next moment of the world's existence. For each single constituent the series of all its states is established from the beginning, and the inner developments of all take place after the manner of a parallel independent course, without interference with each other. The correspondence which is nevertheless maintained between them is the unavoidable consequence of their first arrangement, if we consider the world as a creation of the divine design, or simply their *de facto* character, if we consider it merely as an unalterable object of the divine intellect.

64. This notable theory impresses us in different ways, according as one or other of its features is put in clearer relief. The doctrine of a thorough mutual relation between all elements of the universe, and the other doctrine of the independence of those elements, are in it alike carried to a degree of exaggeration at which both conceptions seem to approach the unintelligible. The whole content of the Universe and of its history is supposed to be present to the divine understanding at one and the same time as a system of elements mutually and unalterably conditioned in manifold ways, so that what appears in time as following an antecedent is not less the condition of that antecedent than is any antecedent the condition of that which it precedes. Thus Leibnitz could say that not merely do wind and waves impel the ship but the motion of the ship is the condition of the motion of wind and waves. The immediate consequence of thus substituting the connexion of a system of consistent ideas for a connexion in the way of active causation is to take away all intelligible meaning from the Reality which God is supposed to have vouchsafed to this world, while he denied it to the other imaginary worlds which were present to his intellect as consistent articulations of what was contained in other ideas. The development in time adds nothing to the eternally predetermined order. It

merely presents it as a succession. What new relation then is constituted for God or the world by this reality, so that it should count for something more and better than the previous presentation of the idea of a world to the mind of God? It is of no avail to say that then the world was merely thought of, whereas now it *is*. It is not open to us consistently with the system of Leibnitz, as it might be elsewhere, simply to recognise this antithesis as one that is given, however hard to define. When the supposition is that of a wise will, which had the alternative of allowing reality to an idea or of refusing it, the question, what new Good could arise merely by the realisation of what previously was present to Thought, must be plainly answered.

If the artist is not satisfied with the completed image of the work, which hovers before his mind's eye, but wishes to see it in bodily form with the bodily eye; or if the hearer of a tale betrays his interest by enquiring whether it is true, what is the source of the craving for reality in these two cases, which we may compare with the case in question? In the first case, I think, it is simply this, that there is a tacit expectation of some growth in the content of the work of art arising from its realisation. To walk about in the building as actually built is something different from the range of imagination through the details of the plan. Not only the materials of the building, but the world outside it, among the influences of which—influences subject to incalculable change—the work, when realised, is placed, create a multitude of new impressions, which the inventive fancy might indeed hope for but without being able to create the impressions themselves. This advantage of realisation is one that Leibnitz could not have had in view, since his theory of the Pre-establishment of all that is contained in the world had excluded the possibility of anything new as well as the reciprocal action from which alone anything new could have issued. The other wish—the wish that a story

heard may be true or (in other cases) that it may not be true, arises from the interest which the heart feels in the depicted relations of the figures brought on the scene. It is not enough that every happy moment of spiritual life should merely be a thought of the Poet and an enjoyment imparted to the hearer, of which the exhibition of unreal forms is the medium. We wish these forms themselves to live, in order that it might be possible for them also to enjoy the good which delights us in the imaginary tale. In like manner we console ourselves with the unreality of what we hear or read, if we are distressed by the images presented to us of unhappiness or wrong.

This line of thought was not excluded by the conception with which Leibnitz began, but it could only be worked out on one supposition. To give reality to an idea of a world was only worth doing if the sum of the Good was increased by the sum of those who might become independent centres of its enjoyment ; if, instead of that which was the object of God's approval remaining simply His thought, the beings, of whom the image and conception were included in the approved plan of a world, were enabled themselves to think it and have experience of it in their lives. I reserve the question how far this view corresponds with Leibnitz' theory. Alien to him it was not. Something at least analogous to spiritual life was accepted by him, for whatever reason, as the concrete import of the being which his Monads possessed.

65. This line of thought, however, which alone seems to me to correspond to the notion of an admission to reality of a world otherwise only present in idea to God, is scarcely consistent with the complete pre-establishment of all events. When we turn to the implications of natural science, we find that it too, if it allows no limits to its principle of causality and denies the possibility of any new starting-point for events, cannot avoid the conclusion that every detail in the established course of the universe is a necessary conse-

quence of the past, and ultimately, though this regress can never be completed, of some state of the universe which it decides to regard as the primary state. But it does not take this doctrine to mean that the sum of all these consequences has been fixed in some primary providential computation. The consequences are supposed really to come into being for the first time, and the validity of universal laws is taken to be sufficient to account for their realisation without any such pre-arrangement. These laws are enough to provide for limitation to a definite direction in the development of the new out of the old. In their ultimate consequences the two doctrines coincide so far as this, that they lead to the belief in an irrevocable arrangement of all events. Yet in the actual pursuit of physical investigations something else seems to me to be implied. We shrink from surrendering ourselves to this last deduction from the causal nexus. No natural law, as expressed by a universal hypothetical judgment, indicates by itself the cases in which it comes to be applied. It waits for the requisite points of application to be supplied from some other quarter.

We know, of course, that upon supposition of the universal validity of the causal nexus neither accident nor freedom is admissible; that accordingly what remains undetermined in our conception of the law cannot be really undetermined; that thus every later point of application of a law is itself only a product of earlier applications. This is admitted without qualification in reference to every limited section of reality, since behind it one still uninvestigated may be conceived in the past, as to which silence may be kept. But with every inclination to treat the spiritual life in its turn according to like principles, we shrink from pronouncing flatly that the whole of reality, including the history of spirits, is only the successive unfolding of consequences absolutely predetermined. That in the real passage of events something should really come to

pass, something new which previously was not ; that history should be something more than a translation into time of the eternally complete content of an ordered world ; this is a deep and irrepressible demand of our spirit, under the influence of which we all act in life. Without its satisfaction the world would be, not indeed unthinkable and self-contradictory, but unmeaning and incredible. When we admit the universal validity of laws, it is at bottom only in the tacit hope that, among the changing points of application which are presented to those laws in the course of events, there may turn out to be new ones introduced from which the consequences of the laws may take directions not previously determined. Natural sympathy, therefore, is what the Pre-established Harmony does not command. Even if it fulfilled its metaphysical purpose, this hypothesis of Leibnitz would have an artificiality which would prevent it from commending itself to our sense of probability. I admit that this repugnance rests more upon feeling than upon theoretical reasons ; more at any rate than upon such reasons as fall within the proper domain of Metaphysics. It remains, therefore, for us to enquire how far this view serves the purpose of a *theoretical* explanation of the universe.

66. In each single Monad, according to Leibnitz, state follows upon state through an immanent action, which is accepted as a fact, unintelligible indeed but free from contradiction. It was only 'transeunt' action of which the assumption was to be avoided. If this exclusion of transeunt action is to accord with the facts, the two states α and β of the Monads A and B , which observation exhibits to us as apparent products of a reciprocal action, must occur in the separate courses of development of the two beings at the same moment. If we had a right to assume that α was separated from a previous state a of A by as many intervening phases as β from a state b corresponding to a , we should not need to ascribe anything but an equal velocity

to the progress of the development of all Monads. But since α may be removed from a by a larger number of phases than β from b , we should be obliged to attribute to every single Monad its special velocity of development in order to understand the coincidence of the corresponding states. This assumption does not seem to me in contradiction with the fundamental view which governs the theory in question. As was above remarked, the thought of Leibnitz approximates to that interpretation of becoming which we conceived to be the pre-supposition of Heracitús: once grant that the being of every Thing, if the name 'Thing' is to be accepted for a closed cycle of phases, consists in a constant effort to pass from one state to another, then it is natural that different things should be distinguished from each other not merely by the direction but also by the velocity of their becoming, i.e. by an intensity of their being or reality which, if it is to express itself subject to the form of time, will appear partly at least as velocity.

I cannot recall any explanation given by Leibnitz on this point. He might have refused any answer. He might have said that the hidden rationality, without which no image of a world would have been possible at all, had provided for this correspondence of all occurrences that go together. Only in that case it would be difficult to say how the whole doctrine was distinguished from the modest explanation, that everything is from the beginning so arranged that the universe must be exactly what it is. The feeling which Leibnitz had of the necessity of accounting in some way for the correspondence is betrayed, I think, by his reference to the example, borrowed from Geulinx, of the two clocks which keep the same time; for it was scarcely required as a mere illustration of the meaning of his assertion, which is simple enough. As an explanation, however, this comparison is of no avail. Mutual influence, it is true, the two clocks do not exercise. But in order that they should at every moment point to the same time, it was not

enough that the artificer ordered it so to be. And on the other hand the mechanism, which he had to impart to them with a view to this end, is according to its idea precisely not transferable to the Monads, shut up in themselves as they are supposed to be. Each of the two clocks, *A* and *B*, is a system of different, mutually connected parts. The materials of which they are constructed, as well as the movements which may be imparted to these, are subject to general mechanical laws, which apply to one as much as to the other. From them it follows that with reference to a time, which is measurable according to the same standard for the rate of motion of *A* and *B*, different quantities of matter can be so arranged that the entire systems, *A* and *B*, can pass at the same moments into constantly corresponding positions, α and β , a and β . But that which in this case carries out the corresponding transition is nothing but the 'transeunt' action, which one element by communication of its force and motion exercises on the other. The independence of mutual influence on the part of the two clocks is compensated by the carefully pre-arranged influence which the elements of each of them exercise upon each other. It is merely the place, therefore, of the 'transeunt' action that is shifted by this comparison. It is not shown that it can be dispensed with in accounting for the correspondence of the events.

All this indeed is of little importance. For it must certainly be admitted that in this case of the clocks, as much as in any other, Leibnitz would deny the 'transeunt' action which appears to us to be discoverable in it. It is not, he would say, that one wheel of the clock acts motively on the other; it is of its own impulse that the latter wheel puts itself in motion—the motion which according to our ordinary apprehension is the effect of the former wheel. Upon this it may be remarked that comparisons are usually employed in order that some process which, as described generally, seems improbable or cannot be brought before

the mind's eye, may be illustrated by an instance in which it is presented with a clearness that allows of no contradiction. The cases therefore which one selects for comparison are not such as, before they can supply the desired demonstration, require, like Leibnitz' clocks, to be rendered by an effort of thought into instances of the process of which a sensible illustration is sought. Granting all this, however, our enquiry will have shown no more than what was well known without it, that Leibnitz was never very happy in his comparisons. The possibility in itself of what he maintains must nevertheless be allowed.

67. For the complete reconciliation of theory and experience one thing more is needed. That the connexion of occurrences according to general laws is intelligible, we may, at least with reference to all natural events, regard as a fact. It is a fact however which, like any other, would demand its explanation—not indeed an explanation of how it comes about, for that would be pre-established like everything else, but an explanation of the meaning which its pre-establishment would have in the Leibnitzian theory of the universe taken as a whole. Images of possible worlds, to which God might vouchsafe reality, we found distinguished from impossible ones, which must always remain without reality. The advantage of consistency, which distinguishes the former sort, we might suppose to lie in this, that they not merely combine their manifold elements according to a plan, but that at the same time the elements which, in so doing, they bring together are such as are really connected with each other according to general laws. It is obvious, that is to say, that every imaginary world must appear as a whole, and its development in time as the realisation of a preconceived plan, in which for all phases of the internally moved Monads—for $\alpha^1, \alpha^2, \alpha^3 \dots$ and $\beta^1, \beta^2, \beta^3$, as for the several pieces of a mosaic, their sequence and their coincidence are prescribed. But there was no necessity for any single one of these phases to occur

more than once in this whole. It was accordingly no self-evident necessity that there should be *general* laws—laws connecting the repetitions of α with repetitions of β . Without any such repetition, these series of events might still be constantly carrying out a predetermined plan. It is a somewhat arbitrary interpretation which I take leave to adopt, since Leibnitz himself gives us no light on the matter, when I understand that rationality, which distinguishes the realisable images of worlds from the unrealisable, to imply not merely an agreement with logical truths of thought, but this definite character of conformity to general laws, which in itself is no necessity of thought: in other words, the fact that the demands made by the realisation of the world-plan are met by help of a multiplicity of comparable elements, which fall under common generic conceptions, and by repetitions of comparable events, which fall under general laws.

But neither with this interpretation nor without it are we properly satisfied. If in the last resort it is the greatest perfection which determines the divine choice between different rational images of worlds, is it then self-evident that among the indispensable pre-conditions of the perfection is to be reckoned above all this conformity to universal law, and that anything which lacked it was not even open to choice? For the coherence of our scientific efforts this conformity to law, which is the sole foundation for our knowledge of things, has indeed attained such overpowering importance, that its own independent value seems to us almost unquestionable. Yet, after all, is it certain that intrinsically a greater good is attained, if every α is always followed by the same β , than if it were followed sometimes by β , sometimes by γ , sometimes by δ , just as was at each moment required by the constantly changing residue of the plan still to be fulfilled? Might there not be as good reason to find fault with those general laws as at bottom vexatious hindrances, cutting short a multitude of

beautiful developments which but for their troublesome intervention might have made the system of the most perfect world still more perfect? If we pursue this thought, it becomes clear what is for us the source of confidence in the necessary validity of universal laws. In a dream, which needs no fulfilment, we find a succession possible of the most beautiful events, connected only by the coherence of their import: and the case would be the same if a realisation of this dream could come about through the instantaneous spell of its admission as a whole to reality, without the requirement by each successive constituent of a labour of production on the part of the previous ones.

If, on the other hand, we follow our ordinary conception of the world which finds this labour necessary, the state of the case is different. Supposing that in the moment t an element a of the world happened to be in the state α , and supposing it to be indispensable that, in order to the completion of the plan of the world or to the restoration of its equilibrium or to consecutiveness in its development, at the same moment t , b also should pass into the state β , then the fact z of this necessity, i.e. the present state of the remaining elements, R , of the world, together with the change of a into α , must exert an action upon b . But in order that only β and not any other consequence may arise in b , z and β —therefore also α and β —must merely in respect of their content, without reference to the phase of development of the universe as a whole, belong together as members that condition each other: and for that reason in every case of the repetition of α the same consequence β will occur, so far as it is not impeded by other relations that condition the state of the case for the moment. Upon this supposition, therefore, which is habitual to us, that the course of the world is a gradual becoming produced by active causation, its connexion according to general laws appears to us to be necessary. But this way of thinking is not reconcileable with the views of Leibnitz. He looks

upon the whole sum of reality as predetermined in all the details of its course and as coming into being all at once through that mysterious admission to existence which he has unhappily done so little to define. No work is left to be gradually done within it. But if this supposition is granted him, the limitation of realisability to such projected worlds as have their elements connected according to general laws is an arbitrary assumption. Any combination whatever of manifold occurrences—any dream—might in this way have just as well obtained a footing in reality. We have here therefore an inconsistency in Leibnitz' doctrine. If the necessity of general laws was to be saved from disappearing, there were only, it would seem, two ways of doing it. He should either have exhibited them as a condition of that perfection of the world which renders it worthy of existence—and it is not improbable that he would have decided for this alternative—or he should have given up the attempt to substitute for the unintelligible action of one thing on another an even more unintelligible pre-establishment of all things.

CHAPTER VI.

The Unity of Things.

68. THERE is only one condition, as we have found, under which the conception of a 'transeunt' operation can be banished from our view of the world and replaced by that of a harmony between independent inner developments of Things. The condition is that we make up our minds to a thoroughly consistent Determinism, which regards all that the world contains as collectively predetermined to its minutest details. So long, however, as we shrink from this conclusion, and cling to the hope, for which we have in the meantime no justification but which is still insuppressible, that the course of Things in which we live admits of events being initiated, which are not the necessary consequence of previous development—so long as this is the case the assumption of 'transeunt' operation cannot be dispensed with by help either of the theory of a predetermined sympathetic connexion, or by that of an unconditioned validity of universal laws. Our final persuasion, therefore, might seem to depend on the choice we make between the two above-mentioned pre-suppositions (that of complete determinism, and that which allows of new beginnings)—a choice which theoretical reasons are no longer sufficient to decide. But if this were really the case—a point which I reserve for later investigation—the option left open to us would be a justification for developing, in the first place hypothetically, the further conceptions which we should have to form as to 'transeunt'

operation if having adopted the second of the suppositions stated we maintained the necessity of assuming such operation. I cannot however apply myself to this task without once again repeating, in order to prevent misunderstandings, a warning that has already been often given.

My purpose cannot be to give such a description of the process by which every operation comes about as may enable the reader to present it to his mind's eye, and thus by demonstrating *how* it happens to give the most convincing proof that it *can* happen. The object in view is merely to get rid of the difficulties which make the conception of a 'transeunt' operation obscure to us while, although in fact understanding just as little how an 'immanent' operation comes about, we make no scruple about accepting it as a given fact. How in any case a condition, if realised, begins in turn to give reality to its effect, or how it sets about uprooting a present state of anything and planting another state in the real world—of that no account can be given. Every description that might be attempted would have to depict processes and modes of action which necessarily presuppose the very operation that has to be explained as already taking place many times over between the several elements which are summoned to perform it. Indeed the source of many of the obscurities attaching to our notion of operation lies in our persistent effort to explain it by images derived from complex applications of the notion itself, which for that reason lead necessarily to absurdity if supposed to have any bearing on its simplest sense. If we avoid these unprofitable attempts, and confine ourselves to stating that which operation actually consists in, we must state it simply thus: that the reality of one state is the condition of the realisation of another. This mysterious connexion we allow so long as its product is merely the development of one and the same Being within the unity of that Being's nature. What seems unthinkable is how it can be that something which

occurs to one Being, *A*, can be the source of change in another, *B*.

69. After so many failures in the attempt to bridge a gulf of which we have no clear vision, in the precise mode demanded by imagination, we can only hope for a better result if we make the point clear in which the cause of our difficulty lies. In the course of our consideration of the world we were led, at the outset, to the notion of a plurality of Things. Their multiplicity seemed to offer the most convenient explanation for the equally great multiplicity of appearances. Then the impulse to become acquainted with the unconditioned Being which must lie at the foundation of this process of the conditioned was the occasion of our ascribing this unconditioned Being without suspicion to the very multiplicity of elements which we found to exist. If we stopped short of assigning to every reality a pure Being that could dispense with all relations to other Beings, yet even while allowing relations we did not give up the independence of Things as against each other which we assumed to begin with. It was as so many independent unities that we supposed them to enter into such peculiar relations to each other as compelled their self-sufficing natures to act and react upon each other. But it was impossible to state in what this transition from a state of isolation to metaphysical combination might consist, and it remained a standing contradiction that Things having no dependence on each other should yet enter into such a relation of dependence as each to concern itself with the other, and to conform itself in its own states to those of the other. This prejudice must be given up. There cannot be a multiplicity of independent Things, but all elements, if reciprocal action is to be possible between them, must be regarded as parts of a single and real Being. The Pluralism with which our view of the world began has to give place to a Monism, through which the 'transeunt' operation, always unintelligible, passes into an 'immanent' operation.

A first suggestion of the impossibility of that unlimited pluralism was, strictly speaking, afforded as soon as we felt the necessity of apprehending the events which form the course of the world, as Consequents that can be known from Antecedents. If no elements of the world admitted of comparison any more than do our feelings of sweet and red, it would be impossible that with the union of the two *A* and *B* in a certain relation *C* there should be connected a consequence *F*, to the exclusion of all other consequences. For in that case the relation of *A* to *B*, which alone could justify this connexion, would be the same—the two elements being completely incomparable and alien to each other—as that between any two other elements, *A* and *M*, *B* and *N*, *M* and *N*. There would accordingly be no legitimate ground for connecting the consequence with one rather than another pair of related elements, or indeed for any definite connexion whatever. Hence it appears that the independent elements of the world, the many real essences which we supposed that there were, could by no means have had unlimited licence of being what they liked as soon as each single one by simplicity of its quality had satisfied the conditions under which its ‘position’ was possible. Between their qualities there would have had to be throughout a commensurability of some kind which rendered them, not indeed members of a single series, but members of a system in which various series are in some way related to each other. All however that this primary unity necessarily implied on the part of the elements of the world was simply this commensurability. Their origin from a single root, or their permanent immanence in one Being, it only rendered probable. It is not till we come to the consideration of cause and effect that we find any necessity to adopt this further view—to hold that Things can only exist as parts of a single Being, separate relatively to our apprehension, but not actually independent.

70. This conclusion of our considerations requires so

much to be added in the way of justification and defence that to begin with my only concern is to explain it. Let M be the single truly existing substance, A , B , and R the single Things into which, relatively to our faculties of presentation and observation, the unity of M somehow resolves itself— A and B being those upon the destinies of which our attention has to be employed, R the sum of all the other things to which has to be applied, by help of analogy, all that we lay down about A and B . Then by the formula $M = \phi (A B R)$ we express the thought that a certain definite connexion of $A B$ and R , indicated by ϕ , exhibits the whole nature of M .

If we allow ourselves further to assume that one of the individual elements has undergone a transition from A into a —however the excitement to this transition may have arisen—then the former equation between $\phi (a B R)$ and M will no longer hold. It would only be re-established by a corresponding change on the part of the other members of the group, and $\phi (a b R^1) = M$ would anew express the whole nature of M . Let us now admit the supposition that the susceptibility, which we had to recognise in every finite Being—a susceptibility in virtue of which it does not experience changes without maintaining itself against them by reaction—that this belongs also to the one, the truly existing M ; then the production of the new states b and R^1 in B and R will be the necessary consequence of the change to a that has occurred in A . But this change a was throughout not merely a change of the one element A , for such a change would have needed some medium to extend its consequences to B and R . It was at the same time, without having to wait to become so, a change of M , in which alone, in respect of Being and content, A has its reality and subsistence. In like manner this change of M does not need to travel, in order as by transition into a domain not its own, to make its sign in B and R . It too, without having to become so by such means, is already a

change of B and R , which in respect of what they contain and are, equally have reality and subsistence only in M . Or—if we prefer another expression, in which we start from the apparent independence of A , B and R —the only mediation which causes the changes of B and R to follow on those of A consists in the identity of M with itself, and in its susceptibility which does not admit a change a without again restoring the same nature M by production of the compensatory change b and R^1 . To our observation a presents itself as an event which takes place in the isolated element A ; b as a second event which befalls the equally isolated B . In accordance with this appearance we call that a ‘transeunt’ operation of A upon B , which in truth is only an immanent operation of M upon M . A process thus seems to us to be requisite to bring the elements A and B , originally indifferent towards each other, into a relation of mutual sympathy. In truth they always stand in that relation, for at every moment the reality which they simultaneously possess has its connexion in the import of M , and A or a is the complement to B and R , or to b and R^1 (as the case may be), required by M in order to the maintenance of its equality with itself, just as B or b is the complement required to A and R or to a and R^1 .

Our earlier idea, therefore, of manifold original essences, unconditionally existing and of independent content, which only came afterwards to fall together into variable actions and reactions upon each other, passes into a different idea, that of manifold elements, of which the existence and content is throughout conditioned by the nature and reality of the one existence of which they are organic members; whose maintenance of itself places them all in a constant relation of dependence on each other as on it; according to whose command, without possibility of offering resistance or of rendering any help which should be due to their own independent reality, they so order themselves at every moment that the sum of

Things presents a new identical expression of the same meaning, a harmony not pre-established, but which at each moment reproduces itself through the power of the one existence.

71. Before passing to details, let me remark that I would not have these statements regarded as meant to describe a process which needed to be hit upon by conjecture, and did not naturally follow from the metaphysical demand which it was its purpose to satisfy. Or, to use another expression, I do not imagine myself to have stated what we have to think in order to render reciprocal action intelligible, but what we in fact do think as soon as we explain to ourselves what we mean by it. If we suppose a certain Being *A* to conform itself to the state *b* of another Being *B* and to fall into the state *a*, this thought directly implies the other, that the change *b* which at first seemed only to befall *B* is also a change for the other Being, *A*. There may be required investigation of the mode in which *b* is a change also for *A*, but there can be no doubt that it has to be brought under the same formal conception of a state of *A* which we at first only applied to *a*. But the idea that the states of a Being *B* are at the same time states of another Being *A*, involves the direct negation of the proposition that *A* and *B* are two separate and independent Beings: for a unity of the exclusive kind by which each would set a barrier between itself and the other, if it is to be more than verbally maintained—if it is to be measured according to what may be called its practical value—can only consist in complete impenetrability on the part of the one against all conditions of the other.

Thus it was not necessary that the unity of all individual Beings should be conjectured or discovered as an hypothesis enabling us to set aside certain difficulties that are in our way. It is, as it seems to me, a thought which by mere analysis can be shown to be involved in the conception of reciprocal action. If we fancy it possible to maintain that

Things are to begin with separate and mutually independent Unities, but that there afterwards arises between them a relation of Union in operation, we are describing, not an actual state of Things or a real process, but merely the movement of thought which begins with a false supposition and afterwards, under the pressure of problems which it has itself raised, seeks in imperfect fashion to restore the correct view which it should have had to start with.

72. Moreover, in the logical requisites of a theory, this view of the original unity of all Things in M is by no means inferior to the other view of their changeable combinations. It might be urged indeed that our view represents all Things too indiscriminately as comprehended once for all in the unity of M , and thus has no place for the gradations that exist in the intimacy of their relations to each other; that the opposite view, by recognising on the one hand the progress from a complete absence of relation to an ever greater closeness of relation, and on the other the relaxation of relations that previously existed, alone admits of due adjustment to experience, which testifies in one case to a lively action and reaction of Things upon each other, in another to their mutual indifference. In truth the reverse seems to me to be the case. So far we regard M as expressing only the formal thought of the one all comprehensive Being. As to the concrete content of that which is to occupy this supreme position of M we know nothing, and therefore can settle nothing as to the form ϕ , in which according to its nature it at each moment comprehends the sum of finite realities. There is nothing, however, against our assuming the possibility of the various equations; $M = \phi (A B R)$, $M = \phi (A B r \rho)$, $M = \phi (A \beta R^1)$, $M = \phi (a \beta R)$. Of these equations the second would express the possibility of a change in the sum of the members R into r —a change which is balanced by a second ρ , and therefore does not require a compensatory change on the part of A and B . This being so, the two latter would appear

unaffected by the alteration of the rest of the world in which they are included. Of the third equation the meaning would be that another change of R , viz. into R^1 , only requires a change β in B , to which A would appear indifferent; while the fourth would represent a reciprocal action which exhausts itself between A and B , leaving the rest of the world unaffected.

It thus appears that our view is not irreconcilable with any of the gradations which the mutual excitability of the world's elements in fact exhibits. There would be nothing to prevent us even from ascribing to the unity, in which they are all comprehended, at various moments various degrees of closeness down to the extreme cases in which two elements, having no effect whatever on each other, have all the appearance of being two independent entities; or in which, on the other hand, limited to mutual operation, they detach themselves from all other constituents of the world as a pair of which each belongs to the other. But the source of these gradations would not be that elements originally independent were drawn together by variable relations ranging in intensity from nought to any degree we like to imagine. Their source would be that the plan of that unity which holds things permanently together, obliges them at every moment either to new reciprocal action of definite kind and degree or to the maintenance of their previous state, which involves the appearance of deficient reciprocal action. Thus the reason why things take the appearance of independence as against each other is not that the Unity M , in which they are always comprehended, is sometimes more, sometimes less, real, or even altogether ceases to be, but that the offices which M imposes on them vary: so that every degree of relative independence which things exhibit as against each other is itself the consequence of their entire want of independence as against M , which never leaves them outside its unity. That relations, on the other hand, which did not previously subsist between

independent things, can never begin to subsist, I have already pointed out, nor is it necessary to revert to this impossible notion

73. The next question to be expected is, not indeed what *M* consists in but how, even as a mere matter of logical relation, the connexion assumed between it, the One, and the multiplicity of elements dependent on it is to be thought of. We have contented ourselves with describing these elements as parts of the infinite *M*. We should find no lack of other designations if we cared to notice all the theories which the history of philosophy records as having on various grounds arrived at a similar Monism. We might read of modifications of the infinite substance, of its developments and differentiations, of emanations and radiations from it. Much discussion and enthusiasm has gathered round these terms. Their variety serves in some measure to illustrate the variety of the needs by which men were led to the same persuasion. Stripped of their figurative clothing—a clothing merely intended to serve the unattainable purpose of presenting to the mind's eye the process by which the assumed relation between the one and the multitude of finite beings is brought about—all that they collectively contain in regard to the import of this relation amounts merely to a negation. They all deny the independent reality of finite things, but they cannot determine positively the nature of the bond which unites them.

This inability by itself would not to my mind form any ground of objection to the view stated. The exact determination of a postulate, whether effected by means of affirmations or by means of negations, may claim to be a philosophic result even when it is impossible to present anything to the mind's eye by which the postulate is fulfilled. An intuition, however—a presentation to the mind's eye—of that which according to its very idea is the source of all possibility of intuition—is what we shall not look for.

Neither the One, before its production of the manifold capable of arrangement in various outlines, nor the meta-physical process, so to speak, by which that production is brought about, can be described by help of any figure, for the possibility of presentation as a figure depends on the previous existence of the manifold, and the origin of the manifold world in the case before us is just the point at issue. But it does not follow that there is no meaning in the conception of that relation of dependence of the many upon the one. Though unable to state what constitutes the persistent force of the bond which connects individual things in reality, we can yet seek out the complex modes in which its unimaginable activity conditions the form of their connexion: and the general ideas, which I have already indicated on the subject, in their application to our given experience, warrant the hope, on this side, of an unlimited growth of our knowledge.

74. In saying this however I do not overcome the objection which our view excites. It will readily be allowed that the relation of the One being to the many does not admit of being exhibited in any positive way. It will be urged however that it ought not to involve a contradiction if it is to be admitted even as a postulate; yet how is it to be conceived that what is one should not only cause a manifold to issue out of itself, but should continue to be this manifold? This question has at all times formed one of the difficulties of philosophy for the reason that in fact, whatever may have been the point of departure, a thousand ways lead back to it. I need not go further back than the latest past of German philosophy. For the idealistic systems, which ended in Hegel, not merely the relativity of everything finite, but also the inner vitality of the infinite which projects the fullness of the manifold out of its unity, was a primary certainty which forced itself on the spirit with an æsthetic necessity and determined every other conviction accordingly. It must be allowed that this prerogative of

the so-called reason in the treatment of things, as against the claims made by the understanding on behalf of an adherence to its law of identity, has been rather vigorously asserted than clearly defended against the attacks made on it in the interest of this law. In the bold paradox, that it is just in contradiction that there rests the deepest truth, that which had originally been conceived as the mystery of things came to be transferred in a very questionable way to our methods of thought. There ensued in the philosophy of Herbart a vigorous self-defence on the part of formal logic against this attack—a defence which no doubt had its use as restoring the forms of investigation that had disappeared during the rush and hurry of ‘dialectical development,’ but which in the last resort, as it seems to me, can only succeed by presupposing at the decisive points the actual existence, in some remote distance, of that unity of the one and the many, which in its metaphysic it was so shy of admitting. On this whole question, unless I am mistaken, there is not much else to be said than what is objected by the young Socrates in the ‘Parmenides’ to the assertions of Zeno. ‘Is there not one idea of likeness and another of unlikeness? And are we not called like or unlike according as we partake in one or the other? Now if something partook in each of the opposed ideas, and then had to be called like and unlike at the same time, what would there be to surprise us in that? No doubt if a man tried to make out likeness as such to be equivalent to unlikeness as such, that would be incredible. But that something should partake in both ideas and in consequence should be both like and unlike, that I deem as little absurd as it is to call everything one on account of its participation in the idea of unity and at the same time many on account of its equal participation in the idea of multiplicity. The only thing that we may not do is to take unity for multiplicity, or multiplicity for unity.’

75. It may seem at first sight as if Socrates had only

pushed the difficulty a step further back. The possibility, it may be said, of simultaneous participation in those two ideas is just what the laws of thought forbid to every subject. With this objection I cannot agree. I have previously pointed out the merely formal significance of the principle of identity. All that it says is that $A = A$; that one is one and that many are many; that the real is real and the impossible impossible; in short, that every predicate is equivalent to itself, and every subject no less so. By itself it says nothing as to the possibility of attaching several predicates simultaneously, or even only one, to a single subject. For that which we properly mean by connecting two thinkable contents S and P , as subject and predicate—the metaphysical copula subsisting between S and P which justifies this mode of logical expression—is what cannot itself be expressed or constructed by means of any logical form. The only logical obligation is when once the connexion has been supposed or recognised, to be consistent with ourselves in regard to it. Therefore the law of excluded middle in its unambiguous form asserts this, and only this; that of two judgments which severally affirm and deny of the same subject S the same predicate P only one can be true. For even that metaphysical copula, which unites S and P , whatever it may consist in, must be equivalent to itself. If it is V , it cannot be non- V ; if non- V , it cannot be V . Thus the propositions, S is P , and S is not P , are irreconcilable with each other; but the propositions, S is P , and S is non- P , are reconcilable until it is established as a matter of fact that there is no non- $P = Q$ which can be connected with S by a copula, W , that is reconcilable with V . No one therefore disputes the simultaneous validity of the propositions, ‘the body S is extended P ’ and ‘ S has weight Q .’ Logic finds them compatible. It could not however state the reason of their compatibility, for the metaphysical copula, V , between S and P —i. e. the real behaviour on the part of the body

which constitutes its extension, or the mode in which extension attaches to its essence—is as unknown as the copula *W*—the behaviour which makes it heavy. Still less could we show positively how it is possible for *V* and *W* to subsist undisturbed along with each other. That is and remains a mystery on the part of *the thing*.

Let us now apply these considerations to the matter in hand. If *M* is one, then it is untrue that it is *not* this unity, *P*. If it is many, then it is impossible that it should not be this multiplicity, *Q*. If it is at once unity and multiplicity, then it is impossible that either should be untrue of it. But from the truth of one determination there is no inference to the untruth of the other. This would only be the case if it could be shown that the concrete nature of *M* is incapable of uniting the two modes of behaviour in virtue of which severally it would be unity and multiplicity. On the contrary, it might be held that their reconcileability is logically shown by pointing out that the apparently conflicting predicates are not applicable to the same subject, since it was not the one *M* that we took to be equivalent to many *M*, but the one unconditioned *M* that we took to be equivalent to the many conditioned *m*. But, although this is correct, yet the material content of our proposition is inconsistent with this logical justification. For *M* was supposed to be neither outside the many *m* nor to represent their sum. It was supposed to possess the same essential being, that of a real existence, which belongs to every *m*. Not even the activity which renders it one would, upon our view, be other than that which renders it many. On the contrary, by the very same act by which it constitutes the multiplicity, it opposes itself to this as unity, and by the same act by which it constitutes the unity it opposes itself to this as multiplicity. Thus here, if anywhere, we expressly presuppose the essential unity of the subject to which we ascribe at once unity and multiplicity.

At the same time that other consideration must be in-

sisted on, that it is quite unallowable to leave out of sight the peculiar significance of the whole procedure which our theory ascribes to *M*, and to generate a contradiction by thinking of unity and multiplicity as united with *M* in that meaningless way which the logical schemata of judgment express by the bald copula, *is*. If this word is to have an unambiguous logical meaning of its own, it can only be the meaning of an identity between the content of two ideas as such. The various meanings of the metaphysical copula, on the contrary, it never expresses—that copula which, as subsisting between one content and another, justifies us in connecting them, by no means always in the same sense, but in very various senses, as subject and predicate. While it cannot be denied, then, that the one *is* the many, if we must needs so express ourselves, still in this colourless expression it is impossible to recognise what we mean to convey. The one is by no means the many in the same neutral sense in which we might say that it is the one. It is the many rather in the active sense of bringing it forth and being present in it. This definite concrete import of our proposition—the assertion that such procedure is really possible—is what should have been disputed. There is no meaning whatever in objections derived from the treatment of unity and multiplicity, *in abstracto*, apart from their actual points of relation, as opposite conceptions. That they are, and cannot but be so opposed, is self-evident. Every one allows it the moment he speaks of a unity of the manifold. For there would be no meaning in what he says if he did not satisfy the principle of identity by continuing to understand unity merely as unity, multiplicity merely as multiplicity. Neither this principle, then, nor that of excluded middle, is violated by our doctrine. On the other hand, they are alike quite insufficient to decide the possibility of a relation, of which the full meaning cannot be brought under these abstract formulæ. In applying them we fall into an error already noticed. From the laws which

our thought has to observe in connecting its ideas as to the nature of things, we deem ourselves able immediately to infer limitations upon what is possible in this nature of things

76. I must dwell for a moment longer on this point, which I previously touched upon. Reality is infinitely richer than thought. It is not merely the case that the complex material with which reality is thronged can only be presented by perception, not produced by thought. Even the universal relations between the manifold do not admit of being constructed out of the logical connexions of our ideas. The principle of identity inexorably bids us think of every A as $= A$. If we followed this principle alone and looked upon it as an ultimate limit of that which the nature of reality can yield, we should never arrive at the thought of there being something which we call Becoming. Having recognised, however, the reality of becoming, we persuade ourselves that it at every moment satisfies the principle of Identity, though in a manner which outrages it in the total result, and that its proper nature can be comprehended by no connexion, which Logic allows, of elements identical or not-identical. For certainly if a passes through the stages $a^1 a^2 a^3$ into b , it is true that at each moment $a = a$, $a^1 = a^1$, $a^2 = a^2$, $a^3 = a^3$, $b = b$, and the principle of Identity is satisfied; but, for all that, it remains the fact that the same a which was real is now unreal, and the b which was unreal is real. How this comes about—how it is that the reality detaches itself from one thing, to which it did belong, and attaches itself to another from which it was absent—this remains for ever inexplicable by thought, and even the appeal to the lapse of time does not make the riddle clearer. It is true that between the extremities, a and b , of that chain, our perception traverses the intermediate links, a^1 , a^2 , and so on. But each of these passes in an indivisible moment into its successor. If we thought of a^2 as broken up into the new chain $a_1 a_2 a_3$, each of these links in turn would be identical

with itself, so long as it remained in existence, and even if the immediately sequent a_4 were separated by an interval of empty time from a_3 , still the transition of a_3 from being into not-being would have to be thought of as taking place in one and the same moment, and could not be expanded into a new series of transitions.

Undoubtedly therefore, if we want to *think of* Becoming, we have to face the requirement of looking upon being and not-being as fused with each other. This, however, does not imply that the import of either idea is apprehended otherwise than as identical with itself and different from the other. How the fusion is to be effected we know not. Even the intuition of Time only presents us with the *de facto* solution of the problem without informing us how it is solved. But we know that in fact the nature of reality yields a result to us unthinkable. It teaches us that being and not-being are not, as we could not help thinking them to be, contradictory predicates of every subject, but that there is an alternative between them, arising out of a union of the two which we cannot construct in thought. This explains how the extravagant utterance could be ventured upon, that it is just contradiction which constitutes the truth of the real. Those who used it regarded that as contradictory which was in fact superior to logical laws—which does not indeed abrogate them in their legitimate application, but as to which no sort of positive conjecture could possibly be formed as a result of such application.

77. The like over-estimate of logical principles, the habit of regarding them as limitations of what is really possible, would oblige us to treat as inadmissible the most important assumptions on which our conception of the world is founded. All ideas of conditioning, of cause and effect, of activity, require us to presuppose connexions of things, which no thought can succeed in constructing. For thought occupies itself with the eternally subsisting relations of that which forms the content of the knowable, not with real

existence and with that which renders this existence for ever something more than the world of thoughts. In regard, however, to all the rest of these assumptions the imaginings of 'speculation' have been busied, though in our eyes ineffectually, in banishing them from our theory of the world. It was only Becoming itself that it could not deny, even after reducing professedly every activity to a relation of cause and effect, and every such relation to a mere succession of phenomena. Even if in the outer world it substituted for the actual succession of events a mere appearance of such succession, it could not but recognise a real Becoming and succession of events at least in those beings in and for which the supposed appearance unfolded itself. It is to this one instance, therefore, of Becoming, that we confine ourselves in order to convey the impression of how much may exist in reality without possibility of being reproduced by a logical connexion of our thoughts. One admission indeed must be made. Of the fact of Becoming at any rate immediate perception convinced us. It cannot similarly convince us that the connexion which we assumed between the one unconditioned real and the multiplicity of its conditioned forms, is more than a postulate of our reflection, that it is a problem eternally solved in a fashion as mysterious as is Becoming itself.

This makes it of the more interest to see how this requirement of the unity of the manifold, in one form or another, is always pressing itself upon us anew. Even the metaphysic of Herbart, though so unfavourably disposed to it, has to admit it among those 'accidental' ways of looking at things, by which it sought to make the perfectly simple qualities, *a* and *b*, of real beings, so far comparable with each other as to explain the possibility of a reciprocal action taking place between them. If the simple *a* was taken to $= p + x$, the no less simple *b* to $= q - x$, these substitutions were to be called 'accidental' only for the reason that the preference of these to others depended on the use to which

it was intended to put them, not on the nature of the things. If the object had been the explanation of another process, a might just as well have been taken to $= r+y$ in order to be rendered comparable with (say) $c = s-y$. However unaffected, therefore, by these 'accidental' modes of treatment the essence of things might be held to be, their application always involves the pre-supposition that the perfect simplicity of quality, from which any sort of composition is held to be excluded, may in respect of its content be treated as absolutely equivalent not merely to some one but to a great number of connected multiplicities.

The ease with which, in mathematics, a complex expression can be shown to be equivalent to a simple one, has made the application of this view to the essence of things seem less questionable than it is. For that which is indicated by those simple mathematical expressions makes no sort of claim to an indissoluble metaphysical unity of content as do the real essences. On the contrary, the possibility of innumerable equivalents being substituted for a rests in this case on the admitted infinite divisibility of a , which allows of its being broken up, and the fragments re-compounded, in any number of forms; or else, in geometry, on the fact that a is included in a system of relations of position, which implies the possibility in any given case of bringing into view those external relations of a to other elements of space by which it may contribute to the solution of a problem proposed without there being any necessity for an alteration in the conception of the content of a itself. The essence of things cannot be thought of in either of these ways. The introduction of mathematical analogies could only serve to illustrate, not to justify, this metaphysical use of 'accidental' points of view. Whoever counts it admissible maintains, in so doing, the new and independent proposition that the unity of the uncompounded quality, by which one real essence is distinguished from another, is identical with many mutually connected multiplicities.

78. A further step must be taken. The 'accidental views' are not merely complex expressions, by which our thought according to a way of its own contrives to present to itself one and the same simple essence; not merely our different ways of arriving at the same end. The course of events itself corresponds to them. In the presentation of a as $=p+x$ and of b as $=q-x$ there was more than a mere view of ours. In the opposition that we assumed to take place between $+x$ and $-x$, which would destroy each other if they could, lay the active determining cause of an effort of self-maintenance on the part of each being, which was not elicited by the mutually indifferent elements, p and q . Now whether we do or do not share Herbart's views as to the real or apparent happening of what happens and as to the meaning of self-maintenance, this in any case amounts to an admission that not merely the content of the simple qualities is at once unity and multiplicity, but also that the things, so far as they are things, in their doing and suffering are at once one and many. It is only with that element x of its essence that a asserts itself and becomes operative, which finds an opposite element in b . But for all that x remains no less in indissoluble connexion with p , which for the present has no occasion for activity, and which would come into play if in another being d it met with a tendency, $-p$, opposed to it.

For reasons to be mentioned presently I cannot adopt this way of thinking. I have only pursued it so far in order to show that it asserts the unity of the manifold, and that in regard to the real, though in a different place from that in which it seemed to me necessary. That which in it is taken to be true of every real essence is what in our theory is required of the one Real; except that with Herbart that abrupt isolation of individual beings continues in which we find a standing hindrance to the real explanation of the course of the world. Herbart was undoubtedly right in holding that an unconditioned was implied in the changes

of the conditioned. But there was no necessity to seek this unconditioned straightway in the manifold of the elements which no doubt have to be presupposed as proximate principles of explanation for the course of events. The experiment is not made of admitting this multiplicity, but only as a multiplicity that is conditioned and comprehended in the unity of a single truly real Being. Yet it is only avoided at the cost of admitting in the individual real a multiplicity so conditioning itself as to become one, of the very same kind as that which is ostensibly denied to the Real as a whole.

79. I return once more to Leibnitz. He too conceives manifold mutually-independent Monads as the elements of the world, in antithesis, however, to the unity of God, by whose understanding, according to Leibnitz, is determined the content of what takes place in the world, even as its reality is determined by his will. If we can make up our minds to abstain from at once dismissing the supports drawn from a philosophy of religion, which Leibnitz has given to his theory, there is nothing to prevent us from going back still further to an eternally mobile Phantasy on the part of God, the creative source of those images of worlds which hover before His understanding. Those of the images which by the rationality of their connexion justify themselves to this understanding are the possible worlds the best among which His will renders real. Now so long as we think of a world-image, *A*, as exposed to this testing inspection on the part of the divine Being, so long we can understand what is meant by that truth, rationality or consistency, on which the possibility of its realisation is held to depend. It is the state of living satisfaction on the part of God, which arises out of the felt frictionless harmony between this image as unfolding itself in God's consciousness and the eternal habits of his thought. In this active divine intelligence which thinks and enjoys every feature of the world image in its connexions with other features—in

it which knows how to hold everything together—the several lines of the image are combined and form not a scattered multiplicity but the active totality of a world which is possible because it forms such a complete whole. I have previously noticed the difficulty of assigning any further determination which accrues to this world, already thought of as possible, if it is not merely thought but by God's will called into reality. Howsoever this may be, it could only enjoy this further something which reality yielded under one of two conditions. It must either continue within the inner life of God as an eternal activity of his Being, or enter on an existence of its own, as a product which detaches itself from him, in an independence scarcely to be defined.

The first of these suppositions—that of the world's Immanence in God—we do not further pursue. It will lead directly back to our view that every single thing and event can only be thought as an activity, constant or transitory, of the one Existence, its reality and substance as the mode of being and substance of this one Existence, its nature and form as a consistent phase in the unfolding of the same

If, on the other hand, we follow Leibnitz in preferring the other supposition that the real world is constituted by a sum of developments of isolated Monads—developments merely parallel and not interfering with each other, in what precise form has this world preserved the very property on which rested its claim to be called into reality? I mean that truth, consistency, or rationality, which rendered it superior to the unrealisable dreams of the divine Phantasy? What would be gained by saying that in this world, while none of its members condition each other, everything goes on as if they all did so; that accordingly, while it does not really form a whole, yet to an intelligence directed to it, it will have the appearance of doing so; that, in one word, its reality consists in a hollow and delusive imitation of that

inner consistency which was pronounced to be, as such, the ultimate reason why its realisation was possible? I can anticipate an objection that will here be made; doubtless, it will be said, between the elements of this world there exist reciprocal conditions, though it may not follow that the elements actually operate on each other in accordance with these conditions; they exist in the form of a sum of actually present relations of all elements to all, but the presence of these relations does not imply an Intelligence that comprehends them; like any truth, they continue to hold though no one thinks of them.

The substance of what I have to say against the admissibility of such views I postpone for a moment. Here I would only remind the reader that all this might equally be said of the unrealised world-image *A* as supposed to be still hovering before the divine understanding. At the same time something more might be said of it. For in this living thought of God it was not merely the case that a part *a* of this image stood to another part *b* in a certain relation, which might have been discovered by the attention of a mind directed to it. For in fact this consciousness actually was constantly directed to it, and in this consciousness, in its relating activity, these relations had their being. The presentation of *a* was in fact in such an instance the efficient cause which brought the presentation of *b* into the divine consciousness, or—if this is held to be the office of the Phantasy—which at any rate retained it in consciousness and recognised it as the consistent complement to *a*. The active conditioning of *b* by *a* is absent from the elements of reality and is expressly replaced, according to the theory in question, by the mere coexistence, without any active operation of one on the other, of things the same in content with the presentations of the divine consciousness. Thus, to say the least, the realised world, so far from being richer, is poorer in consequence of its supposed independent exist-

ence as detached from the Divine Being—in consequence of its course resulting no longer from the living presence of God but only from an order of relations established by him. The requirement that God and the world should not be so blended as to leave no opposition between them is in itself perfectly justified. But the right way to satisfy it would have been not by this unintelligible second act of constitution, by the realisation of what was previously an image of a merely possible world, but by the recognition that what in this theory is presented as a mere possibility and preliminary suggestion (to the mind of God) is in fact the full reality, but that nevertheless the one remains different from all the manifold, which only exists in and through the one.

80. I now return to the thesis, of which I just now postponed the statement for an instant. It at once forms the conclusion of a course of thought previously entered on and has a decisive bearing on all that I have to say in the sequel. At the outset of this discussion we came to the conclusion that the proposition, 'things exist,' has no intelligible meaning except that they stand in relations to each other. But these relations we left for the present without a name, and contented ourselves, by way of a first interpretation of our thought, with reference to various relations in the way of space, time, and of cause and effect, of which the subsistence between things constituted for our every-day apprehension that which we call the real existence of the world. But between the constituents of the world of ideas—constituents merely thinkable as opposed to real—we found a complex of relations no less rich. Nay, our mobile thought, it seemed, had merely to will it, and the number of these relations might be indefinitely increased by transitions in the way of comparison between points selected at pleasure. This consideration could not but elicit the demand that the relations on which the being of things rests should be sought

only among those which obtain objectively between them, not among such as our subjective process of thinking can by arbitrary comparisons establish between them.

This distinction however is untenable. I repeat in regard to it what I have already in my *Logic*¹ had opportunity of explaining in detail. In the passage referred to I started with considering how a *representation* of relations between two matters of consciousness, *a* and *b*, is possible. The condition of its possibility I could not find either in the mere succession or in the simultaneity of the two several presentations, *a* and *b*, in consciousness, but only in a relating activity, which directs itself from one to the other, holding the two together. 'He who finds red and yellow to a certain extent different yet akin, becomes conscious, no doubt, of these two relations only by help of the changes which he, as a subject of ideas, experiences in the transition from the idea of red to that of yellow,' but, I added, he will not in this transition entertain any apprehension lest the relation of red to yellow may in itself be something different from that of the affections which they severally occasion in him; lest in itself red should be like yellow and only appear different from it to us, or lest in reality there should be a greater difference between them than we know, which only appears to us to involve nevertheless a certain affinity. Doubts like these might be entertained as to the external causes, to us still unknown, of our feelings. But so long as it is not these causes but only our own ideas, after they have been excited in us, that form the object of our comparison, we do not doubt that the likenesses², differences, and relations which these exhibit on the part of our presentative susceptibility indicate at the same time a real relation³ on the part of what is represented to us. Yet how exactly is this possible? How can the propositions,

¹ [§§ 337, 338.]

² ['Gleichheiten']

³ ['Sachliches Verhalten' not 'reales.' See p 1, note.]

a is the same as a , and, a is different from b , express an objective relation, which, as objective, would subsist independently of our thought and only be discovered or recognised by it? Some one may perhaps still suppose himself to know what he means by a self-existent identity¹ of a with a , but what will he make of a self-existent distinction between a and b ? and what objective relation will correspond to this '*between*,' to which we only attach a meaning, so long as it suggests to us the distance in space which *we*, in comparing a and b , metaphorically interpolated for the purpose of holding the two apart, and at the same time as a connecting path on which our mind's eye might be able to travel from one to the other? Or—to put the case otherwise—since difference, like any other relation, is neither a predicate of a taken by itself nor of b taken by itself, of what is it a predicate? And if it only has a meaning when a and b have been brought into relation to each other, what objective connexion exists between a and b in the supposed case where the relating activity, by which we connected the two in consciousness, is not being exercised?

The only possible answer to these questions we found to be the following. If a and b , as we have so far taken to be the case, are not things belonging to a reality outside and independent of our thought, but simply contents of possible ideas like red and yellow, straight and curved, then a relation between them exists only so far as we think it and by the act of our thinking it. But our soul is so constituted, and we suppose every other soul which inwardly resembles our own to be so constituted, that the same a and b , how often and by whomsoever they may be thought, will always produce in thought the same relation—a relation that has its being only in thought and by means of thought. Therefore this relation is independent of the individual thinking subject,

¹ ['*Gleichheit. gleich*,' v. note on § 19.]

and independent of the several phases of that subject's thought. This is all that we mean when we regard it as having an existence in itself between *a* and *b* and believe it to be discoverable by our thought as an object which has a permanence of its own. It really has this permanence, but only in the sense of being an occurrence which will always repeat itself in our thinking in the same way under the same conditions. So long therefore as the question concerns an *a* and *b*, of which the content is given merely by impressions and ideas, the distinction of objective relations obtaining between them, from subjective relations established between them by our thought, is wholly unmeaning. All relations which can be discovered between the two are predicable of them on exactly the same footing; all, that is to say, as inferences which their own constant nature allows to our thought and enjoins upon it; none as something which had an existence of its own between them prior to this inferential activity on our part. The relation¹ of *a* to *b* in such cases means, conformably to the etymological form of the term, our act of reference².

81. We now pass to the other case, which concerns us here as dealing no longer with logic, but with metaphysics. Let *a* and *b* indicate expressly Realities, Entities, or Things. The groups, *a* and *b*, of sensible or imaginable qualities, by which these things are distinguished from each other, we can still submit with the same result as before to our arbitrary acts of comparison, and every relation which by so doing we find between the qualities will have a significance for the two things *a* and *b* equally essential or unessential, objective or non-objective. No relation between them could be discovered if it were not founded on the nature of each, but none is found before it is sought.

But it is not these relations that we have in view if, in

¹ ['Beziehung.']

² ['Unsere Handlung des B.eziehens.']

order to render intelligible a connexion of the things a and b which experience forces on our notice, we appeal to a relation C , which sometimes does, sometimes does not, obtain between a and b ; which is thus not one that belongs to the constant natures, a and b , of the two things, but a relation into which the things, as already constituted independently of it, do or do not enter. In this case the conclusion is unavoidable that this objective relation C , to which we appeal, cannot be anything that takes place *between* a and b , and that just for that reason it is not a relation in the ordinary sense of the term, but more than this. For it is only in our thought, while it passes from the mental image or presentation of a to that of b , that there arises, as a perception immediately intelligible to thought, that which we here call a *between*. It would be quite futile to try, on the contrary, to assign to this *between*, at once connecting and separating a and b , which is a mere memorial of an act of thought achieved solely by means of the unity of our consciousness, a real validity in the sense of its having an independent existence of its own apart from the consciousness which thinks it. We are all, it is true, accustomed to think of things in their multiplicity as scattered over a space, through the void of which stretch the threads of their connecting relations; whether we insist on this way of thinking and consider the existence of things to be only possible in the space which we see around us, or whether we are disposed with more or less clearness, as against the notion of a sensible space, to prefer that of an intelligible space which would afford the web composed of those threads of relation equal convenience of expansion. But even if we cannot rid ourselves of these figures, we must at least allow that that part of the thread of relation which lies in the void between a and b , can contribute nothing to the union of the two immediately but only through its attachment to a and b respectively. Nor does its mere contact with a and b suffice to yield this result. It must communicate to both a definite

tension, prevalent throughout its own length, so that they are in a different condition from that in which they would be if this tension were of a different degree or took a different direction.

It is on these modifications of their inner state, which *a* and *b* sustain from each other—on these alone—that the result of the relation between them depends; and these are obviously independent of the length and of the existence of the imagined thread of relation. The termini *a* and *b* can produce *immediately* in each other these reciprocal modifications, which they in the last resort must produce even on supposition that they communicated their tension to each other by means of the thread of relation, since no one would so far misuse the figure as to make the thread, which was ostensibly only an adaptation to sense of the relation between the termini, into a new real material, capable of causing a tension, that has arisen in itself from the reciprocal action of its own elements, to act on inert things, *a* and *b*, attached to it. Let us discard, then, this easy, but useless and confusing, figure. Let us admit that there is no such thing as this interval between things, in which, as its various possible modifications, we sought a place for those relations, *C*, that we supposed to form the ground of the changing action of things upon each other. That which we sought under this name of an objective relation between things can only subsist if it is more than mere relation, and if it subsists not between things but immediately in them as the mutual action which they exercise on each other and the mutual effects which they sustain from each other. It is not till we direct our thought in the way of comparison to the various forms of this action that we come to form this abstract conception of a *mere* relation, not yet amounting to action but preceding the action which really takes place as its ground or condition.

CHAPTER VII.

Conclusion.

82. WE may now attempt by way of summary to determine how many of the ontological questions, so far proposed, admit of a final answer. In the first place, to stand in relations appeared to us at the beginning of our discussion to be the only intelligible import of the beginning of things. These relations are nothing else than the immediate internal reciprocal actions themselves which the things unremittingly exchange. Beside the things and that which goes on in them there is nothing in reality. Everything which we regard as mere relation—all those relations which seem to extend through the complete void of a '*between things*,' so that the real might *enter into* them—subsist solely as images which our presentative faculty on its own account makes for itself. They originate in it and for it, as in its restless activity it compares the likeness, difference, and sequence of the impressions which the operation of *A, B, C* upon us brings into being—this operation at each moment corresponding to the changeable inner states *a, b, c*, which *A, B, C* experience through their action on each other. To pursue this Thesis further is the problem of Cosmology, which deals with things and events as resting or passing in the seemingly pre-existent forms of space and time, and which will have to show how all relations of space and time, which we are accustomed to regard as prior conditions of an

operation yet to ensue, are only expressions and consequences of one already taking place.

We find an answer further to the enquiry as to that metaphysical *C*, that relation which it seems necessary should supervene, in order that things, which without it would have remained indifferent to each other, might be placed under the necessity, and become capable, of operation on each other. The question is answered to the effect that such a thing as a non-*C*, a separation which would have left the things indifferent to each other, is not to be met with in reality and that therefore the question as to the transition from this state into that of combination is a question concerning nothing. The unity of *M* is this eternally present condition of an interchange of action, unremitting but varying to the highest degree of complexity. For neither does this unity ever really exist in the general form indicated by this conception and name of unity and by this sign *M*. It really exists at each moment only as a case, having a definite value, of the equation for which I gave the formula¹, and in such form it is at the same time the efficient cause of the actuality of the state next-ensuing as well as the conditioning ground of what this state contains. Thus the stream of this self-contained operation propagates itself out of itself from phase to phase. If a sensible image is needed to help us to apprehend it, we should not think of a wide-spread net of relations, in the meshes of which things lie scattered, so that tightening of the threads, now at this point, now at that, may draw them together and force them to share each other's states. We should rather recall the many simultaneous 'Parts' of a piece of polyphonic music, which without being in place are external to each other in so far as they are distinguished by their pitch and tone, and of which first one and then another, rising or falling, swelling or dying away, compels all the rest to vary correspondingly in harmony with itself and

¹ [Cp. § 70]

one another, forming a series of movements that result in the unity of a melody which is consistent and complete in itself.

83. Our last considerations started from the supposition that in a certain element *A* of *M* a new state *a* has somehow been introduced. It is natural that now a further question should be raised as to the possibility of this primary change, from the real occurrence of which follows the course of reactions depicted. This question as to the beginning of motion has been a recognised one since the time of Aristotle, but it has been gradually discovered that the answer to it cannot be derived from the unmoved, which seemed to Aristotle the ultimate thing in the world. The most various beliefs as to the nature and structure of reality agree upon this, that out of a condition of perfect rest a beginning of motion can never arise. Not merely a multiplicity of originally given real elements, but also given motions between them, are presupposed in all the theories in which professors of the natural sciences, no less than others, strive to explain the origin of the actual course of the world out of its simplest principles. To us, with that hunger for explanation which characterises our thought, it looks like an act of despair to deny the derivability from anything else of some general fact, when in regard to its individual forms one is accustomed to enquire for the conditions of their real existence. We experience this feeling of despair if we find ourselves compelled to trace back the multiplicity of changeable bodies to a number of unchangeable elements. Yet the question, why it is just these elements and no others that enjoy the prerogative of original reality, does not force itself upon us. Our fancy does not avail, beyond the elements given by experience, to produce images of others, which might have existed but were in some unintelligible way cheated of their equal claim to reality. Of the motions, on the contrary, of which these elements, once given, are capable, we see first one and then another take

place in reality according as their changing conditions bring them about. None of them appears to us so superior to the rest that it exclusively, and without depending in its turn on similar conditions, should claim to be regarded as the first actual motion of the real.

These considerations lead on the one side to an endless regress in time. It is not necessary however at this point to complicate our enquiry by reference to the difficulties connected with occurrence in time. Our effort will be to exclude them for the present. But, no matter whether we believe ourselves to reach a really first beginning or whether we prolong the chain of occurrence in endless retrogression, the established course of the world is anyhow a single reality in contrast with the innumerable possibilities, which would have been realised if either the primary motion had been different, as it might have been, or if, which is equally thinkable, the endless progression, as a whole, had taken a different direction. For whether in reality it be finite or infinite, in either case its internal arrangement admits of permutations which, as it is, are not real.

All these doubts, however, are only different off-shoots of a general confusion in our way of thinking and a complete misunderstanding of the problems which a metaphysical enquiry has to solve. The world once for all is, and we are in it. It is constituted in a particular way, and in us for that reason there lives a Thought, which is able to distinguish different cases of a universal. Now that all this is so, there may arise in us the images and conceptions of possibilities which in reality are not; and then we imagine that we, with this Thought of ours, are there *before* all reality and have the business of deciding what reality should arise out of these empty possibilities, which are yet all alike only thinkable because there is a reality from which this Thought springs. When once, in this Thought, affirmation and denial of the same content have become possible, we can propose all those perverted questions against which we have so often

protested—Why there is a world at all, when it is thinkable that there should be none? Why, as there is a world, its content is M and not some other drawn from the far-reaching domain of the non- M ? Given the real world as M , why is it not in rest but in motion? Given motion, why is it motion in the direction X and not in the equally thinkable direction Z ? To all these questions there is only one answer. It is not the business of the metaphysician to make reality but to recognise it; to investigate the inward order of what is given, not to deduce the given from what is not given. In order to fulfil this office, he has to guard against the mistake of regarding abstractions, by means of which he fixes single determinations of the real for his use, as constructive and independent elements which he can employ, by help of his own resources, to build up the real.

In this mistake we have often seen metaphysicians entangled. They have formed the idea of a pure being and given to this a significance apart from all relations, in the affirmation of which and not otherwise it indicates reality. They have petrified that reality which can only attach to something completely determined, into a real-in-itself destitute of all properties. They have spoken of laws as a controlling power between or beyond the things and events in which such laws had their only real validity. In like manner we are inclined to think at the outset of the truly existing M , the complex of all things, as a motionless object of our contemplation; and we are right in doing so as long as in conceiving it we think merely of the function, constantly identical with itself, which it signifies to us. From this function, it is true, simply as conceived, no motion follows. But we forget meantime that it is not this conception of this function that is the real, but that which at each moment the function executes, and of which the concrete nature may *contain* a kind of fulfilment of the function, which does not *follow* from that conception of it. In what way that one all embracing M solves its problem—whether by maintaining a

constant equality of content, or by a succession of innumerable different instances, of which each satisfies the general equation prescribed by its plan—that is its own affair. Between these two thinkable possibilities it is not for us to choose as we will. Our business is to recognise whichever of them is given as reality. Now what is given to us is the fact of Becoming. No denial of ours can banish it from the world. It is not therefore as a stationary identity with itself, but only as an eternally self-sustained motion that we have to recognise the given being of that which truly is. And as given with it we have also to recognise the direction which its motion takes.

84. I have referred to the theories which agree with my own in being Monistic. In all of them motion is at the same time regarded as an eternal attribute of the supposed ultimate ground of the world. This motion, however, was generally represented as a ceaseless activity, on the opposition of which, as living and animating, to the unintelligible conception of a stark and dead reality the writers referred to loved to dwell. Such language shows that the metaphysical reasons for believing in the Unity of Being have been reinforced by æsthetic inclinations which have yielded a certain prejudice as to the nature of the Being that is to be counted supreme. It was not the mere characteristic of life and activity but their worth and the happiness found in the enjoyment of them which it was felt must belong in some supreme measure to that in which all things have their cause and reason. Such a proposition is more than at this stage of our enquiry we are entitled to maintain. Life and Activity only carry the special meaning thus associated with them on supposition of the spirituality of the Being of which they are predicated. The only necessary inference, however, from the reasoning which has so far guided us is to an immanent operation, through which each new state of what Is becomes the productive occasion of a second sequent upon it, but which for anything we have yet seen to the

contrary may be a blind operation. I would not indeed conceal my conviction that there is justification, notwithstanding, for a belief in the Life of that which is the ground of the world, but it is a justification of which I must postpone the statement. I would only ask, subject to this proviso, to be allowed the use of expressions, for the sake of brevity, of which the full meaning is indeed only intelligible upon a supposition, as we have seen, still to be made good, but which will give a more vivid meaning to the propositions we have yet to advance than the constant repetition of more abstract terms could do.

85. So long as all we know of M is the function which it is required to fulfil—that, namely, of being the Unity which renders all that the world contains what it is—so long we can derive nothing from this thought but a series of general and abstract deductions. Every single being which exists, exists in virtue not of any being of its own but of the commission given it, so to speak, by the one M ; and it exists just so long as its particular being is required for the fulfilment of the equation $M = M$. Again, it is what it is not absolutely and in immemorial independence of anything else; it is that which the one M charges it to be. One thing, finally, operates on another not by means of any force of its own, but in virtue of the One present in it, and the mode and amount of its operation at each moment is that prescribed it by M for the re-establishment of the equation just spoken of.

To the further interpretation of these propositions in detail I return presently. That which is implied in all of them is a denial of any knowledge antecedent to all experience—a denial which goes much deeper, and indeed bears quite another meaning than is understood by those who are so fond of insisting on this renunciation of *a priori* knowledge. It is not in philosophy merely, but in the propositions on which scientific men venture that we trace the influence of the prejudice that, independently of the content realised in

this world, $M = M$, there are certain universal modes of procedure, certain rights and duties, which self-evidently belong to all elements, as such, that are to be united in any possible world, and which would be just as valid for a wholly different world, $N = N$, as for that in which we actually live. There has thus arisen in philosophy a series of propositions which purport to set forth the properties and prerogatives of substances as such independently of that course of the world in which they are inwoven. They obviously rest on the impression that every other order of a universe, whatever it might be, that could ever come into Being, would have to respect these properties and prerogatives and could exact no function from Things other than what, in virtue of a nature belonging to them antecedently to the existence of a world, they were fitted and necessitated to render. And no less in the procedure of the physical sciences, however many laws they may treat as obtaining merely in the way of matter of fact, there is yet implied the notion of there being a certain more limited number of mechanical principles, to which every possible nature, however heterogeneous from nature as it is, would nevertheless have to conform. The philosophers, it is true, have imagined that the knowledge of the prerogatives of Substance was to be attained by pure thinking, while the men of science maintain that the knowledge of ultimate laws is only to be arrived at by experience. But as to the metaphysical value of that which they suppose to be discovered in these different ways they are both at one. They take it as the sum of pre-mundane truth, which different worlds, $M = M$ and $N = N$, do but exhibit in different cases of its application.

This is the notion which I seek to controvert. Prior to the world, or prior to the first thing that was real, there was no pre-mundane or pre-real reality, in which it would have been possible to make out what would be the rights which, in the event of there coming to be a reality, each element to be employed in its construction could urge for its protection

against anything incompatible with its right as a substance, or to which every force might appeal as a justification for refusing functions not imposed on it by the terms of its original charter. There is really neither primary being nor primary law, but the original reality, M or N . Given M or N , there follows from the one M for its world, $M = M$, the series of laws and truths, which hold good for this world. If not M but N were the original reality, then for the world $N = N$ there would follow the other series of regulated processes which would hold good for this other world. There is nothing which could oppose to these ordinances M or N any claim of its own to preservation or respect.

86. Here the objector will interpose: 'Granting this, are you not liable to the charge of having here in your turn given utterance to one of those pre-mundane truths, of which you refuse to admit the validity? Have you not of your own accord expressly alleged the case of two worlds, M and N , which you suppose would both be obliged to conform to the general rule stated?' Now I have purposely chosen these expressions in order to make my view, which certainly stands in need of justification against the above objection, perfectly clear. In the first place, as regards the world N , which I placed in opposition to the real world M , I have to repeat what I have already more than once pointed out. The world M is, and we, thinking spirits, are in it, holding a position which M in virtue of its nature as M could not but assign to us. To this position are adjusted those general processes of our Thought, by which we are to arrive at what we call a knowledge of the rest of the world. Among these is that very important one, no doubt corresponding to the plan on which the world M is ordered, which enables us not only to form general ideas as such, but to subsume any given manifold under any one of its marks, of which a general idea has been formed, as a species or instance thereof. This intellectual capability, once given, does not subject itself to any limits in its

exercise. Even that which, when we consider it metaphysically, we recognise as in reality the all-containing and unconditioned, we may as a matter of logic take for one of the various instances admitting of subsumption under the general idea of the unconditioned. Hence, while it is only of particular things that we assert multiplicity as a matter of reality, we attempt on the other hand to form a plural of the conception 'Universe,' and oppose the real M to many other possible Universes.

But the capacity of doing this we owe not to the knowledge of a law to which M and N alike are subject, but only to that which actually takes place in M , and to a certain tendency transferred from it to us as constituents of M . The tendency to think of everything real as an instance of a kind, of which the conception is derived by abstraction from that thing, and thus at last to think even of the primary all-embracing Real, M itself, as an instance representing the idea we form of it, and so to dream of other instances existing along with it. Thus arises the notion of that world N , a perfectly empty fiction of thought to which we ascribe no manner of reality, and of no value, except, like other imaginary formulæ, to illustrate the other conception M , which is not imaginary. And I employed N exclusively for this purpose. Further, when we said that, if N existed, the laws valid for N would flow from the equation $N = N$ in just the same way as those valid for M flow from the equation $M = M$, this was not a conclusion drawn from knowledge of an obligation binding on both of them. On the contrary, it was an analogy in which what was true of the real M was transferred to the imaginary N . In reality we have no title to make this transfer, for—to put it simply—who can tell what would be and would happen if everything were other than it is? But if we do oppose this imaginary case to the real one in order to explain the latter, we must treat it after the type of the real. Otherwise, as wholly disparate, it would not even serve the purpose of illustrating

the real by contrast with it—the only purpose for which it is introduced.

87. Yet a third objection remains to be noticed. The statement that from M follows the series of laws that hold good for this world M , obviously does not mean merely that these laws proceed anyhow from M ; it means that they are the proper consequences of its nature. But what is meant by a 'proper consequence' when it can no longer be distinguished from an improper consequence as corresponding to some rule to which the improper consequence does not correspond? Have we not after all to presuppose some law of the necessity or possibility of thought, absolutely prior to the world and reality, which determines, in regard to every reality that may come to be, what development of its particular nature can follow consistently from the nature of the primary real, M or N , in distinction from such a development as would be inconsistent?

This variation of the old error can only be met by a variation of the old answer. At first sight it seems a pleonasm to demand that actual consequences should not be inconsequent. Still the expression has a certain meaning. Hitherto we have taken the idea of reason and consequent to be merely this, that from a determinate something there flows another determinate something. The question, what determinate something admits of being connected with what other, by coherence of this sort, has been left aside. The idea of reason and consequent, as above stated, would be satisfied, if with the various reasons $g^1 g^2 g^3$ the completely determinate consequences $p q r$ were as a matter of fact associated, without there being any affinity between $p q$ and r corresponding to that between $g^1 g^2 g^3$. We shall find that our knowledge of reality is in fact ultimately arrested by such pairs of cohering occurrences. For instance, between the external stimuli on which the sensations of sight and hearing depend, we are able to point out affinities which make it possible to present those several modes of

stimulation as kinds, g^1 and g^2 , of one process of vibration, g . But between sounds and colours we are quite unable to discover the same affinity, or to prove that, if sensations of sound follow upon g^1 , sensations of colour must in consistency present themselves on occasion of g^2 .

This example illustrates the meaning of that consistency of consequence which, in our view as stated above, can within certain limits be actually discovered and demonstrated in the real world, but beyond those limits is assumed to obtain universally in some form or other. The Unity of Being, without which there would be no possibility of the reciprocal action within a world of the seemingly though not really separate elements of that world, excludes the notion of a multiplicity of isolated and fatalistic ordinances, which without reference to each other should bind together so many single pairs of events. There must be some rule or other according to which the connexion of the members of each single pair, g^1 and f , with each other determines that of all the other pairs, g^m and f^m . It is only in reference to the comparison of various cases with each other, which thus becomes possible, that there is any meaning in speaking as we did of 'consistency.' The expression has no meaning in relation to any single pair, g and f , which we might have made the point of departure for our preliminary consideration of the rest. The coherence between two members would at the outset be an independent fact of which nothing could be known but simply that it was the fact. For supposing we chose to think of their adjustment to each other as connected with the fulfilment of a supreme condition Z requiring consistency, they would still only *correspond* to this condition. The actual concrete mode in which they satisfied it, the content in virtue of which they subordinated themselves to it, would be something which it

¹ [$'g'$ and $'f'$ stand for 'Grund' and 'Folge' here, as on p 109. Cp. also p 126 where 'Grund' (Reason) is distinguished from 'Ursache' (Cause)]

would be impossible to suppose determined by Z itself; the more so in proportion as Z was more expressly taken to be an ordinance that would have to be fulfilled indifferently in innumerable cases, nay even in the most various worlds. Supposing Z to be neither the determining ground of the content of g and f , nor the productive cause of their real existence, the proposition that a connexion between the two ensues in accordance with Z , cannot be a statement of a real metaphysical order of supremacy and subordination but is just the reverse of the real order. The primary independent fact of the connexion between g^1 and f^1 is of such a character that the comparison of it with g^2 and f^2 , g'' and f^3 , enables us first to apprehend a universal mode of procedure on the part of the various connexions of events in the world—a concrete procedure, peculiar to this world M —and then, upon continued abstraction, to generate the conception of a condition Z , which would hold good for the organization of any world, N , so long as the mental image of N was formed after the pattern of the given reality, M .

88. At the present day few will understand the reasons for the persistency with which I dwell on these considerations and so often return to them. We live quickly, and have forgotten, without settling, a controversy which forty years ago was still a matter of the liveliest interest among the philosophers of Germany. The difficulties involved in Hegel's system of thought were then beginning to make themselves felt even by those who looked with favour on his enterprise—of repeating in thought by a constructive process the actual development of the world from the ground of the absolute. It was not after Hegel's mind to begin by determining the subjective forms of thought, under which alone we can apprehend the concrete nature of this ground of the Universe—a nature perhaps to us inaccessible. From the outset he looked on the motion of our thought in its effort to gain a clear idea of this still obscure goal of our aspiration as the proper inward development of the absolute

itself, which only needed to be pursued consistently, in order gradually to bring into consciousness all that the universe contains.

Thus the most abstract of objects came to be thought of as the root of the most concrete—a way of thinking which it was soon found impossible to carry out. Even in dealing with the phenomena of nature, though they were forced into categories and classifications without sufficient knowledge, it had to be supposed that the process of development, once begun, was carried on with a superabundance in the multiplication of forms for which no explanation was to be found in the generalities which preceded the theory of nature. All that these could do was to make us anticipate some such *saltus*; for the transition of one determination into its opposite, or at any rate into an 'otherness,' had been one of the supposed characteristics of the motion which was held to generate the world. The same difficulty might have been felt when the turn came for the construction of the spiritual and historical world, into which nature was supposed to pass over. There are many reasons, however, even in actual life, for not being content with the derivation of our ideas of the beautiful and the good from the living feeling which in fact alone completely apprehends their value, but for giving them greater precision by requiring them to satisfy certain general formal determinations. It is true that they too undergo a sensible degradation if they are looked on merely as instances of abstract relations of thought, but this was taken almost less notice of than the same fact in regard to the phenomena of nature, for owing to the latter being objects of perception, it could not be ignored how much more they were than the abstract problems which according to the Hegelian philosophy they had to fulfil.

Hegel himself was quite aware of the error involved in this way of representing the world's course of development. He repeatedly insists that what appears in it as

the third and last member of the dialectical movement described is in truth rather the first. And assuredly this remark is not to be looked upon as an after-thought of which no further application is made, but expresses the true intention of this bold Monism, which undertook far more than human powers can achieve, but of which the leading idea by no means loses its value through the great defects in its execution. From the errors noticed Schelling thought to save us. It was time, he told us, that the higher, the only proper, antithesis should be brought into view—the antithesis between freedom and necessity, in apprehending which, and not otherwise, we reach the inmost centre of philosophy. I will not dwell on the manner in which he himself worked out this view in its application to the philosophy of religion. It was Weisse who first sought to develop it systematically. That which Hegel had taken for true Being, he looked upon merely as the sum of prior conditions without which such Being would be unthinkable and could not be, but which themselves have not being. Thus understood, they formed in his view the object of a certain part of philosophy, and that comparatively speaking a negative part, namely Metaphysic. It was for experience on the other hand—the experience of the senses and that of the moral and religious consciousness—as a positive revelation to give us knowledge of the reality built on that abstract foundation.

Such expressions might easily be explained in a sense with which we could agree. It would be a different sense, however, from that which they were intended to convey. According to that original sense the general thoughts, which it was the business of Metaphysic to unfold, were more than those forms of apprehending true Being without which we cannot think. They were understood indeed to be this, but also something more. In their sum they were held to constitute an absolutely necessary matter for

which it was impossible either not to be or to be other than it is, but which, notwithstanding this necessity, notwithstanding this unconditional being, was after all a nothing, without essence and without reality; while over against it stood the true Being, for which according to this theory, it is possible not to be or to be other than it is, thus being constituted not by necessity but by freedom. I shall not spend time in discussing this usage of the terms, freedom and necessity. I would merely point out that the latter term, if not confined to a necessity of thought on our part, but extended to that which is expressly held to be the unconditioned condition of all that is conditioned, would have simply no assignable meaning and would have to be replaced by the notion of a *de facto* universal validity. The adoption of the term 'Freedom' to indicate the other sort of reality expressly recognised as merely *de facto*—the reality of that which might just as well not be—is to be explained by the influence of ideas derived from another sphere of philosophy—the philosophy of religion—which cannot be further noticed here. Taken as a whole, the theory is the explicit and systematic expression of that Dualism which I find wholly unthinkable, and against which my discussions have so far been directed. In this form at any rate it cannot be true. It is impossible that there should first be an absolute *Prius* consisting in a system of forms that carry necessity with them and constitute a sort of unaccountable Fate, and that then there should come to be a world, however created, which should submit itself to the constraint of these laws for the realisation of just so much as these limits will allow. The real alone is and it is the real which by its Being brings about the appearance of there being a necessity antecedent to it, just as it is the living body that forms within itself the skeleton around which it has the appearance of having grown.

89. We have not the least knowledge how it is that

the seemingly homogeneous content of a germ-vesicle deposits those fixed elements of form, around which the vital movements are carried on. Still less shall we succeed in deducing from the simple original character, M , of a world, the organization of the necessity which prevails in it. There are two general ways, however, of understanding the matter, alike admissible consistently with our assumption of the unity of the world, which remain to be noticed here. I will indicate them symbolically by means of our previous formulæ, $M = \phi [A B R]$, and the converse $\phi [A B R] = M$. By the former I mean to convey that M is to be considered the form-giving Prius, of which the activity, whether in the way of self-maintenance or development, at every moment conditions the state of the world's elements and the form of their combination, both being variable between the limits which their harmony with M fixes for them. In the second formula M is presented as the variable resulting form, which the world at each moment assumes through the reciprocal effects of its elements—this form again being confined within limits which the necessity, persistently and equally prevalent in these effects, imposes. I might at once designate these views as severally Idealism and Realism, were it not that the familiar but at the same time somewhat indefinite meaning of these terms makes a closer investigation necessary.

90. Availing ourselves once again, for explanatory purposes, of the opposition between two worlds, M and N , we might designate the form in which, according to the sense of the former view, we should conceive the different characters of the two worlds to be alike comprehended, as that of an Idea¹ or, in the vernacular, as that of a Thought². It is thus that in Æsthetic criticism we are accustomed to speak of the Idea or Thought of a work of Art, in the sense of the principle which determines its form in opposition to the particular outlines in which indeed the principle

¹ ['Idee.']

² ['Gedanke.']

is manifested but to which it is not so absolutely tied that other kindred means, even means wholly different, might not be combined to express it. So again in active life we speak of a project as an Idea or Thought, when we mean to censure it for including no selection between the manifold points capable of being related by the combination of which it might be carried out. If now we drop the imaginary world N , we cannot thereupon suppose that the real world M lacks that concrete character by which we distinguished it from N , although that character would no longer be needed for the purpose of distinguishing it from something else now that it is understood that there is nothing external to it. It would therefore be incorrect to call the Idea, simply as the Idea, the supreme principle of the world. Even the absolute idea, although, in opposition to the partial ideas which it itself conditions as constituents of its meaning, it might fitly be called unlimited, would not on that account be free from a definitely concrete content, with which it fills the general form of the Idea.

In other cases it is more easy to avoid this logical error of putting an abstract designation of essence, as conceived by us, in place of the subject to which the essence belongs. We are more liable to it in the present case, where the reality, being absolutely single, can only be compared with imaginary instances of the same conception. We are then apt to think that every determinate quality which we might leave to this reality would rest on a denial of the other determinate qualities which we excluded from it, and which, in order to the possibility of such exclusion, must at the same time be classed with that which excludes them as coordinate instances of a still higher reality. This reality can then only be reached by an extinction of all content whatever. Thus the tendency, which so often recurs in the history of philosophy, spins out its thread—the tendency to look on the supreme

creative principle of the world not merely as undefinable by any predicates within our reach but as in itself empty and indefinite. These ways of thinking are only justifiable so far as they imply a refusal to ascribe to the supreme *M*, as a sort of presupposition of its being, a multitude of ready-made predicates, from which as from a given store it was to collect its proper nature. It is no such doctrine that we mean to convey in asserting that the supreme principle of reality is to be found in a definitely concrete Idea, *M*, and not in the Idea merely as an Idea. The truth is rather this. *M* being in existence, or in consequence of its existence, it becomes possible for our Thought, as included in it, to apprehend that which *M* is in the form of a *summm genus* to which *M* admits of being subordinated and as a negation of the non-*M*. It is not every determination that rests on negation. On the contrary, there is an original Position without which it would be impossible for us to apprehend the content of that Position as a determination and to explain it by the negation of something else.

91. The mode of development, accordingly, which is imposed on the world by the Idea of which it is the expression, would depend on the content of the Idea itself, and could only be set forth by one who had previously made himself master of this content. So to make himself master of it must be the main business of the Idealist as much as of any one else. The only preliminary enlightenment which he would have to seek would relate to that characteristic of the cosmic order in the way of mere form which is implied in the fact that, according to him, it *is* in the form of a governing Idea that the content just spoken of, whatever it may be, constitutes the basis of this order. For him *M* means simply a persistent Thought, of which the import remains the same, whatever and how great soever in each instance of its realisation may be the collection of elements combined

to this end. The world therefore would not be bound by M either to the constant maintenance of the same elements or to the maintenance of an identical form in their connexion. Not only would ABR admit of replacement by abr and $a\beta\rho$, but also their mode of connexion ϕ by χ or ψ , if it was only in these new forms that those altered elements admitted of being combined into identity with M . It would be idle to seek universally binding conditions which in each single form of M 's realisation the coherent elements would have to satisfy simply in order to be coherent. What each requires on the part of the other in these special cases is not ascertainable from any source whatever either by computation or by syllogism. We have no other analogy to guide us in judging of this connexion than that—often noticed above—of æsthetic fitness which, when once we have become acquainted with the fact of a combination between manifold elements, convinces us that there is a perfect compatibility, a deep-seated mutual understanding, between them, without enabling us to perceive any general rule in consequence of which this result might have come about. The relation, however, of the Idea M to the various forms, thus constituted, of its expression— $\phi[ABR]$, $\chi[abr]$, $\psi[a\beta\rho]$ —is not that of a genus to its species. It passes from one into the other—not indifferently from any one into any other, but in definite series from ϕ through χ into ψ . No Idealism at any rate has yet failed to insist on the supposition—a supposition which experience bears out—that it is not merely in any section of the world which might be made at any given moment, but also in the succession of its phases, that the unity of the Idea will assert itself.

The question may indeed be repeated, What are the conditions which ϕ and χ have to satisfy in order to the possibility of sequence upon each other, while it is impossible for ψ to arise directly out of ϕ ? Of all theories

Idealism is most completely debarred from an appeal to a supra-mundane mechanism, which makes the one succession necessary, the other impossible. In consistency it must place the maintenance of this order as unconditionally as the formation of its successive members in the hands of the Idea itself which is directed by nothing but its own nature. On this nature will depend the adoption of one or other of certain courses, or rather it will consist in one or other of them. It will require either a perfectly unchanged self-maintenance, or the preservation, along with more or less considerable variations, of the same idea and outline in the totality of phenomena; either a progress to constantly new forms which never returns upon itself or a repetition of the same periods. It is only the first of these modes of procedure which observation contradicts in the case of the given world. Of the others we find instances in detail; but if we were called to say which of them bears the stamp of reality as a whole, our collective experience would afford no guide to an answer. All that we know is that the several phases of the cosmic order, whatever the nature of the coherent chain formed by their series as a whole, are made up of combinations of comparable elements, that is, as we are in the habit of supposing, of states and changes of persistent things. This is the justification of our way of employing the equivalent letters of different alphabets to indicate the constituents which in different sections of the cosmic order seem to replace each other. If we allow ourselves then to pursue this mode of representation and concede to Idealism that the Idea *M* determines the series of its forms without being in any way conditioned by anything alien to itself, still by this very act of determination it makes each preceding phase, with its content, the condition of the realisation of that which follows. It is no detached existence, however, that we can ascribe to the Idea, as if it were an as yet unformed *M* apart from all the several forms of its possible realisation. We may not present it to our-

selves as constantly dipping afresh into such a repertory of forms, with a definite series in view, for the purpose, after discarding the prior phase, of clothing itself in the new one which might be next in the series. At each moment the Idea is real only in one of these forms. It is only as having at this particular time arrived at this particular expression of its meaning, that it can be the determining ground for the surrender of this momentary form and for the realisation of the next succeeding one. The æsthetic or, if that term is preferred, the dialectic connexion between such phases of reality as stand in a definite order of succession, which was implied in their being regarded as an expression of one Idea, must pass over into a causal connexion, in which the content and organization of the world at each moment is dependent on its content and organization at the previous moment.

92. The difficulties involved in this doctrine have been too much ignored by Idealism, in the forms which it has so far taken. In seeking to throw light on them, I propose to confine myself to the succession of two phases of the simple form $\phi [A B R]$ and $\phi [a b R]$, which were treated in § 72 as possible cases. This determinate succession can never become thinkable, if each of these phases is represented as an inert combination of inert elements · for in that case each is an equivalent expression for M and the transition from each into each of the innumerable other expressions or phases of M is equally possible and equally unnecessary. Either the included elements must be considered to be in a definitely directed process of becoming, or the common form of combination, ϕ , must be considered a motion which distributes itself upon them in various definite quantities. This assumption is not inconsistent either with the principles previously laid down, according to which a stationary being of things could not be held to be anything but a self-maintenance of that which is in constant process of becoming, or with the spirit of Idealism ; for Idealism

includes in its conception of every form of being the dialectical negativity, which drives the being out of one given form of its reality into another. For these two unmoving members therefore we should have at once to substitute the one independent fact of a process by which A passes into a and B into b , while R remains the same. Now this fact is an equivalent expression of that form of becoming which at this moment constitutes the reality of M . $A-a$ and $B-b$, accordingly, are two occurrences of which, in the expression of the idea which constitutes M , one cannot take place without the other. Taken by themselves, indeed, they would have no such mutual connexion. The connexion does not represent any supra-mundane law, holding good for the world N as well as for the real M . It is only in this real M —which means for us in fact *unconditionally*—that they belong together as each the condition of the other, so long as there is no change on the part of the remaining member R to affect the pure operation of the two on each other.

Supposing it, now, to come about in the course of this world M , that certain preceding phases once again gave rise to the occurrence $A-a$ and along with it to an unchanged R or an R changed only in respect of internal modifications without external effect, then we should infer that in this case of repetition of $A-a$, the occurrence $B-b$ must also re-appear as its consequence required by the nature of M . If, however, the preceding phases necessitated along with $A-a$ a transition of R to r , then the tendency of the former occurrence to produce $B-b$, while continuing, would not be able to realise itself purely. What would really take place would be a resulting occurrence, the issue of those two impulses, determined by a relation of mutual implication in M just in the same way as, in the case of the indifference of R , $B-b$ is determined by $A-a$. Or—to express the same generally—the transition of the one phase ϕ into the other χ is brought about by the combination of the reciprocal

effects, which the several movements contained in ϕ once for all exercise in virtue of their nature, independently of the phase in which they happen to be combined or of the point in the world's course at which they from time to time appear.

We thus come to believe in the necessity of a mechanical system, according to which each momentary realisation of the Idea is that which the preceding states of fact according to certain laws of their operation had the power to bring about. Nor is it, in any fatalistic way, as an alien necessity imposing itself on the Idea, that this mechanism is thought of, but as an analytical consequence of our conception of the Idea—of the supposition that it enjoins upon itself a certain order in its manifold possible modes of manifestation and by so doing makes the one an antecedent condition of that which follows. So long, however, as Idealism continues to regard the import of the Idea as the metaphysical Prius which determines the succession of events, so long there lies a difficulty in this twofold demand—the demand that what is conditioned by the Idea *a fronte* should be always identical with that to which this mechanism of its realisation impels *a tergo*. At a later stage of my enquiry I shall have occasion to return to this question. It will be at the point, to which the reader will have been long looking forward, where the appearance within nature of living beings brings home to us with special cogency the thought of relation to an end as governing the course of things, or of an ideal whole preceding the real parts and their combination. The question can then be discussed on more definite premisses. In the region of generality to which I at present confine myself Idealism could scarcely answer otherwise than by the mere assertion ; ‘Such is the fact : such is the nature of the concrete Idea, and such the manner of its realisation at every moment, that everything which it ordains in virtue of its own import must issue as a necessary result in ordered succession from

the blind co-operation of all the several movements into which it distributes itself, and according to the general laws which it has imposed on itself.⁷

93. It is not every problem that admits of a solution, nor every goal, however necessarily we present it to ourselves, that can be reached. We shall never be able to state the full import of that Idea *M*, which we take to be the animating soul of the Cosmos. Not the fragmentary observation, which is alone at our command, but only that complete view of the whole which is denied, could teach us what that full import is. Nay, not even an unlimited extension of observation would serve the purpose. To know it, we must live it with all the organs of our soul. And even if by some kind of communication we had been put in possession of it, all forms of thought would be lacking to us, by which the simple fulness of what was given to us in vision could be unfolded into a doctrine, scientifically articulated and connected. The renunciation of such hopes has been prescribed to us by the conclusion to which we were brought in treating of Pure Logic. It remains, as we had there to admit¹, an unrealisable ideal of thought to follow the process by which the supreme Idea draws from no other source but itself those minor Premisses by means of which its import, while for ever the same, is led up to the development of a reality that consists in a manifold change. Here, however, as there we can maintain the conviction that in reality that is possible which our thoughts are inadequate to reproduce². It is not any construction of the world out of the idea of which the possibility is thus implied, but merely a regressive interpretation, which attempts to trace back the connexion of what is given us in experience, as we gradually become acquainted with it, to its ineffable source.

To this actual limitation upon our possibilities of knowledge the second of the views above³ distinguished—

¹ Logic, § 151

² Logic, *loc. cit.*

³ [§ 89.]

'Realism'—adjusts itself better than Idealism, though it has not at bottom any other or more satisfactory answer to give to the questions just raised. Realism does not enquire how the course of the world came to be determined as it is. It contents itself with treating the collective structure of the world at any moment as the inevitable product of the forces of the past operating according to general laws. On one point, however, I think the ordinary notion entertained by those who hold this view has already been corrected. They commonly start from the assumption of an indefinite number of mutually independent elements, which are only brought even into combination by the force of laws. That this is impossible and that for this Pluralism there must be substituted a Monism is what I have tried to show and need not repeat. It is not thus, from the nature of objects¹, but from the nature of the one object², that we must, even in Realism, derive the course of things. In fact, the distinction between the two views would reduce itself to this, that while the Idealist conceives his one principle as a restlessly active Idea, the Realist conceives his as something objective³, which merely *suffers* the consequences of an original disintegration into a multitude of elements that have to be combined according to law—a disintegration which belongs to the *de facto* constitution of its nature, as given before knowledge begins. The mode of their combinations may become known to us through the elaboration of experience and this knowledge gives us as much power of anticipating the future as satisfies the requirements of active life. An understanding of the universe is not what this method will help us to attain. The general laws, to which the reciprocal operations of things conform—in the first instance special to each group of phenomena—are presented as limitations co-eval with knowledge, imposed by Reality on itself and within which it is, as a matter of fact, compelled to restrain the multiplicity of its products. The overpowering impression,

¹ ['Sachen.']² ['Sache.']³ ['Sache.']

however, which is made by the irrefragability of these limits, is not justified by any value which in respect of their content they possess for our understanding.

They would thus only satisfy him who could content himself with the mere recognition of a state of things as unconditional matter of fact. But even within the range of realistic views the invincible spiritual assurance asserts itself that the world not merely is but has a meaning. To succeed in giving to the laws, that are found as a matter of fact to obtain, such an expression as makes the reason in them, the *ratio legis*, matter of direct apprehension, is everywhere reckoned one of the finest achievements of science. Nor can the realistic method of enquiry resist the admission that the ends to which events contribute cannot always be credibly explained as mere products of aimless operation. It is not merely organic structures to which this remark applies. Even the planetary system exhibits forms of self-maintenance in its periodic changes, which have the appearance of being particular cases especially selected out of innumerable equally possible, or more easily possible, results of such operations. It is true that our observation is unable to settle the question whether these cases of adaptation to ends are to be thought of as single islands floating in a boundless sea of aimless becoming, or whether we should ascribe a like order in its changes to the collective universe. Realism can find an explanation of these special forms only in the assumption of an arrangement of all operative elements, which for all that depends on the general laws might just as well have been another, but which, being what it is and not another, necessarily leads in accordance with those laws to the given ends. It thus appeals on its part to the co-operation, as a matter of fact, of two principles independent of each other which it knows not how to unite; on the one hand the general laws, on the other hand the given special arrangement of their points of application. In this respect Realism can claim no superiority over Idealism. At the

same time it is only enquiries conducted in the spirit of Realism that will satisfy the wishes of Idealism. They will indeed never unveil the full meaning of the Idea. But there is nothing but recognition of the *de facto* relations of things that can make our thoughts at least converge towards this centre of the universe.

94. The conception of a Thing which we adopt has been exposed to many transformations, hitherto without decisive issue. Doubts have at last been raised whether the union of oneness of essential being with multiplicity of so-called states has any meaning at all and is anything better than an empty juxtaposition of words. In approaching our conclusion on this point we must take a roundabout road. The mis-giving just expressed reaches further. In all the arguments which we ultimately adduced, and in which we passed naïf judgments on the innermost essence of the real, on what is possible and impossible for it, according to principles unavoidable for our thought, what warranted the assurance that the nature of things must correspond to our subjective necessities of thought? Can such reasonings amount to more than a human view of things, bearing perhaps no sort of likeness to that which it is credited with representing?

This general doubt I meet with an equally general confession, which it may be well to make as against too aspiring an estimate of what Philosophy can undertake. I readily admit that I take Philosophy to be throughout merely an inner movement of the human spirit. In the history of that spirit alone has Philosophy its history. It is an effort, within the presupposed limits, even to ourselves absolutely unknown, which our earthly existence imposes on us, to gain a consistent view of the world—an effort which carries us to something beyond the satisfaction of the wants of life, teaching us to set before ourselves and to attain worthy objects in living. An absolute truth, such as the archangels in heaven would have to accept, is not its object, nor does the failure to realise such an object make our efforts bootless

We admit therefore the completely human subjectivity of all our knowledge with the less ambiguity, because we see clearly moreover that it is unavoidable and that, although we may forego the claim to all knowledge whatever, we could put no other knowledge in the place of that on which doubt is thrown, that would not be open to the same reproach. For in whatever mind anything may present itself which may be brought under the idea of knowledge, it will always be self-evident that this mind can never gain a view of the objects of its knowledge as they would seem if it did not see them, but only as they seem if it sees them, and in relation to it the seeing mind. It is quite superfluous to make this simple truth still more plain by a delineation of all the several steps in our knowledge, each monotonously followed by a proof that we everywhere remain within the limits of our subjectivity and that every judgment, in the way of recognition or correction, which we pass from one of the higher of these steps upon one of the lower, is still no more than a necessity of thought for us. At most it is worth the trouble to add that—still, of course, according to our way of thinking—this is no specially prejudicial lot of the human spirit, but must recur in every being which stands in relation to anything beyond it.

Just for this reason this universal character of subjectivity, belonging to all knowledge, can settle nothing as to its truth or untruth. In putting trust in one component of ostensible knowledge while we take another to be erroneous we can be justified only by a consideration of the import of the two components. We have to reject and alter all the notions, which we began by forming but which cannot be maintained without contradiction when our thoughts are systematized, while they can without contradiction be replaced by others. As regards the ultimate principles, however, which we follow in this criticism of our thoughts, it is quite true that we are left with nothing but the confidence of Reason in itself, or the certainty of belief in the general truth that there is

a meaning in the world, and that the nature of that reality, which includes us in itself, has given our spirit only such necessities of thought as harmonise with it.

95. Of the various forms in which the scepticism in question reappears the last is that of a doubt not as to the general capacity for truth on the part of our cognition, but as to the truth of one of its utterances—a determinate though very comprehensive one. It relates to that whole world of things which so far, in conformity with the usual way of thinking, we have taken for granted. After the admirable exposition which Fichte has given us of the subject in his 'Vocation of Man,' I need not show over again how everything which informs us as to the existence of a world without us, consists in the last resort merely in affections of our own *ego*, or—to use language more free from assumption—in forms which hover before our consciousness, and from the manifold variations and combinations of which there arises the idea—and always as our idea—of something present without us, of a world of things. Now we have a right to enquire what validity this idea, irrespectively of its proximate origin, may claim in the whole of our thoughts; but it would have been a simple fallacy merely on account of the subjectivity of all the elements out of which it has been formed, to deny its truth and to pronounce the outer world to be merely a creation of our imagination. For the state of the case could be no other, were there things without us or no. Our knowledge in the one case, our imagination in the other, could alike only consist in states or activities of our own being—in what we call impressions made on our nature, supposing these to be things, but on no supposition in anything other than a subjective property of ours.

As is well known, Fichte did not draw the primary inference which—offensive as it is—would be logically involved in the error noticed, the inference, namely, that the single subject, adopting such a philosophy, would have to consider itself the sole reality, which in its own inner world generated

the appearance of a companion Universe. In regard to Spirits he followed the conviction which I just now stated. It is only by means of subjective effects produced upon him, like those which mislead him into believing in things, that any one can know of the existence of other Spirits ; but just because this must equally be the case if there really are Spirits, this fact proved nothing against their existence. If therefore Fichte allowed the existence of a world of Spirits, while he inexorably denied that of a world of Things, the ground of his decision would only lie in the judgment which he passed on the several conceptions in respect simply of their content—in the fact that he found the conception of Spirit not only admissible but indispensable in the entirety of his view of the world, that of the Thing on the contrary as inadmissible as superfluous. To this conviction he was constant. To have no longer an eye for mere things was in his eyes a requirement to be made of every true philosophy.

96. I proceed to connect this brief historical retrospect with the difficulties which, as we saw, have still to be dealt with. We found it impossible for that to be unchangeable which we treated as a thing, *a*. It did not even admit of being determined by varying persistencies on the part of different qualities¹. We were forced to think of it as in continuous becoming, either unfolding itself into the one series, a^1, a^2, a^3 , or maintaining itself, in the other, a, a, a , by constantly new production. Each of these momentary phases, however, we saw must be exactly like itself, but $a^1 = a^1$ is different from every other. Even the exactly similar members of the latter series, though exactly similar, were not one and the same. For all that we asserted that in this change the Unity of a thing maintained itself. We could not but assert this if we were to conceive the mutual succession of the several forms, which could not arise out of nothing but only out of each other. We were not in

¹ [§ 24 ff.]

a condition, however, to say what it was that remained identical with itself in this process of becoming. We took advantage of the term 'states,'¹ which we applied to the changing forms, but we came to the conclusion that in so doing we were only expressing our mental demand without satisfying it. We saw that an immediate perception was needed to show us this relation of a subject to its states as actually under our hands and thereby convince us of its possibility.

Perhaps the reader then cherished the hope that there would be no difficulty in adducing many such instances in case of need. Now, on returning to this question, we only find one being, from the special nature of which the possibility of that relation seems inseparable. This is the spiritual subject, which exercises the wonderful function not merely of distinguishing sensations, ideas, feelings from itself but at the same time of knowing them as its own, as its states, and which by means of its own unity connects the series of successive events in the compass of memory. I should be misunderstood if this statement were interpreted to mean that the Spirit understands how to bring itself and its inner life in the way of logical subsumption under the relation of a subject to its states or to recognise itself as an instance of this subordination. It experiences the fact of there being this relation at the very moment when it lives through the process of its own action. It is only its later reflection on itself which thereupon generates for it in its thinking capacity the general conception of this relation—a relation in which it stands quite alone without possibility of another homogeneous instance being found. It is only in the sensitive act, which at once repels the matter of sense from us as something that exists for itself and reveals it to us as our own, that we become aware what is meant by the apprehension of a certain *a* as a state of a subject *A*. It is only through the fact that our attention, bringing events into

¹ [§ 47.]

relation, comprehends past and present in memory, while at the same time there arises the idea of the persistent Ego to which both past and present belong, that we become aware what is meant by Unity of Being throughout a change of manifold states, and that such unity is possible. In short it is through our ability to appear to ourselves as such unities that we are unities. Thus the proximate conclusion to which we are forced would be this. If there are to be things with the properties we demand of things, they must be more than things. Only by sharing this character of the spiritual nature can they fulfil the general requirements which must be fulfilled in order to constitute a Thing. They can only be distinct from their states if they distinguish themselves from their states. They can only be unities if they oppose themselves, as such, to the multiplicity of their states.

97. The notion that things have souls has always been a favourite one with many and there has been some extravagance in the imaginative expression of it. The reasoning which has here led us up to it does not warrant us in demanding anything more than that there should belong to things in some form or other that existence as an object for itself which distinguishes all spiritual life from what is only an object for something else. The mere capacity of feeling pain or pleasure, without any higher range of spiritual activity, would suffice to fulfil this requirement. There is the less reason to expect that this psychical life of things will ever force itself on our observation with the clearness of a fact. The assumption of its existence will always be looked on as an imagination, which can be allowed no influence in the decision of particular questions, and which we can only indulge when it is a question, in which no practical consequences are involved, of making the most general theories apprehensible.

.It is therefore natural to enquire whether after all it is necessary to retain in any form that idea of an existence

of Things which forced this assumption upon us. There are two points indeed which I should maintain as essential: one, the existence of spiritual beings like ourselves which, in feeling their states and opposing themselves to those states as the unity that feels, satisfy the idea of a permanent subject¹: the other, the unity of that Being, in which these subjects in turn have the ground of their existence, the source of their peculiar nature, and which is the true activity at work in them. But why over and above this should there be a world of things, which themselves gain nothing by existing, but would only serve as a system of occasions or means for producing in spiritual subjects representations which after all would have no likeness to their productive causes? Could not the creative power dispense with this roundabout way and give rise directly in spirits to the phenomena which it was intended to present to them? Could it not present that form of a world which was to be seen without the intervention of an unseen world which could never be seen as it would be if unseen? And this power being in all spirits one and the same, why should there not in fact be a correspondence between the several activities which it exerts in those spirits of such a kind that while it would not be the same world-image that was presented to all spirits but different images to different spirits, the different presentations should yet fit into each other, so that all spirits should believe themselves planted at different positions of the same world and should be able to adjust themselves in it, each to each, in the way of harmonious action? As to the effects again which Things interchange with each other and which according to our habitual notions appear to be the strongest proof of their independent existence—why should we not substitute for them a reciprocal conditionedness on the part of innumerable actions, which cross and modify each other within the life of the one Being that truly is? If so, the changes which

¹ [*‘Eines Wesens.’*]

our world-image undergoes would at each moment issue directly from the collision of these activities which takes effect also in us, not from the presence of many independent sources of operation bringing these changes about externally to us.

In fact, if the question was merely one of rendering the world, as phenomenally given to us, intelligible, we could dispense with the conception of a real operative atom, which we regard only as a point of union for forces and resistances that proceed from it, standing in definite relations to other like atoms and only changing according to fixed laws through their effect upon it. We could everywhere substitute for this idea of the atom that of an elementary action on the part of the one Being—an action which in like manner would stand in definite relations to others like it, and would through them undergo a no less orderly change. The assumption of real things would have no advantage but such as consists in facility of expression. Even this we could secure if, while retaining the term ‘things,’ we simply established this definition of it; that ‘things’ may be accepted in the course of our enquiry as secondary fixed points, but for all that are not real existences in the metaphysical sense, but elementary actions of the one Being which forms the ground of the world, connected with each other according to the same laws of reciprocal action which we commonly take to apply to the supposed independent things.

98. For the prosecution of our further enquiries it is of little importance to decide between the two views delineated. But a third remains to be noticed which denies the necessity of this alternative, and undertakes to justify the common notion of a Thing without a Self. When we set about constructing a Being which in the change of its states should remain one, it was the experience of spiritual life, it will be said, which came to our aid, and by an unexpected actual solution of the problem convinced us that it was soluble. What entitles us, however, to reckon this solution the only

one? Why might there not just as well be another, of which we can form no mental picture only for the reason that we have had no experience of it as our own mode of existence? Why may not the 'thing' be a Being of its own particular kind, defined for us only by the functions which it fulfils, but not bound in the execution of these to maintain any such resemblance to our Spirit as, with the easy presumption of an anthropomorphic imagination, we force upon it?

This counter-view is one that I cannot accept. So long as what we propose to ourselves is to give shape to that conception of the world which is necessary to us, we allow ourselves to fill up the gaps in our knowledge by an appeal to the unknown object, to which our thoughts converge without being able to attain it; but we may not assume an unknown object of such a kind as would without reason conflict with the inferences which we cannot avoid. Now it seems to me that the suggestions just noticed imply a resort to the unknown of this unwarrantable kind. In the first place it is not easy to see why the conception of the Thing, in the face of the duly justified objections to it, needs to be maintained at the cost of an appeal to what is after all a wholly unknown possibility of its being true. Secondly, while readily allowing that anything which really exists may have its own mode of existence, and is not to be treated as if it followed the type of an existence alien to it, we must point out that where such peculiarity of existence is asserted the further predicates assigned to it must correspond. What manner of being, however, could we consistently predicate of that from which we had expressly excluded the universal characteristics of animate existence, every active relation to itself, every active distinction from anything else? Of that which had no consciousness of its own nature and qualities, no feeling of its states, which in no way possessed itself as a Self? Of that of which the whole function consisted in serving as a medium to convey effects, from which it suffered nothing itself, to other things

like itself, just as little affected by those effects, till at last by their propagation to animate Beings there should arise in these, and not before, a comprehensive image of the whole series of facts. If we maintain that in fact such a thing cannot be said to *be*, it is not that we suppose ourselves to be expressing an inference, which would still have to be made good as arising out of the notion of such a thing: it is that we find directly in the description of such a thing the definition of a mere operation, which, in taking place, presupposes a real Being from which it proceeds and another in which it ends, but *is* not, itself, as a third outside the two. That our imagination will nevertheless cling to the presentation of independent and blindly-operating individual things, we do not dispute nor do we seek to make it otherwise; but in the effort to find a metaphysical truth in this mode of expression we cannot share. It is not enough to try to give a being to these things outside their immanence in the one Real, unless it is possible to show that in their nature there is that which can give a real meaning to the figure of speech conveyed in this '*outside*.'


As to the source of our efforts in this direction and their fruitlessness, I may be allowed in conclusion to repeat some remarks which in a previous work¹ I have made at greater length. We do not gain the least additional meaning for Things without self and without consciousness by ascribing to them a being outside the one Real. All the stability and energy which they ensure as conditioning and motive forces in the changes of the world we see, they possess in precisely the same definiteness and fulness when considered as mere activities of the Infinite. Nay it is only through their common immanence in the Infinite, as we have seen, that they have this capability of mutual influence, which would not belong to them as isolated beings detached from that substantial basis. Thus for the purpose of any being or function that we would ascribe to things as related to and

¹ Mikrokosmos, iii. 530 [E. Trans. ii. 645].

connected with each other, we gain nothing by getting rid of their immanence. It is true however that things, so long as *they* are only states of the infinite, are nothing in relation to themselves. it is in order to make them something in this relation or on their own account that we insist on their existence outside the Infinite. But this genuine true reality, which consists in relation to self—whether in being *something* as related to self or in that relation simply as such—is not acquired by things through a detachment from the one Infinite, as though this ‘Transcendence,’ to which in the supposed case it would be impossible to assign any proper meaning, were the antecedent condition on which the required relation to self depended as a consequence. On the contrary, it is in so far as something is an object to itself, relates itself to itself, distinguishes itself from something else, that by this act of its own it detaches itself from the Infinite. In so doing, however, it does not acquire but possesses, in the only manner to which we give any meaning in our thoughts, that self-dependence of true Being, which by a very inappropriate metaphor from space we represent as arising from the impossible act of ‘Transcendence.’ It is not that the opposition between a being *in* the Infinite and a being *outside* it is obviously intelligible as explaining why self-dependence should belong to the one sort of being while it is permanently denied to another. It is the nature of the two sorts of being and the functions of which they are capable that make the one or the other of these figurative expressions applicable to them. Whatever is in condition to feel and assert itself as a Self, that is entitled to be described as detached from the universal all-comprehensive basis of being, as *outside* it: whatever has not this capability will always be included as ‘immanent’ within it, however much and for whatever reasons we may be inclined to make a separation and opposition between the two.

BOOK II.

OF THE COURSE OF NATURE (COSMOLOGY).



CHAPTER I.

Of the Subjectivity of our Perception of Space.

IN the course of our ontological discussion it was impossible not to mention the forms of Space and Time ; within which, and not otherwise, the multiplicity of finite things and the succession of their states are presented to perceptive cognition. But our treatment did not start from the first questions that induce enquiry, rather it presupposed the universal points of view which have already been revealed in the history of philosophy. We were able therefore to deal with abstract ontological ideas apart from these two forms which are the conditions of perception. Any further difficulties must look for a solution to the Cosmological discussions on which we are now entering. Among the subjects belonging to Cosmology it may seem that Time should come first in our treatment ; seeing that we substituted the idea of a continual Becoming for that of Being as unmoved 'position'.¹ Accessory reasons however induce us to speak first of Space, which indeed is as directly connected with our second requirement, that we should be able in every moment of time to conceive the real world as a coherent unity of the manifold.

¹ [v. Bk. I. § 38.]

99. In proposing to speak of the metaphysical value of Space, I entirely exclude at present various questions which, with considerable interest of their own, have none for this immediate purpose. At present we only want to know what kind of reality we are to ascribe to space as we have to picture it, and with what relation to it we are to credit the real things which it appears to put in our way. No answer to this, nor materials for one, can be got from psychological discussions as to the origin or no-origin of our spatial perception. To designate it as an *a priori* or innate possession of the mind is to say nothing decisive, and indeed, nothing more than a truism, of course it is innate, in the only sense the expression can bear¹, and in this sense colours and sounds are innate too. As surely as we *could* see no colours, unless the nature of our soul included a faculty which could be stimulated to that kind of sensation, so surely could we represent to ourselves no images in space without an equally inborn faculty for such combination of the manifold. But again, as surely as we *should* not see colours, if there were no stimulus independent of our own being to excite us to the manifestation of our innate faculty, so surely we should not have the perception of space without being induced to exert our faculty by conditions which do not belong to it.

On the other hand, one who should regard our spatial perception as an abstraction from facts of experience, could have nothing before him, as direct experience out of which to abstract, beyond the arrangement and the succession of the sense-images in his own mind. He might be able to show how, out of such images, either as an unexplained matter of fact, or by laws of association of ideas which he professed to know, there gradually arose the space-perception, as a perception in our minds. He might perhaps show too, how there originated in *us* the notion of a world of things outside our consciousness as the cause of these spatial

¹ Logic, § 324.

appearances. We shall find this a hard enough problem, later on; but granting it completely solved, still the mere development-history of our ideas of space would be in no way decisive of their validity as representing the postulated world of things, nor of the admissibility of this postulate itself. As was said above, the way in which a mode of mental representation grows up can be decisive of its truth or untruth, only in cases where a prior knowledge of the object to which it should relate convinces us that its way of growth must necessarily lead whether to approximation or to divergence. Therefore, for this latter view, as well as for the former which maintains the *a priori* nature of the space-perception, there is only one sense in which the question of its objective validity is answerable. namely, whether such a perception as we in fact possess and cannot get rid of, however it arose, is consistent with our notions of what a reality apart from our consciousness must be, or whether, directly or in its results, it is incompatible with them.

100. A further introductory remark is called for by recent investigations. We admitted that our ideas of Space are conditioned by the stimuli which are furnished to our faculty for forming them. It is conceivable that these stimuli do not come to all minds with equal completeness, and that hence the space-perception of one mind need not include all that is contained in that of another. But this indefiniteness in the object of our question is easily removed. Modes of mental presentation which are susceptible of such differences of development may have their simplest phases still in agreement with the object to which they relate, while their consistent evolution evokes germs of contradiction latent before. Therefore when their truth is in question, we have only to consider their most highly evolved form; in which all possibility of further self-transformation is exhausted, and their relation to the entirety of their object is completed.

We all live, to begin with, under the impression of a finite extension, which is presented to our senses as surrounding

us, though with undetermined or unregarded limits ; it is our subsequent reflection that can find no ground in the nature of this extension for its ceasing at any point, and brings the picture to completion in the idea of infinite space. This then, the inevitable result of our mode of mental portrayal when once set in motion, is the matter whose truth and validity are in question. But scepticism has gone further. It is no longer held certain and self-evident that the final idea of a space uniform and homogeneous in all directions, at which men have in fact arrived, and which geometry had hitherto supported, is the only possible and consistent form of combination for simple perceptions of things beside one another. Some hold that other final forms are conceivable, though impossible for men ; some credit even mankind with the capacity to amend their customary perception of space by a better guided habituation of their representative powers. This last hope we may simply neglect, till the moment when it shall be crowned with success, the former suggestion, in itself an object of lively interest, we are also justified in disregarding for the present. for all the other forms of space whose conceivability these speculations undertake to demonstrate, would share the properties on which our decision depends with the only form which we now presuppose, that, namely, whose nature the current geometry has unfolded.

101. The kind of reality which we ought to ascribe to the content of an idea must agree with what such a content claims to be ; we could not ascribe the reality of an immutable existence to what we thought of as an occurrence ; nor endow what seemed to be a property with the substantive persistence which would only suit its substratum. Therefore we first try to define what space as represented in our minds claims to be, or, to find an acknowledged category of established existence under which if extended to it, it could fairly be said to fall.

Some difficulty will be found in the attempt. The only

point which is clear and conceded is that we do not regard it as a *thing* but distinguish it from the *things* which are moveable in it; and that though many determinations which are possible in space are properties of things, space itself is never such a property. Further; the definitions actually attempted are untenable; space is not a limit of things, but every such limit is a figure in space; and space itself extends without interruption over any spot to which we remove the things. It is neither form, arrangement, nor relation of things, but the peculiar principle which is essential to the possibility of countless different forms, arrangements, and relations of things; and, as their absolutely unchangeable background, is unaffected by the alternation and transition of these determinations one into another. Even if we called it 'form' in another sense, like a vessel which enclosed things within it, we should only be explaining it by itself; for it is only in and by means of Space that there can be vessels which enclose their contents but are not identical with them. These unsuccessful attempts show that there is no known general concept to which we can subordinate space; it is *sui generis*, and the question of what kind its reality is, can only be decided according to the claims of this its distinctive position.

102. As the condition of possibility for countless forms, relations, and arrangements of things, though not itself any definite one of them, it might seem that Space should be on a level with every universal genus-concept, and as such, merit no further validity. Like it, a genus-concept wears none of the definite forms, which belong to its subordinate species; but contains the rule which governs the manifold groupings of marks in them, allows a choice between certain combinations as possible, and excludes others as impossible.

Just such is the position of Space. Although formless in comparison with every outline which may be sketched in it, yet it is no passive background which will let any chance thing be painted on it; but it contains between its points

unchangeable relations, which determine the possibility of any drawing that we may wish to make in it. It is not essential to find an exhaustive expression for these relations at this moment ; we may content ourselves, leaving much undetermined, with defining them thus far.—that any point may be placed with any other point in a connexion homogeneous with that in which any third point may be placed with any fourth ; that this connexion is capable of measurable degrees of proximity and that its measure between any two points is defined by their relations to others. No matter, as I said, what more accurate expression may be substituted for that given, in as far as our perception of space contains such a legislative rule we might regard every group of manifold elements, which satisfied this rule, as subordinate to the universal concept of Space. But we should feel at once, that such a designation was unsuitable ; such a group might be called a combination of multiplicity in space, but not an instance of space, in the sense in which we regard every animal whose structure follows the laws of his genus as a species or instance of that genus. The peculiarities of what we indicated above as the law of space in general¹ create other relations between the different cases of its application, than obtain between the species of natural Genera. Each of the latter requires indeed that its rule of the grouping of marks shall be observed in each of its species ; but it puts the different species which do this in no reciprocal connexion. They are therefore subordinate to it, but when we call them, as species of the same genus, co-ordinate with one another, we really mean nothing by this co-ordination but the uniformity of their lot in that subordination. Supposing we unite birds, fishes, and other creatures under the universal concept ‘animal,’ all we find is that the common features of organization demanded by the concept occur in all of them ; this tells us nothing of the reciprocal attitude and behaviour of these classes ; the most we can do is,

¹ [‘Raumlichkeit.’]

conversely, to attempt afterwards a closer systematic union, by the formation of narrower genera, between those which we have ascertained from other sources of experience to possess reciprocal connexions.

On the other hand, the character of Space in general¹, requiring every point to be connected with others, forbids us to regard the various particular figures which may satisfy its requirements as isolated instances; it compels us to connect them with each other under the same conditions under which points are connected with points within the figures themselves. If we conceive this demand satisfied, as far as the addition of fresh elements brings a constantly recurring possibility and necessity of satisfying it, the result which we obtain is '*Space*'²: the single and entire picture, that is not only present by the uniformity of its nature in every limited part of extension, but at the same time contains them all as *its* parts, though of course it is not, as a whole, to be embraced in a single view: it is like an integral obtained by extending the relation which connects two points, to the infinite number of possible points. The only parallel to this condition, is in our habit of representing to ourselves the countless multitudes of mankind not merely as instances of their genus, but as parts united with the whole of Humanity; in the case of animals the peculiar ethical reasons which bring this about are wanting, and we are not in the habit of speaking in the same sense of 'animality.'

103. Of course, in the above remarks, I owe to the guidance of Kant all that I have here said in agreement with his account in Sect. 2 of the Transcendental Aesthetic; as regards what I have not mentioned here, I avoid for the moment expressing assent or dissent, excepting on two points which lie in the track of my discussion. 'It is impossible,' Kant says³, 'to represent to one's self that there is no space, though it is possible to conceive that

¹ ['Raumlichkeit.']

² ['der Raum.']

³ [Trans. Aesth. 2. (2).]

no objects should be met with in space.' Unnecessary objections have been raised against the second part of this assertion, by requiring of the thought of empty space, which Kant considers possible, the vividness of an actual perception, or of an image in the memory recalling all the accessory conditions of the perception. Then, of course, it is quite right to pronounce that a complete vacuum could not be represented to the mind, without at least reserving a place in it for ourself; for whatever place, outside the vacuum which we were observing, we might attempt, as observer, to assign ourself, we should unavoidably connect that place in its turn, by spatial relations, with the imagined extension. We should have the same right to assert that we could not conceive space without colour and temperature; an absolutely invisible extension is obviously not perceptible or reproducible as an image in memory: it must be one which is recognised by the eye at least as darkness, and in which the observer would include the thought of himself with some state of skin-sensation, which, like colour, he transfers as a property to his surroundings. But the question is not in the least about such impossible attempts, the admitted mobility of things is by itself a sufficient proof that we imply the idea of completely empty space, as possible in its own nature, even while we are actually considering it as filled with something real. This is most simply self-evident for atomistic views; if the atoms move, every point of the space they move in must be successively empty and full; but motion would mean nothing and be impossible, unless the abandoned empty places retained the same reciprocal positions and distances which they had when occupied; the empty totality of space is therefore unavoidably conceived as the independent background, for which the occupation by real matter is a not unvarying destiny.

To prefer the dynamical view of continuously filled

space leads to the same result. Degrees of density could mean absolutely nothing, and would be impossible, unless the same volume could be continuously occupied by different quantities of real matter; but this too implies that the limits of the volume possess and preserve their geometrical relations independently of the actual thing of which they are the place, and they would continue to possess them, if we supposed the density to decrease without limit and to approach an absolute vacuum. Therefore it is certain that we cannot imagine objects in space without conceiving its empty extension as a background present to begin with; although no remembered image of a perception of it is possible without a remembrance of the objects which made it perceptible to sense.

104. With this interpretation we may also admit the first part of the Kantian assertion. It is true that we cannot *represent* to ourselves the non-existence of space as something that can be experienced, and re-experienced in memory. It is however not *inconceivable* to us absolutely; but only under the condition that an aggregate of actual existence, capable of combination, in short a real world, is to be given, and that the subjects which have to bring it before them are our minds. Now this real world is given us; metaphysic rests entirely on this fact, and only investigates its inner uniformity without indulging in contemplation of the unreal: it is enough then for her to consider space to be given, as the universal, unchangeable, and ever present environment of things, just as much as things and their qualities are recognised to be given as changeable and alternating.

In this sense I may couple Kant's assertion with another saying of his: 'space is imagined as an infinite given magnitude¹.' It has been objected against this too, that an infinite magnitude cannot be imagined as given; but no one knew this better than Kant. A reasonable ex-

¹ [Trans. Aesth 2. (4).]

position can only take his expression to mean, that space is above all things *given*, and is not like a universal of which there can be a doubt whether it applies to anything or not; and that further, in every actual limited perception space is given, as a magnitude whose nature demands and permits, that, as extending uniformly beyond every limit, it should be pursued to infinity. Hence, the infinity of space clearly is given; for there is no limit such that progress beyond it, although conceivable, yet would not be real in the same sense as the interval left behind; every increment of extension, as it is progressively imagined, must be added to the former quantity as equally a given magnitude.

Finally, all these observations strictly speaking do nothing but repeat and depict the impression under which we all are in every-day life. The moment we exert our senses, nothing seems surer to us than that we are environed by Space, as a reality in whose depths the actual world may lose itself to our sight, but from which it can never escape; therefore while every particular sense-perception readily falls under suspicion of being a purely subjective excitement in us, to doubt the objectivity of Space has always seemed to the common apprehension an unintelligible paradox of speculation.

105. The motives to such a startling transformation of the ordinary view were found by Kant not in the nature of space itself, but in contradictions which seemed to result from its presupposed relation to the real world. The attempt of the Transcendental Aesthetic, to demonstrate our mental picture of space to be an *a priori* possession of our mind, does not in itself run counter to common opinion. For suppose a single space to extend all round us and to contain within it ourselves and all things; precisely in that case it is of course impossible that the several visions of it, existing in several thinking beings, could be the space itself; they could not be more

than subjective representations of it in those beings: so whether they belong to us originally, or arise in us by action from without, there is no *prima facie* hindrance to their being, *qua* images belonging to cognition, similar to a space which exists in fact.

Nothing short of the antinomies in which we become entangled, if we attempt to unite our ideas of the entirety of the world or of its ultimate constituent parts with this presupposition of an actual Space, decided Kant for his assumption that the space-perception was *nothing but* a subjective form of apprehension with which the nature of the real world that had to be presupposed had nothing in common. With this indirect establishment of his doctrine I cannot agree; because the purely phenomenal nature of space does not properly speaking remove any of the difficulties on account of which Kant felt compelled to assert it. It is quite inadmissible, after the fashion especially of popular treatises of the Kantian school which exulted in this notion, to treat Things in themselves as utterly foreign to the forms under which they were nevertheless to appear to us; there must be determinations in the realm of things in themselves prescribing the definite places, forms, or motions, which we observe the appearances in space to occupy, sustain, or execute, without the power of changing them at our pleasure. If Things are not themselves of spatial form and do not stand in space-relations to one another, then they must be in some network of changeable intelligible relations with one another; to each of these, translated by us into the language of spatial images, there must correspond one definite space-relation to the exclusion of every other. How we are in a position to apply our innate and consequently uniform perception of space, which we are said to bring to our experiences ready made, so that particular apparent things find their definite places in it, is a question the whole of which Kant has left unanswered; the results of this omis-

sion, as I think it worth while to show briefly, encumber even his decision upon the antinomy of Space.

106. The real world, it is said, cannot be infinite in space, because infinity can only be conceived as unlimited succession, and not as simultaneous. Now how is our position bettered by denying all extension to the real world, while forced, with Kant, to admit that in all our experience space is the one persistently valid form under which that world appears? I cannot persuade myself that this so-called empirical reality of space is reconcilable with the grounds which cause the rejection of its transcendental validity for the world of Things in themselves.

In this world, the world of experience, if we proceed onwards in a straight line, we shall, admittedly, never come to the end of the line; but how do we suppose that our perceptions would behave during our infinite linear progress? Would there always be something to perceive, however far we advanced? And if there was, would there be some point after which it would be always the same or would it keep changing all through? In both of these cases there must be precisely as many distinguishable elements in the world of things in themselves as there are different points of space in this world of perception; for all the things that appear in different places, whether like or unlike, must be somehow different in order to have the power of so appearing, and so must at least consist in a number of similar elements, corresponding to the number of their distinguishable places. Consequently, on this assumption, space could only possess its empirical reality if there were conceded to the real world that very countlessness or infinity the impossibility of admitting which was the reason for restricting space to an empirical reality. I trust that it will not be attempted to object that in fact the infinite rectilinear progression can never be completed. Most certainly it cannot, and doubtless we are

secure against advancing so far in space as to give practical urgency to the question how our perceptions will behave : but in treating of the formation of our idea of the world, we must consider the distances which we know we shall never reach as in their nature simultaneously existent, just as much as those which we have actually traversed are held simultaneously persistent, it is impossible for us to assume that the former are not there till our perception arrives at them, and that the latter cease to be, when we no longer perceive them.

Now, one would think, the other assumption remains ; suppose at a definite point reached in our advance, the world of perception came to an end, and with it, all transmission of perceptions arising from the actually existing contents of the distances previously traversed. This would give the image of a finite actual world-volume floating in the infinite extension of empty space. Kant thinks it impossible ; his idea is that in such a case we should have not merely a relation of things *in* space, but also one of things *to* space ; but as the world is a whole, and outside it there is no object of perception with which it can stand in the alleged relation, the world's relation to empty space would be a relation of it to no object. The note¹ which Kant subjoins here, shows clearly what his only reason is for scrupling to admit this relation of a limitation of the real world by space : he starts with his own assumption that space is only a form to be attached to possible things, and not an object which can limit other objects. But the popular view, which he ought not to disregard as up to this point² he has not explicitly disputed it, apprehends space to be a self-existent form such as to include *possible* things, but clearly in treating it thus by no means takes it for a form which can only exist in attachment to things as one of

¹ [Kritik d. r. V. p. 307, Hartenstein's ed. 1868. Footnote, 'der Raum ist blos die Form,' etc.]

² [Cp. § 105.]

their qualities, or for a simple non-entity. Rather it is held to be a something of its own enigmatic kind, not indeed an object like other objects, but with its peculiar sort of reality, and such therefore as could not be known without proof to be incapable of forming the boundary of the real world. But in any case we should have no occasion to expect of empty space a restricting energy, which should actively set limits to the world, as if it were obvious that in default of such resistance the world must extend into infinity. The fact is rather that the world must stop at its limit, because there is no more of it; we may call this a relation of the world 'to no object,' but such a relation is at least nothing mysterious or suspicious; moreover, it would have to remain true even of our unspatial world of things in themselves; this also, the totality of existence, would be in the same way bounded by Nothing. So if in our progression through the world of experience, the coherent whole of our observations convinced us that at any point the real world came to an end, this fact alone would not cause us the difficulty by which Kant was impelled to overthrow the common idea; were it but clear what is meant by saying of things that they are in space, we should not be disturbed at their not being everywhere.

On the other hand it cannot be denied, that this boundedness of the world in space would also be reconcilable with Kant's doctrine, if this were once accepted, and supplemented in the way I suggest. If the world of things in themselves were a completed whole; if they all stood to each other in graduated intelligible relations, which our perception had to transform into spatial ones; then the phenomenal image of such a world would be complete when all these actually existing relations of its elements had found their spatial expression in our apprehension. But beyond this bounded world-picture there would appear to extend an unbounded empty space; all conceivable but unrealised continuations or higher intensities of those

intelligible conditions would like them enter into our perception, but only as empty possibilities. To indicate it briefly; every pair of converging lines $a\ b$ and $c\ d$ whose extremities we found attached to impressions of real things, would require their point of intersection to be in the infinite void, supposing them not to find it within the picture of the real world. The boundedness of the real world is therefore admissible both on Kant's view of space and on the popular view, and so the choice between them is undetermined; it is equally undetermined if we assume the unboundedness of the world, as neither of the views in question by itself removes the difficulties which are found in the conception of the infinity of existing things.

107. I intend merely to subjoin in a few words the corresponding observations on the infinite divisibility, or the indivisibleness, of the ultimate elements of real existence. If we abide strictly by the empirical reality of space, then in thinking of the subdivision of extended objects as continued beyond the limits attainable in practice, we must come to one of two conclusions about the result; either we must arrive at ultimate actual shapes, indivisible not only by our methods but in their nature; or else the divisibility really continues to infinity.

If real things were infinitely divisible the difficulty which we should see in the fact would be no more removed by assuming space to be purely phenomenal, than was the similar difficulty in the idea of infinite extension: every real Thing, which presented itself phenomenally to our perception as something single and finite occupying space, would have to be itself infinitely divisible into unspatial multiplicities; for every part of the divisible space-image, must, as it appears in a different point of space from every other part, be dependent on a real element which has an existence of its own and in its unspatial fashion is distinct, somehow, from all other points.

If on the contrary we arrived at the conviction, that

definite minimum volumes of real things were indivisible, while the space they occupied of course retained its infinite geometrical divisibility, we might still think it obscure what could be meant at all by saying that real things occupy space : but if we assume this as intelligible, we should not be astonished that in virtue of its nature as a particular kind of unit, each real thing should occupy just this volume and no other, and allow no subdivision of it. Here once more the obscure point remarked upon is made no clearer by the assumption that space is merely phenomenal. We should have to represent to ourselves that every Thing in itself, though in itself unspatial, yet bore in its intelligible nature the reason why it is forced to present itself as a limited extension to any perception which translated it into spatial appearance. This idea involves another ; that the real Thing, though indivisibly one, is yet equivalent to an indissolubly combined unity of moments, however to be conceived ; every point of its small phenomenal volume, in order to distinguish itself from every other and form an extension with their help, presupposes a cause of its phenomenality in the Thing-in-itself, distinct from the corresponding cause of every other point, and yet indissolubly bound up with those causes.

How to satisfy these postulates we do not yet know ; common opinion, which says that the Thing is actually extended in an actual space, probably thinks that it is no less wise, and much more clear, about the fact of the matter than the view of the unreality of space, which common opinion holds to be at all events not more successful in comprehending it.

Here, as in the last section, I dismiss the objection that there is a practical limit ; that we can never get so far in the actual subdivision of what is extended, as to be enabled to assert either infinite divisibility or the existence of indivisible volumes. One of the two must necessarily be thought of as taking place as long as the empirical reality

of space is allowed universal validity ; that is as long as we assume that however far we go in dividing the objects of our direct experience, spatial ideas will find necessary application to all the products of this subdivision ; that there would never be a moment when the disruption of what is in space would suddenly present us with non-spatial elements.

108. The foregoing discussions have brought me to the conviction that the difficulties which Kant discovers by his treatment of the Antinomies, neither suffice to refute the ordinary view of the objectivity of space, nor would be got rid of by its opposite ; but that other motives are forthcoming, though less noticed by Kant, which nevertheless force us to agree with him.

The want of objective validity in the spatial perception is revealed before we come to apply it to the universe or to its ultimate elements. We have only to ask two other and more general questions ; how can space, such as it is and must be conceived whether occupied or not, have ascribed to it a reality of its own, in virtue of which it exists before its possible content ? And how can what we call the existence of things in space be conceived, whether such occupation by real things concerns its entire infinite extent, or only a finite part of it ?

The first of our questions, more especially, but the second as well, require a further introductory remark. We must give up all attempt to pave the way for answering the two questions by assigning to space a different nature from that which we found for it in our former description. There is obvious temptation to do so in order to make the substantive existence of space, and its limiting action on real things, seem more intelligible. Thus we are inclined to supply to space, which at first we took for a mere tissue of relations, some substratum of properties, undefinable of course, but still such as to serve for a substantive support to these relations. We gain nothing by doing so ; we do not

so much corrupt the conception of space, as merely throw the difficulty back, and that quite uselessly. For the second of our questions was, how real things can at all stand in relation to space. Precisely the same question will be raised over again by the new substratum in which space is somehow to inhere. Therefore we must abide by this; there is simply nothing behind that tissue of relations which at starting we represented to ourselves as space; if we ask questions about its existence, all that we do or can want to know is, what kind of reality can belong to a thing so represented, to this empty and unsubstantial space.

109. No doubt, when so stated, the question is already decided in my own conviction by what I said above concerning the nature of all 'relations': that they only exist either as ideas in a consciousness which imposes them, or as inner states, within the real elements of existence, which according to our ordinary phrase stand in the 'relations.'

Still I do not wish to answer the present question merely by a deduction from this previous assertion of mine; but should think it more advantageous if I could succeed in arriving at the same result by an independent treatment. But I do not hide from myself how liable such an attempt is to fail; it is a hard achievement to expound by discursive considerations the essential absurdity of an idea which appears to be justly formed because it is every moment forming itself anew under the overpowering impression of a direct perception; an idea, too, which never defines precisely what it means, and which therefore escapes, impalpably, all attempts at refutation.

This is our present case. It is an impression which we all share that space extends before our contemplating vision, not merely as an example of external being independent of us, but as the one thing necessary to making credible to us the possibility and import of any such being. The idea that it would still remain there, even if there were no vision for

¹ [§ 81, end.]

it to extend before, is an inference hard to refute ; for it does not explain in what the alleged being of that space would any longer consist if it is to be neither the existence of a thing which can act, nor the mere validity of a truth, nor a mental representation in us. It is vain to repeat, that space itself teaches us with dazzling clearness that there are other and peculiar kinds of reality besides these ; this is only to repeat the confusion of the given perception with the inference drawn from it ; the former does find space appearing in its marvellous form of existence ; but perception cannot go outside itself and vouch that there corresponds to this reality which is an object of perception a similar reality which is not ; this notion can only be subjoined by our thought, and is *prima facie* a questionable supposition.

I now wish to attempt to show how little this hypothesis does to make those properties intelligible, which we can easily understand to be true of space if we conceive it merely as an image created by our perceptive power, and forthcoming for it only.

110. Every point p of empty space must be credited with the same reality, whatever that may be, which belongs to space as a whole ; for whether we regard this latter as a sum of points, or as a product of their continuous confluence with one another, in any case it could not exist, unless they existed. Again, we find every point p exactly like every other q or r , and no change would be made if we thought of p as replaced by q or by r . At the same time such an interchange is quite impossible, only real elements can change their relations (which we are not now discussing), to empty space-points ; but these latter themselves stand immovable in fixed relations, which are different for any one pair and for any other.

Of course, no one even who holds space to be real, regards its empty points as things like other things, acting on each other by means of physical forces. Nevertheless, when we say 'Space exists,' it is only the shortness of the phrase that

gives a semblance of settling the matter by help of a simple 'position'¹ or act of presenting itself, easily assigned or thought of as assigned to this totality, which we comprehend under the name of space. But, in fact, for space to *exist*, everything that we have alluded to must *occur*, every point must exist, and the existence of each, though it is like every other, must consist in distinguishing itself from every other, and determining an unalterable position for itself compared with all, and for all compared with it. Hence the fabric of space, if it is to exist, will have to rest on an effectual reciprocal determination of its empty points; this can in any case be brought under the idea of action and reaction, whatever distinction may be found between it and the operation of physical force, or between empty points and real atoms.

This requirement cannot be parried by the objection that as we have not to make space, but only to consider it as existing, we have no occasion to construct its fabric, but may accept it, and therefore the position of all its points, as given. True, we do not want to make space, as if it had not existed before, but this very act, the recognition of it as given, means presupposing that precise action and reaction of its points which I described. No points or elements, unless thought of as distributed in an already existing space, could conceivably be asserted simply *to be* in particular places, without being responsible for it themselves, and to share in the relation subsisting between these places; but the points of empty space cannot be taken as localised in turn in a previous space, so as to have their reciprocal relations derived from their situation in it; it must be in consequence of what they themselves are or do, that they have these relations, and by their means constitute space as a whole. Hence, if the two points p and q exist, their distance $p q$ is something which would not be there without them, and which they must make for themselves.

¹ ['Position,' v. § 10.]

I can imagine the former objection being here repeated in another shape; that we did not conceive the spatial relations as prior, in order to place the points in them afterwards, and so now, we are not to assume the points first, so that they have to create the relations afterwards; the two together, thought in complete cohesion, the points *in* these relations, put before us, at once and complete, the datum which we call existing space. Granting then, that I could attach any meaning to points being in relations simply as a fact, without either creating or sustaining them by anything in themselves; still I should have to insist on the circumstance that every reality, which is merely given in fact, admits of being done away and its non-existence assumed at least in thought. Now not only does no one attempt to make an actual hole in actual empty space; but even in thought it is vain to try to displace one of the empty space-points out of that relation to others which we are told is a mere datum of fact; the lacuna which we try to create is at once filled up by space as good as that suppressed. Now of course I cannot suppose that anyone who affirms the reality of space will set down this invulnerability only to his subjective perception of it, and not to existing space itself; obviously this miraculous property would have to be ascribed to real extension as well.

This property is very easily intelligible on the view of the purely phenomenal nature of space. If a consciousness which recollects its own different acts or states, experiences a number n of impressions of any kind in a succession which it cannot alter at pleasure; if, in the transition from each impression to the next, it experiences alterations, sensibly homogeneous and equal, of its own feeling; if, again, it is compelled to contemplate these differences not merely as feelings, but owing to a reason in its own nature, as magnitudes of a space whose parts are beside each other; and if, finally, after frequently experiencing the same kind of progression, it abstracts from the various

qualities of the impressions received and only calls to mind the form under which they cohered ; then, for this consciousness, and for this only, there will arise before the mind's eye the picture of an orderly series or system of series, in each of which between the terms $m-1$ and $m+1$ it is impossible for m to be missing. If there were no impression to occupy the place m , still the image of the empty place in the series would be at once supplied by help of the images of the two contiguous places and by means of the single self-identical activity of the representing consciousness.

All is different if we require an existing space, and conceive the absence of this consciousness, which combines its images, evokes some to join others, and never passes from one to the others without also representing the difference which divides them. Then, the empty points of space would have to take upon themselves what the active consciousness did ; they would have to prescribe their places to each other by attraction and repulsion, and to exert of themselves the extraordinary reproductive power by which space healed its mutilations. And in spite of all we should at once get into fresh difficulties.

111 For, the relation or interval $p q$, which the two existing points p and q would be bound according to their nature to establish between them, ought at the same time to be different from every other similar relation which p and r or q and r for similar reasons would set up between *them*. But the complete similarity of all empty points involves, on the contrary, an impossibility of p and q determining any other relation between themselves, than any other pair of points could between themselves ; even N , a number of connected points, conceived with determinate relations already existing between them, could assign no place in particular to another point s which we might suppose thrown in, because any other, t or u , would have as good a right to the same place.

It is easy to foresee the answer that will at once be

made; that it is quite indifferent, whether the point is designated by s or t or u ; it is in itself a yet undefined, and therefore, in strictness, a nameless point; it is only after N has assigned it a particular place that it becomes the point s , which is now distinct from the points t and u , which are differently localised by N . But this observation, though quite correct in itself, is out of place here. It would only apply if we were regarding s as the mere idea of an extreme term belonging to a series N begun in our consciousness, such an idea of s would be created by our consciousness, in the act of requiring it, in the particular relations to N which belonged to it; there would be no inducement to the production of any other image which had not these relations. Or again; our consciousness may not restrict itself to its immediate problem, but recalling previous experiences may first form the idea of an extreme term *e.g.* for two series which converge, without being aware what place it will hold in a system of other independent terms which is to serve as the measure of its position; then we have a term x , which has as yet no name, and which is not particularised as s , t , or u , till we come accurately to consider the law according to which each series progresses, and so the simultaneous determining equations are both solved.

Such a productive process of determination, realising what it aims at, is explained in this case by the nature of our single consciousness, which connects with each other all the particular imagined points of its content; but if instead of mental images of empty points we are to speak of actual empty points, then we should really be compelled to assume, *either* that every existing number of points N is constantly creating new points, which by the act of their production enter into the relations appropriate to them; *or* that by exerting a determining activity N imposes these relations on points already existing whose own nature is indifferent to them. Obviously we should not conceive

either of these constructions as a history of something that had once taken place, but only as a description of the continually present unmoving tension of activities which sustains in every moment the apparently inactive nature of space. Having once got so far into this region of interesting fancies I wish to pursue the former of these hypotheses one step further ; the second, my readers will gladly excuse me from considering.

112. We cannot seriously mean to regard a particular ready-made volume N as the core round which the rest of space crystallises. Not merely any N whatever, but ultimately every individual empty point, would have the same right to possess this power of propagation, and we should arrive at the idea of a radiant point in space, fundamentally in the same sense in which it is known to geometry. Then, the radiant point p would produce all the points with which its nature makes a geometrical relation possible, and each of them in the precise relation which belongs to it in respect of p ; among others the point q , which is determined by the distance and direction $p q$. All this is just as true of any other empty point ; it would still hold good if among them was a q , and then among the innumerable points which q would create there would be one standing to q in the relation $q p$, the same which was above designated, in a different order, by $p q$. And now it might be supposed that we had done what we wanted, and obtained a construction of space corresponding to its actual nature ; for it seems obvious that $p q$ and $q p$ indicate the same distance between the same points, and that thus the radiant activities of all points coincide in their results, so as to produce ordinary extension with its geometrical structure.

But this expectation is founded on a subreption. Before we completed our construction we knew nothing more of the empty points from which it was to start, than that they are all similar to one another, and that the same reality attaches to all of them ; but beyond this they had no com-

munity with each other. It is therefore by no means self-evident, that the pencil of rays which starts from the existing point p will ever meet the other, emitted by the independent point q ; both of them may, instead of meeting, extend as if into two different worlds, and remain ever strange to each other, even more naturally than two lines in space which not being in the same plane, neither intersect nor are parallel. The point q , generated by the radiant point p , is not obviously the same q , with that which, as given independently, we expected to generate p ; the second p generated by the given q need not coincide with the first p , nor the line $q p$ with the previous line $p q$; in a word, what is generated is not a single space, in which all empty points would be arranged in a system, but as many reciprocally independent spaces, as we assumed radiant points; and from one of these spaces there would be absolutely no transition into another. Our anticipation of finding that only a single space is generated, started with the tacit assumption that space was present as the common all-comprehending background, in which the radiations from the points could not help meeting.

Still, if all the resources of a disputatious fancy are to be exerted in defence of the attempted construction; there might be this escape. Suppose there are countless different spaces, it might be said; still, just because they do not concern each other, for that very reason they do not concern us; excepting that particular one in which we and all our experiences are comprehended, and with which alone, as the others never come in contact with us at all, Metaphysic has to do. Then let us confine ourselves to the space which is generated by the radiant point p . The point q which it creates, has equal reality with p , and so shares its radiant power; it must, in its turn, determine a point towards which it imposes on itself the relation $q p$; and this point p will certainly be no other than, but the same with, that which first imposed on itself towards q the

relation $p q$; therefore the lines $q p$ and $p q$ will certainly coincide.

But even this does not give us the result aimed at. As we cannot regard a particular point p exclusively, but are able to regard any whatever, as the starting-point of this genesis of space, the result of our representation translated from the past tense of construction into the present of definition, is simply this, that it is the fact that in existing space every point has its particular place, and that a line $p q$ of determinate direction and magnitude, taken in the opposite direction $q p$, returns to its starting-point. No doubt this is correct; but no one will affirm that this last construction fulfils its purpose of explaining such a condition of things; there is something too extraordinary in the notion that an existing point generates out of itself an infinite number of points with equally real existence, and something too strange in the result that every existing empty point has as it were an infinite density, being created and put in its place by every other point, not merely by one; and finally, the whole idea is too empty a fiction, with its radiant power which if it is not to lead to a purely intensive multiplication of being into itself, but to an Extension, must in any case presuppose a space, in which its effect may assume this very character of radiation.

Nevertheless all these incredibilities appear to me to be unavoidable, as long as we persist in thinking of empty space with its geometrical structure as actually existing; but the doctrine of its purely phenomenal nature avoids them from the beginning; and it is hardly requisite to prove this by a protraction of this long exposition.

One can understand how, for a consciousness which remembers its previous progression through the terms $p q r$, there arises the expectation of a homogeneous continuance of this series in both directions, which implies an apparent power of radiation, as above, in those points; only what takes place here is not a self-multiplication of something

existent, but a generation of ideas out of ideas, i.e. of fresh states of a single subject out of its former states, in accordance with the laws of its faculty of ideas and the movement of its activities which was in progress before. It is on this hypothesis equally easy to understand, that the converse march of the movement returns from q to the same p , i.e. reproduces the identical image p from which it started; for the image q has only such radiant power as it derives from representing to the mind the purport of the series; so that q by itself, as long as it is represented as a term in the series, can never induce a divergence from the direction of that series.

On the other hand, starting with a qualitatively determined impression π , which fills the geometrical place of the term p , there may be an advance to other impressions κ and ρ , such that the differences $\pi - \kappa$, $\kappa - \rho$, may be comparable with each other, though not comparable with the difference of the series p , q , r . Then we have the case which we mentioned above; π radiates too, but, so to speak, into another world, and the series π , κ , ρ , finds in fact no place in space-perception, and in respect to its relations within itself can only be metaphorically or symbolically represented by constructions in space, but cannot be shown to have a spatial situation.

113. I am sure that the whole of this account of the matter has only convinced those who were convinced before, and will not have done much to shake the preference for an existing space. Let us therefore ask once more where in strictness the difference of the two views lies; and what important advantage there is that can only be secured by the assumption of this enigmatic existence, so constantly reaffirmed, of an empty extension, and that must be lost by conceding that its import is purely phenomenal? The clearness and self-evidence, with which our perception sees space extended around us, is equally great for both views; we do not in the least traverse this

perception, which is endowed with such self-evidence ; but only the allegation of a being that underlies it, which must be inaccessible to perception and so cannot share its self-evidence. No doubt for common opinion every perception carries a revelation of the reality of what is perceived , but in the world of philosophy Idealism claims the first hearing, with its proof that what is perceived, in this case, space, is given to begin with merely as the subjective perception of our minds. Now of course in common life we do not need to go through the long toil of inference from perception before *attaining* the idea that what is perceived is real, but in the world of philosophy this investigation is essential, to decide whether we may *retain* this idea, for I repeat that in this region it is not the primary *datum*, but remains problematic till it is proved to be necessary.

Such a proof, in strictness, has never been attempted . the burden of disproof has been thrown on the opposite view, and its opponents have taken their stand on the probability of their own opinion as importing a valid presumption of its truth. The probability seems to rest on this, that a space, which exists by itself with all the properties ascribed to it by our perception, makes the origin of this perception seem much more natural than does our more artificial doctrine ; according to which it arises from a combination of inner states of our consciousness wholly dissimilar to it. But the artificiality here objected to must be admitted, even if space were as real as could be wished. The pictures which are made of it in the countless minds which are all held to be within space, could not be more than pictures of it, they could not *be it* ; and as pictures they could only have arisen by means of operations on the mind which could not be extensions, but could only be inner states corresponding to the nature of the subject operated upon. In every case our mental representation of space must arise in this way ; we cannot get it more cheaply, whether we imagine beneath the

picture presented to our mind an existence like it outside us, or one entirely disparate.

What can be gained then by maintaining the view which we oppose? Men will go on repeating the retort; that it is impossible to doubt the reality of space, which is so clearly brought home to us by immediate perception. But are we denying this reality? Ought not people at length to get tired of repeating this confusion of ideas, which sees reality in nothing but external existence, and yet is ready to ascribe it to absolute vacuity? Is pain merely a deceitful appearance, and unreal, because it subsists only for the moment in which it is felt? Are we to deny the reality of colours and tones because we admit that they only shine and sound while they are seen and heard? Or is their reality less loud and bright because it only consists in being felt and not in a self-sustained being independent of all consciousness? So then space would lose nothing of its convincing reality for our perception if we admitted that it possesses it only in our perception.

We long ago rejected the careless exaggeration which attaches to this idea; space is not a mere semblance in us, to which nothing in the real world corresponds; rather every particular feature of our spatial perceptions corresponds to a ground which there is for it in the world of things; only, space cannot retain the properties which it has in our consciousness, in a substantive existence apart from thought and perception. In fact, there is only one distinction forthcoming, and that of course remains as between the two views; for our view all spatial determinations are secondary qualities, which the real relations put on for our minds only; for the opposite view space as the existing background which comprehends things is not merely secondary but primary as a totality of determining laws and limits, which the Being and action of things has to obey, so that the things and ourselves are in space; while our view maintains that space is in us. This brings us

naturally to the second of the questions, which were proposed¹ above

114. When I want to know what precisely we mean by saying that things are in space, I can only expect to meet with astonishment, and wonder what there is in the matter that is open to question, nothing, it will be said, is plainer. And in fact this spatial relation is given so clearly to our perception, that we find all other relations, in themselves not of the spatial kind, expressed in language by designations borrowed from space. We even meet with philosophical views which not only demand constructions in space by way of sensuous elucidation of abstract thought, but prefer to regard the problem of cognition as unsolved till such constructions are found. I have no hope of making clear the import of my question to such a 'scientific mind.' But the assumption of a purely phenomenal space has little difficulty in answering it.

Only I feel compelled to repeat the warning, that this assumption does not any more than the other aim at denying or modifying the directness of the overwhelming impression which makes space appear to us to include things in it; it only propounds reflections on the true state of the facts, which makes this impression possible, and we expressly admit of our reflections that they are utterly foreign to the common consciousness. The power of our senses to see colours and forms or to hear sounds, seems to us quite as simple; we need, we think, only to be present, and it is a matter of course that sensations are formed in us, which apprehend and repeat the external world as it really is; the natural consciousness never has an inkling of the manifold intermediate processes required to produce these feelings; and one who has gained scientific insight into their necessity does not feel them a whit more noticeable in the moment of actual sensation.

It is the task of psychology to ascertain these inter-

¹ [Sect. 108.]

mediate processes for the case in hand ; its solution will not point to an image of empty space, formed prior to all perceptions, into which the mind had subsequently to transplant its impressions ; it is rather the series of peculiar concomitant feelings of homogeneous change of its condition, experienced in the transition from the impression p to the other impression q , that is felt by it as the distance $p\ q$; and from the comparison of many such experiences there arises, as I indicated just now, by help of abstraction from the content of the various impressions, the picture of empty extension. After it has arisen, to localise an impression q in a particular point of this space simply means : taking an impression p as the initial state from which the movement of consciousness starts, to contemplate the magnitude of the change which consciousness felt or must feel in order to reach q , under the form of a distance $p\ q$.

These different concomitant feelings, which distinguish the impressions p and q , are independent of the qualitative difference of their content, and may attach to like as well as to unlike impressions. Therefore metaphysic can only derive the feelings from a difference in the effects produced on the soul by the real elements which correspond to them, in conformity with a difference of actual relations in which the realities stand to the soul, and consequently, with a determinate actual relation in which they stand to each other. I reserve for a moment my further explanations concerning these intelligible relations, as we may call them, of the realities, which we regard as causes of our perceived relations of space ; I only emphasise here the fact that they consist in actual relations of thing and thing, not of things and space ; and that it is not they, as merely subsisting between the things, but the concentration in the unity of our consciousness of effects of the things varying in conformity with them, that is the proximate active cause of our spatial idea in which we picture their locality, and their distance from each other.

115. From this point we may obtain a conspectus of the difficulties which spring from the opposite view, that space has an existence of its own, and that things are in it. If space exists, and consequently the point p exists, what is meant by saying that a real element π is in the point p ? Even if p itself is not to be taken to be a real thing, still, between it as something existent, and the reality π , some reciprocal operation must be conceivable by the subsistence of which the presence of π in p is distinguished from its not being present in p . But as regards π we do not believe that its place does anything to it; on the contrary, it remains the same in whatever place it may be; therefore there is nothing which comes to pass in it by which its being in p is distinguishable from its being in q ; the two cases would only be distinguishable to an observer, who had reason on the one hand to distinguish p from q , and on the other to associate the image of π in the moment of perception only with p and not with q .

If we go on to ask what happens to the point p when π is in it, we should suppose that the nature of p would be just as little changed as that of π , but no doubt the answer will be: the very fact that p is occupied by π distinguishes it from q , which is now not the place occupied by π . Against this answer I am defenceless. It is indeed unassailable if we can once conceive, and accept as a satisfactory solution, that between two realities, the point p and the actual element π , there should be a relation as to which neither of the related points takes note of anything except that it, the relation, subsists, while in every other respect the two things are exactly as they would be if it did not subsist. I might add, that p would not be permanently filled by π , but, in turn, by other real elements κ or ρ ; surely the one case ought somehow to distinguish itself from the other, and the point p to be different when occupied by π from what it is when occupied by κ . But this would be unavailing; I should be answered with

the same acuteness: that in all these cases p remains just the same in every other respect, and the distinction between them is constituted by the simple fact, that the occupation of p , which does not affect it in itself, is carried out by π in one case and by κ in another. As all this moreover is as true of q as of p , I can only meet this reassertion by reasserting the opposite notion; that the whole state of things alleged is inconceivable to me as in real existence, and only conceivable as in the thought of an observer, who, as I indicated, has reason to distinguish p from q and, at the moment, to combine either π or κ with p or q —to make one combination and not another.

Finally, taking $p\ q$ as the distance between the real elements π and κ which occupy the points p and q , we do not in fact treat this localisation as unimportant in our further investigation of things; for we believe the intensity of reciprocal action between π and κ to be conditioned according to the magnitude of the distance. But their action cannot be guided by this changeable distance unless it is somehow brought home to them, how are we to suppose this to be done? The distance $p\ q$ is not in the points p and q but between them; if we suppose the empty point q represented at p by some effect produced by q on p , which makes the distance $p\ q$ always present to p , and consequently, though I can see no reason for the inference, present also to the element π in p and determining its behaviour, still this would hold equally good of any other empty point r or s . All of them would be represented at p , consequently they would all have an equal right to determine the behaviour of the element π at p ; the pre-eminence of q which is at the moment occupied by the real element κ , could only depend on the latter, and would have to be accounted for thus: the empty point q must undergo a change of state by becoming filled, must transmit the change to p through $q\ p$ and there transfer it to the element π ; a reaction between real existence and the

void, which would be as inevitable as it is inexplicable. The argument might be pursued farther, but I conclude here, hoping that the mass of extravagances in which we should be involved has persuaded us of the inconceivability of the apparently simple assumption that space has independent existence and that things have their being in space.

116. The opposite view which I am now maintaining leads to a series of problems which I will not undertake to treat at present ; it is enough to characterise their import as far as is requisite to establish the general admissibility of the doctrine. We may begin by expressing ourselves thus ; that we regard a system of relations between the realities, unspatial, inaccessible to perception, and purely intelligible, as the fact which lies at the root of our spatial perceptions. When these objective relations are translated into the subjective language of our consciousness, each of them finds its counterpart in one definite spatial image to the exclusion of all others. I should avoid calling this system of relations an 'intelligible space' and discussing whether it is like or unlike the space which we represent to ourselves by help of our senses. I start from the opposite conviction, that there exists no resemblance between the two ; for it would transfer to the reality of the new condition of things all the difficulties which we found in the reality of empty space.

However, it is not worth while to keep up the idea of such a system of relations, which was only of use as a brief preliminary expression of the fact ; we now return to the conviction expressed above ; it is not relations, whether spatial or intelligible, *between* the things, but only direct reactions which the things are subject to from each other, and experience as inner states of themselves, which constitute the real fact whose perception we spin out into a semblance of extension. Let P and Q be two real elements thought of as unrelated ; let $P \kappa$ and $Q \pi$ indicate

them when in the states of themselves which are set up by a momentary mutual reaction; these states of theirs contain the reason why P and Q , or at the moment $P \kappa$ and $Q \pi$, appear in our perception in the places p and q , separated by the interval $p q$. It need hardly be observed that the mere fact of the reaction subsisting between P and Q cannot by itself set up our perception; but can only do so by means of an action of P and Q upon us, conformable to their momentary states κ and π ; and therefore other than it would have been in the moment of a different mutual reaction. The meeting of these two actions in our consciousness causes, first, in virtue of its unity, the possibility of a comparison and reciprocal reference of the two; secondly, in virtue of its peculiar nature the necessity that the result of this comparison should assume the form of distance in space to our perception; and finally, the magnitude of the difference which is felt between the two actions on us, determines, to put it shortly, the visual angle by which we separate the impressions of the two elements.

Thus the theory attaches itself to a more general point of view, which I adopt in opposition to a predominant tendency of the philosophic spirit of the age; holding that thought should always go back to the living activities of things, which activities are to be considered as the efficient cause of all that we regard as external relation between things. For in calling these latter 'relations' we are in fact using a mere name; we cannot seriously conceive them to be real and to subsist apart from thought. I regret that there is an increasingly widespread inclination in the opposite direction, namely, to apprehend everything that takes place as the product of pre-existing and varying relations; overlooking the circumstance that ultimately, even supposing that such relations could exist by themselves, nothing but the vital susceptibility and energy which is in Things could utilise them, or attach to any one of them a result different from that attaching to the others.

117. As an elucidation, and more or less as a caution, I add what follows. If the arrangement of perceivable objects in space were always the same, we might think of them as the image of a systematic order in which every element had a right to its particular place, in virtue of the essential idea of its nature. It would not be necessary that the elements which presented a greater resemblance of nature should occur in closer contiguity in space, or that dissimilar things should be more widely separated; the entire scheme of *M*, which realises itself in the simultaneously combined manifold of things, might easily necessitate a multitude of crossing relations or reactions between them, of such a kind that similar elements should repeatedly occur as necessary centres of relation at very different parts of the whole system, while very dissimilar ones would have to stand side by side, as immediately conditioning each other.

The movability of things makes it superfluous to go deeper into this notion; the ground of localisation is clearly not in the nature of the things alone, but in some variable incident which occurs to them, compatible with their nature, but not determined by it alone. This might lead to the idea, that it was simply the intensity of the subsisting reaction between them which dictated the apparent situation of things in space; whether we presume that in all things what takes place is the same in kind and varies only in degree; or, that the inner states produced in things by their reactions are different in kind, but so far comparable that their external effects are calculable as degrees of one and the same activity.

It would be no objection to this that it is observed that there often are elements contiguous in space which seem quite indifferent to each other, while distant ones betray a lively reciprocal action. No element must be torn from its connexion with all others, and none of its states from their cohesion with previous ones, con-

tiguous elements which are indifferent are together not because they demand one another, but because their relations to all others deny them every other place, and only leave them this one undisputed; the remote elements in question act powerfully on one another, because the ceaseless stream of occurrence has produced counteractions, which hinder the two elements from attaining the state towards which they are now striving.

However, it is not my intention to continue the subject now, or to show by what general line of thought my view of space might be reconciled with the particular facts of Nature. The following sections will compel us to make this attempt, but they would entirely disappoint many expectations unless I began by confessing that the theory of a phenomenal space when applied to the explanation of the most general relations of nature will by no means distinguish itself for facility and simplicity in comparison with the common view. On the contrary, the latter is a gift which our mental nature gives us as a means to clearness and vivid realisation. But I insist upon it that my view is not propounded for its practical utility, but simply because it is necessary in itself, however much it might ultimately embarrass a detailed enquiry were we bound to keep it explicitly before us at every step. We shall see that we are not obliged to do so; but at present I maintain with a philosopher's obstinacy, that above all things that must hold good which we find to be in its nature a necessary result of thought, though all else bend or break. In no case may we regard other hypotheses as definitive truth (convenient as they may be for use and therefore to be admitted in use), if they are in themselves as unthinkable as the indefinite species of reality, which the ordinary view attributes to empty space.

CHAPTER II.

Deductions of Space.

118. AMONG the commonest undertakings of modern philosophy are to be found attempted deductions of Space ; and they have been essayed with different purposes. Adherents of idealistic views, convinced that nothing could be or happen without being required by the highest thought which governs reality, had a natural interest in showing that Space was constrained to be what it is, or to be represented as it is represented to us, because it could not otherwise fulfil its assigned purpose. Self-evident as the belief fundamentally is, that everything in the world belongs to a rational whole, there are obvious reasons why it should be equally unfruitful in the actual demonstration of this connexion in a whole ; and even the deduction of Space has hardly given results which it is necessary to dwell on.

The solidarity of the whole content of the universe was maintained, in the dawn of modern philosophy, by Spinoza ; but in a way which rather excluded than favoured the deduction of Space. The reason lay in an enthusiasm, somewhat deficient in clearness, for the idea of Infinity, and for everything great and unutterable that formal logical acumen combined with an imagination bent on things of price could concentrate in that expression. Hence he spoke of infinitely numerous attributes of his one infinite substance, and represented it as manifesting its eternal nature by means of modifications of each of them. Our human experience, indeed, was restricted to two only

of them, consciousness and extension, the two clear fundamental notions under which Descartes had distributed the total content of the universe ; and the further progress of the Spinozistic philosophy takes account of these two only. But it adheres to the principle laid down at its starting about all attributes ; each of them rests wholly on itself, and can be understood by us only by means of itself ; we find it expressly subjoined, that though it is one and the same substance which expresses its essence as well in forms of extension as in forms of thought ; yet the shape which it assumes in one of these attributes can never be derived from that which it has assumed in the other. This prohibits any attempt to deduce the attributes of Space from what is not Space ; but at the same time Consciousness and Extension are considered to be as manifestations of the absolute quite on the same level, in assuming the shape of extension, it does a positive act as much as in giving existence to forms of consciousness ; neither of these is the mere result or semblance of the other.

119. These notions influenced Schelling. After Kant had destroyed all rational cohesion between things-in-themselves and spatial phenomena, it was natural to make the attempt to restore Space to some kind of objective validity. If we may here eliminate the many slight alterations which Schelling's views underwent, the following will be found a pretty constant series of thoughts in him. *Empty* Space is for him too only the subjectively represented image, which remains to our pictorial imagination when it disregards the definite forms of real existence in Space, that is, of matter ; it is not a prior creation of the absolute which goes before the production of the things to be realised in it, but matter itself is this first production, and spatial extension is only real in matter, but in it is actually real and not a mere subjective mode of the spectator's apprehension. How he represents the creation of matter as coming to pass, we need not describe here ; but in general it is easy to see how

the desire to explain by one and the same root the distinction which experience presents between the material and spiritual world might lead to denying the primary presence of the characteristic predicates of these two worlds in the Absolute, the root required; while conceiving, in the complete indefiniteness thus obtained of this absolute Identity, two eternally co-existent impulses, tendencies, or factors, out of which the distinction that had been cancelled might again arise. Some interest attaches to the different expressions which Schelling employs to designate them; he opposes to the real objective producing factor, which embodies the infinite in forms of the finite, the ideal subjective defining factor which re-moulds the finite into the infinite; it is the former whose predominance creates Nature, the latter that creates the world of Mind; though the two are so inseparably united that neither can produce its result without the co-operation, and participation as a determining factor, of the other.

This account admits of no idea of a deduction proper of Space, still I think that the equal rank assigned to the above designations contains an indication of the reason which made the space-generating activity of the absolute appear indispensable to the idea of it. It became obvious not only that nothing could be generated out of the void of absolute Identity, but it was also impossible for the determinations which might have been held to be included in it as merely ideal, to be more than unrealisable problems, failing one condition; that something should be forthcoming, given, with content, and for perception; such as the ideal forms could never create, and as applied to which, *qua* forms of its relations, and so only, they would possess reality. Thus, not without a reminiscence of Kant's construction of matter out of expanding and contracting forces, Schelling makes the one, that is the productive factor, provide above all things for the creation of that which the ideal factor has only to form and to determine; it is only

by the activity of the first that results are made *real*, which for all the second could do, would never be more than a postulate, that is, an idea. Even the actual form which the creation assumes is determined by the character of the productive factor; for it is only this character that can, though under the control and guidance of the other factor, create such shapes of reality as are within its range.

120. The indefiniteness of the absolute Identity has disappeared in Hegel, and the position of the two factors has altered; the comprehensive system of notions which forms his Logic may be regarded as the interpretation of what the ideal factor, now the proximate and primary expression of the Absolute, demands; the consciousness, how strongly all these determinations involve and postulate that as determinations of which they must be presented in order to be real, appears as the urgency of the ideal factor or hitherto purely logical idea, to pass over into its form of otherness; that is, into a shape capable of direct or pictorial presentation, such as can only exist in the forms by which a multiplicity whose parts are outside one another is connected into a whole. Therefore the logical idea, doing away its own character as logical, produces Space as 'the abstract universality of its being outside itself¹.' Hegel says on this point², 'As our procedure is, after establishing the thought which is necessitated by the notion³, to ask, what it looks like in our sensuous idea⁴ of it; we go on to assert, that what corresponds in direct presentation to the thought of pure externality is Space. Even if we are wrong in this, that will not interfere with the truth of our thought.' I refer to this remarkable passage in order to indicate the limits which such speculative constructions of Space as this is can never overstep. They may of course derive in a general way, from the thought in which they conceive them-

¹ ['Die abstracte Allgemeinheit ihres Aussersichseins.']

² Naturphilosophie. Sammtliche Werke, Bd. VII. § 47.

³ ['Begriff.']

⁴ ['Vorstellung.']

selves to express the supreme purpose of the world, a certain postulate which must be fulfilled if the end is to be fulfilled ; but they are not in a position to infer along with the postulate what appearance would be presented by that which should satisfy it. In the passage quoted Hegel admits this ; in pronouncing Space to be the desired principle of externality he professes to have answered a riddle by free conjecture, the solution might be wrong, but the problem, he asserts, would still be there.

Just in the same way Weisse says¹ 'That primary quality of what exists, the idea of which arises from quantitative infinity being specified and made qualitative by the specific character of triplicity—is Space ;' only that he, although in this sentence expressly separating enigma and answer by a mark of interruption, yet regards the latter as a continuous deduction of the space which is present to perception from his abstract and obscure postulate. It can never be otherwise ; after, on the one hand, we feel justified in making certain abstract demands which reality is to satisfy, and after, on the other hand, we have become acquainted with Space, then it is possible to put the two together and to show that Space, being such as it is, satisfies these demands. But it is impossible to demonstrate that only it, and no other form, can satisfy them ; we are confined to a speculative interpretation of space, and any deduction of it is an impossibility on this track. One would think that the opinion Hegel expresses could not but incline him *prima facie* to the view of the mere phenomenality of the sensuous idea of space ; but what he adds on the subject can make no one any wiser as to his true meaning ; as a rule the views of his school have adhered to extension as a real activity of the Absolute.

121. Philosophical constructions, it was held, were under the further obligation, to demonstrate not merely of Space as a whole, but further of each and every property by which

¹ Metaphysik, p. 317.

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121. Philosophical constructions, it was held, were under the further obligation, to demonstrate not merely of Space as a whole, but further of each and every property by which

¹ Metaphysik, p. 317.

geometry characterises it, that it is a necessary consequence of ideal requirements. Attempts have been made on obvious and natural grounds to conceive the infinite divisibility and the homogeneousness of an infinite extension, as antecedent conditions of that which the idea sets itself to realise within space, but the most numerous and least fortunate endeavours have been devoted to the three dimensions. There are two points in these innumerable attempts that have always been incomprehensible to me.

The first is, the entire neglect of the circumstance that space contains innumerable directions starting from every one of its points, and that the limitation of their number to three is only admissible under the further condition that each must be perpendicular to the two others. Accessory reasons, which are self-evident in the case of geometry and mechanics, have no doubt led to the habit of tacitly understanding, by dimensions of space, such *par excellence* as fulfil this condition; but the philosophical deductions proceed as if the only point was to secure a triplicity, and as if it was unnecessary to find among the abstract pre-suppositions from which space is to be deduced, a special reason why the dimensions which are to correspond to three distinct ideal moments (however these may be distinguished), should be at right angles to one another.

The second point which I cannot understand is the fastidiousness with which every demonstration partaking of mathematical form, that a fourth perpendicular dimension must necessarily coincide with one of the other three, is always rejected as an external and unphilosophical process of proof. I think, on the contrary, that if we once supposed ourselves to have deduced that certain relations which we postulated in an abstract form must take the shape of lines and angles between them, then the correct philosophical progress would consist in the demonstration that these elementary forms of space being once obtained were completely decisive of its whole possible structure. As a whole

subject to law it can have no properties but those constituted in it by the relations of its parts ; if its properties are to correspond besides to certain ideal relations then it ought to have been shown that this correspondence demanded just those primary spatial relations from which the properties must proceed as inevitable result. However, it is not worth while to go at greater length into these unsuccessful undertakings, which are not to the taste of the present time, and, we may hope, will not be renewed.

122. Our attention will be much longer detained by other investigations which are sometimes wrongly comprehended under the name of Psychological Deductions of Space. In virtue of the title 'Psychological' they would not claim mention till later ; but they treat in detail or touch in passing three distinct questions, the complete separation of which seems to me indispensable.

1. The first, were it capable of being solved, would really belong to Psychology : it is this : what is the reason that the soul, receiving from things manifold impressions which can only be to begin with unextended states of its own receptive nature, is obliged to envisage them at all under the form of a space with parts outside each other ? The cause of this marvellous transfiguration could only be found in the peculiar nature of the soul, but it never will be found ; the question is just as unanswerable as how it comes to pass that the soul brings before consciousness in the form of brightness and sound the effects which it can only experience by means of light and sound vibrations transmitted through the senses. It is important to make clear to ourselves that these two questions are precisely alike in nature ; and that to answer the first is neither more essential nor more possible than to answer the second, which every one has long desisted from attempting. All endeavours to derive this elementary and universal character of ideas of space, this externality, which appears to us in the shape of an extended line, from any possible abstract relations, which

are still unspatial, between psychical affections, have invariably led to nothing but fallacies of subreption; by which space, as it could not be made in this way, was brought in at some step of the deduction as an unjustified addition.

2. On the other hand, if we postulate as given the capacity and obligation of the soul to apprehend an unspatial multiplicity as in space, then there arises the second problem, which I hold to be capable of being solved though a long way from being so; What sort of multiplicity does the soul present in this peculiar form of its apprehension?—for there are some which it does not treat thus. And under what conditions, by what means, and following what clue, does it combine its occasional particular impressions in the definite situation in space in which they are to us the express image of external objects? As no perception of this variable manifold can take place but by the instrumentality of the senses, the solution of this question concerning the localisation of sensations belongs wholly to that part of psychology which investigates the connexion of sensations, and the associations of these remembered images; which latter are partly caused by the conjoint action of nervous stimuli, partly by the activity of consciousness in creating relations.

3. There remains a third question, that of the geometrical structure of extension which arises if we develop all the consequences that the given character of the original externality necessitates or admits; and which is wanted to complete the totality of the Space-image in whose uniformly present environment we are obliged to set in array the various impressions of sensation. This investigation, which has fallen to the share of Mathematics, has hitherto been conducted by that science in a purely logical spirit; it took no account of the play of psychical activities, which bring about in the individual apprehending subject a perception of the truth of its successive propositions, a play of which in these days we think we know a great deal, and really know

nothing ; it attached the convincingness of their truth purely to the objective¹ necessity of thought with which given premisses demand their conclusions. But the premisses themselves, as well as that combination of them on which the conclusion has to rest, were simply accepted by Mathematics from what it called Direct or Intuitional Perception². Nor could the word perception² be held to designate any psychical activity, which could be shown to possess a peculiar and definite mode of procedure ; every impartial attempt to say what perception² does, must end with the admission that it really does nothing, that there is no visible working or process at all as a means to the production of its content ; but that on the contrary it is nothing but a direct receptivity, with an entirely unknown psychical basis, which merely becomes aware of its object and the peculiar nature of that object. Obviously, an investigation cannot begin before the matter is given to which it is to refer, but again, it will only consist, even when the matter is forthcoming, in presenting one by one to this receptivity all the details which do not fall at once in the line of our mental vision, and defining their differences or similarities by help of marks which make it possible to transfer from one to the other of these features the judgments about them made by direct perception, and to connect all such features systematically together.

I shall return later on to what it is indispensable to say on this head ; I will only add now that it was possible for the Euclidean geometry, which arose in the above way, to remain unassailed as long as no doubt was raised of the objective validity of space ; while it was believed, that is, that we had in it if not a real thing, at least the actual and peculiar form attaching to real things. It was not indeed solely, as we shall see, but chiefly, the modern notion which sees in it only a subjective mode of perception, that disturbed this unsuspecting security and raised such questions

¹ ['Sachliche.']

² ['Anschauung.']

as these ; of how much that is true about the world can we properly be said to get experience by help of this form of apprehension ; could there not be other species of perception that might teach us the same truth about Things better, or other truths quite unknown ; and finally, may not the whole fabric of our spatial perceptions be incomplete, perhaps charged with inner contradictions which escape our notice for want of the empirical stimuli which would bring them to light ? The diversity of opinions propounded in relation to the above matters compels me in my metaphysic to enter upon the essential nature of space in its geometrical aspect ; and I begin my task by a very frank confession. I am quite unable to persuade myself that all those among my fellow-students of philosophy, who accept the new theories with applause, can really understand with such ease what is quite incomprehensible to me ; I fear, that from over-modesty they do not discharge their office, and fail, on this borderland between mathematics and philosophy, to vindicate their full weight for the grave doubts which they should have raised in the name of the latter against many mathematical speculations of the present day. I shall not imitate this procedure ; but while on the contrary I plainly say that the whole of this speculation seems to me one huge coherent error, I am quite happy to risk being censured for a complete misapprehension, in case my remarks should have the good fortune to provoke a thorough and decisive refutation.

123. I begin with the first inference suggested by the doctrine that space is only the subjective form of apprehension which is evolved from the nature of our souls, though not deducible by us. Then, there is nothing to interfere with our thinking of beings endowed with mental images as differing in nature within very wide limits ; or with our assigning to each of these kinds a mode of apprehension of its own, which, as is commonly said, it holds in readiness to apply to its future perceptions. Meantime we

have convinced ourselves how little use such forms could be to these minds, if they were only a subjective manner of behaviour and destitute of all comparability with the things. In short, things would not be caught in nets whose meshes did not fit them ; far less could there be in purely subjective forms any ground of distinction which could compel things to prefer one place to appear in rather than another. We must therefore necessarily give a share in our consideration to the connexion in which the forms of apprehension are bound to stand with the objects which they are to grasp. The following cases will have to be distinguished

Let X and Z be two of those modes of perception, different from our space S , which we arbitrarily assign to two kinds of beings endowed with mental images, and organized differently from us. This assumption would cause us no difficulty as long as, (i.) we supposed the worlds which are to be perceived by their means, to differ from the world M accessible to our experience, but to be such as to admit of apprehension in the forms X and Z as easily as the world M lends itself to our apprehension in the form of our space S . Only, this assumption would not interest us much ; though free from internal contradiction, in fact, strictly, a mere tautology, it has no connexion whatever with the object of our doubt ; the interest of our question depends entirely on a different presupposition ; (ii.) that this same world M , which we represent to ourselves as enclosed in the frame of Euclidean space S , appears to other intellectual beings in the utterly heterogeneous systematic forms X or Z . On this supposition also there are two cases to be kept separate. The actions and reactions which the things of this world M reciprocate with each other may be extremely various ; it is neither necessary nor credible that they only consist in such activities as cause us to localise the things in spatial relations in accordance with them ; on the contrary, much may go on within the things that is not able to find expression in their appearance in space even with the help of motion. There-

fore there is still this alternative; either, (*a.*) the forms of perception *X* and *Z* reproduce relations of things which cannot be represented in our space *S* and do not occur in it; about this assumption we can have no decisive judgment, but only a conjecture, which I will state presently; or (*β.*) we assert that the same relations of things which appear to us as relations in space *S* are accessible to other beings under the deviating modes of perception *X* or *Z*; and on this point we shall have something more definite to say.

124. Let us begin with the former alternative (11. *a.*) We are justified in subordinating the idea of space *S* to the more universal conception of a system of arrangement of empty places, within which the reciprocal position of any two terms is fully determined by a number *n* of relations of the two to others. And there is nothing to prevent us, as long as no other requirements are annexed, from conceiving many other species of this genus, in which the reciprocal definition of the terms might be effected by other rules than those valid for the space *S*, or might require a greater or smaller number of conditions than are required in it. Still, it seems to me unfruitful to refer for further illustration of such ideas to the well-known attempts to arrange in a spatial conspectus either the whole multiplicity of sensations of musical sound, with reference to strength, pitch, quality, and harmonic affinity; or the colours in all their variety on similar grounds. Nothing indeed is more certain than that (1) we here have before us relations of the terms to be arranged for the adequate representation of which our space *S* is unfitted; but at the same time I think nothing can be more doubtful than the implied idea by which, whether furtively, or explicitly, we console ourselves, that (2) there may be other modes of perception *X* or *Z* which permit to beings of different organization the feat which we cannot perform. I must speak more fully of both parts of my assertion.

125. (1) We may arrange musical notes in a straight line according to their rise of pitch ; but as there appears to be an increasing divergence from the character of the keynote up to the middle of the octave, and from that point again an increasing approximation to it, having regard to this we may represent the notes still more clearly, by arranging them as Drobisch does in a spiral, which after every circuit corresponding to an octave returns to a point vertically above the starting-point. But in doing so we should bear in mind that all this, like any other appropriate device which might be added to the scheme, is still a *symbolical* construction ; the notes *are* not in the space in which we localise them for the convenience of our perception, nor is the increment-element Δp of the pitch p really the element Δs of a line in space s , to which, for the purpose of our perception, we treat it as equivalent. No one refuses this concession ; but it is not precisely in this that the ground of my difficulty lies. Seeing that I have asserted the phenomenal nature of space there is no longer any meaning for me in distinguishing Things as in space, from sounds as only to be projected into it by way of symbolism. When Things appear to us in space, what we do to them is just the same as the treatment to which we submit the ideas of notes in the above constructions ; like them, things have neither place nor figure in space, nor spatial relations ; it is only within our combining consciousness and only to its vision that the living reactions which Things interchange with each other and with us expand into the system of extension, in which every phenomenal element finds its completely definite place. So if the innumerable mental representations of sounds compelled us as unambiguously to place each of them in definite spatial relations to others, I should not be able to see how such an arrangement must be less legitimate for them than for things, for which also it remains a subjective apprehension in our minds.

It will further be observed, and quite correctly, that

Things are movable in space, and their place at any time only expresses the sum of relations in which they stand to other things, which subsists at the moment but is essentially variable; it tells nothing of the Thing's own nature, whereas such constructions of the realms of colour or sound aim at a completely different result; they attempt to assign to each one of these sensations, conformably with the peculiar combination in which each unites definite values of the universal predicates of colour or of sound, a systematic position between all others which it can never exchange for another place. No doubt this difference is important as regards the nature of the elements which it is proposed to systematise in the two cases; still there is no essential obstacle to copying the eternal and permanent articulation of a system of contents¹ fixed in the shape of ideas by means of the same mode of perception which is used to represent the variable arrangement of real Things. In fact, for every single indivisible moment the existing arrangement of real things in space would be precisely the total expression of the complete systematic localisation appropriate to the individual things in virtue of the actions which intersected each other in them at that moment. The circumstance that within things there is motion, which will not admit of being represented for ever by the same fixed system, is a fact with its own importance, but not a proof that the space form is inadequate to express systematic relations. Therefore the felt inadequacy of the space-form *S* can only rest on the fact that its articulation, though fitted for what we perceive in it, is not fitted for such matter as these sensations which we project into it.

126. Things then obviously do not arrange themselves in space according to a constant affinity of their natures, but according to some variable occurrence within them, consisting of the reactions which they interchange. We are not justified in assuming an entirely homogeneous form

¹ ['Inhaltssystem.']

of event as produced in all of them by these actions ; but we cannot help regarding as homogeneous all that part of such events which has its effect in fixing their place in space ; in designating it by the name of ' mechanical relations ' of things we approach the common view of physical science, which considers that in every moment the place which a body occupies abandons or tends to, is determined by the joint action of entirely comparable forces and impulses.

Now it is just this comparability which is wanting to the musical properties of sounds ; that is, the felt properties, for we are only speaking of them, not of the comparable physical conditions of their production. The graduated series of loudness¹ i and of pitch p may no doubt be formed, each separately, by addition of homogeneous increments ; but when we come to the series of qualities q we find it cannot be exhibited in this way, and in any case Δi , Δp , and Δq would remain quite incomparable with each other. The lines i , p , and q , though we might suppose that each could be constructed by itself, yet would diverge from any point in which they were united, as it were into different worlds ; and if one of them were arbitrarily fixed in space still there would be nothing to determine the angles at which the others would cross it or part from it.

It will of course be said that this as well as the difficulties raised in the last section was known long ago ; but that no one can be sure that (2) beings different from us have not at command forms of apprehension X or Z , which attach themselves to the content to be arranged just as unambiguously and perfectly, as our space S does to its matter, the mechanical relations of things. Yet I cannot see how this should be supposed possible as long as we

¹ ['Tonstärken.' I have retained the z because it probably stands for 'Intensität' (intensity).]

ascribe to those beings the same achievement as that in which we fail. If instead of the qualitatively different colours and tones which we see and hear, they perceived only uniform physical or psychical actions, from a mixture of which those sensations arose in us, I do not dispute that in that case they might have for such actions an adequate perceptive form X or Z ; but the relations which they would have to arrange would again be purely mechanical, only mechanical in a different way from those which we reproduce in our space S .

On the other hand, if those beings are supposed to feel the same difference between red and blue as we do, or to feel the pitch of a note as independently of loudness and quality as we feel it, then the different progressions i, p, q , would be as incomparable for them as for us; though they might arbitrarily reduce the relations of tones and colours to the forms X and Z by way of symbolism, with the same sort of approximation as we obtain in our space S . But I hold that a special colour-space X or tone-space Z is an impossibility; an impossibility that is, as an endowment of the supposed beings, with two faculties of the nature of empty forms of apprehension, prior to all content and so having none of their own, but able to dictate particular situations to disparate elements subsequently received into them, solely in virtue of the rules of connexion between individual places which they contain. No form of perception X , be it what it may, can enable elements which remain disparate even for it to prescribe their places in it definitely and unambiguously to each other. And conversely; there may no doubt be rules of criticism for variously combined values of disparate predicates, which, being based on an estimate of the efficient causes which produce such combinations, show how to exclude impossible terms and to arrange possible ones in series according to their various aspects, but a form of perception X such as to unite all these different series

of ideas *about* the material into a single image *of* the material seems to me impossible.

I cannot see how we lose much if we admit this; the many-sided affinities, resemblances, and contrasts of colours and tones are not lost to us because we cannot satisfactorily symbolise them in space; we have the enjoyment of all of them when we compare the impressions with each other. Now it seems to me that no being can get beyond this discursive knowledge in respect of elements which in their sum of predicates combine different properties that remain disparate even for that being; a form of perception, in the sense of an ordered system of empty places, can only exist for such relations of elements as are completely comparable, and each of which is separated from a second by a difference of the same kind as separates this second from any third or fourth. It is possible that things contain some system of uniform occurrences which escape us, but form the object of perception for other beings, and are in fact apprehended by them in forms of perception which differ from our space-form S and adapt themselves to the peculiar articulation of the occurrences; but this idea being motivated by no definite suggestion need not be pursued further, at least for the moment.

127. We are much more interested in the other of the cases distinguished above (ii. β)¹. If the same relations of things which are imaged by us as in space were supposed to meet with forms of a different kind in other beings; at least we know that there is nothing in the nature of these relations to make them intractable to combination before the mind's eye into one entire image; such an X or Z undoubtedly might bear the character of perceptive forms. They would not need to be in the least like our space S ; the difference between two places of the system which appears to us in our space as the line s , would represent itself in them in the form x or z ; both of which would

¹ [§ 123, end.]

be as disparate from s as the interval between two notes from the distance between two points. As long as we maintain these postulates, we have no reason to deny the possibility of these perceptions X and Z , but as we do not possess them their assumption remains an empty idea, and we know absolutely nothing further of how things present themselves and what they look like under those forms. Only we must not require more of them than our own space-apprehension can achieve; not, therefore, that the beings which enjoy them shall be enabled by them in each individual perception to apprehend the true relations of what is perceived. This is more than even our space S does for us; for instance we have to assign ourselves a place in it, with the change of which the whole constellation of our impressions is displaced; even to us, owing to the laws of the optical impressions made on us, parallel lines inevitably appear to converge at a distance, magnitudes to diminish, and the horizon of the sea to rise above the level of the shore. As we require the comparison of many experiences to enable us to apprehend the true relations in despite of the persistent semblance of the false, no more than this ought to be demanded of the nature of X and Z ; that is, that combined experiences should give criteria for the elimination of the contradictions and mistakes of isolated ones. We may say then, subject to such conditions, that the same relations of things as appear to us in space admit of other kinds of perception completely unknown to us but leading to equally true cognition. Still even this is by no means what is as a rule in people's minds; it is expressly other *space*-perceptions than ours that it is hoped to make conceivable in this way. It is to be taken as settled that the relation of two elements presented to perception is given by perception the shape of the extended line s , and the relation of two such relations that of the angle a ; and still even so there is to be a possibility that by help of other combinations this s and a may form

not our space S but a different one S^1 or S^2 , like ours in respect of the character of its elements s and a as pictured to the mind, but unlike in the fabric of the whole which they generate. Perhaps it will not be too painful to the feelings of philologists if I propose for these forms S^1 or S^2 the name of Raumoids¹ ['quasi-spaces']. I know no shorter way of expressing the difference between these forms and our previous forms X and Z ; and as I mean to maintain that there cannot be Raumoids, their name will soon disappear again supposing I am right; if I am wrong, I make a present of it to my antagonists as the only thing I can do for their cause. For I shall hardly myself be brought to surrender my conviction that to accept s and a as elements of space is to decide its total form and inner structure, fully, unambiguously, and quite in the sense of the geometry which has hitherto prevailed.

128. I hold it, strictly speaking, unreasonable to require any other proof of this than that which lies in the development of the science down to the present time. That assuming the elements s and a they admit of other modes of combination than can be presented in our space S ; and that these other combinations do not remain mere abstract names, but lead to kinds of perception S^1 and S^2 ; all this could only be proved by the actual discovery of the perceptions in question. But it is admitted that our human mode of representation cannot discover S^1 and S^2 ; nothing but S can be evolved out of it, therefore if the logical sequence of this evolution were established, and we still believed in other beings who could form divergent perceptions out of the same elements s and a , we should have to credit them with other laws of thought than those on which the truth of knowledge rests for us. Such an assumption would destroy our interest in the question; though no doubt it would not in the least run counter to the taste of

¹ [From 'Raum,' 'Space.']

an age whose tendency is so indulgent as to take anything for possible, which cannot be at a moment's notice demonstrated impossible.

But there is a point at which our geometry has long been thought deficient in consecutiveness of deduction; that is in the doctrine of parallel lines and of the sum of the angles of a triangle. Still it appears to me as if philosophical logic could neither advance nor properly speaking admit the peculiar claims to strictness of procedure made at this point by the logic of mathematics. After all, discursive proof cannot make truth, but only finds it; the perception of space with the variety of its inner relations faces us as the given object of inner experience; one which, if not so given, we should never be able to construct by a logical combination of unspatial elements, or even of those elements of space which we assumed; all demonstrations can but serve to discover certain definite relations between a number of arbitrarily chosen points to be implied in the nature of the whole. For such discovery perfect strictness of reasoning is indispensable; and elegance of representation may also require that the multiplicity of relations shall be reduced to the minimum number of directly evident and fundamental ones; but it will always be fruitless to assume fewer independent principles than the nature of the facts requires, and always erroneous to presuppose that it does not require a considerable number. We convinced ourselves in the *Logic* that all our cognition of facts rests on our application of synthetic judgments; the law of Identity will never tell us more than that every *A* is the same as itself; there is no formal maxim which gives us any help about the relation of *A* to *B*, except the one law which simply disjoins them because they are not the same; every positive relation which we assert between *A* and *B* can only express a content which is given us, a synthesis; such as could be derived neither from *A* nor from *B*, nor from any other relation between them which was not itself in

turn given to us in the same way. It is impossible to pursue this here in its general sense, but it will be useful to elucidate it in relation to space in particular.

129. The first consequence of what has been referred to is that a case is possible in which we are unable to give adequate definitions either of A or of B without involving the relation C in which they are given to us, and equally so to define this relation apart from A and B . It would be impossible to say what a point of space is and how distinguished from a point of time, unless we include in our thought the extension in which it is, and treat it, for instance, as Euclid does, as the extremity of a line; no more could we construct this line out of points without a like presupposition. Two precisely similar and co-existent points may have innumerable different relations of the kind which we know as their greater or less distances from one another; but how could we guess or understand this unless the space in which they are distributed, being present to the mind's eye, taught us at once that the problem is soluble and what the solution looks like? Just as little can a line be generated by motion; it can only be followed, for we could not set about to describe the track left behind us without the idea of a space in general which furnishes the place for it; again any definite line could only be generated in space if in every point which we pass through the further direction which we mean to take were already present to our imagination.

Again, in any line when we compare it with others we shall be able to distinguish its length from its direction; but we cannot make the simplest assertions about either property without learning them from perception. That the addition of two lines of the length a gives a line of the length $2a$ seems a simple application of an arithmetical principle; but strictly arithmetic teaches only that such an addition results in the sum of two lines of the length a , just as putting together two apples weighing half an ounce each gives only the sum

of these two, not one apple twice the weight. The possibility of uniting the one line with the extremity of the other so that it becomes its unbroken continuation and the two lengths add up into one only follows from the mental portrayal of a space within which the junction can be effected. I say expressly, 'of a *space*'; for not even the consideration that the things to be united are two lines is sufficient; on the contrary, we know that a thousand lines¹, if thought of as between the same extremities, will form no more than one and the same line; they must be put together lengthways, and to do this the image of the surrounding space which gives the necessary room is indispensable. Geometry only expresses the same thing in another form, when it says that every line is capable of being produced to infinity

As regards direction, it is easily seen that it is a delusion to suppose that we have a conception of it to which straightness and curvedness can be subordinated as co-ordinate species; its conception is only intelligible as completely coinciding with that of the straight line which is called from another point of view, in relation to its extremities, the distance between them; every idea of a curve includes that of a deviation from the straight direction of the tangents and can only be fixed in the particular case by the measurement of this deviation. Thus we can it is true assign a criterion for any extended line which is security for its straightness; the distance between its extremities must be equal to the sum of the distances between all pairs of points by which we may choose to divide the line; but of course we do not by this get rid of the conception of straightness in principle; the distance between the extremities and each of these intermediate distances can only be conceived under that conception. So in fact it is not proper to say that the straight line is the shortest distance between two points; it is rather *the distance* itself; the

¹ [*'Straight lines'* of course.]

different circuits that may be made in going from a to b have nothing to do with this distance which is always one and the same; but their possibility calls our attention to the circumstance that perception is in that fact telling us something more than would follow from its teaching up to that point taken alone.

130. If a straight line can be drawn between a and b and another between a and c , it does not in the least follow from these isolated premisses that the same thing can or must take place between b and c ; the two lines might diverge from a as if into different worlds, and their extensions have no relation to each other. But they have one; our spatial perception and nothing else reveals to us the angle a , and shows us that space extends between the two lines and allows a connexion between the points b and c by means of a straight line bc of the same kind as ab and ac , it teaches us at the same time that there is this possibility for all points of ab and ac , and so creates the third element of our idea of space, the plane p . This, after having so discovered it, we are able to define as the figure in space any point of which may be connected with any other point by a straight line lying wholly in that figure. This definition however, though I should think it a sufficient one, contains no rule for construction according to which we could produce for ourselves the plane p without having had it before; for what is really meant by requiring all connecting lines to be contained in the spatial figure which is to be drawn is only made clear by the spatial perception of the plane. Now I will not deny that it may be of use in the course of scientific investigations to demonstrate even simple conceptions as the result of complicated constructions; in cases, that is to say, in which it is our object to show that the complicated conditions present in a problem must have precisely this simple consequence; but I cannot comprehend the acumen which seeks as the basis of geometry to obtain the most elementary perceptions by

help of presuppositions, which not only contain of necessity the actual elements in question but also more besides them.

It is possible to regard the straight line as a limiting case in a series of curves ; but it would not be possible to form the series of these curves without in some way employing for their determination and measurement the mental presentation of the straight line from which they show a measurable deviation. Whoever should give it as a complete designation of a straight line, that it was the line which being rotated between its extremities did not change its place, would plunge us into silent reflexion as to how he conceived the axis of that rotation ; and by what, without supposing a straight line somewhere, he would measure the change of place which the curve experienced in such a rotation.

I hold it quite as useless to construct the plane ϕ over again, after it has once been given by perceptive cognition ; no doubt it is also the surface in which two spheres intersect, and reappears as the result of countless constructions of the kind ; but every fair judge will think that it is the perception of the plane which elucidates the idea of the intersection and not *vice versa*.

And now, if we may let alone these attempts to clear up what is clear already, we are invited to a more serious defence of the rights of universal Logic by the dazzling play of ambiguities which endeavours to controvert and threatens to falsify perception itself. A finite arc of a circle of course becomes perpetually more like a straight line as the radius of the circle to which it belongs is increased ; but the whole circle never comes to be like one. However infinitely great we may conceive the radius as being, nothing can prevent us from conceiving it to complete its rotation round the centre ; and till such rotation is completed we have no right to apply the conception of a circle to the figure which is generated ; discourse about a

straight line which, being in secret a circle of infinite diameter, returns into itself, is not a portion of an esoteric science but a proof of logical barbarism. Just the same is shown by phrases about parallel lines which are supposed to cut each other at an infinite distance; they do not cut each other at any finite distance, and as every distance when conceived as attained would become finite again, there simply is no distance at which they do so; it is utterly inadmissible to pervert this negation into the positive assertion, that in infinite distance there is a point at which intersection occurs. Here again, however, I am not denying that in the context of a calculation good service may be rendered within certain limits by modes of designation which rest on assumptions like these; so much the more useful would be a precise investigation within what limits they may be employed in every case, without commending to notice absolute nonsense by help of pretentious calculation.

131. It is obvious that according to the above general discussion, I cannot propose to solve the dispute about parallels by the demonstrative method commonly desiderated; I am content with expressing my conviction by saying that in presence of direct perception I can see no reason whatever for raising the dispute. We call parallel the two straight lines a and b which have the same direction in space, and we test the identity of their direction by the criterion that with a third straight line c in the same plane p , the straight lines a and b form on the same side of them s , the same angle α . In saying this I do not hesitate to presuppose the plane p and side s as perfectly clear data of perception; still they might both be eliminated by the following expression; a and b are parallel if the extremities α and β of any equal lengths αa and βb taken on the two straight lines from their starting points a and b , are always at the same distance from one another. It follows from this as a mere verbal definition, that $a b$ will also be parallel

to $a\beta$; and at the same time from the matter of the definition, that a and b , as long as they are straight lines, must remain at the same distance from each other, measured as above; every question whether to produce them to infinity would make any change in this is otiose, and contradicts the presupposition which conceives identity of direction to infinity as involved in the direction of a finite portion of a straight line. That the sum of the interior angles which aa and $b\beta$ make with ab or with $a\beta$ is equal to two right angles, only requires the familiar elucidation.

Now if a triangle is to be made between aa and $b\beta$ both the lines must change their position, or one of them *its* position relatively to the other. If we suppose aa to turn about the point a so that the angle which it forms with ab is diminished, our spatial perception shows us that the interval between its intersection with $a\beta$ and the extremity β of that line must also diminish; if the turning is continued this interval is necessarily reduced to zero, and then ab , $a\beta$, and $b\beta$, enclose the required triangle. When this has been done the line $a\beta$ and the line of its former position aa make an angle, which is now excluded from the sum of the angles which were before the interior angles between the parallels aa and $b\beta$; but the vertical angle opposite to this angle, and therefore the angle itself, is equal to the new angle which $a\beta$ produces by its convergence with $b\beta$; the latter forms a part of the sum of the angles of the triangle which is being made, which sum as it loses and gains equally, remains the same as it was in the open space between the parallels; that is, in every triangle, whatever its shape may be, it is equal to two right angles. If this simple connexion between the two cases will not serve, still we could attach no importance to any attempt to postulate a different sum for the angles of a triangle, except on one condition; that it should not only proceed by strictly coherent calculations but should also be able to present the purely mathematical

perception of the cases which corresponded to its assumption with equal obviousness and lucidity. For in fact it is not obvious, why, if the sum of the angles of a triangle were generally or in particular cases different from what we made it, this state of things should never be discovered to exist or be demonstrated to be necessary. But here we plainly have misunderstandings between philosophy and mathematics which go much deeper. Philosophy can never come to an understanding with the attempt which it must always find utterly incomprehensible, to decide upon the validity of one or the other assumption by external observations of nature. So far these observations have agreed with the Euclidean geometry; but if it should happen that astronomical measurements of great distances, after exclusion of all errors of observation, revealed a less sum for the angle of a triangle, what then? Then we should only suppose that we had discovered a new and very strange kind of refraction, which had diverted the rays of light which served to determine the direction; that is, we should infer a peculiar condition of physical realities in space, but certainly not a real condition of space itself which would contradict all our perceptive presentations and be vouched for by no exceptional presentation of its own.

132. However all this is the special concern of geometry, without essential importance for metaphysic. There is another set of ideas in which the latter has a greater interest. I admitted above that a being endowed with ideas would not evolve forms of space-perception which no occasion was given him to produce. Others have connected with such an idea the conjecture of a possibility that even our geometry may admit of extensions the stimulus to which in human experience is either absent or as yet unnoticed.

Helmholtz (Popular Scientific Lectures, III) in his first example supposes the case of intelligent beings living in an infinite plane, and incapable of perceiving anything outside the plane, but capable of having perceptions like ours within

the extension of the plane, in which they can move freely. It will be admitted that these beings would establish precisely the same geometry which is contained in our Planimetry ; but their ideas would not include the third dimension of space.

Not quite so obvious, I think, are the inferences drawn from a second case, in which intelligent beings with the same free power of movement and the same incapacity of receiving impressions from without their dwelling-space, are supposed to live on the surface of a sphere. At least, I suppose I ought to interpret as I did in the last sentence the expression that they¹ 'have not the power of perceiving anything outside this surface' ; the other interpretation that even if impressions came to them from without the surface, they nevertheless are unable to project them outside it, would give the appearance of an innate defect in the intelligence of these beings to what according to the import of such descriptions ought only to result from the lack of appropriate stimuli. Under such conditions the direct perceptions of these beings would certainly lead in the first place to the ideas which Helmholtz ascribes to them ; but I cannot persuade myself that the matter would end there, supposing we assume that the mental nature of such beings has the tendency with which our own is inspired, to combine single perceptions into a whole as a self-consistent and complete image of all that we perceive.

For shortness' sake I take two points *N* and *S* as the North and South poles of the surface of the sphere, and suppose the whole net of geographical circles to be drawn upon it. Suppose first that a being *B* moves from a point *a* along the meridian of this point. We must assume then that *B* is not only capable of receiving qualitatively different or similar impressions from East and West ; it must be informed by some feeling, by whatever means produced, of

¹ ['Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects,' Atkinson's translation, and series, p 34.]

the fact of its own motion, and at the same time have capacity to interpret this feeling into the fact of its motion, that is, into the change of its relation to objects which for the time at least are fixed; it must finally have equally direct feelings which enable it to distinguish the persistent and similar continuance of this motion or change from a change of direction or a return in the same direction. However these postulates may be satisfied in the being B , it is certain that if we are to count upon any definite combination of the impressions it receives, it can experience no change of its feeling of direction in its continuous journey along the meridian; for by the hypothesis it is insensible to the concavity of its path towards the centre of the sphere. So if having started from a it passes through N and S and returns to a , keeping to this path, such a fact admits of the following interpretations for its intelligence.

As long as a only distinguishes itself from b or c by the quality of the impression it makes on B it will remain unestablished that the a which has recurred is that from which its movement started; it may be a second, like the first but not identical with it. On the other hand, the feelings which arise in B from its actual movement may prove to it a change in its own relation to objects, but as long as this is all it is not self-evident that the feelings can only indicate a change of *spatial* relation to them; the feelings are simply a regular series of states, the repeated passage through which is always combined with the recurrence of one and the same sensation a ; very much, though not exactly, like running up the musical scale, when we feel a continuous increase in the same direction of our exertion of the vocal organs, which brings us back in certain periods not indeed to the same note, but to its octave which resembles it.

If B can feel no more than this, no space-perception can be generated; in order that it should be, a further separate postulate is required; B must be forced by the peculiar nature of its intelligence to represent to itself every difference

between two of its felt states as a distance in space between two places or points. Under this new condition the interpretation of the experience gained is still doubtful, until the identity of the two *a*'s is determined; as *B* does not experience a deviation to East or West, and by the hypothesis does not feel the curvature of its path inwards, it might suppose itself to have moved along an infinitely extended straight line, furnished at definite equal intervals with similar objects *a*.

But it is not worth while to spend time on this hypothesis; let us suppose at once that *B* moves freely on the surface and is able to compare in its consciousness innumerable experiences acquired in succession; then it will find means to establish not only the exact resemblance¹ but the identity of the two *a*'s. If this has taken place its journey along the meridian from *a* by *N* and *S* back to *a* will appear to it to establish the fact that by following a rectilinear movement in space, without change of direction or turning back, it has returned to its starting-point. At least I do not know how its path could appear to it other than rectilinear; as it can measure the whole distance from *a* to *a* by nothing but the length of the journey accomplished, it is of course equal to the sum of all the intermediate distances from point to point of this journey and so falls under the conception of straightness which was determined above; and on the other hand we cannot assume that *B* would detect in every element that made part of his journey, therefore in each of the minimum distances from point to point, the character of the arc of a circle; it would then possess the power denied to it of perceiving convexity in terms of the third dimension; and therein it would at once have a basis for the complete development of the idea of that dimension, its possession of which is disputed.

But such an idea must undoubtedly arise in its mind, not on grounds of direct perception, but by reason of the intoler-

¹ ['*Gleichheit*.']

able contradiction which would be involved in this straight line returning into itself, if this apparent result of experience were allowed to pass as an actual fact. For a power of mental portrayal which has got so far as to imagine manifold points ranged beside each other in a spatial order the content of the experience which has been acquired is nothing but the definition of a curve, and indeed, all things considered, of the uniform curve of the circle; but as it cannot turn either East or West, there must necessarily be a third dimension, out of which immediate impressions never come, and which cannot therefore be the object of a sense-perception for the being *B* in the same way as the two other dimensions; but which nevertheless would be mentally represented by *B* with the same certainty with which we can imagine the interior of a physical body although hidden by its surface. As soon as this conception of the third dimension is established the being *B* would evolve from the comparison of all its experiences according to the most universal laws of logic and mathematics precisely the same geometry that we acquire more easily, not having to call to our aid a dimension which for our sensuous perception is imaginary, to reduce things to order; the being *B* would by this time understand its dwelling-space to be what it is, a figure in space which is extended in three dimensions; and would be in a position to explain the extraordinary phenomena which its experience of motion had presented to it by help of this form of idea.

133. Parallel lines, Helmholtz continues, would be quite unknown to the inhabitants of the sphere; they would assert that any two lines, the straightest possible, would if sufficiently produced, cut one another not merely in one point but in two. It depends somewhat on the definition of parallelism and on the interpretation of the assumptions which are made whether we are forced to agree to the former assertion. Movements along the meridians could of course not lead to the idea of parallel lines; but still,

in case of free power to move, *B* might traverse successively two circles of the same north and south latitude; it would find that these circles have equal lengths to their return to the starting-point, that they never either cut or touch each other; but that counting from the same meridian the extremities of equal segments of the two have always the same distance from each other. This seems to me sufficient ground for calling them parallel, and in fact we use the term parallel of the circumferences of similarly-directed sections of a cylinder, which in this case the two circles would really be.

But that would be, as I said, merely a question of names; I mention these movements here for a different reason. The tangential planes of the successive points of the southern circle cut each other in straight lines which converge to the south; the corresponding sections for the northern circle do the same to the north; the question is whether the being *B* would be aware of this difference or not. If it were not, then *B* would really suppose itself to traverse two paths of precisely the same direction, which would in fact be parallel in the same sense as the above cylinder-sections; and then it might, as long as no other experiences contradicted the idea, conceive both paths to be in one plane as circles, the centre of which are joined by a straight line greater than the sum of their radii.

This would not be so in the other case, which we must anyhow regard as the more probable hypothesis. Of course it is hard to obtain a perfectly clear idea of what we mean by calling *B* sensitive only to impressions in the surface of the sphere; but we may assume that it would become aware of the slope of the tangential planes to North and South from the fact that the meridians, known to it from other experiences, make smaller angles with its path on the side on which the plane inclines to the pole, and greater on the opposite side. However this might produce its further effect on *B*'s feelings of motion, the only

credible result would be that it would think its path along the southern parallel concave to the south ; and that along the northern parallel concave to the north ; in other respects it would take them for circles, returning into themselves. These two impressions given by this second case would not be capable of being reconciled with the experience above mentioned of the constant distance maintained between equal segments of the two paths, taking these latter as transferred into a plane ; and this case also would necessitate, in order to reconcile the contradiction it involves, the invention of the third dimension though not directly perceptible.

134. This result must guide us in forming our opinion on the vexed question of the fourth dimension of space. I omit all reference to fancies which choose to recommend to notice either time, or the density of real things in space, or anything else as being this fourth dimension ; if we do not intend an unmeaning play upon words we must take it for granted at least that any new dimension is fully homogeneous and interchangeable with those to the number of which it is added, moreover if it is to be a dimension of *space*, it must as the fourth be perpendicular to the three others, just as each of them is to the remaining two.

It is conceded that for our perception this condition cannot be fulfilled ; but the attempt is made to invalidate this objection by referring to the beings which have been depicted, whose knowledge stops short even of the third dimension of space because perception affords them no stimulus to represent it to their minds. Therefore, it is argued, a further development of our receptivity might perhaps permit to us an insight into a fourth dimension, now unknown to us from lack of incitement to construct it. The possibility that some beings content themselves with a part of the space-perception attainable can of course be no proof by itself that this form of perception is not in itself a whole with certain limits ; or that it admits of perpetual

additions even beyond the boundary we have reached ; but we must admit that for the moment the appeal to these imaginary cases at least obscures the limit at which we may suppose the mental image to have reached such a degree of completeness as forbids any further additions. This makes it all the more necessary to see what that appeal can really claim. The imaginary beings which could only receive perceptions from a single plane, would have been in the most favourable situation, supposing changed life-conditions to bring them impressions from outside it, for the utilisation of such new perceptions ; they would have been able to add the geometry of the newly discovered direction to the Planimetry which they possessed without having to change anything in their previous perceptions.

When we came to the beings on the sphere-surface we at once found a different situation ; they were forced to devise the third dimension by the contradictions in which the combination of their immediate perceptions entangled them , but yet they never found a direct presentation of it given, and could not do so without remodelling all their initial ideas of space.

If we mean to use this analogy to support the possibility in our own case of a similar extension of our perceptive capacity, I hope that attention will be given to the differences which exist between our position and that of those imaginary beings. In particular ; they were compelled precisely by the contradictions in their observations to postulate the new dimension ; we have no contradiction present to us, of a kind to force us as in their case to regard our space-image as incomplete, and to add a fourth to its three dimensions. At the same time we are not, at all events just now, in the position of the beings in the plane, who were unsuspectingly content with their Planimetry and never even conjectured the third dimension, which we know ; for the idea of a fourth dimension which is now

mooted on all sides is so far a substitute for the absent incitements of experience that it does not leave us quite unsuspecting of the enlargement of our space-perception which may be possible, but draws our attention to it, more seriously than in fact is worth while. If such an enlargement were possible, things would have to go on very strangely for the examination of space as we picture it to ourselves not to reveal it to us even without suggestions on the part of observation ; on the other hand if the required observations came to us, without the possibility of remoulding our space-image so as to reconcile their contradictions, we should simply have to acquiesce in the contradictions. Now the following difference subsists ; the beings on the sphere-surface were no doubt compelled by observations to alter their initial geometrical images, but then they found the alteration practicable ; we are not in any way compelled to make the attempt, and besides, we find it utterly impracticable ; in our space S it is admittedly impossible to construct a fourth dimension perpendicular to the other three and coincident with none of them. This seems to me to settle the matter ; for no one should appeal to the possibility that the space S , without itself becoming different, may still admit of a different apprehension, exhibiting a fourth dimension in it. As long as the condition is maintained that the dimensions must be at right angles to each other, such an apprehension is impossible ; if it is dropped, what we obtain is no novelty ; for in order to adapt our formulæ to peculiar relations of what exists or can be constructed in space it has long been the practice to select a peculiar and appropriate system of axes. Nothing would prevent us from assigning to the plane alone three dimensions cutting each other at angles of 60° ; which would give a more convenient conspectus of many relations of points distributed in space than two dimensions at right angles.

Therefore only the other question remains provisionally

admissible ; whether there can be another form of apprehension X or Z , unlike the space S , which presents four or more dimensions, perfectly homogeneous, interchangeable, and having that impartial relation to each other which appears in the property of being at right angles as known in the space S . I shall return to it directly ; meantime I must insist upon the logical objection for which I have been censured ; it is absolutely unallowable to transfer the name and conception of a space S to formations which would only be co-ordinate with it under the common title of a system of arrangement capable of direct presentation to the mind ; but whose special properties are entirely incompatible with the characteristic differentia of the space S , that is with the line s , the plane p , the angle a , and the relations which subsist between these elements. It is this dangerous use of language that produces the consequences which we have before us ; such as the supposition that the space S in which we live really has a fourth dimension over and above its three, only is malicious enough not to let us find it out ; but that perhaps in the future we may succeed in getting a glimpse of it ; then by its help we should be able to make equal and similar bodies coincide, as we now can equal and similar plane figures. This last reason for the probability of the fourth dimension is moreover one which I fail to understand ; what good would it do us to be occupied with folding over each other bodies of the same size and shape, and what do we lose now by being unable to do it ? and further ; must everything be true which would be a fine thing if it were ? No doubt it would be convenient if the circumference of the circle or any root with index raised to any power in the case of any number could be expressed rationally ; but no one hopes for an extension of arithmetic which would make this possible. What have we come to ? Has the exercise of ingenuity killed all our sense of probability ? The anticipation of such transfigurations of our most fundamental kinds of per-

ception can only remind us of the dreams of the Fourierists, who expected from the social advance of man a corresponding regeneration of nature, extending to the taming of all savageness and ferocity in its creatures. But perhaps the two processes may help each other; it will be a fine thing when we can ride on tame whales through the fourth dimension of the *eau sucré* sea.

135. To return to the above question; I am convinced, certainly, that the triplicity of perpendicular dimensions is no special property of our space S ; but the necessary property of every perception R which presents, however differently from our space, a background or comprehending form for all the systematic relations of a co-existent multiplicity. Still I could wish that I had a stronger argument to sustain my conviction than what I am now going to add. To avoid all confusion with ideas taken from existing space which of course press upon us as the most obvious symbols to adopt, let us conceive a series of terms X , between which, putting out of sight their qualitative character which we treat therefore as wholly uniform, there are such relations, homogeneous in nature but now not otherwise known, that every term is separated from its two next neighbours by a difference x . How in such a system of arrangement R this difference x would be imagined, or pictured to the mind, we leave quite out of the question; it is merely a form or value of an unknown r , and corresponds to what appears in our space-perception as the straight line s or as the distance in space between two points. Now let O be the term of the series X from which we start; then the differences between its place in the series and that of any other term, that is the differences between the particular elements of the required perception R itself measured in the unknown form r , will be of the form $\pm mx$, where m is to be replaced by the numbers of the natural series. Now O may be at the same time a term of another series Y of precisely similar formation, whose terms we will designate

by $\pm my$ so that each my is not merely like in kind but also equal to mx .

There are two conditions which these two series X and Y would have to satisfy in order to stand in a relation corresponding to that of two lines in space at right angles to each other. First, progression in the series Y , however far continued, should bring no increment of one-sided resemblance in the terms my so arising to $+mx$ or $-mx$, but every my should have its difference from $+mx$ equally great with that from $-mx$ in whatever such difference consists. Secondly, this difference should not consist in any chance quality, but should be comparable both in kind and in magnitude both with x and with y . This second condition must be remarked; obviously countless series like Y can be conceived, starting from a term O common to it and X and extending, so to speak, into different worlds, whose terms would approach neither $+x$ nor $-x$ because quite incomparable with either; but such suppositions would have nothing to do with our subject. In our space S the difference between my and mx is a line s , just as mx and my themselves are lines of the kind s ; in the other system of places R which we are here supposing this difference is of the otherwise unknown kind r , just as mx and my are comparable forms or values of r .

From this point we might proceed in different ways. We might attempt to form the idea, still problematic, of several series Y , all of which satisfy these conditions; but against this suggestion it is rightly urged, that as long as we are without the conception of a space whose plainly presented differences of direction would show us how to keep asunder these several Y 's, so long they are all in their relation to X , (and so far they are defined by nothing else), to be considered as one single series; they would not be many, till the same difference should subsist between them, as between them and X , and that without interfering with their common difference from X . Now let us consider one of these Y 's

as given ; the others, which, in the abstract sense which we explained, are as well as the given Y perpendicular to the series X , may have the most diverse relations to the former ; their progressive terms may approximate more or less to the $+my$ or $-my$ of the first given series ; but among all these series there can conceivably be only one which we will call Z , whose successive terms mz though commensurable with $\pm my$ still have equally great differences from the positive and from the negative branch of Y . It is true too of this third series Z as long as it is defined by nothing but its relation to Y , that it is only to be regarded as one ; but of it too we may form the problematic idea that it is forthcoming in a number of instances, all of which stand in the same relation of being perpendicular to Y . If we now choose one of these many Z 's, then the rest may stand to it again in the most diverse relations ; but again only one, which we will call V , could be such that its progressive terms mv would have always equal differences from the $+mz$ and the $-mz$ of that one determinate Z . Observations of this kind might be continued for ever ; but there is an absolutely essential and decisive point which as they stand they just omit.

We have so far only supposed the Y 's perpendicular to X , the Z 's to Y , and the V 's to Z , but have not decided the question, how far the relation of Z as at right angles to Y brings this Z into a necessarily deducible relation with X , or that of V to Z has a similar effect upon V as regards Y or X . If we really added nothing further this would be a case of what I have more than once expressed in metaphor ; the Z 's would no doubt have the same relation to the Y 's that the Y 's have to the X 's ; only the relation of the Z 's as perpendicular to Y would as it were point into another world from that of the Y 's as perpendicular to X ; and though we should be able to have a perception of each particular one of these relations, that of the Y 's to the X 's and that of the Z 's to the Y 's, yet we should not bring

together these two instances of one and the same relation into any definite mental picture at all, in spite of the common starting-point O .

Therefore in this way we shall never obtain the collective perception R , which we were looking for and within which we hoped to distribute in determinate places all the points we met with in its alleged n dimensions; only the accustomed perception of space S , which we introduce unawares, misleads us into the subreption that it is self-evident that these successive perpendicular branchings of the X 's from Y , of the Y 's from Z , and of the Z 's from V take place in a common intuitional form R . But in fact, to secure this, the particular condition must be added to which I drew attention above. A Z which is perpendicular to a Y , or deviates in a measurable degree from the perpendicular to it, must by this circumstance enter also into a perfectly definite relation with X , to which that Y is perpendicular. At present we have only to do with one of these various relations; which is this; among the Z 's perpendicular to Y , that one which is also to be perpendicular to X must necessarily be one among the many Y 's, as they included all the series that had this relation to X ; therefore even this third dimension cannot exist in R without its coinciding with one, and taking X as given, with a particular one of the many instances of the second dimension all perpendicular to X ; still less can there be a fourth dimension V , at once perpendicular to X , Y , and Z , and yet distinct from the one particular Z which stands alone in answering to the two conditions of being perpendicular to X and at the same time to Y . I maintain therefore that in no intuitional form R , however unlike our space S , provided that it really is to have the character of a comprehensive intuitional form for all co-existing relations of the content arranged in it, can there be more than three dimensions perpendicular to each other; taking the designation 'perpendicular' in the abstract meaning which I assigned it, and which refers not only to

lines s and angles a but to every element r , however constituted, in such a form of perception R . Of course this whole account of the matter is, and in view of the facts can be, nothing but a sort of retranslation from the concrete of geometry into the abstract of logic; perhaps others may succeed better in what I have attempted. I believe that I am in agreement with Schmitz-Dumont on this question as well as on some of the points already discussed, but I find it hard to adopt the point of view required by the whole context of his exposition.

136. Among the properties which our common apprehension believes most indispensable to Space is the absolute homogeneity of its infinite extension. The real elements which occupy it or move in it may, we think, have different densities of their aggregation and different rules for their relative positions at different points; space itself, on the other hand, as the impartial theatre of all these events, cannot possess local differences of its own nature which might interfere with the liberty of everything that is or happens at one of its points to repeat itself without alteration at any other. Now if we conceive a number of real elements either united in a system at rest, or set in motion, by the reactions which their nature makes them exert on one another, then there arise surfaces and lines, which can be drawn in space, but are not a part of its own structure, they unite points in a selection which is solely dependent on the laws of the forces which act between the real things. Mathematics can abstract from the recollection of these causes of special figures in space and need not retain more than the supposition of a law, (disregarding its origin,) according to which definite connected series of points present themselves to our perception out of the infinite uniformity of extension as figures, lines, or surfaces.

So far ordinary ideas have no difficulty in following the endeavours of geometry when in obedience to the law of combination of a multiplicity given in an equation it

searches for the spatial outlines which unite in themselves the particular set of spatial points that correspond to this law. But in the most recent speculations we meet with a notion, or at least imagine we meet with it, which we cannot understand and do not know how to justify. It is possible that the difficulties which I am going to state are based on a misconception of the purposes aimed at by the analytically conducted investigations of this subject; but then it is at least necessary to point out plainly where the need exists for intelligibility and explanation which has not been in the least met by the expositions hitherto given.

To put it shortly, I am alluding to the notion that not only may there be in infinite uniform extension innumerable surfaces and lines whose structure within the particular extent of each is very far from uniform, that is, *variously formed figures in space*; but that also there may be *spaces* of a peculiar structure, such that uniformity of their entire extension is excluded. It is clear to us what we are to think of as a spherical or pseudo-spherical surface, but not clear what can be meant by a spherical or pseudo-spherical space; designations which we meet with in the discussion of these subjects without any help being given to us in comprehending their meaning. In the following remarks I shall only employ the former of these designations; the mention of 'pseudo-spherical space,' which is harder to present definitely to the mind, could only reinforce our impression of mysteriousness, without contributing to the explanation of the matter any more than the allusion to the familiar spherical figure. The idea of a spherical surface, being that of a figure in space, presupposes the common perception of space; the situation of its points is determined, at least has been hitherto, by some system of co-ordinates which measures their distance and the direction of that distance from an assumed point of origin according to the rules which hold for a uniform space. To pass from the spherical surface to a spherical space, one

of two assertions seems to me to be needed ; either this surface *is* the whole space which exists, really or to the mind's eye ; or this totality of space *arises* out of the spherical surface by making the co-ordinates pass continuously through the whole series of values compatible with the law of their combination. If we do the latter there arises by the unbroken attachment of each spherical surface to the previous one, the familiar image of a spherical Volume, which we may either limit arbitrarily at a particular point or conceive as growing to infinity, as the equation of the surface remains capable of construction for all values of the radius ; in this way we attain to nothing more than the admissible but purely incidental aspect, that the infinite uniform extension of space is capable of a complete secondary construction, if from any given point of origin we supposed a minimum spherical surface to expand in all directions conformably to its equation. But in the interior of this spherical volume there is no further structure revealed than that of uniform space, on the basis of which the co-ordinates of the boundary-surface at each particular moment had been determined : the interior does not consist permanently and exclusively of the separate spherical shells out of which in this case our representing faculty created its representation ; the passage from point to point is not in any way bound to respect this mode of creation of the whole, as though such a passage could take place better or more easily in one of the spherical surfaces than in the direction of a chord which should unite any places in the interior. The conception of a measure of curvature has its proper and familiar import for each of the surfaces, distinguishable in this space by thought, but wholly obliterated in the space itself ; but it is impossible to conceive a property of space itself to which it could apply.

In the case of the sphere its law of formation permitted the continuous attachment of surface to surface ; but equations are conceivable which if constructed as a system of

positions in space would produce either a series of discrete points or one of discrete surfaces, perhaps partially connected or perhaps not at all. We know such constructions primarily as figures in space and nothing else, and conceive their production as conditioned by equations between co-ordinates whose power of being reciprocally defined by each other corresponds to the nature of uniform space, now known as Euclidean space; but let us assume that we had escaped from that postulate and had employed co-ordinates which themselves partook of the special nature of the variously formed space which is to be obtained. It may then be difficult to project an image of these strange figures within our accustomed modes of space-perception; I attach more weight to another difficulty, that of determining what we properly mean when we speak of them as spaces. Let us assume that the fundamental law, being capable of algebraical expression, which prevails in a system of related points not yet explicitly apprehended as spatial, conditions a systematic order of them which could only be represented in our space S by a number of curved sheets not wholly attached to one another; then the fact, form, and degree of their divergence could only be observed by us through the medium of distance measured according to the nature of the space S , as existing between particular points in the different sheets.

However, let us even put out of the question all idea of a space S as the neutral background on which the figure X was constructed, and attempt to regard this X as the sole represented space; still the different sheets of it could not possibly extend as if into different worlds, so as to prevent there being any measurable transition from one to another; just as little could that which separates them and makes them diverge be a mere nothingness when compared to the space X itself, and capable of no measurable degrees whatever; even in this case that which gave the reason for their being separate could not but be a spatial magnitude or

distance, uniform and commensurable with the magnitudes which formed the actual space X . Thus our attempt would be a failure; we should not be able to regard that X as space, but only as a structure in a space; we might no doubt assume, for the moment, of this space that in each of its minutest parts it had a structure other than that of our space S , but we should have to admit at once that it formed a continuous whole with the same inner structure in every one of its parts. For, provided that this tentatively assumed space X is not to be regarded as something real, but as the empty form of a system for the reception of possible realities, there can be no difference of reality or value between the points contained in those sheets and the other points by the interposition of which their divergence arises; they would all accordingly have equal claims to be starting-points of the construction in question, and from the intersection of all these constructions there would once more be formed the idea of a space uniform through an infinite extension, and indifferent to the structure of the fabrics designed in it. Not even a break in the otherwise uniform extension is possible; such a break is only conceivable if in the first place there is a something between the terms which keeps them asunder, and if moreover that something is comparable in kind and magnitude with what it bounds on both sides of itself; hence space cannot consist of an infinite number of intersecting lines which leave meshes of what is not space between them; it uncontrollably becomes again the continuous and uniform extension which we supposed it to be at first; and the manifold configurations of the kind X are conceivable in it only as bounded structures, not as themselves forms of space.

137. I feel myself obliged to maintain the convictions which I have expressed even against Riemann's investigations into a 'multiplicity extended in n directions. My objections are on the whole directed to the point, that here again the confusion which seems to me to darken the whole

question has not been avoided; the confusion of the universal localisation-system of empty places presented to the mind, a system in which structures of any shape or any extent can be arranged, with the structure and articulation belonging to that which has to be arranged in this system; or to repeat the expression employed above, the confusion of space with structures in space. In II. § 4 of his treatise on the hypotheses which lie at the foundation of Geometry, Riemann expresses himself as follows: 'Multiplicities whose measure of curvature is everywhere zero, may be treated as a particular case of multiplicities whose measure of curvature is everywhere constant. The common character of multiplicities whose degree of curvature is constant may be expressed by saying that all figures can be moved in them without stretching. For, obviously, figures could not be made to slide or rotate in them at pleasure, unless the degree of curvature were constant. On the other hand, by means of the constant degree of curvature the relations of measurement of the multiplicity in question are completely determined; accordingly in all directions about one point the relations of measurement are exactly the same as about another, and therefore the same constructions are practicable starting from the one as from the other and consequently in multiplicities with a constant measure of curvature figures can be given any position.'

Now I have no doubt at all that by analytical treatment of more universal formulæ the properties of space indicated may be deduced as a special case; but I must adhere to my assertion that it is only with these special properties that such an 'extended multiplicity' is a space, or corresponds to the idea of a system of arrangement for perception; all formulæ which do not contain so much as these determinations, or which contain others opposed to them, mean either nothing, or only something which as a special or peculiar formation may be fittingly or unfittingly reduced to order in that universal frame. A system of places which

was otherwise formed in any one of its parts than in another, would contradict its own conception, and would not be what it ought to be, the neutral background for the manifold relations of what was to be arranged in it ; it would be itself a special formation, 'a multiplicity extended in n directions' instead of being the n -dimensional multiplicity of *extension*, about which the question really was.

I cannot believe that any skill in analysis can compensate for this misconception in the ideas ; alleged spaces of such structure that in one part of them they would not be able to receive, without stretching or change of size, a figure which they could so receive in another, can only be conceived as real shells or walls, endowed with such forces of resistance as to hinder the entrance of an approaching real figure, but inevitably doomed to be shattered by its more violent impact. I trust that on this point philosophy will not allow itself to be imposed upon by mathematics ; space of absolutely uniform fabric will always seem to philosophy the one standard by the assumption of which all these other figures become intelligible to it. This may be illustrated by the analogy of arithmetic. The natural series of numbers with its constant difference 1, and its direct progression, according to which the difference of any two terms is the sum of the differences of all intermediate terms, may be treated as a special case of a more general form of series just as much as can uniform space. But, by whatever universal term it might be attempted to express the law of formation of this series, it could have no possible meaning without presupposing the series of numbers. Every exponent or every co-efficient which this universal formula contained, would be of unassignable import unless it had either a constant value in the natural series of numbers, or else a variable one, depending in particular cases on the value, measurable only in this series of numbers, of the magnitudes whose function it might be. Every other arithmetical series only states in its law of formation how it

deviates from the progression of terms of equal rank which forms the series of numbers; no other standard can be substituted for this, without standing in need in its turn of the simple series of numbers to make it intelligible. Precisely the same seems to me to be the case in the matter of space; and I cannot persuade myself that so much as the idea of multi-form space or of a variable measure of curvature in space could be formed and defined, without presupposing the elements of uniform space, rectilinear tangents and tangential planes, in fact uniform space in its entirety, as the one intelligible and indispensable standard, from which the formation of the other, if it could be pictured to the mind at all, would present definite deviations.

CHAPTER III.

Of Time.

THE Psychologist may if he pleases make the gradual development of our ideas of Time the object of his enquiry, though, beyond some obvious considerations which lead to nothing, there is no hope of his arriving at any important result. The Metaphysician has to assume that this development has been so far completed that the Time in which, as a matter of fact, we all live is conceived as one comprehensive form in which all that takes place between things as well as our own actions are comprehended. The only question which he has to ask is how far Time, thus conceived, has any application to the Real or admits of being predicated of it with any significance.

138. In regard to the conception I must in the first place protest against the habit, which since the time of Kant has been prevalent with us, of speaking of a direct perception of Time, co-ordinate with that of space and with it forming a connected pair of primary forms of our presentative faculty. On the contrary we have no primary and proper perception of it at all. The character of direct perception attaching to our idea of Time is only obtained by images which are borrowed from Space and which, as soon as we follow them out, prove incapable of exhibiting the characteristics necessary to the thought of Time. We speak of Time as a line, but however large the abstraction which we believe ourselves able to make from the properties of a line in space in order to the subsumption of Time under the

more general conception of the line, it must certainly be admitted that the conception of a line involves that of a reality belonging equally to all its elements. Time however does not correspond to this requirement. Thought of as a line, it would only possess one real point, namely, the present. From it would issue two endless but imaginary arms, each having a peculiar distinction from each other and from simple nullity, viz Past and Future. The distinction between these would not be adequately expressed by the opposition of directions in space. Nor can we stop here. Even though we leave out of sight the relation in which empty Time stands to the occurrences which fall within it, still even in itself it cannot be thought of as at rest. The single real point which the Present constitutes is in a state of change and is ceaselessly passing over to the imaginary points of the Past while its place is taken by the realisation of the next point in the Future.

Hence arises the familiar representation of Time as a stream. All however that in this representation can be mentally pictured originates in recollections of space and leads only to contradictions. We cannot speak of a stream without thinking of a bed of the stream: and in fact, whenever we speak of the stream of Time, there always hovers before us the image of a plain which the stream traverses, but which admits of no further definition. In one point of it we plant ourselves and call it the Present. On one side we represent to ourselves the Future as emerging out of the distance and flowing away into the Past, or conversely—to make the ambiguity of this imagery more manifest—we think of the stream as issuing from the Past and running on into an endless Future. In neither case does the image correspond to the thought. For this never-ending stream is and remains of equal reality throughout, whether as it already flows on the side where we place the future or as it is still flowing on that which stands for the past; and the same reality belongs to it at the moment of its crossing the

Present. Nor is it this alone that disturbs us in the use of the image. Even the movement of the stream cannot be presented to the mind's eye except as having a definite celerity, which would compel us to suppose a second Time, in which the former (imaged as a stream) might traverse longer or shorter distances of that unintelligible background.

139. Suppose then that we try to dispense with this inappropriate imagery, and consider what empty time must be supposed to be, when it is merely thought of, without the help of images presented to the mind's eye. Nothing is gained by substituting the more abstract conception of a series for the unavailable image of a line. It would only be the order of the single moments of Time in relation to each other that this conception would determine. It is, no doubt, involved in the conception of Time that there is a fixed order of its constituents and that the moment m has its place between $m + 1$ and $m - 1$. also that its advance is uniform and that the interval between two of its members is the sum of the intervals between all the intervening members. Thus we might say that if Time is to be compared with a line at all, it could only be with a straight line. Time itself could not be spoken of as running a circular course. There may be a recurrence of events in it, but this would not be a recurrence if the points of Time, at which what is intrinsically the same event occurs, were not themselves different. So far the conception of a series serves to explain what Time is, but it does so no further. Time does not consist merely in such an order as has been described. That is an order in virtue of which the moment m would have its place eternally between $m + 1$ and $m - 1$. The characteristic of Time is that this order is traversed and that the vanishing m is constantly replaced by $m + 1$, never by $m - 1$. Our thoughts thus turn to that motion of our consciousness in which it ranges backwards and forwards at pleasure over a series which is in itself at rest. If

Time were itself a real existence, it would correspond to this motion, with the qualification of being a process directed only one way, in which the reality of every stage would be the offspring of the vanished or vanishing reality of the preceding one and itself in turn the cause of its own cessation and of the commencing reality of the next stage. We might fairly acquiesce in an impossibility of learning what the moments properly are at which these occurrences take place and what are the means by which existence is transferred from one to the other. In the first place it would be maintained that Time is something *sui generis*, not to be defined by conceptions proper to other realities: and secondly we know that the demand for explanation must have its limit and may not insist on making a simplest possible occurrence intelligible by constructions which would presuppose one more complex. But without wanting to know how Time is made, it would still be the fact that we were bringing it under the conception of a process and we should have to ask whether to such a conception of it any complete and consistent sense could be given.

We cannot think of a process as occurring in which nothing proceeds, in which the continuation would be indistinguishable from the beginning, the result produced from the condition producing it. This however would be the case with empty Time. Every moment in it would be exactly like every other. While one passed away, another would take its place, without differing from it in anything but its position in the series. This position however it would not itself indicate by a special nature, incompatible with its occupying another. It would only be the consciousness of an observer, who counted the whole series, that would have occasion to distinguish it by the number of places counted before it was reached from other moments with which it might be compared. But if so, there would not in Time itself be any stream, bringing the new into the place of the old. Nor can appeal be made to the view

previously stated, according to which even the unchanged duration of a certain state is to be regarded as the product of a process of self-maintenance in constant exercise and thus as a permanent event, though there would be no outward change to make this visible. If this view were applied to Time, it would only help us to the idea of a Time for ever stationary, not flowing at all. A distinction of earlier and later moments in it would only be possible on the basis of the presentation to thought of a second Time, in which we should be compelled to measure the extent in a definite direction of the first Time, the Time supposed to be at rest.

140. Such is the obscurity which attaches to the notion of a stream of empty Time, when taken by itself. The same obscurity meets us when we enquire into the relation of Time to the things and events which are said to exist and take place *in* it. Here too the convenient preposition only disguises the unintelligibleness of the relation which it has the appearance of enabling us to picture to the mind. There would be no meaning in the statement that things exist in Time if they did not incur some modification by so existing which they would not incur if they were not in Time. What is this? To say that the stream of Time carries them along with it would be a faulty image. Not only would it be impossible to understand how empty Time could exercise such a force as to compel what is not empty but real to a motion not its own. The result too would be something impossible to state. For even supposing the real to be thus carried along by the stream of Time, it would be in just the same condition as before, and thus our expression would contradict what we meant it to convey. For it is not a mere change in the place of something which throughout retains its reality, but an annihilation of one reality and an origination of another, that we mean to signify by the power at once destructive and creative of the stream of Time. But, so understood, this power would involve a greater riddle still. Its work of destruction would be unintelligible

in itself, nor would it be possible to conceive the relation between it and that vital power of things to which must be ascribed the greater or less resistance which they offer to their annihilation. Empty Time would be the last thing that could afford an explanation of the selection which we should have to suppose it to exercise in calling events, with all their variety, into existence in a definite order of succession.

But if, aware of this impossibility, we transfer the motive causes of this variety of events to that to which they really belong, viz. to the nature and inner connexion of things, what are we then to make of the independent efflux of empty Time, with which the development of things would have to coincide without any internal necessity of doing so? There would be nothing on this supposition to exclude the adventurous thought that the course of events runs counter to time and brings the cause into reality after the effect. In short, whichever way we look at the matter, we see the impossibility of this first familiar view, according to which an empty Time has an existence of its own, either as something permanent or in the way of continual flux, including the sum of events within its bounds, as a power prior to all reality and governed by laws of its own. But the certainty with which we reject this view does not help us to the affirmation of any other.

141. Doubts have indeed been constantly entertained in regard to the reality which is commonly ascribed to Time and many attempts have been made, in the interests of a philosophy of religion, to establish the real existence of a Timeless Being as against changeable phenomena. A more metaphysical basis was first given to this exceptional view by the labours of Kant. He was led by the contradictions, which the supposition of the reality of Time seemed to introduce even into a purely speculative theory of the world, to regard it equally with space as a merely subjective form of our apprehension. This is not the line which I have myself

taken. It seemed to me a safer course to show that Time in itself, as we understand it and as we cannot cease to understand it without a complete transformation of the common view, excludes every attribute which would have to be supposed to belong to it if it had an independent existence prior to other existence. On the other hand I cannot find in the assumption of its merely phenomenal reality a summary solution of difficulties, which only *seem* to arise out of the application of Time to the Real but in truth are inseparable from the intrinsic nature of the Real. On this subject I may be allowed to interpose some remarks.

142. Were it intrinsically conceivable that an independent existence of any kind should belong to Time, and were it further possible to conceive any way in which the course of the world could enter into relation to it, then the difficulties which Kant found in the endlessness of time would cause me no special disturbance. That the world has of necessity a beginning in Time, is the Thesis of his antinomy, and this according to the method of ἀπαγωγή he seeks to prove by disproving the antithesis. It may be noticed in passing that for those who do not, to begin with, find something unthinkable in empty Time as having an existence of its own, the reference to the world which fills Time is even here really superfluous. The Thesis might just as well assert of Time itself that it must have a beginning, and then proceed as it does. 'For¹ on supposition that *Time* has no beginning, before any given moment of Time there must have elapsed an eternity, an endless series of successive *moments*. Now the endlessness of a series consists in this, that it can never be completed by successive synthesis. An endless past lapse of *Time* is therefore impossible and a beginning of it necessary.'

I confess to having always found something questionable in the relative position which Kant here assigns to the

¹ [Altered from Kant's Kritik d. r. Vernunft, p. 304 (Hartenstein's ed.). The words in italics are Lotze's alterations.]

thought of the endlessness of Time on the one hand, and that of the impossibility of completing the endless series by synthesis on the other. He thinks it obvious that the latter constitutes a reason against the former, whereas one might be tempted on the contrary to consider it merely an obvious but unimportant consequence of this thesis. For undoubtedly, in contemplating an endless lapse of time, we suppose that a regress from the present into the past would never come to an end, and that accordingly we could not exhaust the elapsed time by a successive synthesis of the steps taken in this regress. The two thoughts are thus perfectly consistent, and the endlessness of the past would not be found to involve any contradiction until we could succeed in discovering a last stage in the regress. Presumably indeed Kant merely meant by the second thought to exhibit more clearly an absurdity already implicit in the first. But it is just on this point that I cannot accord him an unqualified assent.

143. To begin with, I propose to put my objection in the following general form: the right and duty to admit that something is or happens does not depend on our ability by combining acts of thought to *make* it in that fashion in which we should have to present it to ourselves as being or happening, *if* it were to be or to happen. It is enough that the admission is not rendered impossible by any inner contradiction, and is rendered necessary by the bidding of experience. By no effort of thought can we learn how the world of Being is made; but there was no contradiction in the conception of it, and experience compelled us to adopt the conception. We have had no experience how the world of Becoming is made, on the contrary, the attempt to construct it in thought constantly brings us to the edge of inner contradictions, and it is only experience that has shown us that there may happen in reality what we cannot re-create in thought. We cannot make out how the operation of one thing on another is brought about, and in this case we found

it impossible to overcome the inner contradiction implied in the supposition that independent elements, in no way concerned with each other, should yet concern themselves with each other so far that the movement of one should be regulated by that of the other. This conception of operation, accordingly, we could not admit without discarding the supposition of the obstructive independence of things, and so rendering possible that mutual regulation of their motions, which experience shows to be a fact. Could the ascription to empty space of an existence of its own, independent of our consciousness, be carried out without contradiction, the infinite extension, inseparable from its nature, would not have withheld us from recognising its reality, although we were aware that we could never exhaust this infinity by a successive addition of its points or of the steps taken by us in traversing it. It was no business of ours to make Space. It is the concern of Space itself how it brings that to pass which the activity of our imagination cannot compass. Certainly, if a self-sustained existence, it was not bound to be small enough for us to be able to find its limits. In its infinity no contradiction was involved. From every limit, at which we might halt for the moment, progress to another limit was possible, which means that such progress was always possible. A contradiction would only have arisen upon a point being found beyond which a further progress would not have been allowed, without any reason for the stoppage being afforded by the law which has governed the process through the stages previously traversed, and against the requirement of that law. From this infinity of Space the impossibility of exhausting it by successive synthesis would have followed as a necessary, but at the same time, unimportant consequence: unimportant, because the essence of Space, as a complex of simultaneous not successive elements, would have been quite unaffected by the question whether a mode of origination, which is certainly not that of Space, is possible.

In this respect the case is undoubtedly quite different in regard to Time. It is by the succession of moments that every section of Time comes into being. Therefore no wrong is done it by the question whether its infinity is attainable by the method of successive synthesis, which ceases in this case to be merely the subjective method followed by our thought. But even here the impossibility of coming to an end cannot be regarded as disproving the endlessness of Time. Kant speaks expressly of a *successive* synthesis, and of the certainty that the infinite series can *never* be exhausted by it. If we insist on these expressions, it is clear that the course of Time, the infinity of which is alone ostensibly impugned, is itself already regarded as a real condition antecedent of that activity of imagination, which attempts the synthesis said to be fruitless. The several steps of this activity follow each other. Now whatever the celerity with which this task of adding moment to moment may be supposed to be carried on, no one will maintain that it is achieved more quickly than the lapse of the moments which it counts. The mental reconstruction of Time in time by means of the successive synthesis of its moments will take as much time as Time itself takes for its own construction ; therefore an endless Time, if Time is endless. And this is in fact, as it seems to me, the real meaning of the word *never* in the above connexion. It cannot have the mere force of negation, *not*. It only asserts what is in itself intelligible, that no succession in Time, neither that of our mental representation of Time nor that of Time itself, can measure an infinite Time in a finite Time. But no inner contradiction lies in this progress from point to point. This is the more apparent from the consideration that the progress must be supposed really to take place if we are to conceive the possibility of the successive synthesis, by which we are said to learn that it continues so endlessly as never to be completed. It is not with itself therefore that the endlessness of Time is in contradiction, but only

with our effort to include its infinite progress in a finite one of the same kind:

144. In writing thus, I am not unaware of the possible objection that this view admits of unforced application only to the Future, which no one would seriously doubt to be without limits. It may be said that the Future, as we conceive it, contains that which is coming to be but has not yet taken shape, and the endlessness of its progression agrees with this conception: whereas the Past (if Infinity is to be ascribed to it) would compel us to assume a finished and ready-made Infinity. I cannot help thinking, however, that we have here a confusion of ideas.

In the first place, I would dispose of the difficulty which may be suggested by Kant's expression, that '*up to any moment of the present an infinite series of Time must have elapsed.*' It seems to me improper to represent the Present as the end of this series. It is not the stream of Time of which the direction can be described by saying that it flows out of the Past, through the Present, into the Future. It is only that which fills Time—the concrete course of the world—that conditions what is contained in the later by what is contained in the earlier. Empty Time itself, if there were such a thing, would take the opposite direction. The Future would pass unceasingly into the Present and this into the Past. In presenting it to ourselves we should have no occasion to seek the source of this stream in the past.

This correction, however, only alters the form of the above objection, which might be repeated thus:—If the Past is held to be infinite, then there must be considered to have elapsed an infinite repetition of that mysterious process, by which every moment of the empty Future becomes the Present, and again pushes the Present before it as a Past. The true ground, however, of the misunderstanding is as follows. Future and Past alike are *not*; but the manner of their not-being is not the same. It is true that in regard to empty Time, though we would fain make

this distinction, we cannot show that it obtains, for one point of the elapsed void is exactly like every point of the void that has still to come. But if we think of that course of the world which fills Time, then the Future presents itself to us as that which, for us at any rate, is shapeless, dubious, still to be made, while the Past alone is definitely formed and ready-made. Only the Past—which indeed *is* not, but still has known what Being is—we take as given, and as in a certain way belonging to reality. For every moment of what has been the series of conditions is finished—the conditions which must have been thought or must have been active in order to make it the definite object which it is. This character of what has been, since it belongs to every moment of the past, is shared by the whole past of the world's history, and is transferred by us to empty Time. Thus, as a matter of course, when we speak of an endless Past, we take it to be the same thing as saying that this endless Past '*has been*'¹. But it is quite a different notion that Kant conveys by his expression '*gone by*'². This is the term used of a stream, of which it is already known or assumed that it has an end and exhausts itself in its lapse. But there is nothing in the essential character of the Past to justify this assumption. Nothing is finished but the sum of conditions which made each single moment what it has been. To say, however, that this determination is in each case finished is quite a different thing from saying that the series of repetitions of this process is itself closed, and must be held to be given as a closed series or to have gone by, if it is to be equivalent to the series of what has been. The latter is indeed the assertion of Kant, but the thought so expressed is not one necessarily involved in the conception of that which has been, so as to be alleged as a disproof of the assumption of an infinite past. All that can be said is that whoever thinks of an infinite past, thinks of an infinite that has been. Why he should not think this

¹ ['*Sei gewesen.*']

² ['*Verflossen.*']

does not appear. He will simply deny that the conception of what has been contains a presumption of its being finite. But that, on supposition of an infinite past, we should never come to an end in an attempt to reconstruct the past by the successive synthesis of a process of imagination, is not anything to surprise us. It is the natural result of our assumption. A contradiction would only arise if the infinity asserted broke off anywhere.

145. The doctrine that our imagination can only approach the infinitely great by a progress which can be continued beyond every limit that may be fixed for the moment may be met with elsewhere than in Kant. I do not dispute the correctness of this doctrine. But if it is meant to convey a definition of the infinite I must object, that it would be a definition of the object only by one of its consequences which may serve as a mark of it, not by the proper nature from which these consequences flow. For that the progress in question admits of being continued beyond every limit is something that cannot have been learned by any actual experiment. Any such experiment must necessarily have stopped at some finite limit without any certainty that the next step in advance, which had unfortunately not been taken, might not have exhausted the infinite. Rather we derive this certainty, that the imagination with its posterior constructions will not exhaust it, from a prior conception which does exhaust it, were it only the simple recognition that the infinite has not an end, and that therefore, as a matter of course, such an end cannot be found.

The above definition by consequences may, notwithstanding, have its use. What must, on the contrary, be disputed is the conclusion connected with it, that in the range of our thoughts about the real a case can never occur in which we might recognise the infinite as actually present and given; or, to put it otherwise, that an infinite can never possess the same reality which we ascribe to finite magnitudes of the same kind. If we continue the series of

numbers by the addition of units, the infinite cannot, it is true, be found as a number. To require that it should be so found would be to contradict our definition of it. But to every further number admitted beyond the last which we presented to ourselves, we have to ascribe the same validity as to this last. The series does not so break off where our synthesis comes to an end as that the further continuation should be in any way distinguishable from the piece already counted, as the merely possible or imaginary from something real or given. On the contrary, to our conception the series has undiminished validity as an infinite one, although on the method of addition of units it could never be begotten for our imagination. The Tangent of an angle increases with the increase of the angle. Not only, however, do we continuously approximate to the case in which its value becomes infinite; we actually arrive at it if the angle is a right angle and the Tangent parallel to the Secant. This infinite length remains throughout unmeasurable by successive synthesis of finite lengths: but we are at the same time forced to admit that as the concluding member of a series of finite Tangent-values, which admit of being stated, this infinite inexhaustible Tangent presents itself with just the same validity as those that are exhaustible. We say with equal *validity*, and that is all that we can say, for none of these lines are realities, but only images which we present to the mind's eye. But I find nothing to prove that in the conception of reality, as such, there is anything to hinder us from recognising, beside finite values which we are forced to admit, the reality of the infinite, as soon as the necessary connexion of our thoughts compels us to do so.

Now for those who consider a stream of empty Time, as such, possible, such a necessity lies not merely in the fact that no moment of this time has any better title than another to form the beginning. On the contrary, try as we may, an independent stream of Time cannot be regarded as anything but a process, in which every smallest part has the

condition of its reality in a previous one. There thus arises the necessity of an infinite progression—a necessity equally unavoidable if, on the other hand, we look merely to the real process of events and regard this as producing in some way the illusion of there being an empty Time. It is impossible to think of any first state of the world, which contains the first germ of all the motion that takes place in the world in the form of a still motionless existence, and yet more impossible to suppose a transition out of nothing, by means of which all reality, together with the motive impulses contained in it, first came into being.

146. All these remarks, however, have only been made on supposition that a stream of empty Time is in itself possible. Since we found it impossible, we will try how far we are helped by the opposite view, that Time is merely a subjective way of apprehending what is not in Time. A difficulty is here obvious, which had not to be encountered by the analogous view of Space. Ideas, *ex parte nostra*, do not generally admit of that which forms their content being predicated of them. The idea of Red is not itself red, nor that of choler cholerick, nor that of a curve curved. These instances make that clear and credible to us which in itself, notwithstanding, is most strange; the nature, namely, of every intellectual presentation, not itself to be that which is presented in it. It may indeed be difficult for the imagination, when the expanse of Space spreading before our perception announces itself so convincingly as present outside us, to regard it as a product, only present for us, of an activity working in us which is itself subject to no conditions of Space. Still, in the conception of an activity there is nothing to make us look for extension in Space on the part of the activity itself as a condition of its activity. On the contrary, had we believed that the impressions of Space in our inner man could themselves have position in Space, we should have been obliged to seek out a new activity of observation which had converted this inner

condition into a knowledge of it, and to look to this activity for that strange apprehension of what is in Space which must do its work without being in Space itself.

If, on the other hand, we try to speak in a similar way of a timeless presentation of what is in time, the attempt seems to break down. The thought that Time is only a form or product of our presentative susceptibility, cannot take away from the presentation itself the character of an activity or at least of an event, and an event seems inconceivable without presupposition of a lapse of time, of which the end is distinguishable from the beginning. Thus Time, unlike Space, is not merely a product of the soul's activity, but at the same time the condition of the exercise of the activity by which Time itself as a product is said to have been obtained, and the presentation to consciousness of any change seems impossible without the corresponding real change on the part of the presenting mind. Now it must be borne in mind that in no case could Time be a subjective form of apprehension in such a sense as that the process of events, which we present to ourselves in it, should be itself opposed to the form of apprehension as being of a completely alien nature. Whatever basis in the way of timeless reality we may be disposed to supply to phenomena in Time, it must at any rate be such that its own nature and constitution remain translatable into forms of Time. To this hidden timeless reality, it may be suggested, that activity of thought would itself belong, of which the product in our consciousness would be that course of occurrences and of our ideas which is seemingly in Time. Of it, and by consequence of every activity as such, it must be sought to show, according to the view which takes Time to be merely our form of apprehension, that while not itself running a course in a time already present, it may yet present itself to sense in its products as running such a course. Let us pursue the consideration by which it may be attempted to vindicate this paradoxical notion.

147. No one will maintain that the stream of empty Time

brings forth events in the sense of being that which determines their character and the succession of the various series of them. It would be admitted that all this is decided by the actual inner connexion of things. But although that which happens at one moment contains the ground G of that which at the next is to appear as consequence F , it may be fancied that the lapse of Time is a *conditio sine qua non* which must be fulfilled if the grounded consequence is really to follow from its ground. A reference to the general remarks previously made, upon the several kinds of cause distinguished in common parlance, may meanwhile suffice to convince us that what we call a *conditio sine qua non* can stand in no other relation to the effect resulting than does every other co-operative cause. The mere presence of that which in each case is so called is never sufficient to draw a distinct event in the way of consequence after it. The case rather is that the presence of such a complementary condition must always manifest itself by an effect exercised on the other real elements which without it would not have sufficed for the production of the consequence F .

Now if upon such a supposition we assume first that at a certain moment a state of things, G , is really given which forms the complete ground of a necessary consequence, F , there is no conceivable respect in which the lapse of an empty Time, T , should be necessary, or could contribute, to bring about the production of F by G . Granted that, during the time T , G has continued without change, neither producing F nor a more immediate consequence, f , preliminary to the other, then at the end of the interval T everything will be just as at the beginning, and the lapse of time T will have been perfectly barren. If, on the other hand, during the same interval G has passed into the series of consequences $f_1, f_2, f_3 \dots$, each related to the next following as ground to consequence, the same remark is applicable to any two proximately related members of this series. If f_2 is the sole ground of f_3 , then the lapse of the

smaller interval of empty Time t_3-t_2 can be neither contributory nor essential to the production by f_2 of its effect f_3 . It will no doubt be objected that the flaw of our argument consists in this, that we fix a certain momentary state of things, G , and consider this fixed state of things, in complete identity with itself, to act as the operative cause of an effect; whereas in fact G only becomes such a cause through a lapse of Time during which it is itself in continuous process of becoming. For this reason, it will be said, the series of determinate causes and effects unfolds itself as a process of events, while on our supposition it remains out of Time and just for that reason cannot form more than a system of members which stand to each other eternally in graduated relations of dependence without ever moving in these relations. It must be admitted that whoever puts this objection strikes a most essential point. He is perfectly right in insisting upon ceaseless motion or uninterrupted becoming as constituents of the real. For undoubtedly, if once the perfectly unchanging fact G were recognised as given, then the consequent F , of which it contains the sufficient reason, would as speculatively valid truth, subsist permanently along with G , while considered as reality it would either always exist along with it or never come into being out of it. For then the addition of the lapse of an empty Time t would not produce the motion absent from G at all, at any rate not produce it more or less than would the lapse of $0 \cdot t$ or $\infty \cdot t$.

This shall be more fully considered below. For the present my concern is to show that for the very process of Becoming in question the mere lapse of Time can afford no means, any possible application of which could be necessary to bringing it about. The proof of this, however, I hold to be involved in what has been already said. For here it comes to the same thing in effect whether we only speak of a series of distinct causes which produce their several effects, so to speak, by jumps, or whether taking the case of continuity we understand by f_1, f_2, f_3 constituents of a continuous

stream of causation—constituents which are only arbitrarily fixed in thought but of which really each in turn moves. On the latter supposition it would be just as impossible that the internal motion, which results in the emission of f_3 from f_2 , should be dependent on the lapse of the empty time t_3-t_2 in such a way as that it could not take place unless this lapse of time preceded. Such an influence is unintelligible unless we suppose that the lapse of empty time can announce itself to f_2 —nay that the completion of the period t_3-t_2 makes itself felt as different from that of the longer period t_4-t_2 , in order that in the former there may be occasion for the advance of the process of becoming from f_2 only to f_3 , in the latter to f_4 . But the ends of the two periods are completely like each other and like every other moment of empty time. The entry of the one has no such distinction from that of the other as can give to f_2 the signal for this or that amount of advance. For that reason the sum of the continuously flowing moments, which forms the duration of each period, cannot make itself felt by the operative power f_2 as a measure of the work which it has to do in the way of production of Becoming. On the contrary, it will only be in the same way in which we measure a period of Time for purposes of our knowledge that the length of this period can announce itself to f_2 so as to determine the magnitude of the change which f_2 has to undergo. This is by the enumeration of the repetitions of a similar process, which at the end of some period of Time exhibits a different state of reality from what it did at the beginning. So far as our knowledge is concerned, the perception of the different positions which a pendulum, for instance, occupies at the beginning and at the end of its vibration, would suffice for the purpose. For a reality, which was to take account of the lapse of Time in order to direct its becoming accordingly, there would be needed the constant summing of the impressions received by it from another real process, by means of which it itself or its own condition had been so changed

as to be able to serve as indicator of the length of Time elapsed. The conclusion plainly is that a process of becoming, *B*, which required a lapse of time in order to come about, must have already traversed in itself a succession of different stages, in order to feel in that succession the lengths of the periods according to which it is supposed to direct itself, and which it is supposed to employ for the purpose of effecting the transition from one stage to another.

148. These considerations do not lead us at once to the end of our task. For the present I may put their result, which I shall not again discuss, as follows. It is quite unallowable to put the system of definite causes and effects, which gives its character to any occurrence, on one side and on the other side to suppose a stream of empty Time, and then to throw the definitely characterised event into the stream in expectation that its fabric of simultaneous conditions will in the fluidity of this stream melt into a succession, in which each of the graduated relations of dependence will find its appropriate point of time and the period of its manifestation. It is only in the actual content of what happens, not in a form present outside it into which it may fall, that the reason can be found for its elements being related to each other in an order of succession, and at the same time for the times at which they succeed each other.

The other view therefore begins to press itself upon us—the view that it is not Time that precedes the process of Becoming and Activity, but this that precedes Time and brings forth from itself either the real course of Time or the appearance in us of there being such a thing. The constant contradiction to this reversal of the habitual way of looking at the matter which our imagination would present, we could no more get rid of than we could of the habit of saying that the sun rises and sets. What we might hope to do would be to understand one illusion as well as the other. It is also our habit to speak of general laws, standing outside things and occurrences and regulating their course; yet we

have been forced to the conviction that these have no reality except in the various particular cases of their application. Only that which happens and acts in determinate forms is the real. The general law is the product of our comparison of the various cases. After we have discovered it, it appears to us as the first, and the realities, out of the consideration of which it arose, as dependent on its antecedence. In just the same way, after the manifold web of occurrence has in countless instances assumed for us forms of succession in Time, we misunderstand the general character of these forms, which results from our comparison of them—the empty flowing Time—and take it for a condition antecedent, to which the occurrence of events must adjust itself in order to be possible. That we are mistaken in so doing and that the operation of such a condition is unthinkable—this ‘*reductio ad impossibile*,’ which I have sought to make out, is, it must be admitted, the only thing which can be opposed to this unavoidable habit of our mental vision.

149. The positive view, which we found emerging in place of the illusion rejected, is still ambiguous. Is it a real Time that the process of events, in its process, produces or only the appearance of Time in us? In answering this question we cannot simply affirm either of the alternatives. One thing is certainly clear, that the production of Time must be a production *sui generis*. Time does not remain as a realised product behind the process that produces it. As little does it lie before that process as a material out of which the process can constantly complete itself. Past and future are *not*, and the representation of them both as dimensions of Time is in fact but an artificial projection, which takes place only for our mind’s eye, of the unreal upon the plane which we think of as containing the world’s real state of existence.

Undoubtedly therefore Time, conceived as an infinite whole with its two opposite extensions, is but a subjective presentation to our mind’s eye; or rather it is an attempt,

by means of images borrowed from space, to render so presentable a thought which we entertain as to the inner dependence of the individual constituents of that which happens. What we call Past, we regard primarily as the condition '*sine qua non*' of the Present, and in the Present we see the necessary condition of the Future. This one-sided relation of dependence, abstracted from the content so related and extended over all cases which it in its nature admits of, leads to the idea of an infinite Time, in which every point of the Past forms the point of transition to Present and Future, but no point of Present or Future forms a point of transition to the Past. That this process must appear infinite scarcely needs to be pointed out. The condition of that which has a definite character can never lie in a complete absence of such character. Every state of facts, accordingly, of which we might think for a moment as the beginning of reality, would immediately appear to us either as a continuation of a previous like state of facts, or as a product of one unlike; and in like manner every state of facts momentarily assumed to be an end would appear as the condition of the continuance of the same state of facts, or in turn as the beginning of a new one. If finally the course of the world were thought of as a history, which really had a beginning and end, still beyond both alike we should present to ourselves the infinite void of a Past and Future, just as two straight lines in space which cut each other at the limit of the real, still demand an empty extension beyond in which they may again diverge.

150. It will be felt, however, that we have not yet reached the end of our doubts. It will be maintained that though the process of Becoming does indeed make no abiding Time, it yet does really bring into being or include the course of Time, by means of which the various parts of the content of what happens, standing to each other in the relation of dependence described above, having been at first only something future, acquire *seriatim* the character of the Present

and the Past. If we chose to confine ourselves simply to highly developed thought, and to regard the dimensions of Time merely as expressions for conditionedness or the power of conditioning, then the whole content of the world would again change into a motionless systematic whole, and everything would depend on the position which a consciousness capable of viewing the whole might please to take up facing, so to speak, some one part of it, *m*. From this point of departure, *m*, the contemplator would reckon everything as belonging to the Past, *m* - 1, in which he had recognised the conditions that make the content of *m* what it is, while he would assign to the Future, *m* + 1, all the consequences which the necessities of thought compelled him to draw from it: and this assignment of names would change according as *m* or *n* might be made the point of departure for this judgment. This however does not represent the real state of the case. This capacity of tracing out the connexion of occurrences in both directions—forwards and backwards—would only be possible to a consciousness standing outside the completed course of the world. It belongs to us only in relation to the past, so far as the past has become known to us through tradition. Immediate experience is confined to a definite range, and neither does the recollection of the past reproduce for experience its actual duration, nor does the sure foresight of the future, in the few cases where it is possible, take the place for experience of the real occurrence of the foreseen event.

What then is the proper meaning of the Reality, which in this connexion of thought we ascribe only to the Present? Or conversely, what constitutes this character of the present, which we suppose to belong successively in unalterable series to the events of which each has its cause in the other, and to be equivalent to reality? I will not attempt to prepare the way for an answer to this question, or to lead up to it as a discovery. I will merely state what seems to me the only possible answer to it. It is not the mere fact that they

happen which attaches *this* character to the content of events. On the contrary the import of the statement that they happen is only explained by the expression 'the Present,' in which Language aptly makes us aware of the necessity of a subject, in relation to which alone the thinkable content of the world's course can be distinguished either as merely thinkable and absent on the one hand, or on the other as real and present. To explain this, however, I am obliged to go into detail to an extent for which I must ask indulgence and patience.

151. Let us consider one of the finite spiritual beings like ourselves, which shall be called *S*. In the collective content of the world, *M*, which to begin with we will think of as we did before, merely as a regularly arranged whole of causes and effects, *S* has its proper place in the system at *m* between a past $m-1$, which contains its conditions, and a future $m+1$, of which it is itself a joint condition. We will first assume that the place *m*, which *S* holds in *M*, is without extension. By this I mean that it is only in this single plane of a section *m* through the manifold interlacing series of causes and effects which forms the content of *M*—not in any other $m-1$ or $m+1$ —that there lie the conditions of *S*: while at the same time every element of *M*—*S* among others—may be supposed to have knowledge, immediately and not by gradual acquisition, as to the whole structure and content of *M*. All that would be implied in this supposition would be that *S* would no longer be able at its pleasure to seek out positions indifferent as concerned itself for its survey of the whole of *M*. Being only able to plant itself in the position *m*, everything in which it recognises a joint condition of its own being will appear to belong to a different branch, $m-1$, of the world's content, from that in which it finds reactions from its own existence—that existence which is confined to *m*. At the same time this knowledge on the part of *S*, that it is merely co-ordinated in this entire system of conditions with the other parts of the world's

content that are included in m , would remain a mere speculative insight, which would excite in S no stronger interest in this m , and one of no other nature, than the interest in the fact of the dependence of m upon $m-1$ and of $m+1$ upon m . Thus, although S would distinguish according to their import the two branches of the system of conditions that have their point of departure in m , it would yet have no occasion to oppose them both to m as what is unreal and absent to what is real and present. And this would still be the case, though we so far altered our assumption as to suppose S to be not only contained in the one section-plane m of M , but also to be co-ordinated with the contents of other planes $m-a$ and $m+a$, without undergoing any change in itself. To us indeed, who are accustomed to the idea of Time, this position of S in a system would present itself as a duration, as the filling by S of the period of time, $2a$: but to S itself, if S continued to possess the immediate knowledge supposed, it could only convey the speculative impression that S is interwoven in an extended section of M , while S would still have no occasion to oppose this section as present to others as absent.

All this would be changed on one supposition only, which indeed for other reasons must be made; the supposition, namely, that the place of S in the system contains not only the conditions of its existence but those of its knowledge. In this is implied that only those elements of $m-1$ can be an object of its knowledge which not only systematically precede it as conditions but of which the consequences are contained in m , and only as far as their consequences are so contained. Of $m+1$ on the contrary all that will be knowable will be the impulse, already present in m , which is the condition of $m+1$. Even the entire content of m will not, merely as such, form an object of knowledge to S . Even the fact of belonging to m is for each element of it only the condition of a more special relation to S , which we may call its effect on S in the way of producing knowledge.

If now we return to our supposition that m is a place without extension, then the knowledge possessed by S will be an unchangeable presentation to consciousness, without there being any occasion for the distinction of Present from Future in it. If on the contrary S found itself contained in the whole extended section $2a$ of M , then it would follow—since we are now supposing its knowledge to rest upon the effect produced in it by the content of this section—that S is no longer identical with itself in all points of $2a$, but has to be defined by s_1, s_2, s_3 , corresponding to the various conditions to which it is subject in the various points of $2a$. But thus S would fall asunder into a multiplicity of finite beings, unless something supervened to justify us in adhering to the unity asserted of it, and this justification, if it is not merely to establish an accidental view about s in us but to constitute an essential unity on the part of s , can only consist in an action of its own on the part of s by which it unites the several s 's.

This requirement however is not satisfied by the assumption of an S having unity, which distinguishes the several s 's in itself as its states. S as thus constituted would still never live through any experience. The whole content of its being would be presented to it just in the same way as on our previous supposition. There would indeed be a clear insight into the plan upon which the elements are formed into a connected whole, but the whole would be presented simultaneously, just as is the frame-work of theoretic propositions which appear to us not as arising out of each other in a course of time but as always holding good at the same time, although we understand their dependence on each other. Only one of the s 's can in any case be the knowing subject, but in it—in s_3 , let us say—the content of s_2 must not only be contained by its consequences, through which it helps to constitute the nature of s_3 , but this content as presented to consciousness must be distinguishable in the form of a recollection from that which belongs to s_3 as its own feeling or perception. On this condition only is it

possible for s_2 to distinguish this latter experience as present from that represented content as absent, and on the same condition, since the same reproduction of s_1 in s_2 has already taken place, the whole series of these mutually dependent contents, as represented in consciousness, while preserving its inner order, will be pushed back to various distances of absence. The question indeed as to the foundation of this faculty of distinguishing a represented absent object from one experienced as present is a question upon which any psychological or physiological explanation may be thankfully accepted in its place. Here however it would be useless. What we are now concerned with is merely the fact itself, that we are able to make this distinction and to represent to ourselves what we *have* experienced without experiencing it again. This alone renders it possible for ideas of a proper succession to be developed in us, in which the member n has a different kind of reality from $n+1$. It would have been more convenient to arrive at this result otherwise than by this tedious process of development. I thought the process indispensable, however, because it leads to some peculiar deductions, which require further patient consideration.

152. For instance; what has been said will be found very intelligible—not to say, obvious—if only we allow ourselves to interpolate the thought that s_2 ceases to exist when it has produced s_3 ; that thus there is a time in which those section-planes of M or of $2a$ succeed each other. But it will be thought to be as impossible after our discussion as it was before it, to look upon the content of the world as out of time, a whole of which the members are related systematically but not successively, while yet there arises in parts of it the appearance of there being a lapse of time on the part of the periods which those parts observe. For if there is no successive alternation of Being and not-Being, then, it will be said, every stage of development, s_2 , which a subject, s_3 , believes itself to have experienced in the past, will possess, as a ground of s_3 , the same reality as a consequence s_3 itself.

Accordingly we should be compelled, it would seem, to think of all that is past—all histories, actions, and states of an earlier time—as still existing and happening; and every individual being s_n , would have alongside of itself as many doubles, s_1, s_2, s_3 , completing themselves one after another, as it counts various moments in the existence which it seems to have lived through.

Against this objection, however, we must maintain that such peculiar views would not be the logical consequence of our denial of the lapse of Time, but on the contrary of the inconsistency of allowing the succession that has been denied again to mix itself with our thoughts. For only this habituation of our imagination to the idea of Time could mislead us into treating the elements of the world, which are of equal value—all, that is to say, equally indispensable to the whole—as if they must be contemporaneous unless they are to be successive, when all the while our purpose was to show that every determination in the way of time is inapplicable to them, as such. We shall never succeed in ridding ourselves of this habit of fantasy. Only in thinking shall we be able to convince ourselves, in standing conflict with our demand for images presentable to the mind's eye, that adherence to the assumption of timelessness does not lead to the consequences in which we have just found a stumbling-block. There would not indeed on our view be that kind of past into which the conditioning stage of development would be supposed to vanish, instead of illegitimately continuing in the present alongside of the consequence conditioned by it—that consequence to which it ought to have transferred the exclusive possession of the quality of being present. The histories of the past would not continue to live in this present, petrified in each of their phases, alongside of that which further proceeded to happen in the course of things. It would not be the case that s_1 really existed earlier than s_2 and strangely continued along with it, but rather that it had reality only so far as it was contained

in s_2 and was presented by the latter to itself as earlier. It will be with Time as with Space. As we saw, there is no such thing as a Space in which things are supposed to take their places. The case rather is that in spiritual beings there is formed the idea of an extension, in which they themselves seem to have their lot and in which they spatially present to themselves their non-spatial relations to each other. In like manner there is no real Time in which occurrences run their course, but in the single elements of the Universe which are capable of a limited knowledge there develops itself the idea of a Time in which they assign themselves their position in relation to their more remote or nearer conditions as to what is more or less long past, and in relation to their more remote or nearer consequences as to a future that is to be looked for more or less late.

It is not out of wantonness that I have gone so far in delineating this paradoxical way of looking at things. It is what we must come to if we wish to put clearly before us the view of the merely subjective validity of Time in relation to a timeless reality. It is vexatious to listen to the mere asseveration of this antithesis without the question being asked whether, when adopted, it intrinsically admits of being in any way carried out, and whether it would be a sufficient guide to the understanding of that experience from which we all start. The description which has been given will be enough to raise a doubt whether the latter is the case. The reasons for this doubt, however, are not all of equal value. In regard to them again, while passing to the consideration of this contradiction, I must ask to be allowed some detail.

153. In order to find a point of departure in what is familiar, I will first repeat the objection which will always recur. Pointing to the external world the objector will enquire—‘Is it not then the case that something is for ever happening? Do not things change? Do they not operate on each other? And is all this imaginable without a lapse

of time?' Imaginable it certainly is not, and we have never maintained that it is so. But in what relation do the lapse of Time and this happening stand to each other, which might enable us to maintain the correctness of this imagination of ours? That it is only in what is contained in a sufficient cause, *G*, that there lies a necessity for the consequence, *F*—that the necessity, if otherwise lacking, could not supervene through lapse of a time, *T*—this we found obviously true. It was admitted also that, *G* being given, it would neither be intelligible where the hindrance should come from which should retard its transition into *F*, nor how the lapse of empty Time could overcome that hindrance. Thus constrained to confess that our habit of thinking the effect as *after* the cause does not point to anything which in the things themselves contributes to the production of the effect, what other conclusion can we draw than this, that succession in Time is something which our mode of apprehension alone introduces into things—introduces in a way absolutely inevitable for us, so that our thought about things remains constantly in contradiction with our habit of presenting them to the mind's eye?

One may attempt to make this thought clear to oneself by gradual approximation. To a definite period of Time it is our habit in common apprehension to ascribe a certain absolute quantity. If we ask ourselves, however, how long a century or an hour properly lasts, we at once recollect that the time filled by one series of events we always measure simply according to its relation to another series, with the ends of which those of the first series do or do not coincide. Our ordinary impression of the duration of periods of time is itself the uncertain result of such a comparison, in which we are not clearly conscious of the standard of our measurement. Hence the same period may appear long or short in memory. The multiplicity of the events contained in it gives it greater extent for the imagination. Poverty of events makes it shrink into nothing.

It has itself no extensive quantity which is properly its own. Therefore no hindrance meets us in the attempt to suppose as short a time as we will for the collective course of events. However small we think it, still it is not in it but in the dependence of events on each other that the reason lies of the order in which events occur; and the entire history which fills centuries admits of being presented in a similar image, as condensed into an infinitely small space of Time through proportional diminution of all dimensions.

With this admission however it will be thought necessary to come to a stop. However small, it will be said, still this differential of Time must contain a distinction of before and after, and thus a lapse, though one infinitely small. But we want to know exactly why. Undoubtedly the transition to a moment completely without extension would deprive History of the character of succession in Time; but then our question is just this, whether the real needed this succession on its own part in order to its appearance as successive to us. And in regard to this we must constantly repeat what has been already said, that neither could the order of events be constituted by Time, if it were not determined by the inner connexion of things, nor is it intelligible how Time should begin to bring that which already has a sufficient cause to reality, if that reality is still lacking to it. On the other hand, we believe that we do understand how a presentative faculty such as to derive from its own nature the habit of viewing the world as in time, should find occasion in the inner connexion between the constituents of that world, as conditioning and conditioned by each other, to treat its parts as following each other in a definite order and as assuming lengths—definite in relation to each other but, apart from such relation, quite arbitrary—of this imagined Time. Thus even upon this method, by help of the idea of an infinitely small moment, we should have mastered the thought of a complete timelessness on the part of what fills the world. For in that case we should

certainly not go out of our way to think of that extension of time, within which this moment would seem of a vanishing smallness, and so bring on the world the reproach of a short and fleeting existence, as compared with the duration which expansion into infinite Time would have promised it.

154. After all, it will be objected, we have not yet touched the proper difficulty. If all that we had to take account of were an external course of the world, then it would indeed cost us little effort to regard all that it contains as timeless, and to hold that it is only in relation to our way of looking at it that it unfolds itself into a succession. But the motion, which we should thus have excluded from the outer world, would so much the more surely have been transferred into our Thought, which, on the given supposition, must itself pass from one of the elements which constitute the world to another, in order to make them successive for its contemplation. For the unfolding, by which what is in itself timeless comes to be in time, cannot take place in us without a real lapse of Time; the appearance of succession cannot take place without a succession of images in consciousness, nor an apparent transition of *a* into *b* without the real transition which we should in such a case effect from the image of *a* to that of *b*.

But convincing as these assertions are, they are as far from containing the whole truth. On the contrary, without the addition of something further, the doctrine which they allege would be fatal to the possibility of that which it is sought to establish. If the idea of the later *b* in fact merely followed on that of the earlier *a*, then a change of ideas would indeed take place, but there would still be no idea of this change. There would be a lapse of time, but not an appearance of such change to any one. In order to a comparison in which *b* shall be known as the later it is necessary in turn that the two presentations of *a* and *b* should be

objects, throughout simultaneous, of a relating knowledge, which, itself completely indivisible, holds them together in a single indivisible act. If there is a belief on the part of this knowledge that it passes from one of its related points to another, it will not itself form this idea of its transition through the mere fact of the transition taking place. In order that the idea may be possible, the points with which its course severally begins and ends, being separate in time, must again be apprehended in a single picture by the mind as the limits between which that course lies. All ideas of a course, a distance, a transition—all, in short, which contain a comparison of several elements and the relation between them—can as such only be thought of as products of a timelessly comprehending knowledge. They would all be impossible, if the presentative act itself were wholly reducible to that succession in Time which it regards as the peculiarity of the objects presented by it. Nay if we go further and make the provisional admission that we really had the idea of *a* before we had that of *b*, still *a* can only be known as the earlier on being held together with *b* in an indivisible act of comparison. It is at this moment, at which *a* is no longer the earlier nor *b* the later, that for knowledge *a* appears as the earlier and *b* as the later. In assigning these determinate places, however, to the two, the soul can only be guided by some sort of qualitative differences in their content—by temporal signs, if we like to say so, corresponding to the local signs in accordance with which the *non-spatial* consciousness expands its impressions into a system of spatial juxtaposition.

Such could not but be the state of the case even *if* there were a lapse of Time in which our ideas successively formed themselves. The real lapse of Time would not, immediately as such, be a sufficient cause to that which combines and knows of the succession in Time which it presents to itself. It would be so only mediately through signs derived by each constituent element of the world from that place in the

order of Time into which it had fallen. But such various signs could not be stamped on the various elements by empty time, even though it elapsed, since one of its elements is exactly like every other. They could only be derived from the peculiar manner in which each element is inwoven into the texture of conditions which determine the content of the world. But just for that reason there was no need of a real sequence in Time to annex them to our ideas as characteristic incidental distinctions. Thus it would certainly be possible for a presentative consciousness, without any need of Time, to be led by means of temporal signs, which in their turn need not have their origin in Time, to arrange its several objects in an apparent succession in the way of Time.

155. I am painfully aware that my reader's patience must be nearly exhausted. Granted, he will say, that in every single case in which a relation or comparison is instituted this timeless faculty of knowing is active: it remains none the less true that numberless repetitions of such action really succeed each other. Yesterday our timeless faculty of knowledge was employed in presenting the succession of *a* and *b*, to-day it presents that from *c* to *d*. There are thus, it would seem, many instances of Timeless occurrence which really succeed each other in Time. I venture, however, once again to ask, Whence are we to know that this is so? And if it were so, in what way could we know of it? That consciousness, to which the comparison made yesterday appears as earlier than that made to-day, must yet be the consciousness which we have to-day, not that which may have been yesterday and have vanished in the course of Time. That which appears to us as of yesterday cannot so appear to us because it is *not* in our consciousness, but because it is in it; while at the same time it is somehow so qualitatively determined, that our mental vision can assign it its place only in the past branch of apparent Time.

I will allow, however, that this last reply yields no result.

The Past indeed, of which we believe ourselves already to have had living experience, one may try to exhibit as a system of things which has never run a course in Time, and which only consciousness, for its own benefit, expands into a preceding history in Time. But how then would the case stand with the Future, which we suppose ourselves still on the way to meet? Let s_3 , according to the symbols previously used, stand for this Ego, which s_2 and s_1 never really preceded but always seem to have preceded, what then is s_4 which s_3 in turn will thus seem to have preceded? What could prevent s_3 from being conscious also of s_4 , its own future, if the temporal signs which teach us to assign to single impressions their position in Time, depended only on the systematic position which belongs to their causes in the complex of conditions of a timeless universe? It may be that the content of s_4 , which follows systematically upon s_3 , is not determined merely by the conditions, which are contained in s_3 and previously in s_2 and s_1 , but jointly by others, resting on the states of other beings which do not cross those of S till a later stage of the system. For that reason s_4 might be obscure to s_3 and this might constitute the temporal character which gives it in the consciousness of s_3 the stamp of something future. But if this were the case, the process would have to stop at this point. It would only be for another being s_4 that what was Future to s_3 could, owing to its later place in the system, be present. On the other hand in a timeless system there would be no possibility of the change by means of which s_3 would be moved out of its place into that of s_4 : yet this would be necessary if to one and the same consciousness that is to become Present which was previously Future to it. If one and the same timeless being by its timeless activity of intellectual presentation gives to one constituent of its existence the Past character of a recollection, to another the significance of the Present, to a third unknown element that of the Future, it could never, if it is to be really timeless, change

this distribution of characters. The recollection could never have been Present, the Present could never become Past and the Future would have to remain without change the same unknown obscurity. But if there is a change in this distribution of light; if it is the case that the indefinite burden of the Future gradually enters the presence of living experience and passes through it into the other absence of the Past; and finally if it is impossible for the activity of intellectual presentation to alter this order of sequence; then it follows necessarily that not merely this activity, but the content of the reality which it presents to itself, is involved in a succession of determinate direction.

This being so, we must finally decide as follows: Time, as a whole, is without doubt merely a creation of our presentative intellect. It neither is permanent nor does it elapse. It is but the fantastic image which we seek, rather than are able, to project before the mind's eye, when we think of the lapse of time as extended to all the points of relation which it admits of *ad infinitum*, and at the same time make abstraction of the content of these points of relation. But the lapse of events in time we do not eliminate from reality, and we reckon it a perfectly hopeless undertaking to regard even the idea of this lapse as an *a priori* merely subjective form of apprehension, which develops itself within a timeless reality, in the consciousness of spiritual beings.

156. Thus, at the end of a long and troublesome journey, we come back, as it will certainly appear, to complete agreement with the ordinary view. I fear however that remnants of an error still survive which call for a special attack—remnants of an error with which we are already familiar and which have here needed to be dealt with only in a new form, viz. the disintegration of the real into its content and its reality. We are unavoidably led by our comparison of the manifold facts given to us to the separation of that on the one hand which distinguishes one real object from

another—its peculiar content which our thought can fix in abstraction from its existence—and on the other hand of that in which every thing real resembles every other—the reality itself which, as we fancy, has been imparted to it. For this is just what we go on to imagine—that this separation, achieved in our thoughts, represents a metaphysical history; I do not mean a history which has been completed once for all, but one which perpetually completes itself; a real relation, that is to say, of such a kind that that content, apart from its reality, is something to which this reality comes to belong. The prevalence of this error is evidenced by the abundant use which philosophy, not least since the time of Kant, has made of the conception of a ‘Position,’ which meeting with the thinkable content establishes its reality. In an earlier part of this work we declared ourselves against this mistake. We were convinced that it was simply unmeaning to speak of being as a kind of placing which may simply supervene upon that intelligible content of a thing, without changing anything in that content or essence or entering as a condition into its completeness. As separate from the energy of action and passion, in which we found the real being of the thing to consist, it was impossible even to think of that essence, impossible to think of it as that to which this reality of action and passion comes from without, as if it had been already, in complete rest, the same essence which it is under this motion.

It is the same impossible separation that we have here once again, in consideration of the prevalence of the misunderstanding, carefully pursued to its consequences in the form of the severance of the thing which happens from its happening. It was thus that we were led to the experiment of seeking the essence¹ of what happens—that by which the

¹ [This is still ‘the content’—‘that which distinguishes one real object from another.’ A verbal difficulty is caused by the distinction being here, *per accidens*, between the actual world and an imaginary world, so that but for the context we might take ‘essence’ to be used

actual history of the world is distinguished from another which might happen but does not—in a complex system of relations of dependence on the part of a timeless content of thought; while the motion in this system, which alone constitutes the process of becoming and happening, was regarded as a mode of setting it forth which might simply be imposed on this essential matter, or on the other hand, might be wanting to it without changing the distinctive character of the essence. We could not help noticing, indeed, the great difference between reality and that system of intelligible contents. In the latter the reason includes its consequence as eternally coexisting with it. In the former the earlier state of things ceases to be in causing the later. Then began the attempts to understand this succession, which imposes itself like an alien fate on the system in its articulation. They were all in vain. When once the lapse of empty time and the timeless content had been detached from each other, nothing could enable the set nature of the latter to resolve itself into a constant flux in the former. It was clear that in this separation we had forgotten something which forced that content—involving as it did, *if* it moved, the basis of an order of time—to pass in fact into such a state of motion. I will not suppose that crudest attempt to be made at supplying the necessary complement—the reference to a power standing outside the world which laid hold on the eternal content of things, as on a store of material, in order to dispose its elements in Time in such a way as their inner order, to which it looked as a pattern, directed it to do. Let us rather adopt the view that in the content itself lies the impulse after realisation which makes its manifold members issue from each other. Still, even on that view it would be a mistake, as I hold, to think of the measure and kind of that timeless conditionedness, which might obtain between two elements of the

in just the opposite sense to that explained a few lines before, and to refer to that which distinguishes what is real from what is unreal.]

world's content, as the antecedent cause which commanded or forbade that operative impulse to elicit the one element from the other. What I am here advancing is only a further application of a thought which I have previously expressed. Every relation, I have said, exists only in the spirit of the person instituting the relation and for him. When we believe that we find it in things themselves, it is in every case more than a mere relation: it is itself already an efficient process instead of being merely preliminary to effects.

On the same principle we say—It is not the case that there is *first* a relation of unchanging conditionedness between the elements of the world, and that afterwards in accordance with this relation the productive operation, even though it may not come from without but may lie in the things themselves, has to direct itself in order to give reality to legitimate consequences and avoid those that are illegitimate. On the contrary first and alone is there this full living operation itself. Then, when we compare its acts, we are able in thought and abstraction to present to ourselves the constant *modus agendi*, self-determined, which in all its manifestations has remained the same. This abstraction made, we can subordinate each single product of the operation, as we look backward, to this mode of procedure as to an ordaining *prius* and regard it as determined by conditions which are in truth only the ordinary habit of this operation itself. This process of comparison and abstraction leads us in one direction to the idea of general laws of nature, which are first valid and to which there then comes a world, which submits itself to them. In another direction it leads to the supposition of an empty Time, in which the series of occurrences succeed each other and which, in the character of an antecedent *conditio sine qua non*, makes all operation possible. But this last way of looking at the matter we have found as untenable as would be the attempt to represent velocities as prior to motions (somewhat as if each motion had to choose

an existing velocity), and to interpret the common expression, according to which the motion of a body *assumes* this or that velocity, as signifying an actual fact; whereas in truth the motion is nothing but the velocity as following a definite direction.

In this sense we may find more correctness in the expressions that may be often heard, according to which it is not Time that is the condition of the operation of things, but this operation that produces Time. Only what it brings forth, while it takes its course, is not an actually existing Time as an abiding product, somehow existing or flowing or influencing things, but only the so-called 'vision' of this Time in the comparing consciousness. Of this—the empty total image of that order in which we place events as a series—it is thus true that it is only a subjective form of apprehension, while of the succession belonging to that operation itself, which makes this arrangement of events possible, the reverse is true, namely that it is the most proper nature of the real.

157. I should not be surprised if the view which I thus put forward met with an invincible resistance from the imagination. The unconquerable habit, which will see nothing wonderful in the primary grounds of things but insists on explaining them after the pattern of the latest effects which they alone render possible, must here at last confess to being confronted by a riddle which cannot be thought out. What exactly happens—such is the question which this habit will prompt—when the operation is at work or when the succession takes place, which is said to be characteristic of the operative process? How does it come to pass—what makes it come to pass—that the reality of one state of things ceases, and that of another begins? What process is it that constitutes what we call perishing, or transition into not-being, and in what other different process consists origin or becoming?

That these questions are unanswerable—that they arise

out of the wish to supply a *prius* to what is first in the world —this I need not now repeat: but in this connexion they have a much more serious background than elsewhere, for here they are ever anew excited by the obscure pressure of an unintelligibility, which in ordinary thinking we are apt somewhat carelessly to overlook. We lightly repeat the words 'bygones are bygones'; are we quite conscious of their gravity? The teeming Past, has it really ceased to be at all? Is it quite broken off from connexion with the world and in no way preserved for it? The history of the world, is it reduced to the infinitely thin, for ever changing, strip of light which forms the Present, wavering between a darkness of the Past, which is done with and no longer anything at all, and a darkness of the Future, which is also nothing? Even in thus expressing these questions, I am ever again yielding to that imaginative tendency, which seeks to soften the 'monstrum infandum' which they contain. For these two abysses of obscurity, however formless and empty, would still be there. They would always form an environment which in its unknown within would still afford a kind of local habitation for the not-being, into which it might have disappeared or from which it might come forth. But let any one try to dispense with these images and to banish from thought even the two voids, which limit being: he will then feel how impossible it is to get along with the naked antithesis of being and not-being, and how unconquerable is the demand to be able to think even of that which is not as some unaccountable constituent of the real.

Therefore it is that we speak of distances of the Past and of the Future, covering under this spatial image the need of letting nothing slip completely from the larger whole of reality, though it belong not to the more limited reality of the Present. For the same reason even those unanswerable questions as to the origin of Becoming had their meaning. So long as the abyss from which reality draws its continuation, and that other abyss into which it lets the precedent

pass away, shut in that which is on each side, so long there may still be a certain law, valid for the whole realm of this heterogeneous system, according to the determinations of which that change takes place, which on the other hand becomes unthinkable to us, if it is a change from nothing to being and from being to nothing. Therefore, though we were obliged to give up the hopeless attempt to regard the course of events in Time merely as an appearance, which forms itself within a system of timeless reality, we yet understand the motives of the efforts which are ever being renewed to include the real process of becoming within the compass of an abiding reality. They will not, however, attain their object, unless the reality, which is greater than our thought, vouchsafes us a Perception, which, by showing us the mode of solution, at the same time persuades us of the solubility of this riddle. I abstain at present from saying more on the subject. The ground afforded by the philosophy of religion, on which efforts of this kind have commonly begun, is also that on which alone it is possible for them to be continued.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Motion.

THE perceived facts of motion are a particularly favourable subject-matter for numerical calculation ; but our present interest is not in the manifold results obtained by the mathematical treatment of accepted relations of proportion between intervals of space and of time ; but solely in the question which phoronomic and mechanical investigations are able to disregard for their immediate purpose ; the question what motion implies as taking place in the things that move.

158. Common apprehension takes motion, while it lasts, to be the traversing of an interval of space ; and its result at every moment in which we conceive it as arrested to be a change of place on the part of the thing moved. We shall be obliged for the moment to invert this order of our ideas, in order to remain in agreement with our view of the merely phenomenal validity of space. Things cannot actually traverse a space which does not actually extend around them, and whose only extension is in our consciousness and for its perception ; what happens is rather that just as the sum S of all the intelligible relations in which an element e at a given moment stands to all others assigns it a place ρ in our spatial image ; exactly in the same way any change of that sum of relations S into Σ will demand the new place π for the impression which is to us the expression, image, or indication of e . Therefore change of place is the first conception to which we are led in this connexion ; and from that point we do not arrive quite directly at the notion

that a journey through space is essential to the change; even an apparent journey, that is, for we no longer think a real one possible.

It only follows from what was said just now that in every moment the thing's situation ρ or π in apparent space is determined by the then forthcoming sum S or Σ of its intelligible relations; it is still undecided in what way the transition takes place from one situation to another. However, it only happens in fairy-tales that a thing disappears in one place and suddenly reappears in another, without having traversed a path leading in space from the one place to the other; all observation of nature assumes as self-evident that the moving object remains in all successive moments an object of possible perception in some point of a straight or curved path, which unites its former and subsequent position without breach of continuity. We have no intention of doubting the validity of this assumption; it involves for us the further one, that in like manner the sum S of intelligible relations does not pass into another Σ without traversing all intermediate values that can be intercalated, without break though not necessarily with uniform speed. And this is what we really think of all variable states which are in things, as far as our modern habit of referring every event to an alteration of external relations will allow us to speak of such states at all. We do not believe that a sensation comes suddenly into being with its full intensity; nor that a body at a temperature t_1 passes to another t_2 , without successively assuming all intermediate temperatures; nor that from a position of rest it acquires the velocity v , without acquiring in unbroken series all degrees of it between 0 and v . Thus we speak of a Law of Continuity to which we believe that all natural processes are subject; yet however familiar the idea may be to us, and however irresistible in most cases to which it is applied, still its necessity is not so self-evident to thought that all consideration of the ground and limits of its validity is wasted.

159. Of course the application of the law of Continuity is not attempted where disparateness between two extremes excludes all possibility of a path leading from one to the other in the same medium. No one conceives a musical note as changing continuously into colour; a transition between the two could only be effected by annihilation of the one and creation of the other anew; but that negation of the note would not have the import of a definite zero in a series such as could not but expand into colours on the other side of it; it would be a pure nothing, of which taken by itself nothing can come, but after which anything may follow, that we choose to say is to follow. On the other hand, in what relation to each other are Being and not-Being, the actual transition between which is put before us in every instance of change? Are we to assume that because this transition takes place it too must come to pass by continuous traversing of intermediate values between Being and not-Being? We unhesitatingly negative this suggestion, if it is to require for one and the same content a a gradation of existence such as without changing a itself to remove it by degrees from reality to unreality or *vice versa*; we could attach no meaning to the assertion of a varying intensity of being which should make a permanent unvarying¹ a partake of reality in a greater or less degree. We should on the other hand assent to this; that the content of a itself could not disappear and could not come into being without traversing all the values intermediate between 0 and a , which its nature made possible; the not-being of a is always in the first place the being of an a , which is continuous with a as the value immediately above or below it. Therefore the transition from being to not-being of the same content is no continuous one, but instantaneous; still, no value a of a natural process or state arises thus instantaneously out of absolute nothingness, but always out of a reality of its own

¹ [v. note on § 19, *supra*.]

kind, whose value a is the proximate increase or diminution of its own.

The case is different with the increase or decrease which property, for instance, is exposed to in games of chance or in commerce. A sum of money which we have staked on a cast of the dice becomes ours or not ours in its whole amount at once, and is whichever it is immediately in the fullest sense. It was no one's property so long as the game was undecided; our hopes of calling it our own are a matter of degree, and no doubt might rise *per saltus*, though not continuously, as one die after another came to rest; but neither this nor any other intermediate process, even if some of them were continuous, can alter the essential state of the facts; on the one hand our complete right of ownership begins instantaneously on the aggregate result of the throw becoming quite certain, and so far from existing to a less degree the moment before, had then no existence at all. On the other hand, this suddenly created right applies at once to the whole sum in question, without extending by degrees over more and more of it. In this instance and in innumerable similar ones presented by human intercourse based on contract, a perfectly arbitrary ordinance has attached to an absolutely peculiar case S a consequence F of which S is not the obvious producing cause; therefore by an equally arbitrary ordinance all the cases $s_1 s_2 s_3$ which naturally belong to the same series as S may be made completely ineffectual; and all equally so, irrespective of their greater or less approximation to the favourable condition S . Such relations can only occur in artificial institutions, in which a covenant, quite foreign to the nature of the thing, attaches anything we please to anything else, and at the same time our loyalty to the covenant is the only pledge for the execution of what was agreed on; as it will not execute itself.

In all natural processes on the contrary the S to which a result F is supposed to correspond is the actual and appropriate ground G of this consequent F ; such as not only

demands the result in question but brings it about by itself and unaided by any ordinance of ours ; hence the cases $s_1 s_2 s_3$ which we have a right to regard as other quantitative values of the same condition S cannot be without effect, but must in like manner produce the consequents $f_1 f_2 f_3$ proportional to their own magnitudes and of the same kind with F . Hence arises the possibility of regarding the amount of a natural phenomenon obtained under a condition S as the sum of the individual consequents produced in succession by the successive increments of the condition. But this possibility is at the same time in a certain sense a necessity. We are not here concerned with a relation of dependence, valid irrespective of time, between the ideal content of F and that of G its sufficient reason, but with the genesis of an effect F which did not exist before ; so that the condition S in like manner cannot be an eternally subsisting relation, but can only be a fact which did not exist before and has now come into being.

Now, if we chose to assume that S arose all at once with its highest quantitative value, no doubt it would seem that F as the consequence of this cause could not but enter upon its reality all at once ; but in fact it would not still have to enter upon its reality, for it would be in existence simultaneously with S , nothing could conceivably have the power to interpose an interval of time, vacant as in that case it would be, between cause and consequence. The same would hold good regressively ; if S arose all at once, the cause of its reality too must have arisen all at once, and therefore, strictly speaking, have existed contemporaneously with S rather than arisen before it. Thus we find that it is impossible to regard the course of the world as a series of sudden discrete states conditioning each other without completely re-transforming it into a mere system of elements which all have their validity or existence simultaneously ; quite unlike reality, the terms of which are successive because mutually exclusive. I shall not prolong this in-

vestigation; it was only meant to show that continuity of transition is not a formal predicate of still problematic validity, which we might assign to Becoming after some hesitation as true in fact; its validity is rather an indispensable presupposition without which the reality of Becoming in general is inconceivable.

160. I have now to give a somewhat different form to the ideas with which I began. In the artificial arrangements which we mentioned, the conscious deliberation of the parties to the agreement had previously determined the result which was to follow from a particular occurrence in the future; and in the same way in all our actions the representation in our minds of an aim that is not yet realised, of a goal that has yet to be reached, may itself be present and effectual among the conditions of the activities which are set in motion to attain our purpose. We should be wrong in transferring this analogy to our present subject-matter, by choosing to regard the altered sum of relations Σ which by itself would be the cause of the quiescence of the element e at the point π , as being at the same time the cause of its seeking and finding this new place. There cannot be an inner state q of any thing such as to be for that thing the *condition* of its *being* in another particular state r . Our reflexion might anticipate with certainty that this state r would contain no reason for further change; but the thing itself could not feel that it was so until the state began, and turned out to be the condition of a more perfect or quite perfect equilibrium.

Thus in our instance; the sum Σ of a thing's relations, if it had always existed, would have corresponded to the place π ; but when something new has to arise out of the transition from S to Σ , its action cannot consist in assigning to the thing a new particular place π , as one which would suit the thing better, if it once were there; it can only consist in expelling the thing from the place p where its nature and conditions no longer hold it in equilibrium. But in the real

world the negation of an existing state can only be the affirmation of another, besides, there can be no such thing as want of equilibrium in general, but only between specific points in relation, and between them only with a specific degree of vivacity. Therefore, the power of negation exerted by a state which is to act as the condition of a fresh occurrence can only consist in displacing the element in question from its present intelligible relations in a specific direction, which we have still in the first place to conceive as unspatial, and with a specific intensity. The spatial phenomenon corresponding to this process would be a specific velocity with which the element departs from its place p in a specific direction, impelled therefore *a tergo* without a predetermined goal but not attracted *a fronte* by the new place π ; this latter cannot act either by retaining or by impelling, till it is reached. So what takes place in the things themselves, and what we might call, of course in quite a different sense from that recognised in mechanics, the *vis viva* of their motion, is this velocity, with which in the intelligible system of realities they leave the place where they were out of equilibrium, or, to our perception, appear to leave a situation in space; what length of space they may traverse, whether with uniform or varying motion, whether in straight lines or in curves, is the result of the existing circumstances; that is, of the new positions into which they are brought by the actual motion which takes place, which positions react on that motion as modifying factors.

161. In this way we have arrived directly at the law of Persistence, the first principle of the doctrines of mechanics, according to which every element maintains its state of rest or motion unaltered as long as it does not come in contact with the modifying influence of external causes. The first part of the law, the persistence of rest, has seldom caused any difficulty; for it can hardly be urged as a serious objection that the nature of an actual element e is quite inaccessible to us and that element may contain inner

reasons unknown to us for setting itself in motion. Whatever un conjecturable states the inner being of a thing may experience, still they can only set up a motion which did not exist before by beginning at a particular moment to manifest themselves as reasons for that motion. In that case they presuppose a previous history of a Becoming within the thing; but if there had once been a moment of complete rest, in which all states of things were in equilibrium with each other, and there was no velocity inherited from an antecedent process of Becoming with which they might have made their way through the position of equilibrium, such quiescence could never have given rise to a beginning of change. Our ignorance of the real nature of things only justifies us in assuming as a possibility that such a succession of states remains for a time a movement within the thing, neither conditioned by influences from without, nor capable of altering the relations of the thing to external related points; and that, as a result of this hidden labour, a reason sufficient to alter even those external relations whether to other things or to surrounding space, may be generated as a new factor at one particular moment. But even then the movement in space would not be produced out of a state of rest, but out of a hidden movement which was not of the same kind with it; as is the case with animated bodies which initiate their changes of place by independent impulse. In the first place, however, even these owe the activity within them which generates their resolutions to the stimuli of the outer world; and in the second place their resolutions can only give rise to movement in space by a precontrived connexion of several parts which are accessible to the action of the mind and under its influence move in the directions prescribed to them by their permanent position in the plan of the organic structure and their situation at the moment in external space.

This analogy is not transferable to a solitary element, to be conceived as setting itself in motion in empty space. In

animated beings the element which is charged with the unspatial work within does not set itself in motion, but only other elements with which it is in interaction; and it does so by destroying the equilibrium of the forces operative between them, and leaving the want of equilibrium which results to determine the amount and direction of the motion to be generated. The solitary element has none of these determining reasons; it could not move without taking a definite direction through the point z of empty space to the exclusion of all others; to secure this it would not be enough that the direction ez should be geometrically distinct from any other, the distinction would have to be brought to the cognisance of e 's inner nature, that is, z would have to act on e differently from any other point in space. But as an empty point it is in no way distinguished from all the other points; it could only be given pre-eminence before all the others by the presence of a real element occupying it. So even if we admit an abundance of inner life in every thing, still we cannot derive the initiation of a movement in space from that life, but only from external determining conditions.

Still, this is an expression which we shall do well to modify. Whatever attractive or repulsive force we conceive to proceed from z , it cannot determine e to motion by reason of its own starting from z , but only by reason of its arrival at e , or rather through the alteration which it effects in the inner states of e . It is therefore, in fact, this state of inner want of equilibrium which hinders e from remaining at rest; only this state cannot have arisen in a way to determine the line of motion, unless e is conceived as part of a universe which by the configuration of its other parts at any moment helps to determine that of e 's inner being.

162. The other part of the law, the continuance of every motion that has once begun, remains a paradox even when we are convinced of it. If we separate the requirements which we may attempt to satisfy; in the first place the cer-

tainty of the law, or its validity in point of fact, is vouched for both by the results of experiment and by its place in the system of science. The better we succeed in excluding the resistances we are aware of as interfering with a motion that has been imparted, the longer and more uniformly it continues, we rightly conclude that it would continue unvaryingly for ever, if it were permanently left to itself without any counteraction. And on the other hand, however a motion that is going on may be modified at every moment by the influence of fresh conditions, still we know that our only way of arriving at the actual process of calculation is to estimate the velocity attained in every moment as continuing, in order to combine it with the effect of the next succeeding force.

If we go on to ask whether this doctrine being certain in point of fact has also any justification as conceivable and rational, we can at least see the futility of the assumptions which prevailed in antiquity, when, under the influence of inappropriate analogies, men held that the gradual slackening of all motion was the behaviour more naturally to be expected. If they had said that all motion is wholly extinguished in the very moment in which the condition that produces it ceases to act, the idea put forward would at least have been an intelligible one in itself; but by treating the motion as becoming gradually weaker they actually admitted the law of persistence for as much of the motion as at any given moment had not disappeared. Still, the more definitely we assume the ordinary ideas of motion, the more remarkable does the law of persistence appear; if motion is nothing but an alteration of external relations by which the inner being of the moving object is in no way affected, and which in no way proceeds from any impulse belonging to that object, why should such an alteration continue when the condition which compelled it has ceased?

We look in vain for more general principles which might

decide the question. I said above in the *Logic* (§ 261) that the law '*Cessante causa cessat effectus*' cannot safely be held to mean more than that after the cessation of a cause we do not find the effect which the cause would have had if it had continued; but that it remains doubtful whether the effect which is already produced requires a preserving cause for its continuance. It appeared to me then that every state which had in reality once been produced would continue to exist, if it were neither in contradiction with the nature of the subject to which it occurs, nor with the totality of the conditions under which that subject stands towards other things. But even this formula is useless; for there is still this very question, whether motion which has been generated in a thing not by its own nature, but only by means of external conditions, is to count among the states which are conceivable as going on to infinity without contradicting that nature and those relations. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the reason for the persistence of states of motion in things must in every case lie in the actual nature of the things; I am convinced that no explanation is to be found in this direction; we should only be obliged, after executing some useless circuits, to assert the principle of Persistence about some motion or other within real things, with no more success in deducing it than if we had taken the shorter way of granting its validity at once for motion in space. Instead of a direct demonstration of the law, I believe that nothing more is possible than an indirect treatment, which I subjoin.

163. Let C_1 be the condition which sets in motion an element e with definite velocity and direction so as to traverse the distance $d x$ in the time $d t$. Let us suppose that the activity and effect of C_1 continue through the duration of $d t$, but cease when at the end of that interval e has traversed the short distance $d x$, has thus changed its position, and has for this reason come under the influence

of the new condition C_2 . This again, if operative during an equal time $d t$, will make another equal journey $d x$ possible for e , and will cease when e has traversed it. It is plain that as long as we treat $d x$ as a real distance however small, the element e , acted upon 'by this series of successively annihilated influences, will pass through a finite length of space in the time t .

But our assumptions, as we made them just now, have to be modified. C_1 must cease to act not *when*, but *before*, e has arrived at the extreme point of the first distance $d x$, by the time e has accomplished the smallest portion of that short distance its position would be changed, and would no longer be that which acted upon it as the motive impulse C_1 ; if in spite of this we suppose e to traverse the whole distance $d x$ in consequence of the impulse C_1 , the only possible reason for its doing so will be the postulated validity of the law of persistence; the motion produced by C_1 will have lasted after C_1 itself had ceased to exist or act. But if we do not regard this law as valid, then not even the smallest portion of the short journey in question will really be achieved; the moment that C_1 so much as threatens to change the place of e , and so transform itself into C_2 , the determining force with which it purposed to produce this result must disappear at once, and the matter will never get as far as the entrance into action of the fresh condition C_2 , which could maintain the motion; for the motion never begins. If y is a function of x , there may be a finite integral of the formula $y d x$ as long as we regard $d x$ as a real magnitude; and the calculation would be more exact as this interval is less for which we take a value of y as constant; but the whole integral becomes 0, if we regard $d x$ as vanishing entirely.

In the present case we should apply this common mode of representation as follows; if y is the velocity generated by C_1 , or existing along with some initial value of x , according to the law of Persistence this y will hold good for the

whole interval for which the integral is required. The succeeding condition C_2 will be partly satisfied, in respect of what it has in common with C_1 , by the motion y which already takes place in consequence of C_1 ; only that in which C_2 deviates from C_1 is a fresh active condition whose consequence dy , a positive or negative increment of velocity, continues in like manner from that moment through the entire interval of the integration. It is the summation of the initial value y , and of these continuously succeeding increases or decreases, that gives the total of the result obtained between the limits in question.

The tendency of all this is obvious; of course it cannot tell us how, strictly speaking, it comes to pass that motion when once generated maintains itself; but still we can see that the law of Persistence is not a marvellous novelty of which it might be questioned whether it would or would not be true of a given natural motion; in fact its truth is an integral part of our idea of motion. Either there is no such thing as motion, or, if and as there is, it necessarily obeys the law of Persistence, and could not come to pass at all if really and strictly the effect produced had to end with the cause that produced it. For the law holds good not merely as applied to motion, but with this more general significance. No condition can act without having a result which is, speaking generally, a modification of the state of things that contained the stimulus or impulse to action; and therefore apart from the principle of Persistence no result could ever be reached; the excitation would begin to be inactive at the moment in which it began to act.

164. If two elements change their distance from one another in space, real motion must in any case have occurred; but it remains doubtful which of the two moved or whether both did so, and in the latter case the same new position may have been brought about either by opposite motions of the two, or by motions in the same direction but of different amount. This possibility of interpreting

what to our perception is the same result by different constructions continues to exist most obviously as long as we look exclusively to the reciprocal relations of two elements without regard to their common environment; nor does it cease when we consider the latter also; only in that case the possible constructions will not all seem equally appropriate. We should prefer to regard as in motion the element which is alone in altering its position relatively to many which retain their reciprocal situations; still there is nothing to prevent us from conceiving that one as at rest, and the whole system of the numerous others as moving in the opposite direction. I need not pursue the advantages which we gain in practice from this plasticity of our ideas; but the casuistic difficulties which metaphysic attaches to this Relativity of motion, seem to me to rest on mere misapprehensions.

Let us conceive to begin with a solitary element in a perfectly void world of space; is there any meaning in saying that it moves, and that in a particular direction? Again, in, what can its motion consist, seeing that the element cannot by moving alter its relations to related points, as there are none, while we should not even be able to distinguish the direction in which it would move from the other directions in which it would not move? I think we must answer without hesitation: as long as we adhere to ordinary ideas by speaking of real space, and by setting down the traversing of it under whatever condition as a possible occurrence, there is no reason against regarding the motion of this solitary element as one which actually takes place, and none therefore against recognising so-called 'absolute motion' as a reality. If perfectly empty space is wholly devoid of related points for purposes of comparison, even of distinctions between the quarters of the heavens, still this does not plunge the motion itself into any such ambiguity or indefiniteness of nature as to prohibit it from actually occurring; only we lose all possibility of designating

what occurs. However little we may be in a position to distinguish intelligibly between the point z which is in the direction of the moving object e and other points which are not, still it would *be* distinct from all others as long as we regard as real the extension of space which by its definite position towards all other points it helps to constitute. And however little we could distinguish the direction ez in which e moves from other directions, before we had a given line in a particular plane which would define the position of ez by help of the angle formed between them, still ez would *be* in itself a perfectly definite direction; for such an angle would not be capable of being ever ascertained and determined, unless the position of ez were already unambiguously fixed at the moment when we applied our standard of comparison in order to define it.

So the assertion that a motion is real is certainly not dependent for admissibility on the implication of a change of relations in which the real element in motion stands to others like it. Indeed, during every moment for which we conceive a previously attained velocity to continue according to the law of persistence, the moving element moves with precisely the kind of reality which is held in the above case to be of doubtful possibility. True, in this case we are in a position to assign the direction of the motion, within a world in which it took place, by relations to other realities and to the space which they divide and indicate. Still all these relations in this case only enter into consideration as interfering or modifying causes; the persistent velocity of the element, which we must not leave out of our calculation, is in itself, in fact, simply such a motion of a solitary element that takes no account of anything else. Thus, so far from being a doubtful case, it is truer to say that absolute motion is an occurrence which is really contained in all motion that takes place, only latent under other accretions. On the other hand, if we intended to acknowledge no motion but what is relative, in what way

should we suppose it to take place? If we understand by it one which involves a real and assignable change of relative position on the part of the elements, how can this change have arisen unless one or several of the elements in order to approach or to separate from each other had actually traversed the lengths of space which form the interval that distinguishes their new place from their old? But suppose we understood by relative motion one which was merely apparent, in which the real distances between pairs of elements underwent no change. Still it is clear that such an appearance could not itself be produced apart from motion really occurring somewhere, such that the subject to whom the appearance is presented changes its position towards one or more of the elements in question.

165. Our conclusion would naturally be just the same about the other case which is often adduced; the rotation of a solitary sphere in empty space. No doubt it would be absolutely undefinable till a given system of co-ordinates should determine directions of axes, with which its axis could be compared. But there is also no doubt that the specific direction of the rotation is not *made* by these axes which serve to designate it; the rotation must begin by being thoroughly definite in itself, and different from all others, that it may be capable of being unambiguously reduced to a system of co-ordinates. All that such a reduction is wanted for, is to make it definable; but what happens happens, whether we can define it or not; of course a capacity for being known demands plenty of auxiliary conditions, whose absence no one would conceive as destroying the possibility of the occurrence itself. Suppose we had the clearest possible system of co-ordinates at our disposal, and saw a sphere in a particular place of that system; still we should fail to ascertain whether it was turning or not, or in what direction, if it consisted of perfectly similar parts *a* distinguished to our eye neither by colouring nor by variable reflexions of light. At every

moment we should observe the similar appearance a in the same point of space; we should have no means of distinguishing one instance of the impression from another; are we to infer from this that a sphere of uniform colour cannot turn round in space, but only a chequered one; and even this only with a limited velocity, for fear the different impressions of colour should blend into an undistinguishable mixture to our eyes?

Hence we may be sure that such absolute rotation about an axis is perfectly conceivable; in fact it is not in the least a problematic case, but is continually going on. We have no proof of any action of the heaven of the fixed stars on the motions within our planetary system, nor is it required to explain those motions; both it and the influences of the other planets can never claim to be regarded as more than disturbing causes when we are considering the revolution of the earth and sun round their common centre of gravity; these two bodies therefore actually move as a solitary pair in universal space. And again, the earth, by itself, continues its existing rotation about its axis without help or hindrance in it from its relation to the sun. So in fact, rotation of this kind, the possibility of which is doubted, really occurs, only concealed by accessory circumstances which have no influence on it; indeed the instance of a spinning top which maintains its plane of rotation and opposes resistance to any change of it, presents it strikingly to our senses. The idea of the reality of an infinite empty space and the other of an absolute motion of real elements in space are thus most naturally united and are equally justifiable; nor will it ever be feasible to substitute for this mode of representation another which could form as clear a picture in the mind.

166. As we have surrendered the former of these ideas, we have now to reconcile the latter with the contrary notion which we adopt. Our observations up to this point could not do more than prove that the absolute motion of an

element in empty space was conceivable as a process already in action ; what still appeared impossible was its beginning and the choice of a direction and velocity out of the infinite number of equally possible ones. This alone would give no decisive argument against an existing space and an actual motion through it ; whatever inner development we choose to substitute for this apparent state of facts as the real and true occurrence, the impossibility of a first beginning will always recur. We should have to be satisfied with setting down the fact of motion with its direction and velocity along with the other original realities which we have to look on as simply given, and which we cannot deduce from a yet undecided choice between different possibilities. In fact, every permanent property of things, the degree of every force, and all physical constants whatever, might give rise in infinite recurrence to the same question ; why are they of this specific amount and no other, out of the innumerable amounts conceivable ?

I need only mention in passing once more, that the unavoidable relativity of all our designations of such constants is not to seduce us into the mistake of considering the constants themselves as indefinite. The units to which we refer the measurement of a certain force g , and in which we express it, are arbitrarily chosen ; but after they are chosen it results from the peculiar and definite intensity of the force that according to this standard its measurement must be g and cannot be $n g$. A semicircular movement which goes from right to left when looked at from the zenith, will go from left to right when looked at from the nadir of its axis. This does not prove that its direction is only determined relatively to our position, but just the reverse ; that it is definite in itself independently of that position, and therefore to suit the observer's different points of view must be expressed by different definitions relating to those points.

Undoubtedly therefore, the real world is full of such

constants, perfectly definite, yet taken by themselves incapable of being designated ; they must be set down as definite even while they vary in value according to a law, under varying conditions ; for, to adhere to the example of the force above mentioned, its intensity under a new and definite condition will always be measured by a function of g , and never by the same function of $n g$. It is, as has been observed more than once already, only by application of our movable thought, with its comparisons of different real things, that there can arise either the idea of countless possibilities, which might equally well have existed but do not ; or the strange habit of looking on what is real as existent to some extent before it exists, and as then proceeding to acquire complete existence by a selection from among possibilities. Therefore, if we recognise that the first genesis of real things is altogether incapable of being brought before our minds by us, though we find their continuance intelligible, we may accept absolute motion in space and its direction as one of the immemorial data from which our further considerations must start.

167. But it cannot be denied that one thorny question is left. We admit all constants which, speaking generally, form the essence of the thing whose further behaviour is to be accounted for ; but here we have on one side an empty space which is absolutely indifferent to all real things and could exist without them, and on the other side a world of real things which, even supposing it to seem to us in need of a spatial extension of its own, is yet expressly conceived as wholly indifferent to the place which it occupies, and therefore just as indifferent to the change of that place, and incapable of determining by its own resources the direction of any motion to be initiated, although actually engaged in one motion out of infinitely many. Sensuous perception may find no difficulty in such a fundamental incoherence between determinations which nevertheless do cohere together ; but thought must pronounce it quite incredible ;

for the endeavours of thought will always be directed to deriving the causes which determine the destiny of existing things from the nature of the things themselves. To say that motion is the natural state of things is utterly worthless as a philosophical idea ; nothing is natural to a thing but to be what it is ; states of it may be called matter of fact, but cannot be called natural ; they must always have their conditions either in the things or without them. Each particular thing, on the other hand, cannot be in motion merely in general, but its motion must have a certain direction and velocity ; further, the whole assumption of original motion is only of use by ascribing different directions and velocities to different elements ; but as, at the same time, it persists in regarding the elements as uniform, it is all the less able to conceive such differences as natural states, and is compelled to treat them simply as matter of fact, and indeed as alien to the nature of the thing.

In reality it was this causelessness that was the principal obstacle to the recognition of absolute motion ; for what, strictly speaking, does happen if the advancing element *e* traverses one empty space-point after another, without being in itself at all different when it reaches the third from what it was when in the first or second ? or, fruitless as the transition is, without so much as receiving an indication of the fact of its fruitless occurrence : finally, without making it possible for even an observer from without, were it only by help of relations to other objects, so much as to give a bare designation of the supposed proceeding ? And are we to suppose that a process so unreal as this, a becoming which brings nothing to pass, must of necessity last for ever when once stimulated to action, though to begin with incapable of originating without external stimulus ? These inconceivabilities have at all times led to some rebellion against the view adopted by mechanics (though it yields so clear a mental picture and is so indispensable in practice), which makes the moving element merely the substratum of the

motion, without any peculiar nature which is affected by the motion or generates it by being affected. It is objected that motion cannot consist in the mere change of external relations, but must in every moment be a true inner state of the moving body in which it is other than it would be in a moment of rest or of different movement. Then can the view which concedes to space no more than a phenomenal validity offer anything satisfactory by way of a resolution of this doubt?

168. Let us suppose a real element e to be in inner states which we will sum up in the expression p . Then the question for us could not be whether e_p would produce a motion in space, but only whether e_p could form the ground of an apparent motion of e within space for a consciousness which should possess the perception of such space. We will begin by making the same assumption as we made in the discussion of time¹; that the consciousness in question is an absolutely immediate knowledge of everything, including therefore e_p ; and is not based on the acquisition of impressions by means of any effect produced by e_p on the knowing subject; and therefore does not compel us to attribute to this subject any specific and assignable relation to e_p .

Then, I think, we may consistently conclude as follows. Such a consciousness has no more ground for ascribing a particular spot in the space of which it has a mental picture, or motion in a particular direction, to the e_p of which it is aware, than e_p has power in an actual empty space to prefer one place to another as its abode, or one direction to others for its motion which has to be initiated. If we want to bring before ourselves in sensuous form what appears the reasonable result under such imaginary conditions,—we can only think of a musical note, to which we do no doubt ascribe reality in space, but localise it most imperfectly, and then only in respect of its origin: or we must think of

¹ [Cp. p. 338 sup.]

a succession of notes, which we do not exactly take to sound outside space, but which still remains a purely intensive succession, and has definite direction only in the realm of sound, and not in space.

I should not adduce such utterly fictitious circumstances, were they not about on a par with what is usually put forward by popular accounts of the Kantian view; a ready-made innate perception of space, without any definite relations between the subject which has it, and the objects which that subject has to apprehend under it. But in reality we find the consciousness in question invariably attached to a definite individual being ϵ , and in place of immediate knowledge we find a cognition which is always confined to the operations of e on ϵ . Besides this postulate, however, something more is required for the genesis of phenomena of motion in the experience of ϵ . Whatever the inner state p within e may be, and in whatever way it may alter into q and its effect π on ϵ into κ , still, for an ϵ that is simple and undifferentiated in itself all this could only be the ground for a perception of successive contents, not for their localisation in space and for their apparent motion. More is required than even a plurality of elements, e_p, e_q, e_r in different states of excitation, operating simultaneously on a simple ϵ . No doubt, the felt differences of their action might furnish ϵ , supposing it able and obliged to apprehend them by spatial perception, with a clue to the determination of the *relative* positions which their images would have to occupy in space. And alterations of their action would then lead to the perception of the relative motions by which these images changed their apparent places as compared with each other. But the whole of the collective mental picture which had thus arisen, whether at rest or in motion, would still be without any definite situation relatively to the subject which perceived it. The complete homogeneousness of this latter would make it analogous to a uniform sphere, so that it could turn round within the

multiplicity which it pictured to itself without experiencing, in doing so, any alteration in the actions to which it is subjected, or any, therefore, in its own perceptions. To make one arrangement of phenomena *a b c* distinguishable from another arrangement *c b a* or a downward motion to the right from its counterpart in an upward motion to the left, it is essential that the directions in question should be unmistakably distinguished in the space-image for ϵ itself by a qualitative mark; then ϵ will be able to refer every action or modification of an element to that direction to which it belongs according to the qualitative nature of the impression made or of the modification of that impression.

The result of the argument comes to this, after the insertion of some intermediate ideas which I reserve for the psychology. It is true that a simple atom, endowed with a perception of space, might find occasion in the qualitative differences of the impressions received from innumerable others to project a spatial picture of phenomena with a definite configuration of its own. But for this same atom there would be no meaning in the question what place or direction in absolute space such images or their motions occupied or pursued. What could be meant by such an expression in general would not become intelligible to it till it had ceased to be an isolated atom endowed with knowledge, and had come into permanent union with a plurality of other elements, we may say at once, with an Organism; such that its systematic fabric, though still to be conceived as itself unspatial, should supply polar contrasts between the qualitatively definite impressions conducted from its different limbs to the conscious centre. The directions along which consciousness distributes these impressions as they reach it, in its picture of space, and in which it disposes such images as appear to it of its own bodily organism, would alone furnish consciousness with a primary and unambiguous system of co-ordinates, to which further all impressions would have to be reduced which might arise from variable

intercourse with other elements. ϵ the subject of perception may then gain further experiences in this intercourse, such as prove to it that permanent relations exist between the other elements towards the totality of which ϵ can give itself and its body varying positions; and then the inducement arises to look in the spatially presented picture of the outer world for a fresh system of co-ordinates belonging to that world, to which both its permanent relations and ϵ 's varying positions shall be most readily reducible.

But it will again be essential to any such fresh system that it should be defined by a qualitative distinction between the perceptions which are assigned to the opposite extremities of one of its axes¹; though on the other hand what place this whole system with its inner articulation holds in absolute space, or in what direction of absolute space this or that of its axes extends, are questions which on our view would cease to have any assignable meaning at all. For this is just what does not exist, an absolute space in which it is possible for the subject of spatial perception with all the objects of its perception, to be contained over again, and occupy a place here or there. Space only exists within such subjects, as a mental image for them; and is so articulated for them by the qualitative difference of their impressions, that they are able to assign the appearances of other elements their definite places in it; and finally, it is the thorough coherence of all reality which brings about that each of these subjects also presents itself in the space pictured by every other in a station appropriate to the totality of its relations with the rest of what the world contains; and thus it happens that each of them can regard the space which is in its own perception as a stage common to all, on which it can itself meet with other percipient subjects than itself, and can be in relations which agree with theirs, to yet another set of subjects.

¹ [This alludes to the distinction of 'up' and 'down' furnished by the feeling of resistance to the force of gravity. Cp. § 287.]

169. But it is still necessary to return expressly to the two cases given above, in order to insist on the points in them which remain obscure. We saw that they present no special difficulties on the common view; if we have once decided to accept empty space as a real extension, and motion as an actual passage through it, then rectilinear progress and rotation of a solitary element might be accepted into the bargain as processes no less real although undefinable. But we should now have to substitute for both of them an internal condition of ϵ , say ρ , whose action π on an ϵ endowed with perception produces in this latter the spectacle of a motion of ϵ through the space mentally represented by ϵ . Now according to the common view the absolute motion of ϵ , whether progressive or rotatory, though it really took place, yet was undefinable. The reason was that the observing consciousness which had to define it was treated only as an omnipresent immediate knowledge, possessing itself no peculiar relation with its object which helped to define its perception; therefore the designation of the actual occurrence would have been effected in this case by co-ordinates independent of the observer; and as none such were found in empty space the problem of designating this occurrence remained insoluble, though its reality was not thereby made less real.

For us the case is different. What we want to explain is not a real movement outside us, but the semblance of one, which does not take place outside, within us; therefore for us the presence of the observing subject ϵ for whom the semblance is supposed to be forthcoming, and the definite relation of ϵ to the external efficient cause of this semblance, is not merely the condition of a possible designation and definition of the apparent motion, but is at the same time the condition of its occurrence, as apparent. So we too, within the phenomenal world which we represent to our minds, may accept the progress or rotation of a solitary ϵ for a real occurrence, if we do not forget to include ourselves in

the conception as the observer ϵ , in whose mind alone there can be a semblance at all. For then there must in any case be a reaction and a varying one between e and ϵ as elements in one and the same world, and it is the way in which the action of e on us changes from π to κ while e is itself undergoing an inner modification, that will define the direction of the apparent motion in question with reference to some system of co-ordinates with which we must imagine the space-perceiving ϵ to be equipped from the first if its universal perception is to admit of any method of application to particular things.

170. Still I feel that these doctrines are inadequate, as strongly as I am persuaded that they are correct; they leave in obscurity a particular point on which I will not pretend to see more clearly than others. It concerns that transition of e from one inner state to another which in acting on us produces for us the semblance of a motion of e . It must of course be conceived as going on at times when it does not act on us, or before it begins to act on us; and at those times it can be nothing but an inner unspatial occurrence which has a capacity of appearing at some later time as motion in space by means of that action upon us which it is for the moment without. Here we are obstructed by an inconvenience of our doctrine which I regret, but cannot remove; we have no lifelike idea of inner states of things. We are forced to assume them in order to give a possibility of fulfilling certain postulates of cognition which were discussed above; but we cannot portray them; and anyone who absolutely scorns to conceive them as even analogous to the mental states which we experience in ourselves, has no possible image or illustration of the constitution by help of which they accomplish this fulfilment of essential requirements.

This lack of pictorial realisation would not in itself be a hindrance to a metaphysical enquiry; but it becomes one in this particular case where we are dealing with the con-

ceivability of the motions in question. When the element e traverses an apparent path in our perception it is true that the beginning of the series of inner states, whose successive action on us causes this phenomenon, must be looked for not in e itself, but in the influence of other elements; but still the undeniable validity of the law of persistence compels us to the assumption that an impulse to motion when it has once arisen in e becomes to our perception independently of any further influences the cause of an apparent change of place of the sense-image, with uniform continuance. The same assumption is forced on us by another instance, that of two similar elements e which unceasingly traverse the same circle, being at the opposite extremities of its diameter.

We can easily employ the ordinary ideas of mechanics to help out our view so far as to assume an inner reaction between the two elements, which, if left to itself, would shorten the distance between their sense-images in our perception; then there would still remain to be explained the rectilinear tangential motion, which, continuing in consequence of the Law of Persistence, would counteract this attraction to the amount needed to form the phenomenal circle. Now what inner constitution can we conceive e to possess, capable of producing in our eyes the phenomenon of this inertia of motion? Considered as a quiescent state it could never condition anything but a permanent station of e in our space; considered as a process it still ought not to change e_p into e_q in such a way that the new momentary state q should remove the reason for the continuance of the same process which took place during e_p ; we should have to suppose an event that never ceases occurring, like a river that flows on ever the same without stopping, or an unresting endeavour, a process which the result that it generates neither hinders nor prohibits from continuing to produce it afresh. This conception appears extraordinary enough, and justifies a mistrust which objects to admitting it before

it is proved by an example to signify something that does happen, and not to be a mere creation of the brain.

It is certainly my belief, though I will not attempt a more definite proof, that mental life would present instances of such a self-perpetuating process, which would correspond in their own way to the idea, extraordinary as it is though not foreign to mechanics, of a *state* of motion. Perhaps there may even be someone who cares to devote himself to pursuing these thoughts further; after we have been so long occupied with the unattainable purpose of reducing all true occurrence to mere change of external relations between substrata which are in themselves unmoved, even fashion might require a transition to an attempt at a comprehensive system of mechanics of inner states; then we should perhaps find out what species are admitted as possible or excluded as impossible by this conception of a *state* as such, which has hitherto been as a rule rather carelessly handled. Till then, our notions on the subject have not the clearness that might be desired, and the law of persistence remains a paradox for us as for others; I will only add that it presents no more enigmas on our view than on the common one. The fact of such an eternal continuance of one and the same process is actually admitted by mechanics; the strangeness of the fact is what it ignores by help of the convenient expression which I have quoted, '*State of motion.*'

171. I may expect to be met with the question whether it would not be more advisable to abstain from such fruitless considerations; it is not, however, merely the peculiarity of the presuppositions that we happen to have made which occasions them. Poisson, in § 112 of his '*Mechanics*,' in speaking of uniform motion according to the law of persistence, observes; 'the space traversed in a unit of time is only the measure of velocity, not the velocity itself; the velocity of a material point which is in motion, is something which resides in that point, moves it, and distinguishes it

from a material point which is at rest ;' and he adds that it is incapable of detailed explanation. I am better pleased that the illustrious teacher should have expressed himself somewhat cavalierly on a difficult problem, the solution of which was not demanded by his immediate purpose, than if he had philosophised about it out of season. He, however, is not open to the charge of taking a mere formula of measurement furnished by our comparing cognition for a reality in things ; on the contrary, he justly censures the common notion as overlooking a reality to which that formula should only serve as measure. Velocity and acceleration are not merely the first and second differential quotients of space and time ; in that case they would only have a real value in as far as a length of space was actually traversed ; but it is not only within an infinitely short distance, but in every indivisible moment that the moving body is distinguished from one not moving ; although if the time is zero, that which distinguishes them has no opportunity to make itself cognisable, by the body describing a path in space and by the ratio of that interval to the time expended.

It is impossible to deny this while we speak of the law of persistence. If an element in motion, that *passes through* a point, were even in the unextended moment of passing precisely like another which merely *is* in the point, its condition of rest would according to the law last for ever. Therefore, we shall not indeed conclude with Zeno that the flying arrow is always at rest, because it is at rest in *every* point of its course. But we shall maintain that it would have to remain at rest for ever if it were at rest in a single point, and that so it would never be able to reach the other places in which, according to Zeno's sophism (which rather forgets itself at this point), the same state of rest is to be assigned to it. Now if that in which this essence of motion consists cannot exist in an indivisible moment as velocity, i. e. as a relation of space and time, but nevertheless must

exist with full reality in such a moment, then of course nothing remains but to regard it as an inner state or impulse of the moving object which is in existence prior to its result. We may admit too that this impulse moves the element ; for however it may itself have arisen by the action of external forces, still Poisson and we were only speaking of the impulse which has arisen, in as far as it is for the future the cause of the persistence of the motion.

172 The parallelogram of motions teaches us the result of the meeting of two impulses in the same movable material point. Its validity is so certain that all proofs which only aim at establishing its certainty have merely logical interest ; we should here be exclusively concerned with any which might adduce at the same time the meaning of the doctrine, or the *ratio legis* which finds in this proposition its mathematical expression as applicable to facts.

If a subject S has a predicate p attributed to it under a condition π this same S as determined by π could possess no other predicate q ; for every condition can be the ground of one consequent only and of no other. Thus, the two propositions S_π is p , and S_κ is q , each of which may be correct in itself, speak of two different cases or two different subjects ; mere logical consideration gives no determining principle to decide for what predicate ground would be given by the coexistence of the two conditions π and κ in the same case or in the same subject. The real world is constantly presenting this problem ; different conditions may seize upon an element, which they can determine, not merely in succession, but at once ; and as long as no special presuppositions are made no one of them can be postponed or preferred to the others. Just as little can the conflict of their claims remain undecided ; in every case a result must be generated which is determined by the two conditions together.

I thought this characteristic of the real world worth a few words of express notice ; it is generally presupposed as self-

evident and attention turned at once to determining the form of such a result. If we are to attempt this in an absolutely general way, we shall first have to reflect on the possibility that the conditioning force of the two may depend on their priority in time, and consequently there may be a different result if κ follows π and if π follows κ . In the case of motion this doubt is solved by the law of persistence. The element moved by the condition π is at every moment in the exact state of motion into which it was thrown at the moment in which the motion was first imparted. Therefore at whatever moment the second condition κ begins to act all the relations are just the same as if π was only beginning to exert its influence simultaneously with κ , and so the order of the two conditions in time is indifferent. But even so it remains doubtful whether κ will endeavour to give an element e acted on at the same time by the condition π the same new movement q which it would have imparted to it in the absence of π . If we conceived p as the motion produced first by π alone, then the motion resulting from the two conditions might possibly be not merely $p+q$ or $p q$, but also $(p+q) (1 \pm \delta)$ or $p q (1 \pm \delta)$; if, first, q had been produced alone by κ , the addition of π would turn it into $q p (1 \pm \epsilon)$ or $(p+q) (1 \pm \epsilon)$. It is obviously indifferent which of the two formulæ we choose; the only function of the mathematical symbol is to designate p and q as absolutely equal in rank; the result which is produced is strictly speaking neither sum nor product. Now as the order in time of the conditions is indifferent, $p q (1 \pm \delta)$ must $= p q (1 \pm \epsilon)$; and this equation is satisfied by either of two assumptions; that $\delta = \epsilon$, or that both $= 0$. I do not think it possible to decide on general grounds for one or other of these assumptions with reference to the joint action of any two conceivable conditions however constituted; on the contrary, I am convinced that the first has its sphere of application as well as the other; therefore though it is a familiar fact that the second holds

good for motions and their combinations, I can only regard it, in its place in my treatment of the subject, as a fact of the real world, such as is easily interpreted when established on other evidence, but such as in default of that confirmation could not be reliably proved *a priori*. The meaning of this fact then is, that n simultaneous motions produce in the element e in a unit of time the same change of place which they would have produced in n units of time if they had acted on e successively, each beginning at the place which e had already reached. It is unnecessary to observe how the final place of e and also, as the same relations hold good for every infinitely small portion of time, the path of e as well, determine themselves by this principle in accordance with the parallelogram of motions.

This behaviour of things is akin in significance to the law of persistence; just as by the latter a motion once in existence is never lost if left to itself, so too in its composition with others none of it is lost, in so far as the collective result completely includes the result of each separate motion. Only, the process by which this collective consequence is attained must be single at every moment and cannot contain the multiplicity of impulses as a persistent multiplicity; it is the resultant, which blends them. The expression $p+q$ would correspond to the former idea by indicating the two motions which may be allowed to succeed one another with a view to obtaining the same result; the other, $p\ q$, would express the latter, the process by which this result is reached; namely that the motion in the direction p would be continuously displaced parallel to itself through the condition q .

173. In declining the problem of a deduction of the law of the parallelogram I expressly said that I only did so in its place in my discussion. But if we make the ordinary assumptions of mechanics I believe that the restriction of it to mere empirical validity is quite baseless. I find it maintained that all attempts to prove it as a necessary truth

of the understanding have to meet the argument that there is nothing in our reason to compel us to assume precisely this arrangement to exist in nature. There would be, it is said, no contradiction to the nature of our reason in such an assumption as that the physical or chemical quality of the material points and the mode of generation of the forces brought into play had an influence on the amount and direction of the resultant. For instance, forces of electric origin might influence degree and direction of the resultant differently from forces of gravitation, or attractive forces differently from repulsive; it is admitted that this is not the case, but alleged that it is only experience that tells us so. As against this argument I must remind my readers that the general science of mechanics treats of forces only in as far as they are causes of perfectly homogeneous motions, distinguished by nothing but direction, velocity, and intensity, and not with reference to other and secret properties. The law of the parallelogram applies directly to none but the above motions, and to them only as already imparted and so brought under the uniform law of persistence; and this application excludes all reference to the history of what precedes their origin. In the same way the movable elements are taken to be simply and solely substrata of motion, and perfectly indifferent to it. That component, with respect to which they are purely homogeneous masses possessing a quantitatively measurable influence on the course of their motions only by the resistance of inertia, is conceived as standing out separately to begin with from the rest of their qualitative nature.

Granting these postulates our reason has no longer a number of possible cases before it; on the contrary, it is certain that two motions which are nothing but changes of place, and have no force behind them which can influence their persistence, can produce no more than their sum if they are similar, or their difference if they are opposed. This determines the maximum and minimum of the change,

because no increase or diminution of what exists can take place without a reason. But supposing that there are other relations between two motions besides complete agreement and complete opposition, it is equally certain that if the nature of the case admits of both impulses being obeyed at once both will have to be satisfied as far as it admits ; for again, nothing can be subtracted from their complete satisfaction unless the new phenomenon of subtraction has a compelling cause that hinders the complete continuance of what already exists. Now it is the nature of space which in virtue of the infinite variety of directions possible in it admits of these relations of imperfect opposition between motions. And this same nature of space, by permitting the different directions to be combined, and compensated by each other, makes possible the complete and simultaneous fulfilment of the different impulses ; and therefore the determination of the result in accordance with the law of the parallelogram is of course a necessity and there is no alternative which can be treated as equally possible. This was the proper occasion to notice the objection just refuted ; for as long as the question was how the inner movements of things modify each other it was possible for the total result of two simultaneous impulses to be an increase or diminution of the phenomenon in question dependent on the qualitative peculiarities of the impulse itself. But when it comes to be decided that their results in the e which is acted on are nothing but two homogeneous motions, and when these motions come to be regarded as already produced or as communicated to e , then the further composition of the motions can only result according to a simple law that regards what they are at the moment and not the utterly extinct history of their past.

END

